Bombay High Court
Arvind Ramchandra Wagajkar vs Maniklal Motilal Bhandari And Ors on 9 October, 2024
Neeta Sawant
2024:BHC-AS:40214 WP-16068-2023-FC
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 16068 OF 2023
Mr. Arvind Ramchandra Wagajkar ....Petitioner
(Orig. Defendant/Respondent in
Civil Appeal No. 161 of 2016)
: Versus :
1. Shri. Maniklal Motilal Bhandari
2. Shri. Mohanlal Motilal Bhandari
3. Shri. Santoshkumar Motilal Bhandari
4. Mrs. Lata Mohanlalji Gundecha
5. Mrs. Chaya Babulalji Gandhi ....Original Plaintiffs/Appellants
In Civil Appeal No. 161 of 2016
6. Mr. Vaibhav Arvind Wagajkar
7. Mr. Rahul Arvind Wagajkar ....Original Defendant Nos.2 and 3
in Civil Suit No. 219 of 2010/
Respondents
____________
Mr. S.C. Wakankar with Ms. Aishwarya Bapat, for the Petitioner.
Mr. Shlok Parekh i/by. Vaish Associates, for the Respondents.
_____________
CORAM : SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.
Judgment Reserved on : 1 October 2024.
Judgment Pronounced on : 9 October 2024.
JUDGMENT :
-
1) Petitioner-Defendant has filed this petition challenging the
decree dated 10 August 2023 passed by the District Court, Baramati
allowing Regular Civil Appeal No. 161/2016 and setting aside the judgment
and order dated 2 September 2016 passed by the Second Joint Civil Judge
Junior Division, Daund in Rent Suit No. 219 of 2010. The Appellate Court
has decreed the suit and has directed Petitioner-Defendant to handover
possession of the suit premises to the Plaintiff with further directions to
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conduct enquiry into mesne profits under Order 20 Rule 12 of the Civil
Procedure Code, 1908.
2) Shop admeasuring 272 sq. ft in 'Bhandari Building' situated at
Municipal House No. 94, New No.187 at Daund, District-Pune are the suit
premises. The house property was originally owned by the Motilal
Dalichand Bhandari, after whose death, the house property is inherited by
the Plaintiffs. The suit premises were let out to Defendant No.1-Arvind
Ramchandra Wagajkar on monthly rent of Rs. 125/- for conducting
business of stationery and medicines. Plaintiff's father had instituted
Regular Civil Suit No. 121 of 1973 for recovery of possession of the suit
premises which was decreed on 27 February 1976. The Appeal against the
decree was partly allowed on 14 October 1977 and the Defendant therein
were directed to handover possession of half portion of the premises
involved in that suit. Cross-petitions were filed before this Court by
landlords and tenants and compromise was entered into by the parties,
under which it was agreed that the firm M/s. R.M. Wagajkar was dissolved
and Defendant No.1-Arvind Ramchandra Wagajkar alone would the tenant
in respect of the suit premises who handed over possession of northern
portion of the premises involved in the previous round of litigation to
Plaintiff's father in the year 1982 and Defendant No.1 continued as tenant
in respect of the balance portion, which are suit premises involved in the
present petition.
3) Plaintiffs instituted Regular Civil Suit No.219/2010 in the
Court of Civil Judge Junior Division, Daund on the grounds of default in
payment of rent and bonafide requirement. It was contended by the
Plaintiffs that Defendant No.1 was in arrears of rent from September 2006,
for which demand notice was served on Defendant No.1 on 26 July 2010.
That the rent from 1 September 2006 to 31 August 2010 was paid by
Defendant No.1-tenant to Plaintiffs vide reply dated 13 August 2010. So far
as the bonafide requirement is concerned, it was pleaded that son of
Plaintiff No.2, Atul as well his nephew Swapnil had turned major and
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needed premises for conducting their own businesses. It was also pleaded
that Defendant No.1 had his own premises in Daund City.
4) In the suit, Plaintiffs impleaded Defendant No.1, as well as, his
two sons, Vaibhav Arvind Wagajkar and Rahul Arvind Wagajkar as
Defendant Nos. 2 and 3. The suit was resisted by Defendants by filing
common Written Statement pleading that Plaintiff was in possession of
several other premises, which were suppressed. The Plaint was amended to
incorporate pleadings about development of another property by
Defendant No.1 and his children and availability of the suitable alternate
accommodation in the ownership building constructed thereat. Defendants
filed additional Written Statement contending that only residential
premises are agreed to be handed over under the Development Agreement.
Both the parties led evidence in support of their respective claims. Plaintiff
examined Shri. Mohanlal Motilal Bhandari (Plaintiff No.2), Nandkishore
Anandrao Yadav and Amit Popatlal Bamb and relied upon several
documents. Defendants examined Arvind Ramchandra Wagajkar
(Defendant No.1) and also relied upon several documents. After
considering the pleadings, documentary and oral evidence, the Trial Court
proceeded to reject both the grounds of default in payment of rent and
bonafide requirement of Plaintiffs. The suit was accordingly dismissed by
decree dated 2 September 2016. Plaintiffs filed Regular Civil Appeal
No.161/2016 in District Court, Baramati. The Appeal has been allowed by
reversing the findings of the Trial Court on both the issues of default in
payment of rent as well as the landlord's bonafide requirement. The
Appellate Court has accordingly allowed the Appeal reversing the decree of
the Trial Court. Plaintiff's suit has accordingly been decreed by directing
Defendants to handover possession of the suit premises with further
enquiry into mesne profits under Order 20 Rule 12 of the Code. Aggrieved
by the decree passed by the Appellate Court on 10 August 2023, Defendant
No.1-Petitioner has filed the present petition.
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5) Mr. Wakankar, the learned counsel appearing for
Petitioner/Defendant No. 1 would submit that the Appellate Court has
erroneously reversed well-reasoned decision of the Trial Court rejecting
both the grounds of default in payment of rent and bonafide requirement.
That in the plaint itself, it was pleaded that the entire arrears of rent upto
31 August 2010 was paid by Defendant No.1 immediately upon receipt of
notice dated 26 July 2010. That therefore the suit on the ground of default
in payment of rent could not have been instituted. He would further submit
that Defendant No.1 was regular in payment of rent during pendency of the
suit. Taking me through the judgment of the Appellate Court, he would
submit that no specific pleadings are recorded by the Appellate Court while
reversing the decision of the Trial Court on the issue of default in payment
of rent. That the Appellate Court has erroneously mixed up the issues of
bonafide requirement and default in payment of rent and has decided both
the issues together. He would therefore submit that the judgment and
decree passed by the Appellate Court suffers from the vice of non-
application of mind and deserves to be set aside.
6) So far as the ground of bonafide requirement is concerned,
Mr. Wakankar would submit that it was Plaintiffs' duty to first disclose all
the premises available with them and thereafter plead and prove as to how
the premises already available with them were not suitable or convenient
for fulfilling their bonafide requirement. That the Plaintiffs in the present
case chose to suppress the premises available with them and it was the
Defendants, who were required to bring details about them on record. He
would submit that for failure to disclose the available premises, the suit
ought to have been dismissed by the Appellate Court. In support, he would
rely upon judgment of this Court in Vasant Mahadeo Gujar Versus. Baitulla
Ismail Shaikh & Another1.
(2015) 5 Bom.C.R. 243
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7) Taking me through the findings recorded by the Appellate
Court, Mr. Wakankar would submit that the Plaintiffs thoroughly failed in
proving that son of Plaintiff No.2 or his nephew did not have other
premises for conduct of their respective businesses. He would take me
through the evidence on record to demonstrate that Plaintiffs possessed
four rooms on upper floor of the shop-Rahul Medical. That in the
compromise effected in the previous round of litigation, Plaintiffs have
already secured substantial portion of the suit premises. That children of
Plaintiffs are found to be doing independent businesses at several premises
in Daund. Mr. Wakankar would therefore submit that the need sought to be
put forth by the Plaintiff was not at all genuine and was rightly rejected by
the Trial Court. In support he would rely upon judgment of the Apex Court
in Shiv Sarup Gupta Versus. Dr Mahesh Chand Gupta2. Mr. Wakankar would
accordingly pray for setting aside the decree passed by the Appellate Court.
8) The petition is opposed by Mr. Parekh, the learned counsel
appearing for Respondent Nos.1 to 5-Original Plaintiffs submitting that no
interference is warranted in well considered decision rendered by the
Appellate Court. He would submit that Petitioner has attempted to mislead
the Trial Court by inviting its attention to various other residential
premises ignoring the fact that what is needed by the Plaintiffs are
commercial premises for conduct of business by their next generations.
That Defendants could not establish availability of even single commercial
premises for Plaintiff for conduct of business by their children. On the
contrary, the Appellate Court has considered the photographs of the suit
premises and has seen that the suit shop was closed and was in dilapidated
condition. That the Appellate Court has considered the position that
Defendants are not occupying the suit premises. That they did not produce
valid license for running of pharmacy store. That therefore the bonafide
need of Plaintiffs has rightly been appreciated by the Appellate Court. He
would rely upon judgment of this Court in Balwant P. Doshi Versus. Shantaben
(1999) 6 SCC 222
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Dhirajlal Shah and another 3 in support of his contention that the tenant
cannot dictate the landlord as to how to use the premises owned by him.
That it is sufficient for the landlord to express the desire to occupy the
premises and it is not necessary to establish the dire necessity so long as
existence of need is demonstrated. Mr. Parekh would pray for dismissal of
the petition.
9) Rival contentions of the parties now fall for my consideration.
10) Plaintiffs sought eviction of Defendant No.1-tenant on twin
grounds of default in payment of rent and bonafide requirement. As
observed above, the demand notice for payment of rent from 1 September
2006 onwards was made good by Defendant No.1 by paying the entire
arrears of rent from 1 September 2006 to 31 August 2010 on 13 August 2010.
Ordinarily therefore the Plaintiff could not have included the ground of
default in payment of rent. The ground of default was however included by
demanding Rs. 3000/- towards notice expenses. Thus, though the entire
arrears of rent were paid, Plaintiffs contended that Defendant remained in
arrears of Rs.3,000/- towards notice expenses. In my view, eviction of
tenant under the provisions of Section 15 of the Maharashtra Rent Control
Act, 1999 (MRC Act) cannot be sought for failure to pay the notice charges.
In that sense, ordinarily Plaintiff could not have included the ground of
default in payment of rent in the suit. However, the Full Bench of this Court
in Babulal Fakirchand Agrawal Versus. Suresh Kedarnath Malpani & Ors. 4 has held
that the ground of default under Section 15(3) is independent from Section
15(2) and that even if the default indicated in the demand notice is made
good, the law does not prevent the Plaintiff from maintaining the suit for
recovery of possession if conditions specified under Section 15(3) of regular
deposit of rent is not fulfilled, the Court is empowered to pass decree for
eviction. Therefore, I am unable to hold that the suit on the ground of
default in payment of rent was not maintainable.
2002(4) Mh.L.J. 473
2017 4 All M.R. 365
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11) The Trial Court rejected the ground of default in payment of
rent holding that the entire amount demanded was already paid. There is
nothing on record to indicate that Defendant No.1 committed any default
in regular payment of rent during pendency of the Suit or Appeal. The
Appellate Court has mixed up the issue of default in payment of rent and
that of bonafide requirement and has answered both the issues together
which is clearly erroneous. The Appellate Court has not recorded a single
finding as to why it is has reversed the finding of default in payment of
rent. Therefore, the finding of the Appellate Court recording the ground of
default in payment of rent is clearly unsustainable.
12) Coming to the ground of bonafide need of Plaintiffs, the
pleaded case is that the son of Plaintiff No.2 (Atul) and of Plaintiff No.3
(Swapnil) had turned major and required suit premises for commencement
of their businesses. Additional bonafide need of Plaintiff No.2 was also
pleaded for earning income for livelihood. Defendant contested the claim of
bonafide requirement pleading that in addition to the suit premises,
Plaintiffs possessed two storey building in which Santosh Kirana Store was
being operated. That business of Rahul Medical was also being operated in
adjoining premises by Rahul Bhandari. That Plaintiff No.1-Manik was
operating Atul Mobile Shopee, tea stall and Manish Mini Market and
Medical at House Property No.1066. It was also pleaded that Plaintiff No.2 is
a journalist and was able to earn livelihood. That additionally Plaintiffs had
several shops, as well as property bearing C.S. No.1436.
13) In his Affidavit of evidence, Plaintiff No.2 Mohanlal Bhandari
repeated the contents of para-7 of the plaint. In his cross-examination,
Defendants attempted to secure admissions relating to availability of other
properties for Plaintiffs. It was admitted that son of Plaintiff No.1 is
advocate at Mumbai. That four rooms above shop-Rahul Medical are in
possession of the Plaintiffs. Thus, in the cross-examination there is no
admission by Plaintiffs about availability of any commercial premises for
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conduct of business by children of Plaintiff Nos.2 and 3. Nothing is brought
on record to indicate that commercial premises are lying vacant, in which
sons of Plaintiff Nos.2 and 3 could commence their business. Mere
availability of 'some premises' is not sufficient unless Defendant No.1 was
to prove that the said premises are commercial, in which sons of Plaintiff
Nos.2 and 3 could conduct their businesses. The four rooms located above
Rahul Medical are residential. There is nothing on record to indicate that
recovery of some portion of the premises during compromise has resulted
in availability of additional commercial space for Plaintiffs, in which sons of
Plaintiff Nos.2 and 3 could commence their business. There is nothing on
record to indicate that the portion of premises handed over to the Plaintiffs
during the course of compromise are commercial in nature or that they
were lying vacant at the time of filing of the suit. In my view, therefore the
Defendants could not prove availability of any commercial premises for
commencement of business by children of Plaintiff Nos.2 and 3.
14) Mr. Wakankar has led great deal of emphasis on Plaintiff's
failure to disclose availability of various premises. True it is that when
Plaintiff comes up with the case of bonafide requirement, he needs to first
disclose availability of possession of entire property and then plead as to
how the said properties are not convenient for particular use. Mr.
Wakankar has relied upon judgment of this Court in Vasant Mahadeo Gujar
(supra) in which this Court has held in paras-54, 55 and 58 as under:
54] However, the respondentlandlords, have not at all been candid
with the Court insofar as the pleadings are concerned. In the course of
evidence, it has come on record that the respondent landlords
have, besides the suit premises several other premises, which are being
used by them for purposes of commerce as well as residence. Some of the
premises, may have been acquired post the institution of the suit
including in particular, the premises acquired by one of the sons of
Baitullah Shaikh. Nevertheless, there were no disclosures volunteered in
the course of examinationinchief. Even if, the premises subsequently
acquired are left out of consideration, there was a duty upon the
respondentlandlords to fully and candidly make disclosure about the
premises in their occupation, both for the purposes of residence as
well as commerce and thereafter to explain, howsoever briefly, the
subsistence of the need in respect of suit premises. The
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respondentlandlords have completely failed in this aspect. Such non-
disclosure is a relevant consideration in the context of determining both
the reasonability as well as bona fides.
55] The tenants have managed to bring on record the material in the
context of occupation and control of several premises by the respondent-
landlords. Looking to the conduct of the respondent-landlords, there is no
certainty as to whether the premises in respect of which the tenants have
obtained and produced documents, are only premises which are in the
occupation of control of the respondent landlords or whether there
are some others as well. However, even on basis of the existing
material on record, there was no question of making any decree under
Section 16(1) (g) of the Rent Act.
58] In case of Tarachand Hassaram Shamdasani (supra), the learned
Single Judge of this Court has held that it is obligatory for the landlord to
disclose in the pleadings and in his evidence that the fact that he owns
other premises which were capable of being utilized for the requirement
pressed into service in the suit filed against the tenant and to further
disclose and explain that in spite of those acquisitions, ownership of
other premises, the requirement which is pressed into service against the
tenant would still survive. It is only then the landlord would be entitled to
invoke the ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement and would
succeed in establishing that the need is indeed bona fide and reasonable.
In the said case also, there were no disclosures and the material with
regard to ownership of other premises came on record only during the
course of crossexamination. This was possible because the tenants
through their efforts managed to obtain information. This Court, upset
the concurrent findings as to bona fide and reasonable requirement,
where the landlord has suppressed such material particulars. The
relevant observations are contained in paragraphs, 7,8 and 9, extract of
which reads thus:
7. ...................That building can be used for residence. These facts were
indeed relevant for deciding the issue of bonafide and
reasonableness of the requirement of the Plaintiff, but were not
disclosed either in the pleadings or atleast in the examinationinchief
when the Plaintiff entered the witness box. However, were elicited only
during the cross examination conducted by the Defendanttenant. This
was possible only because all these details were within the
knowledge of the Defendant tenant. In spite of such overwhelming
evidence on record, the Courts below have proceeded to answer the
issue of bonafide and reasonable requirement in favour of the
Respondent landlord. That cannot be countenanced, to say the least.
8. To my mind, however, it is obligatory for the landlord to disclose in
the pleadings and in his evidence the fact that he owns other premises
which were capable of being utilized for the requirement pressed into
service in the suit filed against the tenant and to further disclose and
explain that inspite of those acquisitions and ownership of other
premises, the requirement which is pressed into service against
the tenant would still survive. It is only then the landlord would be
entitled to invoke this ground and would succeed in establishing
his need to be bonafide and reasonable.
9. I have no hesitation in taking the view that in the fact situation of the
present case the Plaintiffs has failed to plead and also depose in his
evidence (examinationinchief) about the ownership of other premises
capable of being used for the requirement pressed into service in the
subject suit. Besides, he has failed to disclose and explain that even
the other premises were not sufficient to satisfy the requirement pressed
into service in the suit against the tenant. Only when the landlord pleads
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and proves all these material facts that the Court would be able to
adjudicate fully, completely and effectually as to whether the
requirement pressed into service by the landlord in the suit so filed is
bonafide and reasonable. As mentioned earlier, it is well settled that the
landlord is not only required to establish his need to be bonafide but also
to be reasonable. If the landlord fails to plead or establish either of this
ingredient then the ground under Section 13(1)(g) of the Act for eviction
is unavailable to the landlord. Inherent in this test is that if the landlord
has failed to disclose relevant materials in the pleading and in his
evidence (examinationinchief), dejure, the landlord has not approached
the court with clean hands. In such a case, it will be the duty of the court
to nonsuit the landlord with regard to this ground. It will be useful to
place reliance on the enunciation of the Apex court in the case of S.P.
Chengalvaraya Naidu's case (supra). The Apex Court has observed
that duty is cast upon the Plaintiff to disclose all the facts, it is the
duty of the Plaintiff to come to Court with true case and prove it by true
evidence. The Apex Court has further observed that deliberate deception
with the desire of securing something by taking unfair advantage of
another, it is a deception in order to gain by another's loss, it is a cheating
intended to get an advantage. Further, in Paragraph 6 it has observed
that, non disclosure of all the material and relevant facts at the trial
tantamount to playing fraud on the Court. A litigant, who approaches the
Court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are
relevant to the litigation. Withholding of any vital document in this
case information, in order to gain advantage on the other side then
he would be guilty of fraud on the Court as well as on the opposite party.
Such a person can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.
If this principle is to be applied to the facts of the present case, I have no
manner of doubt that the RespondentLandlord will have to be non suited
on this ground. Because, it is a case of non disclosure of material facts and
information, therefore, one of approaching the Court with unclean hands.
And as observed by the Apex Court tantamount to playing fraud on the
court as well as the opposite side. In this case sheerly because the
Petitioner tenant was vigilant enough, could muster the necessary
information to confront the Respondent landlord regarding his need
being not bonafide and reasonable.
(emphasis supplied)
15) There can be no doubt to the position that Plaintiffs ought to
have disclosed all the premises in their possession for the purpose of
enabling the Court to decide the issue of bonafide and reasonable
requirement. However considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of
the case, I am not inclined to disturb the finding of bonafide requirement
only on technical reason of failure on the part of Plaintiffs to make full
disclosure. The Courts below have assessed the evidence on record about
availability of all premises with the rival parties. While leading evidence
with regard to availability of alternate premises for Plaintiffs, Defendants
could not establish availability of commercial premises for commencement
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of business by children of Plaintiff Nos.2 and 3. I am therefore not inclined
to disturb the finding of the Appellate Court only on account of failure on
the part of the Plaintiff to disclose all the premises in their possession.
16) By now it is well settled position of law that the Plaintiff
merely needs to disclose the need and it is not for the Court or the tenant
to dictate terms as to how Plaintiff must put the premises in his possession
to particular use. In this regard, reliance by Mr. Parekh on judgment of this
Court in Balwant P. Doshi (supra) appears to be apposite in which this Court
held in para-4 as under:
4. After having considered the rival submissions, to my mind, no infirmity
can be traced to the finding of fact recorded by both the Courts below
that the petitioner was not in possession of the suit premises much less as
a licencee on the basis of a subsisting licence on 1-2-1973. The court below
for the reasons noted in their decisions have correctly doubted the
genuineness of the alleged leave and licence relied by the petitioner. Once
this finding is undisturbed, it necessarily follows that the petitioner is not
a protected licencee and would get no right to assail the decree of
possession. Assuming that, the petitioner is a protected licencee as
claimed, even then since the petitioner has contested the suit claim of the
respondent No. 1 of bona fide and reasonable requirement will be bound
by that finding. Accordingly, if finding on that issue was to be upheld by
this Court then the petitioner would also suffer the eviction decree and
bound by the same. Therefore, I am straightway addressing this decision
to the issue of bona fide and reasonable requirement instead of dwelling
upon the issue of legality of the leave and licence agreement relied by the
petitioner or his status as protected licencee. This is not to say that I
accept the petitioner's contention that he is a protected licencee.
Reverting to the merit of the issue of bona fide and reasonable
requirement, the Appellate Court has neatly summarized the evidence
adduced on behalf of the respondent No. 1. The respondent No. 1 has
herself entered the witness box as well as examined her two sons as PW 2
and PW 4. No doubt the evidence of respondent No. 1 was not very
elaborate but all the relevant details regarding the reasonable and bona
fide need of the respondent No. 1 and her family members has been
unmistakably stated by her sons viz. PW 2 and PW 4. Both the courts
below have examined the evidence of the plaintiff's witnesses as a whole
and have recorded clear finding of fact that the plaintiff has established
the need for herself and her family members being bona fide and
reasonable. These findings of fact cannot be interfered in exercise of writ
jurisdiction. The Appellate Court has rightly applied the settled legal
position. It is well settled that the courts cannot ordinarily doubt
the bona fide need of the landlord nor the courts can dictate to the
landlord as to how the premises owned by him should be used. It is
sufficient for the landlord to express his desire to occupy the premises
which are owned by him. It is not necessary for the landlord to establish
the dire necessity but it is enough to show that some need exists. (See
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(1996) 5 SCC 353 : (1998) 3 SCC 341 : (1998) 8 SCC 1 : (1996) 5 SCC 344 and
(1999) 4 SCC 1). In the present case, the plaintiff has produced ample
evidence on record and has established the bona fide need for herself and
for her family members. Both the Courts below have analysed the
evidence of plaintiff's witnesses and have held that the need pressed into
service by the plaintiff was also reasonable because the plaintiff was
presently staying with her son at Sion which was a rented premises in the
name of her son. The courts below have rightly applied the settled
principle that when the landlord who is staying in the rented premises
desires to stay in his own accommodation then the Courts, as a rule
should not refuse the decree. It is relevant to note that both the Courts
below have also held that the premises presently occupied by the
respondent belongs to her son which is a rented premises and only
admeasures 750 sq. ft. whereas the suit premises are 1200 sq. ft. with 3
bed rooms. Understood thus, the Courts below have rightly held that the
respondent No. 1 plaintiff has established the reasonable and bona
fide need in respect of the suit premises. I have no hesitation in affirming
the said view taken by the courts below.
(emphasis added)
17) Accordingly, Defendants cannot dictate terms for Plaintiffs
that the children of Plaintiff Nos.2 and 3 should conduct business on first
floor of the premises above Rahul Medical or at any other residential
premises. The need expressed by Plaintiffs about commencement of new
businesses by children of Plaintiff Nos.2 and 3 appears to be genuine.
Therefore, reliance of Mr. Wakankar on judgment of this Court in Shiv Sarup
Gupta (supra) does not assist the case of the Petitioner.
18) What bears mention is the factum of Defendant No.1 not using
the suit shop and also availability of additional premises for Defendants out
of the redevelopment process carried out in respect of their own property.
Defendant No.1 was running pharmacy business at the suit premises and
therefore it was incumbent for him to demonstrate existence of valid
pharmacy license to prove use of the suit premises. The Appellate Court has
taken into consideration the photographs showing that the suit premises
were lying shut and in dilapidated conditions. No evidence is produced by
Defendants to demonstrate active running of pharmacy business in the suit
premises. In my view, therefore the finding of comparative hardship
recorded by the Appellate Court does not warrant any interference.
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19) After considering the overall conspectus of the case, I am of
the view that Plaintiffs have established their genuine and bonafide need in
respect of the suit premises. The decree therefore needs to be sustained
only on the ground of bonafide requirement. The Writ Petition being
devoid of merits is accordingly dismissed. Petitioner is however granted
time upto 31 December 2024 to handover possession of the suit premises to
the Plaintiff.
[SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.]
NEETA SHAILESH
SHAILESH Date:
SAWANT 2024.10.10
17:33:35
+0530
9 October 2024
