Citation : 2024 Latest Caselaw 14350 Bom
Judgement Date : 7 May, 2024
2024:BHC-AUG:9733
1 wp 3601.2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
WRIT PETITION NO.3601 OF 2024
PANDURANG BHALCHANDRA PAWAR
VERSUS
SATYABHAMA VIKRAM BHISE AND OTHERS
...
Advocate for Petitioner : Mr. Dhiraj R. Jethliya
Advocate for Respondent No.1: Mr. S. V. Natu
...
CORAM : ARUN R. PEDNEKER, J.
DATE : 07th MAY, 2024
ORDER:
1. Heard.
2. By the present petition, the petitioner is challenging the
order dated 07.03.2024 passed by the C.J.S.D., Latur, whereby the
application filed under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC by the petitioner to
implead him as a necessary party in the suit is rejected on the ground
that the application is filed at the fag end of the proceedings and the final
arguments are partly heard by the court and that the application is not
bonafide and is made only to defeat the right of plaintiff no.3.
3. The facts leading to the filing of the present petition are
summarised as under:-
2 wp 3601.2024
A. The plaintiffs filed the suit for partition on
26.04.2010 against the defendant. The plaintiff no.1 is the
husband of plaintiff no.2 and father of plaintiff no.3 as well
as the sole defendant.
B. On 29.12.2010, plaintiff no.1 sold portion of the
suit land to the present petitioner i.e. the son of sole
defendant and the grandson of Dhondiram / plaintiff no.1.
Plaintiff no.1 expired on 08.11.2013 and plaintiff no.2
expired on 01.11.2012. Thereafter, the suit proceeded
further.
C. On 07.03.2024, the petitioner filed an
application below Exhibit 187 in RCS No.209 of 2010
praying for impledment as defendant no.2 in the suit
claiming that he is a purchaser of the part of the suit land
and he become aware of the suit when notice was issued to
him to place on record the copy of the sale deed, as such,
thereafter, he sought impleadment in the suit.
D. The application filed by the petitioner is rejected
by order dated 07.03.2024 and the same is challenged in the
present petition.
3 wp 3601.2024
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relies upon the
judgments in the case of Khemchand Shankar Choudhari & another Vs.
Vishnu Hari Patil & others reported in [1983] 1 SCC 18, in the case of
Dhanlakshmi and others Vs. P. Mohan and others reported in [2007] 10
SCC 719, in the case of A. Nawab John and others Vs. V. N.
Subramaniyam reported in [2012] 7 SCC 738 and in the case of Chandra
Bai [Dead] Through Legal Representatives Vs. Khandalwal Vipra
Vidyalaay Samiti and others reported in [2016] 12 SCC 534 and
contends that he being purchaser pendente lite has a right to be
impleaded as a party defendant in this suit.
5. Per contra, the learned counsel for respondent no.1 /
plaintiff no.3 relies upon the judgment in the case of Bibi Zubaida
Khatoon Vs. Nabi Hassan Saheb and another reported in [2004] 1 SCC
191 and submits that the trial court has assigned the cogent reasons
while rejecting the application for impleadment and that the trial court
has rightly passed the impugned order. The learned counsel submits that
the application filed is only to delay the proceedings as the applicant is
aware of the suit and has filed the application at the fag end of the suit
after more than 10 years and the application is filed only to delay the
plaintiff no.3 from getting the fruits of the decree. Plaintiff no.3 being the 4 wp 3601.2024
daughter of the plaintiffs no.1 and 2 and sister of sole defendant attempt
is being made to deprive her of the fruits of the decree.
6. Having considered the rival submissions, it is to be noticed
ordinarily the transferee pendente lite is permitted to implead himself as
a party in the suit. As such, the decree can be effectively passed. So also,
the person who has sold the property may loose interest in prosecuting
the suit.
7. However, the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case
of Bibi Zubaida Khatoon (supra) would be squarely applicable to the
instant case. In the instant case, the petitioner has purchased the property
during the pendency of the suit in the year 2010. However, he had moved
the application for impleadment in the year 2024 towards the fag end of
the trial. The suit is at the stage of argument. The trial court has noticed
that in the instant case by the sale deed in the entire portion of Gut
No.123 and 1 Hector 16 Are from Gut No.104 has been disposed of in
favour of the petitioner by the above sale deed and because of the
purchase by the petitioner the undivided share of the plaintiff no.3 in the
suit property would be affected if the suit is ended in her favour. The trial
court has observed that the co-sharer has the right to sell his undivided
share during the pendency of the suit but if the said alienation is affecting
the other parties then the said alienation to the extent of excessive 5 wp 3601.2024
portion of the property will not be binding upon the other co-sharers nor
in such circumstances the transferee pendente lite can be allowed to take
the plea of bonafide purhaser.
8. The trial court has observed that the applicant is well aware
of the proceedings and it is also to be noticed that the contention of the
applicant that he came to know only of the dispute in the month of
January - 2022 is the ex-facie concocted one as the suit land is purchased
by him from his father the original defendant and the notice is issued by
the defendant / father to the son / petitioner to place on record the sale
deed to clearly create the situation to seek impleadment of the petitioner
in the suit and thus delay the suit.
9. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bibi Zubaida Khatoon
(supra) in somewhat similar kind of situation has observed as under:-
"7. The learned senior counsel Shri S. B. Sanyal strenuously urged that even though the petitioner is a transferee pendente-lite within the meaning of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act to afford effective opportunity to her to prosecute the suit for redemption of mortgage and the counter suit for specific performance of the contract, her joinder in two suits as party and prayer to bring subsequent events on record by proposed amendment to the pleadings ought to have been allowed by the trial court. It is submitted that the High Court ought to have interfered in the orders of the trial court as the latter had failed to exercise its judicial discretion in accordance with law. Reliance is placed on Khemchand Shankar Choudhari & Anr vs. Vishnu Hari Patil & 6 wp 3601.2024
Ors [1983(1) SCC 18]; Jayaram Mudaliar vs. Ayyaswami & Ors [AIR 1973 SC 569]; Savitri Devi vs. District Judge, Gorakhpur & Ors. [AIR 1999 SC 976]; Saila Bala Dassi vs. Nirmala Sundari Dassi & Anr. [1958 SCR 1287]; and Dhurandhar Prasad Singh vs. Jai Prakash University & Ors. [2001 (6) SCC 534].
9. It is not disputed that the present petitioner purchased the property during pendencey of the suit and without seeking leave of the court as required by section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The petitioner being a transferee pendente lite without leave of the court cannot, as of right, seek impleadment as a party in the suits which are long pending since 1983. It is true that when the application for joinder based on transfer pendente lite is made, the transferee should ordinarily be joined as party to enable him to protect his interest. But in instant case, the trial court has assigned cogent reasons for rejecting such joinder stating that the suit is long pending since 1983 and prima facie the action of the alienation does not appear to be bona fide. The trial court saw an attempt on the part of the petitioner to complicate and delay the pending suits.
10. The decisions cited and relied on behalf of the appellant turned on the facts of each of those cases. They are distinguishable. There is no absolute rule that the transferee pendente-lite without leave of the court should in all cases be allowed to join and contest the pending suits. The decision relied on behalf of the contesting respondents of this court in the case of Savinder Singh (supra) fully supports them in their contentions. After quoting section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, the relevant observations are thus :-
"6. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act envisages that :-
'During the pendency in any court having authority within the limits of India \005.. of any suit or proceeding which is 7 wp 3601.2024
not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under the decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the court and on such terms as it may impose.'
It would, therefore, be clear that the defendants in the suit were prohibited by operation of section 52 to deal with the property and could not transfer or otherwise deal with it in any way affecting the rights of the appellant except with the order or authority of the court. Admittedly, the authority or order of the court had not been obtained for alienation of those properties. Therefore, the alienation obviously would be hit by the doctrine of lis pendens by operation of section
52. Under these circumstances, the respondents cannot be considered to be either necessary or proper parties to the suit. "
11. In case of Dhurandhar Prasad Singh(supra), observations relevant for the purpose of these appeals read thus :-
"Where a party does not ask for leave, he takes the obvious risk that the suit may not be property conducted by the plaintiff on record, yet he will be bound by the result of the litigation even though he is not represented at the hearing unless it is shown that the litigation was not properly conducted by the original party or he colluded with the adversary."
10. The law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
above case while considering section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act
would be squarely applicable to the facts of this case.
8 wp 3601.2024
11. The property is purchased by the petitioner without taking
leave of the court and that the petitioner has taken the risk that the suit
may not be properly conducted by the plaintiff or his legal heir and the
application is filed belatedly. The reason given for delay cannot be
accepted and are obviously concocted.
12. The right flowing from the valid sale deed if any can be
protected by the vendee in the execution proceedings to the extent of the
share that would be available to the vendor. However, the applicant
would have no right to add himself at belated stage of the suit. The trial
court to also ensure while passing preliminary decree of partition to grant
share to each of plaintiff as on the date of filing of the plaint and
thereafter further distribute the share of deceased plaintiff to other legal
heirs. This will protect the rights of third parties if there is transfer of the
share of deceased plaintiff during the pendency of the suit or prior to the
suit to the extent of share of the deceased plaintiff.
13. With the above observations, the writ petition is dismissed.
[ARUN R. PEDNEKER, J.]
marathe
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