Bombay High Court
Baban Sopan Hon vs Rayat Shikshan Sanstha, Satara And ... on 15 January, 2024
2024:BHC-AUG:1191
1 21 W.P. No. 1942-2013-.odt
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
WRIT PETITION NO. 1942 OF 2013
1. Baban s/o Sopan Hon,
Age : 54 Years, Occ. Service,
R/o. Chande-kasare Tq. Kopargaon,
Dist. Ahmednagar. .. Petitioner
VERSUS
1. Rayat Shikshan Sanstha
Satara, Dist. Satara
Through its Secretary
2. Jagdamba Vidyalaya,
Rashin Tq. Karjat,
Dist. Ahmednagar
Through its Headmaster
3. New English School,
Puntamba Tq. Rahata,
Dist. Ahmednagar
Through its Headmaster
4. The Education Officer ( Secondary)
Zilla Parishad, Ahmednagar
Through its Headmaster .. Respondents
....
Advocate for the petitioner : Mr. Kalyan Patil h/f Mr. S.R. Barlinge
Advocate for Respondent No.1 to 3 : Mr. S.R. Sapkal
A.G.P. for Respondent No.4 : Mrs. R.R. Tandale
...
CORAM : S. G. MEHARE, J.
DATE : 15.01.2024
PER COURT :
1. Heard, the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned
counsel for respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and the learned A.G.P for
respondent No.4.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was
appointed as an Assistant Teacher on 22.09.1986. On 31.12.2007,
he was promoted to Supervisor and transferred to the New
English school at Puntamba, Tq. Rahata Dist Ahmednagar. The
petitioner contends that before his promotion to the post of
Supervisor, there were no complaints against him. He had a good
past. The respondent/management issued a notice against the
false complaint made against him and decided to hold an inquiry
against him. The petitioner was communicated for nominating a
member to be a member of the Inquiry Committee. He had
nominated an Advocate on his behalf to be a member of the
Inquiring Committee. Since only an employee of any private
school would be a nominated member of the employee, his
request to appoint a lawyer was rejected. Thereafter, an
opportunity was granted to the petitioner to nominate a member
as prescribed under Rule 36(2) (i) of the Maharashtra Employees
of Private School (Conditions of Service) Regulation Rules, 1981.
(Rules 1981 for short) He did not appoint a nominee and stated
before the concerned that he himself would conduct the inquiry.
The serious charges of moral turpitude were levelled against him.
The management had examined the witnesses. The petitioner had
cross-examined them. The charges of moral turpitude were
proved against him. Considering the gravity of the charges, the
management terminated him on 01.04.2011. Against the said
termination, he preferred an appeal before the School Tribunal.
The School Tribunal granted him an opportunity, examined the
record, disbelieved his defence, and dismissed him on
12.07.2012. Against the said judgment, the petitioner is before
this Court.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the
opportunity to nominate the member for the employee was not
granted. The inquiry, as contemplated under Rule 37(2) (f) of
Rules 1981, was not completed within 120 days; therefore, the
inquiry was vitiated. He also argued that the principle of natural
justice was not followed. He has submitted that the petitioner's
past was unblemished. There were no complaints against him for
his long service. However, since he was promoted, somebody was
aggrieved, and he had played the role behind a false complaint.
The utterance of the indecent words was concocted. The
management tutored the students. Hence, they deposed against
him. Only four to five years of his services were left. He has been
superannuated after his termination. The punishment was
disproportionate to his alleged acts. A lenient view may be taken,
and appropriate punishment be awarded if the Court concludes
that he is liable to be punished.
4. The learned senior counsel for the contesting respondents
argued that the charges proved against the petitioner were
serious. He has been held guilty of moral turpitude. The evidence
of the students was natural. Nobody had tutored the students to
depose against the petitioner. The Inquiry Committee considered
the evidence and believed the witnesses without prejudice. A
good past is not a defence. The Inquiry Committee considered the
material before it. Considering the serious charges of moral
turpitude, the management has proportionately imposed the
punishment of termination from service. The management is a big
institution with a reputation. A fair opportunity was granted to
the petitioner. He had exercised his right to cross-examine each
witness. He failed to nominate a member of the Inquiry
Committee. He made a statement before the concerned that he
would conduct the enquiry on his own. Therefore, a two-member
committee was constituted, and the committee was said to be
legal as provided under Rule 36(4) of the Rules, 1981. He prayed
that there was no error either in the inquiry or in the impugned
order of the School Tribunal.
5. The first objection raised is regarding the nomination of the
employee by the petitioner. The record reveals that he was
granted an appropriate opportunity, as contemplated under Rule
36(2) (a) of the Rules, 1981, to nominate a member for the
constituting Inquiry Committee. However, instead of nominating
an employee of any private School, he nominated an Advocate. As
per Rule 36(2) (ii) of the Rules 1981, the employee has to
nominate an employee of any private school. The nominee's
qualification to be appointed by an employee has been prescribed
in the above rules. Therefore, his request to appoint an advocate
on his behalf was correctly rejected. Thereafter, sufficient
opportunity was granted to him to nominate a member. He did
not nominate a member who was an employee of a private
school. The finding of the inquiry report reveals that the
petitioner stated to the Inquiry Committee that he wanted to
contest and face the inquiry on his own. He consciously did not
nominate a member of the Inquiry Committee. Sub Rule 4 of
Rule-36 is specific that if the employee fails to communicate the
name of his nominee within the stipulated period i.e. 15 days of
the receipt of the communication of the proposed Inquiry
Committee, the Inquiry Committee shall be deemed to have been
constituted on expiry of the stipulated period under Rule 36(3) of
Rules, 1981 and such committee consisting of only two members,
as provided under sub-rule (2). Considering these facts and legal
provisions, the Court recorded the finding that since the
petitioner failed to nominate a member as prescribed under sub-
rule 2 (a) (ii) of Rule 36 of Rules 1981, the Inquiry Committee
consisting of only two members was legal and proper.
6. The next ground raised was that the inquiry was not
completed within 120 days as contemplated under clause (2)(f)
of Rule 37 of Rules, 1981. It has been vehemently argued that
since the inquiry was not completed within 120 days, the
complete inquiry was vitiated in toto. However, reading sub-
clause 2(f) of Rule 37, it is provided therein that if the inquiry is
not completed within 120 days, the employee shall cease to be
under suspension and shall be deemed to have rejoined duties
without prejudice to the continuance of the inquiry. The
consequence of failure to complete the inquiry within 120 days,
as provided above, was not vitiating the inquiry. Only the
suspension of the employee ceases, and he is deemed to have
rejoined the duties. However, the inquiry continues. In view of
the above rule, there appears to be no substance in the argument
of the learned counsel for the petitioner.
7. The next ground was that the principles of natural justice
were not followed. The record reveals that time and again, an
opportunity was granted to the petitioner to cross-examine the
witnesses and produce the evidence. The petitioner has cross-
examined each of the witnesses examined before the Inquiry
Committee. It is not the case that the Inquiry Committee refused
him to cross-examine the witnesses, contest the inquiry on merits,
and hastily pass the order. The record reveals that the petitioner
was granted the fullest opportunity to face the inquiry. Therefore,
it is difficult to accept that the principle of natural justice has
been violated.
08. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also argued that
considering the length of service of the petitioner for more than
twenty years, a lenient view may be taken, and his detriment
punishment of termination may be reduced to removal from the
service with pensionary and other financial benefits. The Court
has considered the provisions of law and facts, particularly the
nature of charges proved against the petitioner and did not find
mitigating circumstances to take the other view to reduce the
punishment. Considering the charges proved against him, the
Court is satisfied that the punishment is proportionate to the acts
of the petitioner. For the above reasons, the petition stands
dismissed.
( S. G. MEHARE, J. )
ysk/
