Bombay High Court
Dilip Dattatray Walse Patil (Minister ... vs Swarajsingh Shivpalsingh Parihar And ... on 6 August, 2024
Author: Ravindra V Ghuge
Bench: Ravindra V. Ghuge
2024:BHC-AUG:18170-DB
905&906CP577&587-24
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
CONT. PETITION NO. 577 OF 2024
SWARAJSINGH SHIVPALSINGH PARIHAR
VERSUS
DILIP DATTATRAY WALSE PATIL (MINISTER OF CO-OP. DEPT
MANTRALAYA MUMBAI) THROUGH ITS SECRETARY
WITH
905 CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7574 OF 2024
IN CP/577/2024
DILIP DATTATRAY WALSE PATIL (MINISTER OF CO-OP. DEPT
MANTRALAYA MUMBAI)
VERSUS
SWARAJSINGH SHIVPALSINGH PARIHAR AND OTHERS
AND
CONT. PETITION NO. 587 OF 2024
IN WP/1651/2024
SWARAJSINGH SHIVPALSINGH PARIHAR
VERSUS
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THROUGH ITS ADDITIONAL
PRINCIPAL SECERTARY ANOOP KUMAR
WITH
906 CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7575 OF 2024
IN CP/587/2024
DILIP DATTATRAYA WALSE PATIL MINISTER OF COOPERATIVE
DEPARTMENT
VERSUS
SWARAJSINGH SHIVPALSINGH PARIHAR AND OTHERS
...
Mr. Vishal Bagal h/for Mr. K. T. Taur, Advocate for the Contempt
Petitioner.
Mr. A. B. Girase, Government Pleader for the Applicant/Respondents
CORAM : RAVINDRA V. GHUGE &
Y. G. KHOBRAGADE, JJ.
DATE : 6th August, 2024
Page 1 of 28
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ORDER (Per : Ravindra V Ghuge, J)
1. The Petitioner in both these two Petitions, has put forth
paragraph Nos. 1 to 14 (wrongly mentioned as 12) in Contempt Petition
No. 577/2024, as under:
1. The petitioner is the original complainant before Resp.
No. 2. The petitioner has filed complaint / application dated
24..05.2028 against Resp. No.5 for seeking disqualification for
the post of Director of Resp. No.4 Bank on the ground that,
Resp. No.5 is the representative and Director of defaulter
society i.e. the Member society of Resp. No.4 Bank, therefore,
the Resp. No.5 is covered under the disqualification
prescribed U/Section 73 (c) (a)(f) (2) of M.C.S, Act, 1960.
2. That, the Resp. No.5 is the M.L.A. of ruling party, therefore,
the above mentioned complaint has not been decided by the
Resp. No.2. considering this aspect, the petitioner has filed W.
P. No. 10061/2023 before this Hon'ble Court for seeking
direction against the Resp. No.2. to decide the complaint filed
by the petitioner. This Hon'ble Court by its order dated
19.08.2023 directed to Resp. No.2 to decide the complaint/
application filed by the Petitioner within a 12 weeks from the
date of order.
3. That, the Resp. No.3 has submitted detail inquiry report
dated 05/09/2023 alongwith all the evidential documents
before Resp. No.2. The said inquiry report clearly revels that,
the Resp. No.5 is the representative and director of the
defaulter society - the Member society of Resp. No.4 Bank.
905&906CP577&587-24
4. That, the Resp. No.2 has granted satisfactory
opportunity of hearing to the Resp. No.5 thereby considering
each and every documents alongwith the inquiry report which
is self explanatory and enough documents to clarify the Resp.
No.5 is the representative and director of defaulter society,
therefore, the Resp. No.2 have rightly passed order dated
08.12.2023, thereby the Resp. No.5 has been disqualified
from the post of Director of Resp. No.4 Bank.
5. That, the petitioner has filed caveat before Resp. No.1.
Accordingly, the Resp. No.5 has filed revision application
No.672/2023, thereby the disqualification order dated
08.12.2023 passed by Respondent No.2 has been challenged
by the Respondent No.5.
6. That, the petitioner has filed application on 13.12.2023
on the date of hearing thereby requesting to supply the copies
of revision and stay petition and to grant time for filing reply
to the same. Thereafter, the Resp. No.1 has granted stay to the
order of disqualification by its order dated 15.12.2023. In the
stay order, the next date of hearing has been mentioned on
10.01.2024.
But, there is no hearing has been taken by the Resp.
No.1. Therefore, the petitioner has filed requesting
application before Resp. No.1, thereby the petitioner has
requested to fix the date of hearing in the revision petition
filed by Resp. No.5.
905&906CP577&587-24
7. That, the Resp. No.1 have not granted or fix the date of
hearing in the revision petition filed by Resp. No.5 therein the
petitioner is the original complainant. Therefore, the
petitioner has filed Writ petition No.1599/2024 before this
Hon'ble Court for seeking direction against Resp. No.1 to
decide the revision petition No.671/2023 within a stipulated
period. A copy of memo of Writ petition No.1599/2024 dated
22.01.2024 is annexed herewith and marked EXHIBIT-"A-1".
8. That, the AGP submits that, revision petition is pending
before the Hon'ble Minister and the hearing has been fixed on
21.02.2024 at 3.00 p.m. The petitioner is undertaking, that,
he would be remain present for hearing. Therefore,
considering the above mentioned facts and circumstances of
the instant case, this Hon'ble Court by its order dated
09.02.2024 directed to Resp. No.1 to decide the Revision
Petition No.67 /2023 be decide as expeditiously as possible
not more than two months from today. A copy of order dated
09.02.2024 passed by this Hon'ble Court in W. P. No. 1599/
2024 is annexed herewith and marked as EXHIBIT ''A-2".
9. That, as per the above mentioned order of this Hon'ble
Court, the petitioner is appeared before Resp. No.1 on
21.02.2024 and submit affidavit in reply alongwith this
Hon'ble Court. But, there is no hearing has been taken by
Resp. No.1 as well as there is no any next date has been
informed by the Resp. No. 1. A copy of affidavit in reply filed
by petitioner before Resp. No.1 dated 21.02.2024 is annexed
herewith and marked as EXHIBIT- "A-3".
905&906CP577&587-24
10. That, as per the order of this Hon'ble Court, the time
period granted by this Hon'ble Court by its order dated
09.02.2024 has been expired on 08.04.2024, therefore, the
petitioner has requested to Resp. No. 1 to decide the revision
petition filed by Resp. No.5.
Thereafter, the Resp. No.1 has fixed the hearing on
22.04.2024 in the revision petition filed by Resp. No.5.
Accordingly, on the said date 22.04.2024, the revision petition
filed by Resp. No.5 has been reserve/close for order.
11. That, the petitioner various requested to the Resp. No.1
to pass the order or to decide the revision petition filed by
Resp. No.5 thereby to comply the order of this Hon'ble Court.
But, till today there is no any positive step has been taken by
the Resp. No.1 for passing order or deciding the revision
petition filed by Resp. No.5.
12. That, the Resp. No. 5 is the MLA of ruling party,
therefore, the Resp. no.1 is not deciding revision petition,
though the directions has been issued by this Hon'ble Court.
On the contrary, the Respondent No.5 is holding the post of
Director of Resp. No.4 due to the stay granted by the Resp.
No.1.
13. That, the provision itself mandate to decide revision
petition within a three months, therefore, it is crystal clear
that, the intention of Resp. No. 1 is willful and malafide
disobedience of the Order of the Hon'ble Court, the present
905&906CP577&587-24
Resp. No.1 needs to be punished as per the provisions of
Contempt of Court Act.
12. That, thus the Respondent No.1 has committed breach of
order of this Hon'ble Court, which amounts to contempt of
Court's Order and therefore, he is liable to be punished under
the provisions of the said Act. Hence, this Contempt Petition."
2. The Writ Court (Coram: Vibha Kankanwadi and S. G.
Chapalgaonkar, JJ.), vide order dated 9th February, 2024 in Writ
Petition Nos. 1599 of 2024 and 1651 of 2024, specifically directed
Respondent No. 1, Shri Dilip Dattatraya Walse-Patil, Cabinet Minister,
Cooperation (Government of Maharashtra), to decide the Revision
Application Nos. 172 of 2023 and 671 of 2023, within two months from
the date of the order.
3. Both these Contempt Petitions were filed before this Court on
20th June, 2024, alleging disobedience of the order of this Court dated
9th February, 2024. When we heard these matters on 3rd July, 2024, the
two months' time granted by this Court had expired on 9th April, 2024
and no order was passed by the concerned Minister. Hence, we issued
notice under the Contempt of Courts Act in the form prescribed,
returnable on 29th July, 2024. The matters were then listed yesterday.
4. We have heard the learned Advocate for the Petitioner and
the learned Government Pleader. The learned Advocate for the
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Petitioner has received the affidavit in reply filed by the concerned
Minister, dated 24th July, 2024.
5. The Government Pleader has presented both these Civil
Applications, which are filed personally by the said Minister, seeking
exemption from appearance in the proceedings before the Court. An
unconditional apology has been tendered. Both these Civil Applications
are filed seeking recalling of our order dated 3rd July, 2024. These
matters were listed yesterday, before the Co-ordinate Bench of this
Court. It was opined that the matters would lie to this Bench. This is the
submission of the learned Government Pleader and which is confirmed
by the learned Advocate for the original Petitioner. Hence, these matters
were mentioned at 2.30 p.m. yesterday and were called out at 6.00
p.m., for hearing. We have, therefore, heard the learned advocates in
both these Petitions along with the Civil Applications, yesterday and
today.
6. There is no dispute that the timeline granted by the Writ
Court has been crossed by Respondent No.1. It is equally undisputed
that the matters were heard by Shri Anup Kumar and were closed for
orders on 22nd April, 2024. They were decided by the Principal
Secretary (Additional Chief Secretary) Shri Anup Kumar, on 5th July,
2024.
905&906CP577&587-24
7. Before we deal with the facts of this case, it will be apposite
to refer to Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and Rules 9
and 20 below Chapter XXXIV of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side
Rules, 1960. Section 12 and Rules 9 and 20 read as under:
"12. Punishment for contempt of court.--(1) Save as otherwise
expressly provided in this Act or in any other law, a contempt of
court may be punished with simple imprisonment for a term
which may extend to six months, or with fine which may
extend to two thousand rupees, or with both:
Provided that the accused may be discharged or the
punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being made
to the satisfaction of the Court.
Explanation.--An apology shall not be rejected merely on the
ground that it is qualified or conditional if the accused makes it
bona fide.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time
being in force, no court shall impose a sentence in excess of
that specified in sub-section (1) for any contempt either in
respect of itself or of a court subordinate to it.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where
a person is found guilty of a civil contempt, the court, if it
considers that a fine will not meet the ends of justice and that a
sentence of imprisonment is necessary shall, instead of
sentencing him to simple imprisonment, direct that he be
detained in a civil prison for such period not exceeding six
months as it may think fit.
905&906CP577&587-24
(4) Where the person found guilty of contempt of court in
respect of any undertaking given to a court is a company, every
person who, at the time the contempt was committed, was in
charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct
of business of the company, as well as the company, shall be
deemed to be guilty of the contempt and the punishment may
be enforced, with the leave of the court, by the detention in
civil prison of each such person:
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section
shall render any such person liable to such punishment if he
proves that the contempt was committed without his
knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent its
commission.
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (4),
where the contempt of court referred to therein has been
committed by a company and it is proved that the contempt has
been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is
attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director,
manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such
director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be
deemed to be guilty of the contempt and the punishment may
be enforced, with the leave of the court, by the detention in
civil prison of such director, manager, secretary or other officer.
Explanation.--For the purpose of sub-sections (4) and (5),--
(a) "company" means any body corporate and includes a firm
or other association of individuals; and
(b) "director", in relation to a firm, means a partner in the
firm."
905&906CP577&587-24
Rule 9. (1) Notice to the person charged shall be in form I. The
person charged shall, unless otherwise order, appear in person
before the Court as directed on the date fixed for hearing of the
proceedings, and shall continue to remain present during
hearing till the proceeding is finally disposed off by Order of
the Court.
(2) When action is initiated on a Petition or a Reference,
a copy of the Petition or the Reference along with the
annexures and Affidavits shall be served upon the person
charged.
Rule 20: Whenever the High Court or Designated Court issues
a notice, it may dispense with the personal attendance of the
person charged with the contempt and permit him to appear
through an Advocate and in its discretion, at any stage of the
proceeding, direct the personal attendance of such person, and,
if necessary, enforce such attendance in the matter herein
above provided."
8. The first proviso, below Sub Section 1 of Section 12 provides
that an accused may be discharged or the punishment awarded may be
remitted, on an apology being made to the satisfaction of the Court.
The explanation there below indicates that an apology shall not be
rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or conditional, if the
accused makes it bona fide. Sub Section 3 provides that if a person is
found guilty of a civil contempt, the Court, if opines that a fine will not
meet the ends of justice and that a sentence of imprisonment is
necessary, shall, instead of sentencing him to simple imprisonment,
905&906CP577&587-24
direct that he be detained in a civil prison for such period not exceeding
six months, as it may think fit. The proviso below Sub Section 4,
purports that nothing contained in sub-section 4 would render any
person liable to such punishment if he proves that the contempt was
committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence
to prevent it's commission.
9. As we turn to the facts of this case, it is undisputed that the
order of this Court dated 9th February, 2024 was conveyed to the
Respondent Minister, by the Office of the Government Pleader via E-
mail, on 20th February, 2024. Thereafter, the Model Code of Conduct,
in view of the general elections to the Parliament, was declared on 16th
March, 2024.
10. It is stated by Respondent No.1 that he deemed it proper not
to take up the matters because of the introduction of the Code of
Conduct and, therefore, a meeting was scheduled on 2nd April, 2024
with the Principal Secretary of the said Department. With due
consultation, the file was transferred to the Principal Secretary on 10th
April, 2024. It is undisputed amongst the parties that such delegation
of authority is permissible for enabling the Principal Secretary to decide
the proceedings, if the Minister, for any reason whatsoever, is unable to
take up the matter or deal with the same. The record also reveals, and
which is undisputed that, the Principal Secretary heard the parties and
905&906CP577&587-24
closed the matter for orders on 22nd April, 2024. It is also undisputed
that the Nation went to the Polls and insofar as the State of
Maharashtra is concerned, the polling was held in five phases as
under:
Activities Phases
I II III IV V
Notification 20.03.2024 28.03.2024 12.04.2024 18.04.2024 26.04.2024
Nomination 27.03.2024 04.04.2024 19.04.2024 25.04.2024 03.05.2024
Scrutiny 28.03.2024 05.04.2024 20.04.2024 26.04.2024 04.05.2024
Last date for 30.03.2024 08.04.2024 22.04.2024 29.04.2024 06.05.2024
withdrawal
Poll Date 19.04.2024 26.04.2024 07.05.2024 13.05.2024 20.05.2024
Results declared on 04.06.2024
11. The Principal Secretary, who was dealing with the said file
was also the Additional Chief Secretary for the State of Maharashtra
and the learned Government Pleader submits that the entire
Government machinery was fully engrossed and occupied in the general
election. The order in these two matters, was passed on 5th July, 2024.
12. The learned Advocate for the Original Petitioner had stated
yesterday that, he will file his affidavit in Reply to the Civil Applications
filed by the first Respondent seeking exemption. However, today, he has
decided to proceed to address the Court, orally, without a reply, on the
basis of his pleadings in the Contempt Petitions.
905&906CP577&587-24
13. The learned Advocate for the Original Petitioner submits that
Respondent No.5 in both the Petitions, is an MLA from the ruling
party to which the Respondent No. 1 Minister belongs. The Revision
was filed by Respondent No.5, on 13th December, 2023. The Petitioner
had filed a caveat. Hearing was conducted on the interim application
on 15th December, 2023 and an interim order was passed on the same
day. Thereafter, the matters were posted on 12th January, 2024 along
with various other matters. Only these two matters were adjourned by
Respondent No.1 Minister, by continuing the interim order. The
contention is that this happened only because Respondent No.5 is an
MLA. Thereafter, the Petitioner visited the office of the Hon'ble
Minister on two to three occasions. However, there was no hearing
conducted. Hence, the Petitioner approached this Court by filing two
Writ Petitions in which the order dated 9th February, 2024 was passed
and Respondent No. 1 Minister was granted 60 days time to decide the
pending proceedings.
14. The learned Advocate further submits that on 21st February,
2024, the matter was not on Board. The Petitioner tendered a reply in
the office. No hearing was conducted. Thereafter, a hearing was
arranged on 22nd April, 2024 and the Principal Secretary closed the
proceedings for orders. An order was passed on 5th July, 2024, after
this Court passed an order issuing contempt notice, on 3rd July, 2024.
905&906CP577&587-24
15. We are informed that the proceedings before the Minister,
were allowed in favour of the present Petitioner and an adverse order
was passed against Respondent No.5, MLA. It is further informed that
the said Respondent No.5 has approached the learned Single Judge of
this Court, in Writ Petition No. 7751 of 2024. By a speaking order
dated 25th July, 2024, the order of Respondent No.1 Minister has been
stayed by the learned Single Judge of this Court.
16. Yesterday, when these matters were heard at length, the
learned Government Pleader informed us that, as the Model Code of
Conduct was declared on 16th March, 2024, the concerned Minister
deemed it appropriate not to hear the matter. The allegation that the
appellant before the Minister is an MLA of the ruling party, also
weighed on his mind. Due to the enforcement of the Model Code of
Conduct, the Department of Co-operation issued a communication
dated 26th March, 2024 to the Election Commission of India, to seek a
clarification, as to whether Respondent No.1 Minister could hear and
decide the proceedings. The file to obtain guidelines, was submitted to
the Committee under the Chairmanship of the Chief Secretary of the
Government of Maharashtra, which was constituted by GR dated 28th
February, 2024. Thereafter, the meeting of the committee was held on
2nd April, 2024 and it was decided by the Chief Secretary that the
Principal Secretary (Cooperation and Marketing), would be the
905&906CP577&587-24
authority to decide the said proceedings. The parties to the said
proceedings appeared before the Principal Secretary on 22nd April,
2024 and addressed him on all the grounds raised by each of them.
17. In the light of the facts recorded above and on perusal of
Rules 9 and 20 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960,
the discretion is with the Court. Taking into account the above factors
which indicate that Respondent No.1 Minister showed due diligence
and even the Chief Secretary of the State, being the Chief Election
Commissioner of the State of Maharashtra, constituted a Committee to
take a decision. The matter was referred to the Principal Secretary.
This consumed time. Their bona-fides are evident.
18. Insofar as the issue as to whether Respondent No.1 deserves
to be punished for contempt, we have revisited the facts as recorded
herein above. It is apparent that after this Court passed the order
dated 9th February, 2024, the Government Pleader communicated the
order to the Respondent No.1 vide E-mail dated 20th February, 2024.
The Code of Conduct was enforced on 16th March, 2024. The
Department of Cooperation immediately moved a communication to the
State Election Commissioner dated 26th March, 2024 for seeking
guidelines. Considering that the order of the High court was at issue,
the Chief Secretary constituted a Committee in terms of the GR dated
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28th February, 2024 and conducted a meeting on 2nd April, 2024. A
decision was taken to let the Principal Secretary decide the matter,
instead of Respondent No.1 Minister. Hearing was also held on 22nd
April, 2024 and the order was delivered on 5th July, 2024.
19. As such, the issue is as to whether, there has been an
intentional, deliberate and willful disobedience of the order of the High
Court, by Respondent No.1 or the Principal Secretary. We have
considered the law on this issue.
20. In BALWANTBHAI SOMABHAI BHANDARI VS. HIRALAL
SOMABHAI CONTRACTOR, 2023 SCC online SC 1139, it is held that,
An unconditional apology not enough to evade punishment
for contempt of court if conduct damages dignity of
institution -
(i) We hold that an assurance in the form of an undertaking
given by a counsel / advocate on behalf of his client to the
court; the willful breach or disobedience of the same would
amount to "civil contempt" as defined under Section 2(b) of
the Act 1971.
(ii) There exists a distinction between an undertaking given to
a party to the lis and the undertaking given to a court. The
undertaking given to a court attracts the provisions of the Act
1971 whereas an undertaking given to a party to the lis by
way of an agreement of settlement or otherwise would not
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attract the provisions of the Act 1971. In the facts of the
present case, we hold that the undertaking was given to the
High Court and the breach or disobedience would definitely
attract the provisions of the Act 1971.
(iii) Although the transfer of the suit property pendente lite
may not be termed as void ab initio, yet, when the court is
looking into such transfers in contempt proceedings the court
can definitely declare such transactions to be void in order to
maintain the majesty of law. Apart from punishing the
contemnor, for his contumacious conduct, the majesty of law
may demand that appropriate directions be issued by the
court so that any advantage secured as a result of such
contumacious conduct, is completely nullified. This may
include issue of directions either for reversal of the
transactions by declaring such transactions to be void or
passing appropriate directions to the concerned authorities to
ensure that the contumacious conduct on the part of the
contemnor does not continue to enure to the advantage of the
contemnor or any one claiming under him.
(iv) The beneficiaries of any contumacious transaction have
no right or locus to be heard in the contempt proceedings on
the ground that they are bona fide purchasers of the property
for value without notice and therefore, are necessary parties.
Contempt is between the court and the contemnor and no
third party can involve itself into the same.
(v) The apology tendered should not be accepted as a matter
of course and the court is not bound to accept the same. The
apology may be unconditional, unqualified and bona fide, still
if the conduct is serious, which has caused damage to the
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dignity of the institution, the same should not be accepted.
There ought not to be a tendency by courts, to show
compassion when disobedience of an undertaking or an order
is with impunity and with total consciousness.
21. In COURT ON IT'S OWN MOTION VS. AMAR SINGH BHALLA,
2023 SCC Online Del 5740, it was held that,
Contemnor had willfully disobeyed his own undertaking and also
disobeyed the directions passed by the court and accordingly
sentenced him for six months simple imprisonment -
50. This court has taken note of the fact that the mere
imposition of the fine would neither serve the purpose of
maintaining the dignity of this court nor would be appropriate in
the facts and circumstances of the present matter. Even in these
contempt proceedings, this court had to issue NBW several times
to ensure the presence of the contemnor as he was evading
appearance. Therefore, this court is constrained to impose the
maximum sentence as the contemnor has repeatedly breached
his own undertakings.
51. Considering the facts of the instant case and the rule of law
laid down in the foregoing decisions, it is deemed appropriate to
punish the contemnor with simple imprisonment for a term of six
months, commencing from 14.09.2023
22. In RAMA KISHAN VS. TARUN BAJAJ, (2014) 16 SCC 204,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:-
"Willfully disobeyed his own undertaking and also the directions
passed by the court -
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12. Thus, in order to punish a contemnor, it has to be
established that disobedience of the order is "willful". The word
"willful" introduces a mental element and hence, requires
looking into the mind of a person/contemnor by gauging his
actions, which is an indication of one's state of mind. "Willful"
means knowingly intentional, conscious, calculated and
deliberate with full knowledge of consequences flowing
therefrom. It excludes casual, accidental, bona fide or
unintentional acts or genuine inability. Willful act does not
encompass involuntarily or negligent actions. The act has to be
done with a "bad purpose or without justifiable excuse or
stubbornly, obstinately or perversely". Willful act is to be
distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly,
heedlessly or inadvertently. It does not include any act done
negligently or involuntarily. The deliberate conduct of a person
means that he knows what he is doing and intends to do the
same. Therefore, there has to be a calculated action with evil
motive on his part. Even if there is a disobedience of an order,
but, such disobedience is the result of some compelling
circumstances under which it was not possible for the
contemnor to comply with the order, the contemnor cannot be
punished. "Committal or sequestration will not be ordered
unless contempt involves a degree of default or misconduct."
23. In RAMA NARANG V.S RAMESH NARANG, 2021 SCC Online
SC 29, it was concluded that,
Willful disobedience or willful breach - are these necessary
requisites for bringing in action for civil contempt? - not like an
execution proceeding under CPC.
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It is quasi - criminal in nature and standard of proof required is
in the same manner as in the other criminal cases.
24. In INDIAN AIRPORTS EMPLOYEES UNION VS. RANJAN
CHATTERJEE AND OTHERS, 1999 (2 ) SCC 537, it was held that,
It is well settled that disobedience of orders of Court, in order to
amount to `Civil Contempt' under section 2(b) of the Contempt
of Courts' Act, 1971 must be `willful' and proof of mere
disobedience is not sufficient. [S.S.Roy vs. State of Orissa &
Others AIR 1960 SC 190]. Where there is no deliberate flouting
of the orders of the Court, but, a mere misinterpretation of the
executive instructions, it would not be a case of Civil Contempt
[Ashok Kumar Singh & Others vs. State of Bihar & Others AIR
1992 SC 407]. In this contempt case, we do not propose to
decide whether these six sweepers do fall within the scope of the
notification dated 9.12.1976 or the judgment of this Court dated
11.4.1997. That is a question to be decided in appropriate
proceedings.
It is true that these six sweepers' names are shown in the
annexure to the W.P. No.2362 of 1990, in the High Court. But, the
question is whether there is willful disobedience to the orders of
this Court. In the counter affidavit of the respondents, it is stated
that there is no specific direction in the judgment of this Court for
absorption of these sweepers, if any, working in the Car Park
area, and that the directions given in the judgment were in
relation to the sweeper working at the `International Airport,
National Airport Cargo Complex and Import Warehouse'. It is
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stated that the cleaners employed by the licensee in charge of
Maintenance of the Car Park area do not, on a proper
interpretation of the order, come within the sweep of these
directions. It is contended that even assuming that they were
included in the category of sweepers working at the
`International Airport', inasmuch as, they were not employed for
the purpose of cleaning, dusting and watching the buildings, as
mentioned in the notification abolishing contract labour, they
were not covered by the judgment. It is also contended that the
case of such sweepers at the Car Park area was not even referred
to the Advisory Board under section 10 of the Contract Labour
(Prohibition) Act and it was highly doubtful if they were covered
by the notification.
In our view, these rival contentions involve an interpretation of
the order of this Court, the notification and other relevant
documents. We are not deciding in this contempt case whether
the interpretation put forward by the respondents or the
petitioners is correct. That question has to be decided in
appropriate proceedings. For the purpose of this contempt case, it
is sufficient to say that the non-absorption of these six sweepers
was bonafide and was based on an interpretation of the above
orders and notification etc. and cannot be said to amount to
`willful disobedience' of the orders of this Court".
25. In SURESH SRIKRISHANA NAIK VS. DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL WELFARE, 2002(3) Mh.L.J 889, this Court held as under:-
10. The reference to Bhimsen Dixit's case by the learned
advocate for the petitioner was to draw attention to paras 15
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and 16 thereof. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
therein that "just as the disobedience to a specific order of the
Court undermines the authority and dignity of the Court in a
particular case, similarly the deliberate and malafide conduct of
not following the law laid down in the previous decision
undermines the constitutional authority and respect of the High
Court. "Attention is drawn to this observation by submitting
that in view of the fact that the High Court in its decision had
set aside the earlier decision of the respondents denying the
benefits to the staff members of the institutions under the
Social Department and having directed to consider the same to
be extended by phased manner, the case is squarely covered by
the said observation of the Apex Court. However, as already
observed above, merely because the decision to grant the
benefit was set aside, that itself cannot be construed as a
direction to grant such benefits to the staff members of such
institutions in view of the specific direction given by the Court
to the respondents "to consider" such extension being granted
to such staff members in a phased manner. Apparently, the
Court had taken into consideration the fact of financial
constraints by the Government and, therefore, it was left the
matter and to see to it if such benefits can be granted in phased
manner. Being so, the said observations of the Apex Court is of
no help to the petitioner for the action of contempt of Court in
relation to the said order dated 18th January, 2000. The
decision of Bhimsen Dixit case, rather than assisting the
petitioner's contention in the matter, justifies refusal of any
action against the respondents. The Apex Court therein has
clearly held that "Contempt of Court is disobedience to the
Court, by acting in opposition to the authority, justice and
905&906CP577&587-24
dignity thereof. It signifies a willful disregard or disobedience
of the Court's order; it also signifies such conduct as tends to
bring the authority of the Court and the administration of law
into disrepute." Apparently before initiating action under the
Contempt of Courts Act against a party, it is necessary to
ascertain whether that the party has acted in willful disregard
or disobedience of the Court's order. The act on the part of the
respondents in disregarding or disobeying the order has
necessarily to be willful. The facts disclosed in this case
apparently reveal that the decision not to extend the benefit
even by phased manner to the staff members of the institutions
under the Social Welfare Department has been taken on
account of the financial constraints by the respondents.
Certainly the said decision has been taken 2002(3) Mh.L.J 889
pursuant to the direction to consider such extension in phased
manner. The very fact that while setting aside the earlier
decision of 8th July, 1998 denying such benefits the Court had
chosen not to give any direction beyond leaving it to the
discretion of the respondents to take appropriate decision of
the matter, discloses that the respondents were not given any
specific direction for extension of such benefits and in such
circumstances if the respondents have denied or refused to
grant such benefits to the staff members of the institutions in
question, it cannot be said that there is any disobedience of the
Court's order, much less willful disobedience.
12. The Apex Court in Chhotu Ram's case has clearly observed
that the conduct in order to come within the purview of the
statutory provisions must be willful and deliberate. It has been
further observed that "the introduction of the Contempt of
905&906CP577&587-24
Courts Act, 1971 in the statute-book has been for the purposes
of securing a feeling of confidence of the people in general and
for due and proper administration of justice in the country. It is
a powerful weapon in the hands of the law Courts by reason
wherefore the exercise of jurisdiction must be with due care
and caution and for larger interest. Similar is a decision of the
Apex Court in Kapildeo Prasad Sah, which has been relied upon
by the petitioner, therein, it has been observed that "for holding
the respondents to have committed contempt, Civil Contempt
at that, it has to be shown that there has been willful
disobedience of the judgment or order of the Court. Power to
punish for contempt is to be resorted to when there is clear
violation of the Court's order. Since notice of contempt and
punishment for contempt is of far-reaching consequence, these
powers should be invoked only when a clear case of willful
disobedience of the Court's order has been made out. Whether
disobedience is willful in a particular case depends on the facts
and circumstances of that case." It has been further observed
that "initiation of contempt proceedings is not a substitute for
execution proceedings though at times that purpose may also
be achieved." It has been further ruled that "willful would
exclude the casual, accidental, bona fide or unintentional acts
or genuine inability to comply with the terms of the order."
26. In Vishram Singh Raghubanshi Vs. State of UP, AIR 2011 SC
2275, the Hon'ble Supreme Court concluded that the contempt
jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and the dignity of the Court.
905&906CP577&587-24
27. In Pushpaben & Anr Vs. Narandas V. Badiani AIR 1979 SC
1536, it was held that the Court must apply its mind properly and give
special reasons for imposing punishment and imprisonment in a
particular situation. Imprisonment is an exception and fine is a rule.
28. In Balram Singh vs Bhikam Chand Jain And Ors., AIR 1985
SC 1726, it was held that it would be a travesty of justice, if the Courts
were to allow gross contempt of Court to go unpunished, if there is no
mitigating circumstance.
29. In Abdul Jabbar Taj Vs. R.K. Karanjia, AIR 1970 BOM 48, this
Court concluded that an unreserved, clean and immediate apology
tendered at the earliest opportunity, must undoubtedly be given greater
weight than a belated apology. If an apology is tendered belatedly,
after getting a feeling that a conviction is possible, it ceases to have the
evidence of real contriteness and manly consciousness of the wrong
doer and instead, indicates 'a cringing of a coward shivering at the
prospect of the stern hand of justice about to descend upon his head'
(quoted from the cited judgment).
30. In Prem Surana Vs. Additional Munsif and Judicial Magistrate
& Anr. 2002 SC 2956, it was held that the judges should not be hyper-
sensitive, but that does not mean and imply that they ought to maintain
905&906CP577&587-24
angelic silence. A person occupying the chair is immaterial. It is the
seat of justice whose majesty needs to be protected and nobody can be
permitted to tarnish the image of the temple of justice.
31. The learned Government pleader has cited a judgment
delivered by the Three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court,
dated 05.02.2024, in Civil Appeal Nos. 1644-1645 of 2024 /SLP
(C)25880-25881/2025, Sri L. V. Subramanyam Vs. The Registrar
General, High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad, wherein the challenge
to the conviction of the appellants with fine of Rs.500, was being looked
into. The High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of
Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh, passed an order coming to
a conclusion that though the order, of which contempt was alleged,
was complied with, there was a delay in compliance of the same. The
High Court observed that there is no explanation for the delay. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court concluded that a mere delay in complying with
the order, unless there is a deliberate or willful act on the part of the
alleged contemners, would not attract the provisions of Contempt of
Courts Act. Proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act are quasi
judicial in nature and, therefore, as the Court comes to a conclusion
that the act was neither deliberate nor willful, it could not have
convicted the appellants for contempt of the Court. The appeals were
allowed and the impugned orders were quashed and set aside.
905&906CP577&587-24
32. Having recorded the dates and sequence of events as above,
it is apparent that there is neither a deliberate delay caused by Shri
Dilip Dattatray Walse Patil, nor has the Principal Secretary Shri Anup
Kumar caused a delay in the matter, intentionally or willfully or
deliberately. The dates and sequence of events 'speak louder than
words'. It is obvious that Respondent No.1, in our view, pragmatically
avoided to hear the matter, after the Code of Conduct was enforced on
16th March, 2023 in the face of an allegation that the appellant before
the concerned Minister was an MLA of the ruling party. The Chief
Secretary showed equal pragmatism in forming a committee and
transferring the matter by delegation of authority to the Principal
Secretary, which is neither challenged nor contradicted. After the file
was transferred on 10th April, 2024, which is within eight days of the
meeting and two days after the timeline of the High Court concluded,
the Principal Secretary conducted the hearing, within 12 days.
33. Much ado has been made by the Petitioner that after the
matter was closed for orders on 22nd April, 2024, Shri Anup Kumar
should have passed an order expeditiously. In a sense, the Petitioner
may be justified in saying so. But it cannot be ignored that the State of
Maharashtra went to the polls, from 20th March, 2024 and it is a
herculean task for the State Administration to conduct the polling in
various parts of the State, in a general election or even in a State
905&906CP577&587-24
assembly election, under the strict guidance and vigil of the National
Election Commission.
34. We do not find any deliberate or willful or intentional conduct
on the part of Shri Anup Kumar. The allegation of bias and prejudice is
also put to rest by the fact that the final order delivered by the Principal
Secretary, upholds the claim of the Petitioner and was against
Respondent no. 5, MLA. It is a different issue that the said order has
been subsequently stayed by the learned Single Bench of this Court.
35. In view of the above, we do not find that there is any
intentional, deliberate or willful disobedience of the order of this Court
dated 9th February, 2024, with the object of overbearing the majesty of
law or for undermining the constitutional provision enshrined under
Article 226, which vests with this Court with the Writ jurisdiction.
36. Both these Contempt Petitions are, therefore, dismissed. Both
the Civil Applications, also stand disposed off.
( Y. G. KHOBRAGADE, J. ) ( RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J. )
JPChavan
