Bombay High Court
The Chairman And Managing ... vs India Spice Jet Staff And ... on 3 May, 2023
Bench: N. J. Jamadar
2023:BHC-OS:3881
4-WP1240-2022.DOC.DOC
Santosh
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 1240 OF 2022
1 The Chairman and Managing Director
M/s. Spice Jet Limited, 319 Udyog Vihar,
Phase-IV, Gurugram - 122 016
2 The Station Manager, M/s. Spice Jet
Limited, Terminal 2, Sahar Road,
Andheeri (E), Mumbai 400 099 ...Petitioners
Versus
All India Spice Jet Staff and Employees
Association, A Trade Union registered
under The Trade Unions Act, 1926
Having its office at Shop No.2, Sai Krupa
Chawl, Adarsh Nagar, Nambalipada,
Kalina, Santacruz (East),
Mumbai 400 029 ...Respondent
Mr. Kiran Bapat, a/w Mr. Mahesh Shukla, i/b Mr. Niraj
Prajapati, for the Petitioners.
Mr. Sanjay Singhvi, Senior Advocate, i/b Mr. Jaiprakash
Sawant, for the Respondent.
CORAM: N. J. JAMADAR, J.
RESERVED ON: 10th APRIL, 2023
PRONOUNCED ON : 3rd MAY, 2023
JUDGMENT:-
1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and with the
consent of the learned Counsel for the parties heard finally.
2. This petition takes exception to an order dated 10 th
January, 2022 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Central
Government Industrial Tribunal - 2, Mumbai ("the CGIT-2,
4-WP1240-2022.DOC.DOC
Mumbai") on an application for interim relief (Exhibit-3) in
reference CGIT-1/18 of 2021, whereby the petitioners - first
party were directed to provide employment to 463 workmen as
per the terms and conditions which prevailed as of 31 st
December, 2021.
3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the background facts can be
stated as under:
(a) The petitioners are in the aviation industry.
Petitioner No.1 is a Civil Aviation Company. On account of the
situation which arose due to Covid-19 Pandemic and the
consequent disruptions the petitioners claim that they were
passing through a bad phase and striving hard to sustain
themselves in the business.
(b) Respondent is a Trade Union registered under the
Trade Unions Act, 1926. Respondent served a strike notice
dated 1st June, 2021 on the petitioners. It led to the
proceedings before the Conciliation Officer. The petitioners
asserted before the Conciliation Officer that the concerned
employees were appointed on fixed term contract basis and were
governed by the provisions contained in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ("the Act, 1947"). Conciliation
failed.
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(c) Respondent preferred Writ Petition No.9111 of 2021
seeking a direction to the appropriate government to make an
industrial reference. Pursuant to order passed on 23 rd
December, 2021 the appropriate Government made a reference
to the CGIT-2, Mumbai being referred CGIT-1/18 of 2021. On
29th December, 2021, the respondent filed its statement of claim.
An application for interim relief (Exhibit-3) also claimed to be
filed. The petitioners contested the application by filing a
written statement on the very day.
(d) The learned Presiding Officer, CGIT passed ad-
interim order on 29th December, 2021, inter alia, directing the
Assistant Labour Commissioner to submit list of employees, who
were concerned in the reference while noting an undertaking of
the management that it did not intend to terminate the services
of their employees without following due process of law and that
they were at liberty to take disciplinary action and follow the
process of law in terminating the services of employees, if
required, as per terms of the contract.
(e) Post completion of pleadings on the application for
interim relief, the learned Presiding Officer, CGIT, heard the first
and second party. By the impugned order, the learned Presiding
Officer was persuaded to partly allow the application holding,
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inter alia, that the management did not adhere to the
undertaking given to the Tribunal that it would not terminate
the services of its employees. And, thus, the employees who
came to be terminated on account of non-renewal of the
contract were entitled to interim relief. The petitioners were
therefore directed to provide employment to 463 workers on the
terms and conditions which prevailed on 31st December, 2021.
4. Being aggrieved, the petitioners have invoked the writ
jurisdiction. On 19th January, 2022 when the petition was listed
before this Court, the petitioners were directed to tender a list of
their workmen, who had been termed as fixed term contract
employees and who could be offered work, on that day. The
respondent - Union was directed not to precipitate the issue
whilst directing the petitioners to maintain status quo as it
existed on that day and not to deploy contractual employees or
personnel through any agency.
5. It would be contextually relevant to note that the
petitioners claim to have offered work to 60 employees. However,
there is serious dispute as to whether those 60 employees were,
in fact, offered effective work in true spirit.
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6. In the wake of the aforesaid controversy, the parties have
filed affidavits and counter affidavits. A detailed reference to the
pleadings of the parties may not be necessary, especially in the
context of the nature of the impugned order passed at an
interim stage and the consideration it deserves in exercise of the
writ jurisdiction. It would be suffice to note that the core
controversy between the parties revolves around the question as
to whether the concerned employees fall within the ambit of the
exclusionary Sub-clause (bb) of Clause (oo) of Section 2 of the
Act, 1947 and thus the termination of their services does not
amount to retrenchment within the meaning of the Act, 1947.
7. Before adverting to determine the core controversy, it may
be appropriate to note that the exact number of employees, who
were allegedly retrenched and governed by the impugned order,
was also a matter in controversy. The parties are now not at
issue over the fact that there were 371 employees who according
to the petitioners have been refused employment being on fixed
term contract basis. The parties however differ on the number
of employees who have put in a particular number of years of
service. The controversy on facts, on this score also, does not
significantly bear upon the determination of this petition.
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8. Mr. Bapat, the learned Counsel for the petitioner,
strenuously submitted that the impugned order singularly lacks
consideration. It is devoid of reasons. It is bereft of
consideration on the well recognized parameters which govern
the grant of interim relief. Mr. Bapat would urge that the
learned Presiding Officer CGIT has copiously noted the
contentions of the parties in the pleadings and submissions
canvassed in support thereof and thereafter allowed the
application by a cryptic observation. In the process, according
to Mr. Bapat, the learned Presiding Officer completely
misconstrued the facts and incorrectly recorded that it was an
admitted position that 463 workers were working with the
petitioners as of 29th December, 2021, and that there was breach
of undertaking on the part of the petitioners. A complete
misreading of the statement made on behalf of the petitioners
vitiated the entire approach of the Tribunal.
9. Mr. Bapat would further urge that the learned Presiding
Officer did not at all consider the adverse situation in which the
petitioners were operating, including the substantial reduction
in the number of flights and the revenue, which were relevant
considerations in determination of balance of convenience and
irreparable loss in the event of grant or refusal of interim
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relief. Without adverting to all these material considerations,
the learned Presiding Officer directed the petitioners to provide
work to the employees, where no work was at all available,
submitted Mr. Bapat.
10. Mr. Bapat further submitted with a degree of vehemence
that at any rate the impugned order cannot be sustained as it
has the effect of granting the final relief at an interim stage. The
Supreme Court, according to Mr. Bapat, has time and again
reminded the Courts and Tribunals about unjustifiability of
granting final relief at an interim stage. Attention of the Court
was invited to an order passed by the Supreme Court on 3 rd
December, 2021 in Civil Appeal No.7393 of 2021 (arising out of
SLP (C) No.18009 of 2021) in the case of National Textile
Corporation Limited (WR) vs. Priyanka Pradeep Chavan.
11. Mr. Singhvi, the learned Counsel for the respondent -
Union, countered the submissions on behalf of the petitioners. A
two-pronged submission was canvassed by Mr. Singhvi. One,
the petitioners were, evidently, guilty of not adhering to the
undertaking that they would not terminate the services of the
employees, duly recorded by the Tribunal. Mr. Singhvi would
urge that, based on the said undertaking, the learned Presiding
Officer by way of ad-interim relief had directed the petitioners to
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maintain status quo upto 4th January, 2022. Yet, in clear
violation of the aforesaid order, the services of the employees -
members of the respondent - Union were terminated on 31 st
December, 2021 on a specious ground that they were on fixed
term contract. Therefore, the Tribunal was fully justified in
directing the petitioners to provide work to the said employees
during the pendency of the industrial reference.
12. Two, according to Mr. Singhvi, the petitioners, irrespective
of the nature of the undertaking, could not have disrupted the
status quo ante industrial reference. In no circumstances, the
petitioners could have terminated the employees in breach of the
provisions contained in Section 33(1)(a) of the Act, 1947, without
obtaining prior permission of the Tribunal. Mr. Singhvi would
urge that since the very question of the grant of permanency
and the petitioners desisting from the practice of employing the
employees on a fixed term contract basis for years together was
the subject matter of the industrial reference, it was not open to
the petitioners to terminate the employees on the ground that
the they were on a fixed term contract. In a situation like this,
according to Mr. Singhvi, no recourse can be made to the
exclusionary Sub-clause (bb) of Clause (oo) of Section 2 of the
Act, 1947.
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13. Mr. Singhvi urged that the position in law is no longer res
intergra. A strong reliance was placed on the judgment of the
Supreme Court in the case of Bhavnagar Municipalty vs. Alibhai
Karimbhai and others1 and a judgment of a learned Single
Judge of this Court in the case of Dalanvalan Imarat Bandhkam
and Patbandhare Kamgar Union and Others vs. State of
Maharashtra and others2.
14. Mr. Singhvi would further submit that as the termination
was clearly in teeth of the provisions contained in Section 33(1)
(a) of the Act, 1947, the submission that the interim relief takes
the shape of the final relief and, therefore, could not have been
granted at an interim stage, does not merit acceptance.
15. To start with, it is imperative to note the genesis of the
industrial dispute. It is the claim of the employees that they
have been working with the petitioners for years together. The
petitioners controvert by asserting that all the concerned
employees have been appointed on fixed term contract basis.
From the own showing of the petitioners as many 60 employees
have completed 4 to 10 years. As noted above, the parties are at
issue over the number of employees who have put in a specified
period of service.
1 (1977) 2 SCC 350.
2 (1991) 4 BCR 111.
4-WP1240-2022.DOC.DOC
16. It is in this context, the demands were raised by the
employees in the strike notice and letter dated 17 th October,
2021. At this juncture, it would be contextually relevant to note
that the appropriate Government in exercise of the powers
under Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) and Section 2A of Section 10
of the Act, 1947 made a reference for adjudication of the
following points.
"1. Whether the demands raised in strike notice and letter
dated 17th October, 2021 (copy enclosed) including the
demand of permanency in service of workmen as raised by
the union is legal, fair and justifiable? If yes, what relief they
are entitled to?
2. Whether the action of the management of Spice Jet
Limited in terminating the services of 2 workmen i.e. Ms.
Pinky Yadav and Ajay Shukla w.e.f. 12.10.2021 during the
pendency of conciliation proceedings in violation of Section
33 of the ID Act, 1947 as claimed by the Union is legal, fair
and justifiable? If not, what relief they are entitled to?
3. Whether the action of the management of Spite Jet
Limited in terminating the services of 78 workmen on fixed
term contract (list enclosed) during the pendency of
conciliation proceedings in violation of Section 33 of the ID
Act, 1947 as claimed by the Union is legal, fair and
justifiable? If not, what relief they are entitled to?"
17. The aforesaid reference arose in the backdrop of the fact
that the respondent alleged that the services of 78 workers were
not extended after 1st June, 2021 on the premise that the term
of their contract came to an end. As regards 371 employees as
well, it is the specific stand of the petitioners that the term of
their contract came to an end on 31st December, 2021 and
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therefore it did not amount to retrenchment. In paragraph 5 of
the affidavit-in-reply to the application for interim relief it was
categorically asserted that the petitioner had not terminated the
services of any employee. Term of 78 employees came to an end
on 31st May, 2021. Whereas the term of 371 employees came to
an end on 31st May, 2021 and non-renewal of the contract
clearly falls under the exclusion provided in Section 2(oo)(bb) of
the Act, 1947.
18. The question which thus wrenches to the fore is whether
the cessation of the engagement of 371 employees on account of
non-renewal of the contract (as claimed by the petitioners) post
31st December, 2021, during the pendency of the reference
before the Tribunal falls within the ambit of the protective
umbrella contained in Section 33(1)(a) of the Act, 1947. In other
words, whether the petitioners altered the conditions of service
applicable to the workmen immediately before the
commencement of the conciliation proceedings.
19. Section 33(1)(a) of the Act, 1947 read as under:
"[33. Conditions of service, etc., to remain unchanged under
certain circumstances during pendency of proceedings.--
(1) During the pendency of any conciliation proceeding
before a conciliation officer or a Board or of any proceeding
before [an arbitrator or] a Labour Court or Tribunal or
National Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute, no
employer shall,
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(a) in regard to any matter connected with the dispute,
alter, to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such
dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them
immediately before the commencement of such proceeding;
or
(b) .......... Save with the express permission in writing of
the authority before which the proceedings is pending."
20. A plain reading of the aforesaid provision would indicate
that there is a clear prohibition in Section 33(1)(a) of the Act
against altering the conditions of service of a workman sans
written permission of the Tribunal or other Authority before
whom the conciliation or other proceedings, in the wake of an
industrial dispute, are pending. The section thus makes the
power of the employer to alter the conditions of service to the
prejudice of the workman involved in the industrial dispute
subject to the permission in writing of the authority before
which the proceeding is pending. If this staus quo ante is not
maintained the proceedings before the specified authorities
would be rendered infructuous by the employer resorting to the
device of altering the conditions of service of the workmen.
21. The question as to whether retrenchment constitutes an
alteration in condition of service so as to fall within the
tentacles of the provisions contained in Section 33(1)(a) of the
Act was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of
Bhavnagar Municipality (supra). In paragraph 2, the Supreme
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Court has narrated the factual background in which the
aforesaid question arose in the said case. It reads as under:
"2. There was an industrial dispute pending between the
Bhavnagar Municipality (briefly the appellant) and its
workmen before the Industrial Tribunal in Reference 37 of
1974 referred to it under Section 10(1)(d) of the Act on March
5, 1974. The said industrial dispute related to several
demands including the demand for permanent status of the
daily rated workers of the Water Works Section of the
Municipality who had completed 90 days' service. While the
aforesaid industrial dispute was pending before the Tribunal,
the appellant, on September, 30, 1974, passed orders
retrenching 22 daily rated workmen (briefly the respondents)
attached to the Water Works Section of the Municipality. It is
not disputed that the appellant had complied with Section
26F of the Act and due retrenchment compensation had
been paid to those workers. On June 20, 1975, the
respondents filed a complaint to the Tribunal under Section
33A of the Act for contravention of Section 33 of the Act by
the appellant."
(emphasis supplied)
22. After adverting to the provisions contained in Section 33(1)
(a) of the Act, 1947 and the essential features thereof, the
Supreme Court enunciated the legal position as under:
"13. Retrenchment may not, ordinarily, under (a) of the
Industrial Disputes Act. The circumstances clearly showed
that there was breach of section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial
Disputes Act. Once the conclusion reached that there was
breach of Section 33(1)(a), it is only as short hop therefrom
to the conclusion that there is an unfair labour practice
within the meaning of Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act in
view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in S. G.
Chemical's case (supra). ........." all circumstances, amount to
alteration of the conditions of service. For instance, when a
wage dispute is pending before a Tribunal and on account of
the abolition of a particular department the workers therein
have to be retrenched by the employer, such a retrenchment
cannot amount to alteration of the conditions of service. In
this particular case, however, the subject matter: being
directly connected with the conversion of the temporary
employment into permanent, tampering with the status quo
ante of these workers is a clear alteration of the conditions of
their service. They were entitled during the pendency of the
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proceeding before the Tribunal to continue as temporary
employees hoping for a better dispensation in the pending
adjudication. And if the appellant wanted to effect a change
of their system in getting the work done through a contractor
instead of by these temporary workers, it was incumbent
upon the appellant to obtain prior permission of the Tribunal
to change the conditions of their employment leading to
retrenchment of their services. The alteration of the method
of work culminating in termination of the services by way of
retrenchment in this ease has a direct impact on the
adjudication proceeding. The alteration effected in the
temporary employment of the respondents which was their
condition of service immediately before the commencement of
the proceeding before the Tribunal, is in regard to a matter
connected with the pending industrial dispute."
(emphasis supplied)
23. The aforesaid pronouncement thus indicates that nature
of the dispute pending before the Tribunal or Authority assumes
critical salience. If the change in the condition of service
pertains to any matter connected with an industrial dispute
before the Tribunal or Authority the interdict contained in
Section 33(1)(a) would come into play. In the said case, since
the industrial dispute revolved around conversion of the
temporary employment into permanent, the Supreme Court
held that the order of retrenchment of daily rated workmen was
in contravention of the provisions contained in Section 33(1)(a)
of the Act, 1947.
24. A useful reference can also be made to a judgment of this
Court in the case of Dalanvalan (supra) wherein, after following
Bhavnagar Municipality (supra), the learned Single Judge
repelled the contention that retrenchment does not fall foul of
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Section 33(1)(a) of the Act, 1947 and held that the justification
of the retrenchment was wholly besides the point and irrelevant.
The observations in paragraphs 7 and 8 are material and hence
extracted below.
"7. The justification of the retrenchment of the concerned
workmen is wholly besides the point and irrelevant. The
question before the Industrial Court was not whether the
workmen were justifiably retrenched, but whether their
retrenchment amounted to breach of Section 33(1)(a) of the
Industrial Disputes Act and consequently an unfair labour
practice within the meaning of Item 9 of Schedule IV of the
Act. This is the question considered by the Industrial Court
on which a finding adverse to the petitioner has been
recorded. This is the only adverse finding which the
petitioner has impugned in the present petition. Despite the
efforts of Mr. Soni to persuade me to hold that there was no
change in the conditions of service of the workmen, as they
continued to be temporary throughout and consequently
there was no breach of section 33(1)(a), I am afraid, this
question also is not res intergra in view of the judgment of
the Supreme Court in (The Bhavnagar Municipality v. Alibhai
Karimbhai and others), 1977 LIC 834. In the case before the
Supreme Court, daily rated workmen of the Municipality had
raised an industrial dispute. The subject matter of the
dispute was connected with the conversion of the temporary
workmen into permanent. During the pendency of this
dispute, the Municipality removed the concerned workmen
from service and the Supreme Court took the view that such
tampering with status quo ante of those workers was a clear
alternation of the conditions of their service and the
alteration was in regard to a matter connected with the
pending industrial dispute and thus there was contravention
of Section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In view of
the clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court on this issue,
I decline to accede to the able arguments advanced by Mr.
Soni touching this aspect of the matter.
8. In my view, the Industrial Court erred in law and
misdirected itself in coming to the conclusion that there was
no breach of section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
The circumstances clearly showed that there was breach of
section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Once the
conclusion reached that there was breach of Section 33(1)(a),
it is only as short hop therefrom to the conclusion that there
is an unfair labour practice within the meaning of Item 9 of
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Schedule IV of the Act in view of the judgment of the
Supreme Court in S. G. Chemical's case (supra). ........."
25. In the light of the aforesaid enunciation of law, the nature
of the industrial dispute, which was referred for adjudication to
the industrial adjudicator assumes significance. I have noted
that the first issue referred to the Tribunal by the Central
Government was that whether the demands raised in strike
notice and letter dated 17th October, 2021 including the demand
of permanency in service were legal, fair and justifiable. The
said dispute arose on account of the demand of the respondent
Union that all the employees be granted continuation in service
without resorting to the device like fixed term contract. It was
the claim of the respondent Union that the appointment of the
employees under fixed term contract was bad in law.
26. Prima facie, the question as to whether the employees were
entitled to claim permanency, meaning thereby the conversion
of the fixed term appointment into permanent one, was the
subject matter of the industrial reference. Non continuation of
the employees beyond 31st December, 2021 on the premise that
their term came to an end thus prima facie constituted a
disruption in the status quo ante reference to the Tribunal. It
seems, prima facie, the petitioners could not have changed the
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conditions of service without obtaining the permission of the
Tribunal.
27. What exacerbates the situation, in the case at hand, is the
discontinuation of engagement of the employee despite the order
of the Tribunal to maintain the status quo. What was the
nature and import of the undertaking, in the contemplation of
the petitioners, may be debated. However, the fact remains that
the Tribunal had ordered the petitioners to maintain the status
quo till 4th January, 2022. In the face of the said order it was
not open to the petitioners to disengage the services of 371
employees on the ground that their fixed term of appointment
came to an end on 31 st December, 2021. In the aforesaid view of
the matter, the impugned order to the extent it holds that the
petitioners acted in breach of the undertaking cannot be faulted
at if considered in the light of the restraint superimposed by the
Tribunal that the petitioners shall maintain the status quo till
4th January, 2022. Any other view would have the consequence
of undermining the binding efficacy of the orders passed by the
Courts and Tribunals.
28. The criticism of Mr. Bapat that the learned Presiding
Officer, CGIT-2, did not advert to the aspects of balance of
convenience and irreparable loss is required to be appreciated in
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the totality of the circumstances. The petitioners assert, in the
affidavit dated 22nd November, 2022 that during the pre-Covid
era they had about 522 flight operations per day. In the year
2021 it got reduced to 245 flight operations per day and it has
further been reduced to 242 operations per day, with reduced
number of Air-crafts. The frequency of the flights operated per
day from Mumbai Airport has come down to 44 from 144, which
was the case during pre-Covid period. According to the
petitioners, there is no work available as concerned employees
were primarily engaged in ground handling work and the same
has since been entrusted to an agency which is authorized by
AAI on principal to principal basis.
29. It could be urged that the impugned order lacks in refined
articulation. However in the totality of the circumstances, the
ultimate conclusion arrived at by the learned Presiding Officer
cannot be faulted at. There is material on record to indicate
that the employees were working for a number of years. Prima
facie the claim of the petitioners that the employees were
covered by exclusion Clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act, 1947
does not seem sustainable. The termination of their
employment while the reference awaited adjudication before the
Tribunal was clearly to the prejudice of the employees. This tilts
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balance of convenience in favour of the employees. Thus denial
of interim relief would cause irreparable loss to the employees.
30. Since the services of the employees were terminated
during the pendency of the reference, the petitioners cannot be
permitted to urge that the grant of interim relief would amount
to granting a final relief. It was open to the petitioners to
approach the Tribunal, before whom the reference was pending,
if the petitioners desired to alter the status quo ante. Thus the
submission on behalf of the petitioners that the impugned order
could not have passed at an interim stage does not merit
acceptance.
31. The contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners,
however, deserve to be considered from the perspective of
moulding relief. Thus, I am inclined to hold that in the peculiar
facts of the case the interim order passed by the Tribunal is
required to be modified to address the change in circumstances
pleaded on behalf of the petitioners. The impugned order also
deserves to be modified as regards the number of the employees
to whom interim protection is required to be granted in view of
the broad consensus that there were 371 employees who were
disengaged with effect from 31st December, 2021. (Based on
separate notes tendered on behalf of the petitioners and
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respondent on 21st March, 2023 indicating the particulars of the
concerned 371 workmen.) There is, however, a dispute as to
how many of these employees have since resigned. The
petitioners claimed 120 employees have resigned. For the
respondent, only 74 workmen have resigned. Thus, the number
of employees who would turn up in the event the petitioners
offer employment is in the arena of uncertainty.
32. In view of the above, appropriate orders to provide an
opportunity to the employees who have yet not resigned to stake
claim for continuation of employment are required to be passed.
Simultaneously, the petitioners are required to be given an
alternative mechanism to make amends if the petitioners do not
find themselves in a position to give employment to the
employees who turn up for employment. The petition thus
deserves to be partly allowed.
33. Hence, the following order:
:ORDER:
(I) The petition stands partly allowed in the following
terms:
(A) The impugned order passed by the learned Presiding
Officer, CGIT-2, Mumbai, dated 10 th January, 2022
stands modified as under:
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During the pendency of the reference before the
CGIT,
(a) the petitioners shall continue to provide work to 60
employees or pay wages to them as undertaken
before this Court in terms of the order dated 23 rd
March, 2022.
(b) the employees, out of the rest of 371 employees, who
have yet not resigned, shall intimate to the
petitioners - first party either individually or through
the respondent Union the second party, that they are
willing to work with petitioner No.1 company, on or
before 31st May, 2023.
(c) The petitioners shall provide work to the employees
who have shown the willingness within the aforesaid
period and pay wages and all benefits as per the
terms and conditions of their employment, which
existed as of 31st December, 2021, on or before 30th
June, 2023.
(d) In the alternative to the Clause (c) above, the
petitioners shall furnish bank guarantee to the
extent of the amount of wages and all benefits to the
employees, who have shown willingness to work with
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the petitioners, from the date of their termination till
30th June, 2023, to the satisfaction of CGIT-2, on or
before 31st July, 2023, and continue to do so every
year till the adjudication of the reference.
(e) The bank guarantee(ies) to be furnished by the
petitioners shall be valid for the period of three
months from the disposal of the reference.
(f) It is clarified that the employees who have already
resigned shall not be entitled to the benefits under
Clauses (c) or (d) above.
(II) By way of abundant caution, it is further clarified
that the Tribunal shall decide the reference on its
own merits and in accordance with law without
being influenced by any of the observations made
hereinabove.
(III) No order as to costs.
(IV) Rule made absolute in the aforesaid terms.
[N. J. JAMADAR, J.]
