Balaso Mhadgonda Patil (Since ... vs Hirabai Malgonda Patil And Ors
2023 Latest Caselaw 4918 Bom

2023:BHC-AS:14608

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                         IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                              APPELLATE SIDE CIVIL JURISDICTION

                                      WRIT PETITION NO.9457 OF 2018

             Balaso Mhadgonda Patil
             (Since deceased through Legal Heirs)
             1. Shantabai Balasaheb Patil
             2. Annaso Balaso Patil
             (Since deceased through Legal Heirs)
             2A. Annapurna Annaso Patil
             2B. Shivaji Annaso Patil
             2C. Vaibhavi Annaso Patil
             2D. Abhiraj Annaso Patil
             3. Santosh Balaso Patil
             4. Rajashree Anand Adke
             5. Rajashree Nanasaheb Khot-Desai
             6. Vijayshree Sanjay Desai
             7. Bhagyashree Sadashiv Patil                     ...Petitioners
                               verses
             1. Hirabai Malgoanda Patil
             2. Ratnabai Malgonda Patil
             3. Shobha Rajendra Walwekar
             4. Shantinath Kallappa Magdum
             5. Malutai Annaso Chougule
             6. Ashok Appaso Badbade
             7. Sarojini Jakkanna Badbade
             (Since deceased through Legal Heirs)
             7A. Jakkanna Dhulappa Badabade
             7B. Jayashree Jakkanna Badabade
             7C. Jayveer Dhullappa Badabade


             .Vishal Parekar                                                                    ...1




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8. Nanda (Kunda) Mahaveer Badabade
9. Kalgonda Malgonda Patil
(Since deceased through Legal Heirs)
9A. Sunanda Kalgonda Patil
9B. Shruti Kalgonda Patil                                ...Respondents

Mr. Pramod Arjunwadkar, for the Petitioners.
Mr. Manoj Patil, for the Respondent Nos. 2 to 8.

                             CORAM :       N. J. JAMADAR, J.
                         RESERVED ON :     APRIL 10, 2023
                         PRONOUNCED ON :   JUNE 5, 2023


JUDGMENT :

1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. With the consent of the

learned counsel for the parties, heard finally at the stage of

admission.

2. The legality, propriety and correctness of the order dated 7 th

June, 2016 passed by the Principal Secretary and Officer on Special

Duty (Appeals) Revenue and Forest Department condoning the

delay in filing Review Application and the subsequent order dated

8th August, 2016 allowing the said review by setting aside his own

order dated 26th August, 2014 passed in Second Revision

Application No. R.T.A.3813/PK55/ J-5A/PK634/(02)/2014.AVP and

affirming the order 30th June, 2005 passed by the Additional

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Divisional Commissioner, Pune in RTS First Revision Application

No. RTS/KOP/395/2003, are assailed in this petition.

3. The litigation has a checkered history yet the background

facts necessary for the determination of this petition can be

summarized as under:

a} Anna Appa Patil, was the father of Mhadgonda Patil, the

predecessor in title of the petitioners and Malgonda, the

predecessor in title of respondent Nos. 1 to 3. After the demise of

Anna, the joint Hindu Family comprising Mhadgonda and Malgonda

was holding a number of joint family properties including the

agricultural lands bearing Survey No.93, Gut No. 380 (New Gut No.

700) and Gut No. 474 situated at Mouje Abdul Lat, Tal. Shirol, Dist.

Kolhapur (the subject lands), on tenancy.

b} The subject lands were owned by Jahagirdar of Ichalkarnji

and Keshav Gadre, respectively. After the demise of Anna,

proceedings were initiated and purchase price came to be fixed

under section 32G of the the Maharashtra Tenancy and

Agricultural Act, 1948 (the Act, 1948). Since Malgonda, according

to the petitioners, was the manager of the joint family, the subject

lands were purchased in the name of Malgonda out of the joint

family income. However, the subject lands continued to be joint

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family properties.

c} The petitioners claimed on 30th August, 1972 Malgonda

surreptitiously gave an intimation (vardi) to the revenue

authorities and the name of his son Kalgonda came to be mutated to

the record of right of the subject land, without notice to

Mahadgonda. The mutation entry No. 5504 came to be certified on

12th November, 1972.

d}        A spate of proceedings ensued:

(i)       Mahadgonda preferred an appeal before the Sub Divisional

Officer, Kolhapur. By judgment and order dated 20 th February, 1979

in RTS First Appeal No. 98 of 1977, the SDO was persuaded to allow

the appeal and cancel M.E.No.5504. It was, inter alia, held that the

mutation was effected and certified on one and the same day while

an appeal preferred against the order issuing certificate under

section 32G was still subjudice.

(ii) Second RTS Appeal No. 12 of 1979 preferred by the

respondent Nos. 2 and 3, who claimed to be the wife and daughter of

Malgonda, and Kalgonda Patil, against the aforesaid order came to

be dismissed by the Additional Collector, Kolhapur by an order

dated 30th August, 2001.

(iii) Being aggrieved, respondent Nos. 1 to 3 preferred First

Revision through their Power of Attorney holder Shantilal Badbade

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before the Divisional Commissioner, Pune. By judgment and order

dated 30th June, 2005 the Divisional Commissioner was persuaded

to allow the Revision Application and set aside the order passed by

the Additional Collector in RTS Appeal No. 39 of 1979 dated 30 th

August, 2001. The Additional Divisional Commissioner was of the

view that in the intervening period a suit instituted by Mahadgonda

and successors in interest, being Partition Suit No. 24 of 1976, came

to be decided against Mahadgonda. The rights of the parties were

adjudicated by the Civil Court and, thus, there was no reason to

cancel the M.E.No.5504.

(iv) Being aggrieved, the petitioners preferred Second Revision

Application before the State Government. Initially by a judgment

and order dated 26th August, 2014 in Second Revision Application

No. R.T.A.3813/PK55/J-5A/PK634/(02)/2014.AVP, the Secretary

and Officer on Special Duty (Appeals) was persuaded to allow the

Revision Application and set aside the aforesaid order passed by the

Additional Divisional Commissioner in First Revision Application

No. RTS/KOP/395/2003. It was, inter alia, held that the name of

Kalgonda was mutated to the subject land vide ME. No.5504 in the

absence of any instrument and the subject land being governed by

the provisions of the Act, 1948 was transferred of in violation of the

provisions contained in section 43 thereof and thus the said

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mutation was invalid.

(v) The respondent Nos. 1 to 8 herein preferred a Review

Application before the State Government seeking review of the

aforesaid order dated 26th August, 2014, inter alia, on the ground

that the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 were not provided an effective

opportunity of hearing as they were not impleaded through the POA

Shantilal Badbade through whom the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 had

prosecuted the First Revision Application before the Divisional

Commissioner, Pune and, therefore, they could not appear before

the State Government. It was further contended that the relevant

documents which were germane to the determination of the

controversy between the parties were also not brought to the notice

of the revisional authority.

e} Initially, by an order dated 7th June, 2016 the Principal

Secretary and OSD allowed the application for condonation of delay

in taking out the Review Application opining that the order was

passed in Second Revision Application No. R.T.A.3813/PK55/ J-5A/

PK634/(02)/2014.AVP dated 26th August, 2014 without providing

an opportunity of hearing to respondent Nos. 1 to 3.

f} Subsequently, by the impugned order the Principal Secretary

was persuaded to allow the review itself holding that the

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respondent Nos. 1 to 3 were not provided an effective opportunity

of hearing as the petitioners had not impleaded the POA through

whom the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 were prosecuting the proceedings

and therefore they could not appear before the Court when the

Second Revision Application was initially decided by order dated

26th August, 2014.

4. Being thus aggrieved, the petitioners have invoked the writ

jurisdiction of this Court.

5. I have heard Mr. Pramod Arjunwadkar, learned counsel for

the petitioners, and Mr. Manoj Patil, learned counsel for the

Respondent Nos. 2 to 8 at some length. With the assistance of the

learned counsel for the parties, I have also perused the material on

record including the orders passed by the authorities below and the

Civil Courts which were tendered on behalf of the parties.

6. Mr. Arjunwadkar, learned counsel for the petitioners would

submit that the Principal Secretary and OSD committed a grave

error in exercising the writ jurisdiction when no case for review

was made out even remotely. Firstly, the Review Application was

preferred by few of the persons who were not the parties to the

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proceedings before the Divisional Commissioner, Pune. Secondly,

the second Revisional Authority was not at all justified in setting

aside its earlier order straightaway. If the second Revisional

Authority considered it appropriate to review its order dated 26 th

April, 2014 it ought to have proceeded to hear the matter afresh

after recording a finding that it was persuaded to consider the

prayer for review. Instead, the second Revisional Authority

proceeded to set aside its earlier order and restore the order passed

by the Divisional Commissioner by one and the same order. Thirdly,

during the course of hearing of the Review Petition, the respondent

Nos. 1 to 8, the applicants in Review Application for the first time

tendered certain documents. Those documents were within the full

knowledge of the applicants therein. At the stage of review, the

Principal Secretary could not have looked into those documents and

the proper course would have been to remit the matter to the

Additional Commissioner for a fresh determination.

7. Mr. Arjunwadkar, strenuously submitted that, in effect, the

revisional authority under the garb of review has exercised

appellate jurisdiction. Such a course of action is legally

impermissible. Mr. Arjunwadkar further submitted that, at any

rate, the decision to review the earlier judgment in Revision

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Application dated 26th April, 2014 and pass an order in review by

setting aside the earlier order, passed by the very same authority,

could not have been made by one and the same order.

8. Mr. Manoj Patil, the learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 2

to 8 submitted that there is no error in the impugned order which

warrants exercise of extraordinary writ jurisdiction. Mr. Patil

strenuously submitted that the order condoning the delay dated 7 th

June, 2016 cannot be assailed in this petition as it was never

challenged and thus attained finality. Laying emphasis on the fact

that the Second Revision Application came to be decided on 26 th

August, 2014 without providing an opportunity of hearing in as

much as the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 were not impleaded through the

POA, though the First Revision was preferred by respondent Nos. 1

to 3 through the POA, it was submitted that the first order was non

est in the eyes of law as no effective opportunity was provided.

Thus the Principal Secretary and OSD was within his rights in

reviewing the order once it was found that the first order was

passed without adequate notice to respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and

consideration of the relevant material. In any event, according to

Mr. Patil, the claim of the petitioners that their predecessor had

interest in the subject land has been negatived by the Civil Court. In

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the face of such record, according to Mr. Patil, the petitioners

cannot be permitted to re-agitate the issue of the alleged incorrect

mutation.

9. Section 258 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966

reads as under:-

258. Review of orders:-

(1) The State Government and every revenue or survey officer may, either on its or his own motion or on the application of any party interested, review any order passed by itself or himself or any of its or his predecessors in office and pass such orders in reference thereto as it or he thinks fit :

Provided that -

(i) if the Collector or Settlement Officer thinks it necessary to review any order which he has not himself passed, on the ground other than that of clerical mistake, he shall first obtain the sanction of the Commissioner or the Settlement Commissioner, as the case may be, and if an officer subordinate to a Collector or Settlement Officer proposes to review any order on the ground other than that of clerical mistake, whether such order is passed by himself or his predecessor, he shall first obtain the sanction of the authority to whom he is immediately subordinate;

(ii) no order shall be varied or reversed unless notice has been given to the parties interested to appear and be heard in support of such order.

... .....

(iv) no order affecting any question of right between private persons shall be reviewed except on an application of a party to the proceedings, and no such application of review of such order shall be entertained unless it is made within ninety days from the passing of the order.

(2) No order shall be reviewed except on the following grounds, namely :--

.Vishal Parekar                                                                        ...10





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(i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence

(ii) some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record ;

(iii) any other sufficient reason.

.... .....

(4) An order which has been dealt with in appeal or on revision shall not be reviewed by any revenue or survey officer subordinate to the appellate or revisional authority.

10. The text of aforesaid section regulates the power of review by

enumerating the authorities under the Code who are empowered to

review their orders, the limits on the power of review, period of

limitation for review, where the order affects the right of private

parties and, more importantly, the grounds on which the review can

be had. The grounds enumerated under sub section (2) of section

258 of the Code are by and large identical to the grounds on which a

judgment can be reviewed under Order XXXXVII of the Code of

Civil Procedure, 1908.

11. A review of a judgment or order can be sought in the

following situations :

(a) Upon the discovery of new or important matter or evidence which, after exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the applicant;

(b) Such important matter or evidence could not be produced by the applicant at the time when the order was passed;

.Vishal Parekar                                                                      ...11





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                  (c)     on account of some mistake or error apparent
                  on the face of the record;
                  (d)      any other sufficient cause.

12. Clauses (a) and (b) above, are self-explanatory. An error

apparent on the face of the record, as the term signifies, is an error

which is self evident from the record and does not require an

elaborate examination and scrutiny of the matter. If the error is not

self evident and its detection requires a long process of reasoning, it

cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record. It

is also well recognized that 'any other sufficient reason', means a

reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in

the preceding clauses.

13. An application for review is more restricted than that of an

appeal and the Court of review has its jurisdiction circumscribed by

the defined limits under the statutory provision. The powers of

review cannot be exercised as an inherent power nor can an

appellate power be exercised in the guise of power of review.

14. In the case at hand, Mr. Arjunwadkar, learned counsel for the

petitioners made an earnest endevour to impress upon the Court

that the Principal Secretary and OSD ought to have deferred the

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matter for hearing on merits once he came to the conclusion that

the order dated 26th August, 2014 passed in second revision by him

warranted review. Mr. Arjunwadkar would urge, where the

authority is called upon to exercise review jurisdiction, a two-stage

inquiry is warranted. First, whether a case to review the order is

made out. Second, if yes, whether the order sought to be reviewed

deserves to be reviewed ?

15. I have extracted relevant part of the provisions of section 258

of the Code, on purpose. From the phraseology of section 258, it

appears difficult to deduce the process of two-stage inquiry

propounded by Mr. Arjunwadkar. As noted above, sub section (2) of

section 258 incorporates the grounds on which an authority can

review its own order. It implies that the authority reviewing its own

order must satisfy itself that one of the three grounds enumerated

in sub section (2) of section 258 of the Act, 1966 is made out. Once

such satisfaction is arrived at, I am afraid it is incumbent upon the

authority to take a pause and defer the hearing of the review

application on merits by recording a tentative finding that review is

warranted.

16. There are two conceivable impediments in the course

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suggested by Mr. Arjunwadkar. One, the very satisfaction that the

order sought to be reviewed warrants review either on account of

discovery of new fact or evidence or an error apparent on the face

of record in itself provides Raison d'etre for the review. Two, it is

not always practicable to appraise the necessity of review and

justifiability of review of the original order in watertight

compartments. Often finding of necessity of review subsumes the

finding on justifiability of review of the original order.

17. In any event, in the absence of any prescription in the Code, in

my view, such a two-stage determination of review application

cannot be put forth as a mater of inviolable procedure. In a given

case, the reviewing authority may consider it appropriate to take a

pause and defer matter for hearing on merits. However, not

following such course of action, without anything more, would not

render the ultimate order passed on review suspect for violation of

fundamental principles of judicial process.

18. In the facts of the case at hand, I do not find that a grievance

of not providing an effective opportunity of hearing while the

review application was heard by the Revisional Authority can be

legitimately made. Thus, the impugned order does not suffer from

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procedural defect of such nature as to warrant interference in

exercise of writ jurisdiction.

19. On the merits of the matter, Mr. Arjunwadkar would submit

that the Additional Commissioner had passed order in 1 st Revisional

Application setting aside the orders passed by appellate authorities

only on the premise of the outcome of the suits instituted between

the parties before the Civil Court. By an order dated 26 th August,

2014 the IInd Revisional Authority had rightly interfered with the

said order. In review, according to Mr. Arjunwadkar, the IInd

Revisional Authority re-appreciated nay misread the evidence and

reviewed its first order. This is impermissible in exercise of review

jurisdiction, urged Mr. Arjunwadkar.

20. To lend support to this submission, Mr. Arjunwadkar placed

reliance on a Division Bench judgment in the case of Balkrishna

Tukaram Shikhare vs. Madhukar Ramchandra Pawar 1 wherein the

limited discretionary nature of review jurisdiction was enunciated.

The Division Bench held that if a Tribunal exceeds the legitimate

limits of its jurisdiction and/or wrongly interferes with its own

orders in the supposed exercise of its review powers, such an order

must be interfered in exercise of writ jurisdiction. 1 1979 Bom. C.R. 653.

.Vishal Parekar                                                                 ...15





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21. Reliance was placed on the observations in paragraph 8

which read as under:-

8] Review jurisdiction is invoked and exercised to correct mistakes or errors apparent on the face of the record and even in the case of such mistakes or errors, to review or not to review is yet discretionary. Having gone a little deeper into the matter and having also gone through the record of the case, we are of the further view that even assuming a case for review had at all been made out, even so discretion, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, pre-eminently required rejection of the review application. The conduct of the respondent is replete with various elements and features which even in a revision application would prevent a Tribunal from exercising its revisional jurisdiction in his favour. Stricter still would be the position against him in a review application. With not a title of title in his favour; with a clear admission of not even knowing who is his landlord; with a further clear admission of not having been paid any rent to any one at any time; with the undisputed position that his name does not find any place even in the record of rights at any time (except the disputed entry duly cancelled) with all these fatal infirmities the respondent still claimed, and indeed succeeded in persuading the Tribunal to hold, that though he failed on merits in appeal and though he failed on merits in his revision therefrom, he should some how or the other be granted relief on appreciation and re-appreciation once again of the entire evidence and that too in a review application. Grant of such claim and relief in a review application is, in the facts and circumstances of the cases, nothing but a travesty of justice. If there have been cases which require interference under Article 227 of the Constitution, the present is pre-eminently one of that nature. If a Tribunal exceeds the legitimate limits of its jurisdiction and/or wrongly interferes with its own orders in the supposed exercise of its review powers, justice will be a casualty and at half mast. A judicial Tribunal is not expected to be at the mercy even of its own whims and caprices.

22. Mr. Arjunwadkar also placed reliance on the decisions of this

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Court in the cases of Anoopchand Nathmal Baid vs. Maharashtra

Revenue Tribunal at Nagpur and Others2 and Genu Laxman Shinde

vs. Chandrakant Dagadu Kotulkar 3, to bolster up the case that in

the case at hand, there was no error apparent on the face of the

record.

23. Lastly, reliance was placed on the judgment of this Court in

the case of Nalini Onkar Patil vs. Girdhar Kashinath Patil and

Others4 wherein import of the provisions contained in section 149 of

the Code 1966 was expounded. It was inter alia observed that none

of those statutory provisions would entitle any person to claim

right to any immovable property by any of the modes specified in

the said section otherwise than by following the procedure

prescribed under the respective statutes. Those provisions of law

invariably provide for necessary documentation either by way of

deeds inter vivos or by way of order of the court or the authority.

24. Mr. Arjunwadkar strenuously urged that in the absence of any

document, which was duly registered and stamped, according to

governing provisions of law, Malgonda could not have given

intimation to mutate the name of Kalgonda, his son, to the subject

2 1986 Mh.L.J. 520.

3 1999(1) Mh.L.J. 235.

4 2002(4) Mh.L.J. 728.

.Vishal Parekar                                                                ...17





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lands and the authorities could not have mutated the name of

Kalgonda especially when the subject lands were, the joint family

properties. Mr. Arjunwadkar invited the attention of the Court to an

entry in the register of tenants which indicates that the name of

Malgonda was mutated to Survey No. 93 as the Manager of the

Joint Family.

25. It would be imperative to note that the Principal Secretary

and OSD was persuaded to review the order passed on 26 th August,

2014 primarily on three counts. One, no effective opportunity of

hearing was provided to respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and therefore they

could not appear before the State Government when the first order

was passed. Two, important material and evidence could not be

brought before the State Government. Three, the statements of land

owners and tenants indicated that only Malgonda was the tenant of

the subject land and Mahadgonda was not. The material also

indicated that ME. NO.5504 was certified after following due

process. The outcome of the proceedings before the Civil Court

indicated that respondents 4 to 8, the transferee of the successors

in interest of Malgonda had acquired interest in the subject land in

conformity with law. The aforesaid material was, however, not

available when the first order was passed on 26th August, 2014.

.Vishal Parekar                                                                ...18





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26. Undoubtedly, the review jurisdiction is of limited nature.

Court or Tribunal is not empowered to exercise the appellate

jurisdiction disguised as an exercise in review. However, if the

conditions to exercise the review are made out, then it cannot be

faulted at for the only reason that the original order is reviewed.

27. In the case at hand, the fact that the respondents 1 to 3 had

not appeared when the first order was passed on 26 th August, 2014

is evident from the narration of the facts therein. It was noted that

despite due service, the respondents did not appear. It would be

contextually relevant to note that the respondents 1 to 3 were

prosecuting the proceedings before the Divisional Commissioner

through the POA Shantilal Badbade. This becomes evident from the

judgment passed by the Divisional Commissioner on 3 rd June, 2005

which was impugned by the petitioners before the second

Revisional Authority. Yet, Shantilal Badbade was not impleaded in

the capacity of POA of respondent Nos. 1 to 3. The petitioners could

not have feigned ignorance of respondents 1 to 3 having been

represented through Mr. Badbade.

28. In the circumstances, non appearance of respondents 1 to 3

before the Revisional Authority when the second revision was

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decided by an order dated 26th August, 2014 can be said to have

been satisfactorily accounted for. The Principal Secretary and OSD

was thus justified in recording a finding that the respondents 1 to 3

had no effective opportunity of hearing and resultantly their case

could not be placed before the Revisional Authority.

29. Evidently, the reasons which weighed with the Additional

Divisional Commissioner in allowing the first Revision were not

fully dealt with by the IInd Revisional Authority while passing the

order dated 26th August, 2014. Probably the non representation of

the respondents 1 to 3 before the IInd Revisional Authority

deprived it of the benefits of the contentions on behalf of

respondents 1 to 3.

30. The principal reason which weighed with the Additional

Divisional Commissioner was the outcome of the proceedings before

the Civil Court. It could hardly be disputed that the said matter was

germane. I have perused the plaint in Partition Suit No. 24 of 1976

instituted by Mhadgonda, the predecessor in title of the petitioners,

seeking partition of the joint family properties. It would be suffice to

note that in the said plaint it was categorically asserted that subject

lands stood purchased under the provisions of the Act, 1948 for and

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on behalf of the joint family in the name of Malgonda and the later

was not the sole tenant thereof and on 30 th August, 1972 Malgonda

had surreptitiously got mutated the name of Kalgonda to the

subject land. Mhadgonda thus sought declaration that the subject

lands were the joint family properties and he had one half

undivided interest therein and also prayed for partition and

separate possession thereof. Indisputably, the said suit came to be

dismissed in default on 18th November, 1988.

31. It cannot be controverted that the averments in the plaint in

the said suit constitute the core of the resistance to M.E.No. 5504.

Secondly, in the suits instituted by respondents 4 to 8, the

transferee of the subject lands, being the suit No. 22 of 2006, 23 of

2006 and 24 of 2006, against the petitioners and their predecessor

in title, categorical findings were recorded that the subject lands

were the self-acquired properties of Malgonda, no evidence was

adduced on behalf of the predecessor in title of the petitioners that

the subject lands were joint family properties and Mhadgonda was

never cultivating the subject lands as a member of the joint family.

In contrast, the subject lands were purchased by Malgonda as a

tenant thereof.

.Vishal Parekar                                                                 ...21





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32. In the face of the aforesaid material, in my view, the

Revisional Authority was justified in reviewing its order on the

ground that the aforesaid material and the orders passed by the

authorities under the Act, 1948 could not be considered by the

Revisional Authority when the first order was passed on 26 th

August, 2014. Thus, no fault can be found with the impugned order.

33. The matter can be looked at from another perspective. The

suit instituted by the predecessor in title of the petitioners to assert

that the subject lands constituted joint family property, came to be

dismissed. In other proceedings, the Civil Court as well as the

authorities under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,

1948 have recorded the findings that Malgonda was the tenant of

the subject land and Mhadgonda did not cultivate the subject land

in the capacity of tenant as a member of a joint family. Thus the

challenge to Mutation Entry 5504, even otherwise, does not merit

countenance. Resultantly, the petition deserves to be dismissed.

Hence, the following order.

ORDER

1] The petition stands dismissed.

2] Rule discharged.

3] No costs.

                                             (N. J. JAMADAR, J.)

.Vishal Parekar                                                                   ...22