Krishna Sahebrao Patil ... vs The State Of Maharashtra And ...
2022 Latest Caselaw 6123 Bom

                                      1                          901-BA-315-22.odt




          IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                      BENCH AT AURANGABAD

                        BAIL APPLICATION NO.315 OF 2022

1.      Narayan Vishwanath Wakle,
        Age 46 years, Occu. Agriculture,
        R/o. Lasur Station, Taluka Gangapur,
        District Aurangabad.

2.      Krishnakant Bhagwan Vyavhare,
        Age 46 years, Occu. Agriculture,
        R/o. Katepimpalgaon, Taluka Gangpur,
        District Aurangabad.                          ..      Applicants

                 Versus

        The State of Maharashtra,
        (Through Police Station Gangapur)             ..      Respondent

                                  ...
Mr. A. S. Bajaj, Advocate instructed by Mr. Ambar S. Barlota and Mr.
Subhash K. Barlota, Advocates for Applicants

Mr. S. B. Naravade, A.P.P. for Respondent / State
                                  ...

                                   WITH
                   CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 943 OF 2022
                              IN BA/315/2022

Krishna s/o. Sahebrao Patil Dongaonkar,
Age 44 years, Occu. Agri and Social Work,
R/o. Khadkeshwar, Aurangabad                          ..      Applicant

        Versus

1.      The State of Maharashtra,
        Through Gangapur Police Station,
        Taluka Gangapur, District Aurangabad

2.      Narayan s/o. Vishwanath Wakale,
        Age 46 years, Occu. Agri.,
        R/o. Lasur Station, Taluka Gangapur,
        District Aurangabad.




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                                    2                             901-BA-315-22.odt



3.      Krishnakant s/o. Bhagwan Vyavhare,
        Age 46 years, Occu. Agri.,
        R/o. Katepimpalgaon, Taluka Gangapur,
        District Aurangabad                   ..              Respondents

                                 ...
Mr. V. D. Sapkal, Senior Advocate instructed by Mr. Sandip R.
Sapkal, Advocate for applicant/complainant

Mr. S. B. Naravade, A.P.P. for Respondent / State

Mr. A. S. Bajaj, Advocate instructed by Mr. Ambar S. Barlota and Mr.
Subhash K. Barlota, Advocates for Respondents No. 2 and 3
                                  ...


                                       CORAM :        S.G. MEHARE, J.

                                       DATE       : 01-07-2022


PER COURT :-

1. Heard Mr. A. S. Bajaj, the learned counsel for the applicants,

Mr. S. B. Naravade, the learned A.P.P. for the respondent/State and

Mr. V. D. Sapkal, the learned senior counsel for the complainant.

2. Mr. Sapkal, learned senior counsel, has filed Application No.

943 of 2022 for intervention in Bail Application No. 315 of 2022,

seeking leave of this Court to assist the learned Public Prosecutor /

APP at the time of the hearing and also allow him to address this

Court on behalf of the complainant.

3. Mr. Bajaj, learned counsel for the applicants, raised a serious

objection that once permission is sought to assist the Public

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Prosecutor, the counsel cannot address the Court.

4. Mr. Sapkal, the learned senior counsel, has referred to the

order of this Court passed in the case of Vinay Poddar Versus State of

Maharashtra, 2009 All M.R. (Cri) 687 and Kashinath Jayram Shetye Versus

Ramakant Mahadev Sawant and others, 2013 All M. R. (Cri) 861. He would

point out that even the informant is entitled to make oral

submissions while opposing the bail application.

5. He would point out that a similar objection was raised by Mr.

Bajaj, learned counsel while hearing the anticipatory bail

application. However, the law is clear that the informant has a

right to address the Court. This Court has consistently taken the

same view, and the informant is allowed to address the Court.

6. In view of the ratio laid down in the case of Vinay Poddar and

Kashinath Jayrabjectionm Shetye (supra), this Court does not find

substance in the objection raised by the learned counsel Mr. Bajaj

that the counsel, requesting the Court to assist the Public

Prosecutor cannot address the Court. Therefore, Mr. Sapkal, the

learned senior counsel for the original informant, is allowed to

address the Court. Criminal Application No. 943 of 2022 is allowed.

7. Before adverting to the rival contentions of the parties, it

would be appropriate to appreciate the law on Section 439 of the

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Code of Criminal Procedure ("Cr.P.C.", in short).

8. Mr. Bajaj, learned counsel for the applicants, would rely on

the case of Sanjay Chandra Versus Central Bureau of Investigation and

additional petitioners Vinod Goenka and others, A.I.R. 2012 Supreme Court 830,

and referred to paragraph No. 28 of the said judgment. He has

vehemently argued that the object of bail is neither punitive nor

preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a

punishment unless it can be required to ensure that an accused

person will stand his trial when called upon. The Courts owe more

than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after

conviction and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly

tried and found guilty. The learned counsel read paragraph No. 14

from the said judgment. The principle that every man shall be

considered innocent until he is found guilty is the settled principle

for considering the bail application. However, he has referred to

paragraph No. 16, wherein, the case of State of Rajasthan Versus

Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308, has been referred to in paragraph No. 3 of

the said Judgment, which has been extracted in the case of Vinod

Goenka and would point out that the gravity of the offence involved

is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and

must weigh with us with considering the question of jail. In sum

and substance, the gist of the observations in the above cases was

that while considering the bail application, the heinousness of the

crime, the social circumstances, etc., should be considered.

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9. In paragraph No. 24 of the said judgment, State of U.P. Versus

Amarmani Tripathi, (2005) 8 S.C.C. 21 has also been reproduced in

paragraph no. 18 of the said judgment is extracted which read

thus,

"18. It is well settled that the matters to be considered in an application for bail are (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the charge; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail [see Prahlad Singh Bhati v. N.C.T., Delhi (A.I.R. 2002 SC 1444) and Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) (A.I.R. 1978 SC 179)]. While a vague allegation that the accused may tamper with the evidence or witnesses may not be a ground to refuse bail, if the accused is of such character that his mere presence at large would intimidate the witnesses or if there is material to show that he will use his liberty to subvert justice or tamper with the evidence, then bail will be refused. We may also refer to the following principles relating to grant or refusal of bail stated in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (A.I.R. 2004 SC 1866) (S.C.C. pp. 535-36, para 11)

"11. The law in regard to grant or refusal of bail is very well settled. The Court granting bail should exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of

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course. Though at the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merit of the case need not be undertaken, there is a need to indicate in such orders reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted particularly where the accused is charged of having committed a serious offence. Any order devoid of such reasons would suffer from non-application of mind. It is also necessary for the Court granting bail to consider among other circumstances, the following factors also before granting bail; they are:

(a) The nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence.

(b) Reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant.

(c) Prima facie satisfaction of the Court in support of the charge. (See Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh and Puran v. Rambilas.)"

10. Further, Mr. Bajaj, learned counsel, relied on the case of

Dataram Singh Versus State of Uttar Pradesh and another, (2018) 3 S.C.C.22. The

Hon'ble Apex Court in the said case has observed that a human

attitude is required to be adopted by a Judge while dealing with an

application for remanding a suspect or an accused person to police

custody or judicial custody.There are several reasons for this,

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including maintaining the dignity of an accused person, howsoever

poor that person might be, the requirements of Article 21 of the

Constitution and the fact that there is enormous overcrowding in

prisons, leading to social and other problems as noticed by the

Supreme Court in Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons, In re, (2017) 10 SCC

658.

11. Mr. Sapkal, the learned senior counsel for the complainant,

pointed out paragraph No. 6 from the judgment of Dataram cited

supra, that the grant or refusal of bail is entirely within the

discretion of the Judge hearing the matter, and though that

discretion is unfettered, it must be exercised judiciously and in a

humane manner and compassionately. Mr. Bajaj, the learned

counsel for the applicants, has fairly conceded that the rule of bail

is not absolute; it is always subject to the gravity and nature of the

offence, the possibility of tampering with the witness, etc. are the

factors to be considered.

12. Mr. Bajaj, the learned counsel for the applicants, also relied

on the case Rajinder Singh Versus Central Bureau of Investigation,

AIRONLINE 2019 SC 888 and argued that where there are no criminal

antecedents to the discredit of the applicant/accused, normally,

the bail shall be granted to such an accused. Further, he relied on

Aman Preet Singh Versus C.B.I. Through Director, AIR ONLINE 2021 SC 689 and

argued that the purpose of keeping the applicant behind the bar is

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not fruitful, then the Court should take a liberal view to release the

accused on bail.

13. In the case of Amar Mani Tripathi (supra), the Hon'ble

Apex Court has laid down the factors to be considered in the

application for bail. Reasonable apprehension of the witnesses

being tampered with is one of the grounds to be considered by the

Court while considering the bail application. Undoubtedly, the

vague allegations of tampering with the evidence of the witnesses

may not be considered. However, if there is material to show that

the applicants may use liberty to tamper with the prosecution

witnesses, then bail may be refused.

14. Mr. Sapkal, the learned senior counsel for the complainant,

has vehemently argued by way of reply that none of the cases

cited by the applicants is applicable to the facts of the present

case simply for the reason that in either of the case, there were no

charges of serious offences like punishable under Sections 472 and

478 of the Indian Penal Code ("I.P.C."). However, he relied on the

case of Nimmagadda Prasad Versus Central Bureau of Investigation, (2013)

A.I.R. (SC) 2821, which is also relied upon by the learned A.P.P. and

vehemently argued that though it appears on the face of the

record that the offence under the I.P.C. However, after going

through the charge sheet, it appears that the Chairman and the

Directors of the Sugar Factory were involved in money laundering,

and they have committed the offence under the Maharashtra

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Protection of Interest of Depositors (in Financial Establishments)

Act, 1999 (M.P.I.D. Act).

15. Mr. Bajaj, the learned counsel for the applicants by reply,

has vehemently argued that whatsoever observations recorded by

this Court in Anticipatory Bail Applications No. 1221 and 1227 of

2020 shall not influence this Court as the present application is

filed for regular bail after filing the charge sheet. So, the material

collected by the Investigating Officer is for consideration of this

Court. That apart, whatever adverse observations recorded by this

Court in the above anticipatory bail applications were mainly

against the other coaccused and not these applicants. In short, he

wanted to argue that the present application should be decided

without considering the earlier observations made by this Court

while considering the anticipatory bail application.

16. The powers under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C. are discretionary

whether to admit an accused on bail or not. Law is settled that the

Court shall exercise such discretion judiciously. Under Section 439

of the Cr.P.C., all the combined circumstances must be believed by

the Court in every such case. The gravity and seriousness of the

offences are also factors to be considered. The principle

underlying Section 439 of the Cr.P.C. is that the Court would also

bear in mind the post effect of releasing the accused, particularly

the influence of the person seeking bail and tampering with the

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evidence at his hand or under his direction. Therefore, the

character of the accused and his background plays a vital role, and

that may be one of the factors to be considered by the Court.

17. The material before the Court, while dealing with the

application under Section 438 of the Cr.P.C., is normally limited

compared to the material after the charge sheet. After the charge

sheet, both parties have the opportunity to access the evidence

and material collected by the Investigating Officer. Both the

prosecution and the accused may point out what material is in

their favour and how it is to be appreciated. However, there are

also limitations the Court, exercising the powers under Section 439

of the Cr.P.C. need not appreciate the evidence as if it is a trial.

The Court cannot see the merits and demerits of the evidence

collected by the Investigating Officer. However, without

considering the merits and demerits, the Court shall appreciate

the material collected by the Investigating Officer. These are the

broad principles to be born in mind exercising power under

Section 439 of the Cr.P.C.

18. Let us now go through the factum of the allegations and the

material collected by the Investigating Officer. The applicants have

been arrested in Crime No. I-402/2020 registered at Police Station

Gangapur Taluka, District Aurangabad, for the offence punishable

under Sections 406, 467, 468, 469, 471, 472, 474 read with

Section 34 of the I.P.C. The prosecution has a case, that , the Board

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of Directors have collected the money in contravention of the

provisions of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act,

Regulation, and Rules framed thereunder. The appellate Tribunal

transferred the money to the factory that was transferee/ paid to

the depositors illegally through the power of attorneys. For an

unauthoriesed refund of the money to the depositors, the

Chairman and Directors have innovated a novel idea to repay the

money to the depositors by transferring the money to the bank

accounts of the applicants an unauthorised power of attorneys has

been given. The unauthorised resolutions have been passed by the

Board of Directors, giving the power of attorneys to the applicants.

The applicants and other coaccused have misappropriated the

public money and cheated the public.

19. It is not in dispute that the Sugar factory was a sick unit. A

bank had proceeded under The Securitisation and Reconstruction

of Financial Assets, and Enforcement of Securities Interest Act,

2002 ("The SARFAESI Act", for short) and against the recovery of

loan, an auction order was passed against the sugar factory.

However, the Sugar factory had challenged the said order before

the appellate Tribunal. The appellate Tribunal granted a conditional

stay on depositing Rs.9 Crore. Fortunately, the sugar factory

succeeded in the said appeal, and the order auctioning the sugar

factory was set aside. The money deposited with the Appellate

Tribunal for stay was transferred to the factory bank account.

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20. The applicants have a case that since the factory was in bad

condition and was under an auction, the chairman and directors of

the sugar factory appealed to the Members/ shareholders of the

sugar factory to contribute as per their capacity to comply with the

order of D.R.A.T. In pursuance of the appeal made by the

chairman-cum-MLA, around 1050 members have contributed and

deposited the money with the sugar factory. The said amount was

deposited in the D.R.A.T. The amount of Rs.9 Crore, which was

collected from the members of the sugar factory, was agreed to be

paid with interest amount aggregating Rs. 15,75,33,382/-.

21. Mr. Bajaj, learned counsel for the applicants, has

vehemently argued that there was no limitation in collecting such

an amount from the members. They had the bonafide object to

protect the sugar factory, and it was the desire of each member of

the factory. The members have voluntarily deposited the money.

The huge amount worth Rs.15,75,33,338/- was to be returned to

the depositors. The interest of the depositors was also required to

be protected by refunding their deposits with interest. He argued

that when the money was deposited with the factory, a few ill

motive persons started activities that the depositors could not get

their money refunded. The order of D.A.R.T. was impugned before

the Principal seat at Bombay, and its decision was reserved.

Hence, to protect the depositor's interest, they had to make a

decision to return the depositor's money through the power of

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attorney and accordingly, resolution no.849 was passed that a

power of attorney is given to the present applicants and one

Bhimrao Pandav. It was also decided that the applicants would

obtain a power of attorney from the members and agriculturists

who have deposited the money. It was further resolved that the

said amount should be transferred to the accounts of present

applicants and one Bhimrao Bhikaji Pandav. Through them, the

amount of the depositors shall be transmitted either through

cheque / RTGS / NEFT. In pursuance of the said resolution, the

account was opened; however, that account was not in their

names but the name of the sugar factory. In pursuance of the said

resolution, the disbursement was started, and the amounts were

deposited in the accounts of the depositors either by R.T.G.S.or

other approved mode of banking. However, when this process was

in progress, the complainant moved an application before the

Hon'ble Minister of Co-operation, the State of Maharashtra, on 4 th

November, 2020, praying to stop the illegal disbursement of the

amount of Rs.15 Crore 45 Lakhs. The Hon'ble Minister passed the

order on the same day and directed the Sugar Commissioner to

take immediate action. Therefore, the accounts of the applicants,

as well as depositors, have been frozen. The amount of Rs.7 lakh

was deposited in the account of applicant - Wakale on 31.05.2011,

and on 21.06.2011, the amount of Rs.5 Lakh was transferred to

the account of applicant Vyavhare. The transactions were made by

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the legally approved banking mode.

22. He has also argued that bare allegations of transfer of

amount have been made, but nowhere it is alleged that amount

was not refunded to the depositors. He tried to point out that

everything was going on very well; nobody had an objection, but

only due to the political rivalry, the complainant had raised the

objection to the payment to the depositors was stopped. Except

for the 15 depositors, the other depositors have categorically

stated in their statements that they had executed power of

attorney in favour of the applicants. Those who have alleged

against the applicants have stated for the first time in 2020. The

allegations of fraudulent General Power of Attorney are false.

Whatever transactions were done are on record to prove the

genuineness of the transactions. He has filed on record the ledger

books of the depositors from 2011-2012. Referring to the entries in

the ledger book, he would point out that the accounts were

maintained in due course of business. Therefore, it cannot be said

that it is a created document. These accounts were written in the

year 2011-2012. The principal and the interest amounts have been

shown separately, and after calculating the interest, the money

was refunded to the depositors. He has also argued that before

presenting the complaint on 09.11.2020, a report was lodged, but

no action was taken. The Investigating Officer has specifically

recorded his opinion that since the Auditor was appointed to verify

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the factum, no action is required against anybody. However, on

18.11.2020, the complainant filed a complaint suppressing the fact

of the appointment of the Auditor. Whatever the witnesses are

deposing against the applicants, they are puppets in the hand of

the complainant, who is Ex-MLA and Chairman of the sugar factory.

23. As far as the allegations of forging the documents are

concerned, he would point out that some reports are in favour of

applicants that falsify the allegation of creating fraudulent

documents. Referring to each statement and document from the

charge sheet, he argued that the prosecution has not doubted that

power of attorney or authority letters has been misused. The final

audit report also shows that these applicants have done no

misappropriation. The entire documentary evidence required for

the investigation has also been seized. Nothing is to be recovered

and discovered from the applicants. He would argue that notice

under section 41 of the Cr.P.C. was issued to the applicants two

days before filing the charge sheet, and under the garb of inquiry,

the applicants were called and apprehended. The applicants are

the breadwinners of their families, and their families depend on

them. They have acted as per the resolution passed by the board

of directors. He prayed to release them on bail.

24. Per contra, the learned APP would submit that the list of

beneficiaries had been prepared by the applicants. It is not part of

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the charge sheet. The investigating officer had no opportunity to

go through the said documents, which are prepared by the

applicants. Hence, he cannot comment on those documents. He

has vehemently argued that the so-called resolution is incomplete

with no clarification on how these persons will refund the amount

to the total investors of 1050 and which applicant will pay or

transfer the money to which depositor. The resolution is not clear

as regards the power given to the applicants. The depositors had

deposited the money directly in the factory account. The board of

directors were responsible for refunding the amount, but a novel

idea of depositing the money in the accounts of the applicants was

invented. There were no reasons to transfer the amount from the

factory to the accounts of the applicants and then refund it to the

depositors. The applicants have only 248 power of attorneys. If

there were no power of attorney from all 1050 depositors, what

about the money of the depositors other than those 248 persons.

The resolution by which the decision has been taken to transfer

money from the factory to the account of the applicants is without

obtaining permission or sanction from the authorities appointed

under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act. He has referred

to those resolutions and argued that the G.P.A.s were prepared on

17.03.2020 before the said resolution. Therefore also G.P.A. were

illegal and unauthorised .

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25. Referring to page No. 145 of the charge sheet, the learned

A.P.P. has vehemently argued that the majority of the depositors

denied the execution of power of attorney or they had not

deposited the money as stated by the applicants. Thirty witnesses

have neither deposited the money nor executed the document.

They have stated that the persons belonging to the group of

directors of the factory, under the garb of filing the petition for

recovering the money, have obtained their signatures, and at the

same time, they obtained the signatures of depositors on the

blank papers. A vehement argument advanced by the learned

A.P.P. is that the resolution was passed during the lockdown when

business all over the world was paralysed. Passing such a

resolution in such an adverse situation raises doubt about its

genuineness. He has referred to the statements of the various

witnesses. He has referred to the order passed by the Judge, Co-

operative Court, Aurangabad, in which the resolution dated

17.03.2020 and 12.09.2020 were challenged. He has referred to

the findings recorded by the learned Judge, Co-operative Court,

Aurangabad, who has recorded the finding on the fact and allowed

the application partly. The Cooperative Court has stayed the

implementation of the said resolutions. He has attached the bank

accounts and restrained the account holders from withdrawing the

amount lying in the bank accounts. He also directed Bank

Managers of the concerned Banks to implement the orders strictly.

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The original G.P.A. is to be recovered from the house of Narayan

Vishwanath Wakle. He has expressed apprehension of tampering

with the prosecution witnesses as the applicants are influential

and are supported by powerful leaders. Lastly, he would argue that

it is an economic offence; therefore, the bail under such offence

must be dealt with strictly, and he relied on the case of

Nimmagadda Prasad (supra). He also added that still, the

investigation is going on. There is a possibility of adding more

accused who have played an active role from behind the curtain.

Considering the gravity of the accused, the illegality committed by

the applicants and the possibility of tampering with the

prosecution evidence, the application be rejected.

26. Mr. Sapkal, the learned senior counsel for the first informant,

has raised an objection to the legality of the resolutions to refund

the money. He has argued that if any amount has to be raised by

the sugar factory, there must be an agreement with the borrower.

There are specific bye-laws for raising such loans. There shall be

an agreement with clear terms as envisaged in the law about the

terms of the loan and agreed rate of interest. However, without

following due process of law, the Board of Directors have given a

different rate of interest to the different depositors. In the absence

of such agreement, whatsoever amount credited by the depositors

shall be a donation only. The donation cannot be refunded. He has

referred to the statements of the witnesses and submitted that

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these witnesses have categorically stated that the persons

belonging to the group of M.L.A. Shri Bamb were wandering in the

village. They were obtaining the signatures of the villagers saying

that the M.L.A. had deposited the money in their names, and now

that amount is to be recovered. This clearly shows money

laundering. The applicants and others have invested crores of

rupees violating the rules and laws. The refund of money was the

responsibility of the factory. He has assailed the practice adopted

by the applicants to refunding the money. All the directors are

equally responsible as a huge amount is illegally refunded. He has

referred to the observations recorded by this Court in the

anticipatory bail application cited supra. He has a serious objection

that after the Court has recorded the findings that the custodial

interrogation of the applicants is necessary on 12.05.2022, notice

under Section 41(1) of the Cr.P.C was issued two days before filing

the charge sheet. also pointed out that since the investigation

officer was under the influence of the M.L.A., a Writ Petition was

filed, and the new investigating officer was appointed. However,

the influence of the M.L.A. continued. The investigating officer

favoured on accused Bhimrao Bhikaji Pandave. He was also served

a notice under section 41 of Cr.P.C, but the investigating officer

released him instead of arresting him. Considering the gravity of

the offence, the notice under Section 41 of Cr.P.C. was not at all

required. He has prayed to dismiss the application.

20 901-BA-315-22.odt

27. It has been provided in the rules and regulations under the

Cooperative Societies Act that the factory may raise capital

through various sources like placing deposits, raising loans, and

overdrafts. It has also been provided therein how the loan should

be raised. However, the permission of the sugar Commissionerate

or other authorities under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies

Act is obligatory. Admittedly, before collecting deposits from the

members, the Board of Directors had not sought the sanction of

the competent authority under the Cooperative Societies Act.

28. The dispute has a checkered history. The record revel that

witnesses have deposed that they never deposited the money with

the factory but have been shown as depositors. A few of them

never executed authority in favour of the applicants. However, the

money is transferred to their bank accounts. The complainant has

the allegations against the M.L.A that he has deposited the money

in the name of depositors without their consent. The fingerprint

report also supports that many documents have been created in

the names of the witnesses who have never signed the

documents. The report submitted under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C.,

by the Investigating Officer speaks volumes about the role played

by various other persons who have not been arraigned as accused.

The money has been transferred to the bank accounts of the fake

depositors. The prosecution has the evidence that the persons

belonging to the group of chairman were going to various

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depositors and obtaining their signatures under the garb of filing a

petition in the Court for recovery of the amount, but it was

misused for the withdrawal of the money invested by the M.L.A.

Obtaining the signatures of the depositors believing the applicants

show that they had a good influence and impression over such

poor depositors. Since the applicants are behind bars, many

witnesses dared to state the factum of playing fraud and creating

false documents in their names. The complainant has the

allegations against the accused and others that they have

committed money laundering. The applicants have no explanation

under what approved head they had collected the money from the

depositors. The acts of the applicants are apparently in violation of

the provision of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act and

Rules.

29. Considering all the aspects, this Court is of the view that the

possibility of influencing and tampering with the prosecution

witnesses cannot be ruled out. The offence is serious and grave.

Huge public money has been siphoned. Returning the amount to

certain depositors would not make the offence mild. The record

also reveals that favour is shown to few depositors, giving them a

higher rate of interest than the rate prescribed under the

cooperative laws. The investment/deposit in the name of fake

depositors is a matter of serious concern. The motive of refunding

the money to the depositors appears not bonafide. The money

22 901-BA-315-22.odt

could have been disbursed through the bank of the factory, as it

was deposited in the factory bank account. Prima facie evidence is

there against the applicants. Hence, for a fair trial, it would not be

appropriate to release the applicants on bail. For the above

reasons the application stand dismissed.

30. Needless to state, the above observations are prima facie

and restricted only to the bail application.

( S. G. MEHARE ) JUDGE

rrd