Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 1228 Bom
Judgement Date : 3 February, 2022
905.CA.3162.21.odt
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
SECOND APPEAL (ST) NO.12677 OF 2020
WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO.3162 OF 2021
IN SAST/12677/2020
1. Sumanbai @ Rukhmanbai w/o Kacharu Jadhav,
Age : 82 years, Occu: Household,
R/o. Sulibhajan, Tq. Khultabad,
Dist. Aurangabad.
2. Gautam s/o. Vitthal Bankar,
Age : 67 years, Occu: Labour
Sonkheda, Tq. Khultabad,
Dist. Aurangabad.
3. Babasaheb s/o. Kacharu Jadhav,
Age : 46 years, Occu: Labour,
R/o. Sulibhajan, Tq. Khultabad,
Dist. Aurangabad.
4. Sunita Prakash Devkar,
Age : 50 years, Occu: Labour,
R/o. Sulibhajan, Tq. Khultabad,
Dist. Aurangabad.
5. Ratan s/o. Kacharu Jadhav,
Age : 44 years, Occu: Tailor,
All R/o. Sulibhajan, Tq. Khultabad,
Dist. Aurangabad. ... APPELLANTS
(Orig. Defendants)
VERSUS
Rauf Beg s/o. Ismail Beg,
Age: 40 years, Occu: Business,
R/o. Kamal Mohalla, Lalbag, Khultabad,
Tq. Khultabad, Dist. Aurangabad. ... RESPONDENT
(Orig. Plaintiff)
...
Advocate for Applicants : Mrs. Janabai S. Aute
Advocate for Respondent : Mr. S.S. Shaikh
...
CORAM : MANGESH S. PATIL, J.
DATE : 03.02.2022
905.CA.3162.21.odt
PER COURT :
For the reasons stated in the Civil Application No.3162/2021
seeking to condone the delay of 201 days in filing the Second Appeal, civil
application is allowed. Delay is condoned.
2. At the joint request of both the sides I have heard them finally
on the following substantial questions of law :
• Whether the lower appellate court was justified in refusing to
condone the delay of more than three years in preferring the
appeal by the appellant challenging the judgment and decree
passed by the trial court, by refusing to take cognizance of the
fact that she had made an attempt to challenge the judgment and
decree by filing a separate suit bearing RCS No.5/2018
overlooking Section 14 of the Limitation Act ?
• Whether the lower appellate court was legally justified in refusing
to condone of delay by referring to the supervening events,
wherein, the respondent plaintiff had succeeded in the execution
proceeding and recovered possession of the suit property by
demolishing the appellant's dwelling house ?
3. It is a matter of record that initially the respondent had filed the
suit seeking perpetual injunction against the appellant. He had succeeded in
obtaining a decree. Subsequently, he filed the present suit alleging about
the appellant having encroached over his property to the extent of 15x20
sq.ft. It is also a matter of record that the suit for removal of encroachment
905.CA.3162.21.odt
was decreed and in execution thereof the dwelling house of the appellants
has been demolished delivering its vacant possession to the respondent
plaintiff. It is equally a matter of record that before seeking to file the first
appeal before the lower appellate court, the appellants had filed Regular
Civil Suit No.5/2018 seeking to quash and set aside the decree passed in the
present suit. That suit was also dismissed on 04.07.2018 and it is thereafter
that the appellants had filed the First Appeal on 03.09.2018 with a prayer to
condone the delay of 3 years, 2 months and 9 days in filing the First Appeal.
4. After having heard both the sides and perusing the judgment
under challenge it is quite apparent that the appellate court seems to have
got swayed away by the fact that the respondent plaintiff was waiting for
justice for years together and had succeeded in getting the decree executed
by removing the dwelling house of the appellants. To my mind, this
approach of the lower appellate court is not legally correct.
5. The question that was to be addressed and decided was as to
whether within the parameters of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the
appellants had demonstrated sufficient cause for condoning the delay.
Merely because the decree was executed, one could not have made it a
ground to refuse to condone the delay. Precisely for this reason, in order to
meet a contingency of this kind, provision of restitution has been
contemplated under Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure to enable
restitution of possession if the appellate court subsequently sets aside the
decree for possession. Therefore there was no question of the appeal having
905.CA.3162.21.odt
become infructuous. Though not in so many words this was precisely what
has weighed with the lower appellate court.
6. Again, the order under challenge does not clearly spell out
about the learned Judge of the lower appellate court having considered the
effect of filing of a subsequent suit by the appellant bearing RCS No.5/2018.
Though he could notice that it was subsequently dismissed, she failed to
take note of the provision of Section 14 of the Limitation Act which enables
a party to seek exclusion of limitation if it prosecutes a wrong remedy or
chooses a wrong forum bona fide.
7. It is trite, as has been laid down in catena of judgment including
in the matter of Collector, Land Acquisition Vs. Mst. Katiji ; (1987) 2 S.C.C.
107, Ramlal and Ors. Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd.; AIR 1962 SC 361, the
approach of this Court in the matter of condonation of delay is to examine
as to if the delay was intentional or deliberate or that the inaction was
prompted with some mala fides. The underlying principle being a party
would not gain anything by allowing his remedy to be lost by efflux of time.
If, admittedly, appellants have lost their dwelling house alleged to be erected
by encroaching over the property of the respondent, they were not to gain
anything by not preferring the appeal challenging the decree in time. Under
some advice they seems to have approached wrong forum with the incorrect
remedy of filing a separate suit RCS No.5/2018 seeking declaration
regarding nullity of the decree passed in the matter in hand.
8. If such is the state of affairs, the lower appellate court while
905.CA.3162.21.odt
passing the impugned order having clearly failed to take cognizance of the
facts within the parameters of Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act and
having refused to condone the delay by insinuating that probably the appeal
had become infructuous by execution of the decree, is clearly unsustainable
in law.
9. I therefore answer both the points in negative and allow the
Second Appeal by imposing appropriate costs.
10. The Second Appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the
lower appellate court is quashed and set aside. The Civil Miscellaneous
Application No.278/2018 filed by the appellant before it stands allowed
subject to payment of cost of Rs.5000/- to the respondent. The cost to be
deposited in the lower appellate court within four weeks from today failing
which this order shall stand revoked automatically. On such cost being
deposited, the delay would stand condoned and the appeal would be
registered. The respondent shall be entitled to claim the cost from the lower
appellate court.
11. Parties to appear before the lower appellate court on
21.02.2022.
(MANGESH S. PATIL, J.)
habeeb
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