Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 14747 Bom
Judgement Date : 8 October, 2021
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO.102 OF 2019
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO.2183 OF 2021
Linker Shelter Pvt. Ltd. through Director
Prasad Chandrakant Deshpande .. Applicant
Versus
Dudadhari @ Kathada @ Kagzipura Masjid
Trust through Trustee Sayed Abdul Shakoor
Sayyed & Ors. .. Respondents
WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO.40 OF 2019
Narendra Ramnath Ugale & Anr. .. Applicants
Versus
Linker Shelter Pvt. Ltd. through Director
Prasad Chandrakant Deshpande .. Respondents
AND
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION (ST) NO.25385 OF 2019
Dudadhari @ Kathada @ Kagzipura Masjid
Trust through Trustee Sayed Abdul Shakoor
Sayyed & Ors. .. Applicants
Versus
Uttam s/o Nabhaji Mahale & Ors. .. Respondents
M.M.Salgaonkar
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WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION (ST) NO.93681 OF 2020
Yogita Sundar Kokate .. Applicant
Versus
Dudadhari @ Kathada @ Kagzipura Masjid
Trust through Trustee Sayed Abdul Shakoor
Sayyed & Ors. .. Respondents
...
Mr.Girish Godbole with Mr.Sagheer A. Khan, G.D.Shaikh, Akif
Patel and Maaz Sayed i/b Judicare Law Associates for the
Applicant in CRA/102/19 and for Respondent No.7 in
CRAST/25385/19.
Mr.Parth Zaveri i/b Mr.Akhlaque M.S.Solkar for Respondent
Nos.8 to 13 in CRA/102/19 and for Respondent Nos.1 to 6 in
CRAST/25385/19.
Ms.Madhavi Ayyapan with Ms.Ayesha Keshodwala i/b Talekar
& Associates for the Applicant in CRAST/25385/19.
Mr.Tejesh Dande with Mr.Pradip Shingte, Mr.Bharat Gadhavi,
Mr.Aniket Aghade for the Intervenor in IAST/93681/20.
Mr.N.N.Gawade i/b M/S Sanjay Udeshi & Co. for the Applicant
in CA/40/19.
Mr.R.M.Momin for Respondent Nos.6 and 7 in CRA/102/19 and
for Respondent Nos.8 and 9 in CRAST/25385/19.
...
CORAM: BHARATI DANGRE, J.
DATED : 08th OCTOBER, 2021
JUDGMENT:-
1. The two Civil Revision Applications were placed for
expeditious hearing in terms of the order passed by the
learned Single Judge of this Court (Coram : S.C.Gupte, J.) on
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24/09/2019. In furtherance of the said order, these two
applications are heard fnally, by the consent of parties.
2. Civil Revision Application No.102 of 2019 is fled by the
Applicant challenging the judgment delivered by the
Maharashtra State Waqf Tribunal at Aurangabd (hereinafter
referred to as "the Tribunal") in Waqf Appeal No.01 of 2016,
which is instituted by Respondent Nos.1 to 5. By the said
judgment dated 16/10/2018, the Tribunal has allowed the
Appeal and has set aside the order dated 04/02/2016 passed
by the Chief Executive Offcer (C.E.O.) of the Maharashtra
State Board of Waqf, Aurangabad and the matter is remanded
back to the Board for deciding afresh, after affording an
opportunity to both the parties. The Board is directed to
expedite the matter and decide the same within a period of six
months.
As far as Civil Revision Application (St) No.25385 is
concerned, it is instituted by the Wakf and its trustees. The
relief prayed therein is to set aside the judgment and order
dated 31/08/2019, passed by the Tribunal in Wakf Application
No.34 of 2019 and to restrain the Respondents from
transferring the possession of tenements on Wakf property till
four weeks after disposal of Wakf Application under Section 40
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of the Waqf Act, pending before the Maharashtra State Board
of Wakfs. A relief is sought to continue the protection granted
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court thereby setting aside the
transfer of tenements on wakf property.
3. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective
parties.
4. The dispute in the two Applications revolves around the
land bearing Survey Nos.980 and 981 situated at Morwadi,
Nasik. The parties can be introduced in the following
manner :-
(a) Linker Shelter Pvt. Ltd., a company registered under the
Companies Act is a Developer, who has a development
agreement with the original owners; Respondent Nos.8 to 13,
are the members of Mahale family. Respondent No.1 is a Waqf
viz. Dudadhari @ Kathada @ Kagzipura Masjid Trust whereas
Respondent Nos.2 to 5 are Mutawallis of Respondent No.1.
5. Respondent Nos.2 to 5 set a claim qua the subject matter
of the land described above and alleged that the aforesaid land
is the waqf property whereas Respondent Nos.8 to 13
canvassed that they they are the owners of the said land on
the basis of their claim, that their predecessors-in-title were
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the cultivators of the said land and they had purchased the
said land as per the scheme under the Bombay Tenancy and
Agricultural Land Act, 1948 (for short, "the BTAL Act"). It is
alleged that they had also obtained the certifcate under
Section 32M of the BTAL Act. The discord between the parties
was referred to the Waqf Board and these two Civil Revision
Applications are the offshoot of the said reference.
6. Learned Counsel Mr.Godbole appearing for the Applicant
in Civil Revision Application No.102 of 2019 has placed before
me an exhaustive list of dates and events, which relate back to
the year 1923 when a claim is staked by the Respondents,
Trust that the property, which is the subject matter of the
Applications, was given to the Trust in Inaam for maintaining
the Masjid from the incomes derived there from. As against
this, event in the year 1945 is stated to be of great
consequence since at the relevant time, the forefathers of
Respondent Nos.8 to 13 were cultivating the said property and
on 10/03/1962, the Tenancy Tribunal, passed an order under
Section 32-G of the BTAL Act, fxing the purchase price of the
property and on 16/10/1967, upon payment of installments, a
certifcate under Section 32-M of the BTAL Act was issued
and was registered as per the provisions of the Registration
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Act, 1908.
The initiating point for the discord is described as the
event dated 05/02/1983, when the trustees of Respondent
No.1 fled an application under Section 18 of the Bombay
Public Trust Act, 1950 for its registration, but did not include
the said property as its properties in the application.
Pertinent to note that since the Waqf Act, 1954 was not
applicable to the State of Maharashtra except Marathwada
Region, the application was preferred under the BPT Act,
1950. Another milestone in the dispute was attained when the
Respondent/Trust fled an application under Section 36 of the
Waqf Act, 1995, on the commencement of the Waqf Act
throughout the State of Maharashtra and registration of the
subject property, as a property of Waqf was sought. The
registration was granted on 04/08/2008.
7. This event led to the respective parties to institute the
proceedings and the initiation was by the owners of the
property, who challenged the order of registration before the
Tribunal, who set aside the registration on 04/02/2016. The
Trust challenged the order by fling Waqf Appeal No.01 of 2016
where the impugned judgment came to be delivered on
16/10/2018. During this interregnum, the parties approached
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the highest Court of the land. The orders came to be passed
restraining the Applicant/Developer and the owners from
allowing handing over possession to the fat purchasers. This
order came to be modifed at some later point of time and was
made subject to the outcome of the Waqf Appeal. However, I
need not be detained by the niceties of the interim orders,
which were granted, modifed and again reinforced by
subsequent orders and I deem it expedient to go to the core
issue, which arises for determination in Civil Revision
Application No.102 of 2019.
In my endeavour to fnd out the bone of contention
between the parties in assailing the judgment dated
16/10/2018 passed in Waqf Appeal No.01 of 2016, I am assisted
by the learned counsel Mr.Godbole and Ms.Ayyapan.
8. The exhaustive judgment of the Tribunal, which runs
into 43 pages and 57 paragraphs, when carefully perused,
would divulge that the Tribunal has traced the history of
litigation, but from paragraph 44 onwards, the main issue is
dealt with and which is about the jurisdiction of the C.E.O. and
the power in passing the impugned order dated 04/02/2016 by
which the registration of the subject land as waqf property has
been set aside. The Appellant had questioned the exercise of
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power under Section 40 of the Waqf Act, 1995 by the C.E.O.
and this formed the fulcrum of the Appeal instituted by them.
9. It would be necessary to make a brief reference to the
said provision contained in the Waqf Act, which provide for the
better administration of waqf. By Section 40, the Board
constituted under Chapter IV of the Act, is empowered to
collect information regarding any property, which it has
reason to believe to be a waqf property and to determine the
question whether a particular property is waqf property or not
and whether a waqf is a Sunni waqf or a Shia waqf and for the
said purpose, it is empowered to make such inquiry as it deem
ft and decide the question. By virtue of sub-section, the
decision of the Board on a question whether the property is a
waqf property shall be fnal unless revoked or modifed by the
Section 27 permit the Board, by a general or special order in
writing, to delegate such of its power and duties under the Act
as it deem necessary to the Chairperson or to the other
member, the Chief Executive Offcer or any other offcer or
servant of the Board, subject to the conditions and limitation
as may be specifed in the said order. Certain exceptions are
carved out by the Section itself where the power cannot be
delegated.
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10. The impugned order dated 04/02/2016 is passed by the
C.E.O. of the Waqf Board, in exercise of delegation of power
fowing from the Board itself. The controversy involved in the
Civil Revision Applications can be concised and formulated, by
searching it in the order of the Tribunal and the limited
controversy is; whether the C.E.O. was delegated the powers to
deal with the application fled under Section 40 of the Act and
whether there was resolution of the Board delegating such a
power.
11. During the course of hearing of appeal before the
Tribunal, the Appellant/Trust tendered a list of documents,
which was exhibited as Exhibit 23 and which includes,
following three documents;
(1) Copy of Sanad of the year 1853;
(2) Resolution dated 13/07/2013;
(3) Resolution dated 19/12/2013
The confict is about the document at Sr.No.3; being Resolution
dated 19/12/2013. The said document came to be exhibited as
'Exh.A-12' and the said document was placed before the
Tribunal and is enlisted at page 250 of the paper-book of the
present Civil Revision Applications. The said document is in
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form of Minutes of the Board Meeting dated 19/12/2013 held
at Regional Wakf Offce, Haj House, Nagpur and is passed in the
presence of 7 members, completing the coram. On Point No.7,
the following resolution is passed.
"Establishment Section
Point No.7. Delegation of powers to the Chief Executive
Offcer, Member, Servants under section 27 of the Wakf
Act, 1995.
Resolution No. 110/2013 :- It is unanimously resolved to
delegate the powers of the Board as prescribed in
section 36, 37, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 70 to Chief Executive
Offcer for smooth functioning of the business of the
Board."
The resolution is signed by the President/Chairman of the
Maharashtra State Board of Wakfs and the fve members as
well as by the C.E.O. of the Board. It is apparent that the said
document was before the Tribunal and it was imperative for
the Tribunal to have referred the same. Instead, the Tribunal
proceed to record as under :-
"50. Here, it is disclosed that by the resolution
dtd.19.12.2013 the Board has delegated the powers to
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the C.E.O. of the Board for deciding the application
under Section 40 of the Act and by virtue of the said
powers the C.E.O. has passed the order. However, there
is no such reference of delegation of powers in the
impugned order and even the order does not speak any
such power of the Board were delegated to him for
deciding the application under Section 40 of the Act.
Not only this but the record and proceeding called from
the Board also does not have any copy of the order in
written made by the Board or the resolution of the
Board under which the powers were delegated to the
C.E.O."
12. The Respondent had placed reliance upon a letter of the
State Government dated 16/10/2015, which is in a form of
clarifcation addressed to the C.E.O. of the Board, when the
guidance is sought by the C.E.O. about the powers to be
exercised. The Government clarifed that by virtue of
resolution No.7 in the meeting dated 19/12/2013, the C.E.O.
has been delegated the powers under Sections 36, 37, 40, 41,
42, 43 and 70 of the Act alongwith Sections 69(5), 52A(3). As
per resolution No.12, the guidance is provided that in exercise
of the said powers, which are delegated, the C.E.O. shall
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discharge the day-to-day functioning of the Board and if at all
some more delegation is required, a meeting of the Waqf Board
can be called for and the resolution can be passed. The said
letter of the Government dated 16/10/2015 fnds place at page
No.248 of the paper-book.
13. As far as the said letter is concerned, the Tribunal
concluded that this is not a authority letter, which would
empower the C.E.O. to decide the application under Section
40(1) of the Act and even the State Government is not
empowered by law to delegate the powers, which are vested
with the Board, as Section 27 of the Act makes it clear that
only the Board can delegate the powers to the C.E.O. or
chairperson as contemplated under the said provision. Here,
the Tribunal is right, as the said letter of the Government does
not delegate the power because the delegation under Section
27 must come from the Board itself. After recording this, in
paragraph 23 of the impugned judgment, the Tribunal
observed as under :-
"53. Even the resolution of the Board
dtd.19.12.2013 which is referred in the said letter is
not produced on record. The surprising thing that, the
Board is party but no any attempt is also made from
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the Board to substantiate their contention to produce
the said resolution of the Board by which the powers
are delegated to the C.E.O.. In short, there is no any
document on record to show that the C.E.O. was
delegated the powers of the Board to decide the
application under Section 40(1) of the Act of
petitioner."
14. The said observation of the Tribunal is clamped as
perverse, as it has failed to take into consideration the
resolution of the Board dtd.19/12/2013, which was placed
before the Tribunal by the Appellants themselves. I agree with
the said submission. The said fnding is undoubtedly perverse
as the Tribunal has recorded that, since the order of C.E.O.
does not speak of any such resolution, nor the Government
communication dated 16/10/2015 grants delegation in favour
of the C.E.O. and thirdly, the resolution of the Board itself is not
produced. This observation is in utter contrast to the factum
of production of resolution before the Tribunal by the
Appellants themselves vide Exhibit 23. Now, the Tribunal has
travelled further and made the following observations in
paragraph 56,
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"56. Since, the order of the C.E.O. is without
jurisdiction and hence the application under Section 40
of the Act is to be decided by the authority having a
competent jurisdiction, particularly by the Board as per
the directions of the Hon'ble High Court and hence it is
just to remand the matter with direction to decide it as
a fresh by the Board."
15. True it is, that this Court directed the Board to decide the
application under Section 40(1), but when the power of the
Board is delegated to the C.E.O., necessarily the Board is
denuded of its power to decide the application and the decision
of the C.E.O., in exercise of the power delegated to it, cannot be
said to be without jurisdiction. The Tribunal has completely
omitted the relevant document, being a resolution dated
19/12/2013, which clearly delegate the power of the Board to
the C.E.O. and this delegation is qua the several powers under
the Act, which include the power under Section 40 to conduct
an inquiry.
16. Learned counsel appearing for the Respondents makes a
futile attempt to justify the order by relying upon the
application for production of documents, which came to be
exhibited as Exhibit 36. On 18/04/2016, certain documents
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were sought to be produced on record of the Tribunal, which
include some old revenue records and pre-independent era
documents received from the Archives Department and also
the letters written by the members of the Wakf Board,
objecting to the delegation of powers to the C.E.O. of the Board.
Alongwith the said application what is annexed is, a letter
signed by the three members of the Maharashtra State Wakf
Board and the subject mentioned is "withdrawal of the board's
power delegated to CEO".
A careful reading of the said letter, at the most is
indicative of a proposed resolution to be put up before the
Board for withdrawal of power from the C.E.O., but this surely
is not a resolution passed by the Board. It can be very well
said that if the power has been conferred upon the C.E.O. by a
resolution, it shall be withdrawn in a like manner i.e. it could
have been withdrawn only by the Board by passing the
resolution. A letter being addressed by the three members to
the C.E.O., in no case would amount to withdrawal of powers
conferred by a resolution passed by the Board on 19/12/2013.
In any case, the Appellant never relied upon this document
while the Tribunal dealt with the point of delegation of power
to the C.E.O. by resolution of the Board dted 19/12/2013. This
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is probably for the reason that the counsel for the Appellants
was conscious that this letter dated 21/08/2014 does not
amount to withdrawal of delegation.
17. Learned counsel of the Respondents has vehemently
argued that the delegation itself is improper and there cannot
be a blanket delegation in light of Section 27 of the Waqf Act
and she placed reliance upon a decision of this Court in case of
Shaikh Saleemuddin s/o Shaikh Ameenuddin & Ors. Vs. Baba
s/o Manna Quereshi & Anr.,1. When the said decision is
perused, it can be seen that the issue before the learned Single
Judge of this Court was revolving around framing of a scheme
under Section 32 of the Act, which in fact was a scheme under
Section 69, and the argument was, the Chief Executive Offcer
had no powers to frame such a scheme. This judgment does
not assist the parties in any way.
When Section 27 of the Act makes it clear that the Board
can delegate its powers and duties under the Act to any person
mentioned in the said provision and when the Board has
chosen to exercise its power, being delegated to the C.E.O. to
determine the question whether the subject property is waqf
property and the C.E.O. accordingly has passed an order in
1 2015(3)Mh.L.J. 681
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exercise of his delegated power and, when the delegation by
the resolution is never called in question, I do not see any
reason to doubt the correctness of the delegation by the
resolution.
18. The aforesaid would clearly lead to an irresistible
conclusion that the Tribunal has failed to consider the
resolution dated 19/12/2013, which forms the core of the
appeal, although it was placed before it by the Appellants
themselves. The short point on which the impugned judgment
deserves to be set aside is this. Resultantly, the decision of the
Tribunal remanding the appeal back to the Board for taking a
decision on an application preferred under Section 40 of the
Waqf Act, therefore, cannot be sustained as it suffers from
perversity.
19. Upon such a conclusion being arrived, learned counsel
appearing for the Applicants, Respondents as well as the
Intervenors are at consensus that the Tribunal shall decide the
appeal on its merits as it has passed the order on a technical
ground, being the alleged resolution delegating the powers to
the C.E.O. is not on record. Now, since it is noticed that the
very said document i.e. Resolution dated 19/12/2013 was
before the Tribunal, it cannot discard its responsibility to
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decide the appeal on merits, where the order passed by the
C.E.O. is questioned, which it has refused to do on a technical
ground, that the resolution which was said to be the basis of
the power of the C.E.O.. Hence, the Tribunal shall decide the
appeal fled by the Appellants on its own merits. The parties
are also consenting to an order that the appeal pending before
the Tribunal shall be decided within a period of four weeks
from today and both the sides to the appeal shall render their
co-operation to the Tribunal in concluding the appeal within
the stipulated period.
20. As far as the position about the fats being allowed to be
transferred or not to be transferred is concerned, my attention
was invited to a factual position to the effect that 634 fats
have been constructed by the petitioner No.1 on the subject
property and out of which, 491 fats have been handed over to
the purchasers, but the remaining could not be handed over on
account of the orders being at variance from time to time. In
any case, learned counsel Mr. Godbole appearing for the
Applicant concede to the fact that there shall be no more
confusion at their end and the stage at which the party stands
as on today, shall continue till fnal decision by the Tribunal in
Appeal No.01 of 2016 and since, the Tribunal is now directed to
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decide the appeal within a period of four weeks, status-quo as
on today shall be maintained by the parties till its culmination
after four weeks.
21. Civil Revision Application (St) No.25385 of 2019 pose a
challenge to the order dated 31/08/2019 passed by the Wakf
Tribunal in Wakf Application No.34 of 2019. It is pertinent to
note that by the said order, the Tribunal has quashed and set
aside the order dated 18/02/2019 and order dated 02/03/2019
passed by the Wakf Board, by which it had directed
continuation of the status-quo order granted by this Court till
passing of further orders. In any case, the said orders were in
nature of interim orders and on 31/08/2019, the Tribunal had
made an order to the effect that if any transaction is made by
the contesting Respondent with any purchasers for selling of
fat, it shall be subject to the decision of the application fled by
the Trust under Section 40(1) of the Wakf Act. Since the
Application under Section 40(1) preferred by the Trust will be
adjudicated upon by the Tribunal within a period of four
weeks, no orders are necessary on the aforesaid Civil Revision
Application, which stands disposed of.
22. Civil Revision Application No.102 of 2019 is allowed in
the aforesaid term and the impugned judgment of the Waqf
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Tribunal in Appeal No.01 of 2016 is set aside. The Tribunal
shall adjudicate the Appeal on its own merits, uninfuenced by
any observations, touching the merits of the matter.
23. In view of the disposal of the Civil Revision Applications,
the Interim Applications do not survive and are disposed of.
( SMT. BHARATI DANGRE, J.)
M.M.Salgaonkar
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