Bombay High Court
Sunil S/O. Ratnakar Gutte vs State Of Maharashtra, Thr. ... on 11 January, 2021
Bench: S.B. Shukre, Avinash G. Gharote
12 wp 866-18-Judgment 1/10
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 866 OF 2018
PETITIONER :- Sunil Ratnakar Gutte
Aged about 36 years, Occupation
Business, C/o M/s Sunil Hitech Engineers
Limited, 97, East High Court Road,
Ramdaspeth, Nagpur, 440010
(Maharashtra).
...VERSUS...
RESPONDENTS :- 1. State of Maharashtra, through Police
Station Officer, Police Station, Sitabuldi,
Nagpur.
2. Commissioner of Police, Nagpur.
3. State of Punjab, Through Principal
Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs,
Chandigarh.
4. Director General of Police,
State of Punjab, having office at Jan
Marg, 9A,Sector -9.
5. Senior Superintendent of Police,
Bathinda, Punjab.
6. Police Station Officer,
Police Station, Civil Lines, Bathinda,
Punjab.
7. Officer In Charge,
Economic Offences Wing City-II,
Kavita
::: Uploaded on - 13/01/2021 ::: Downloaded on - 07/02/2021 09:44:14 :::
12 wp 866-18-Judgment 2/10
Bathinda, Punjab.
8. Shri.Ajay Pal Garg
Proprietor of M/s Siya Trading Company,
having its office at 12762,1st Floor,
Bhatti Road, Bhatinda, Punjab.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. S.V. Bhutada, counsel for the petitioner.
Ms. H.N. Jaipurkar, APP for respondent nos.1 and 2
Mr. S.A.Chaudhari, counsel for respondent nos.5 to 7.
Mr. Anand Parchure, counsel for respondent no.8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CORAM : SUNIL B.SHUKRE &
AVINASH G. GHAROTE, JJ.
DATE : 11.01.2021.
ORAL J U D G M E N T (Per :Sunil B.Shukre, J.)
Heard.
2. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally
by consent of the learned counsels appearing for the parties.
3. The petitioner is one of the accused in Crime No.0158
of 2018 registered for an offence punishable under Section 420 of
the Indian Penal Code against him on the basis of the complaint
lodged by respondent no.8. The respondent no.8 has alleged that
the petitioner, as Managing Director of VAG Buildtech Limited,
Kavita
12 wp 866-18-Judgment 3/10
formerly known as Sunil Hitech India Infra Pvt.Ltd., after having
purchased steel and cement from respondent no.8 at different
times, and also having furnished corporate guarantees for paying
the items purchased from respondent no.8, failed in his promise
and committed default in making proper payments to the
respondent no.8. According to respondent no.8, the petitioner
purchased steel and cement worth ₹ 1,07,88,262/- from him and 1,07,88,262/- from him and
the purchase was made at Bathinda. Respondent no.8 further
alleged that out of the said amount of ₹ 1,07,88,262/- from him and 1,07,88,262/-, the
petitioner paid some amount and an amount of ₹ 1,07,88,262/- from him and 82,46,180/- is
still outstanding against him. The respondent no.8 has alleged
that not making payment of such huge amount displayed
dishonest intention on the part of the petitioner and the persons,
who signed the corporate guarantees on behalf of the Company
and therefore, respondent no.8 filed a complaint against the
petitioner and other persons. This is how the offence punishable
under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code vide FIR No. 0158 of
2018 came to be registered against the petitioner and some other
persons at Bathinda.
Kavita
12 wp 866-18-Judgment 4/10
4. The petitioner submits that the complaint has been
filed by respondent no.8 against him and other persons with a
mala fide intention to harass the petitioner, although no criminal
offence of any nature is made out against any of them. The
petitioner has therefore filed this petition with a prayer for
quashing and setting aside the impugned First Information Report
registered at Police Station Bathinda with an alternate prayer
seeking transfer of the investigation into the said First Information
Report from Bathinda Police Station to Police Station Sitabuldi,
Nagpur.
5. Shri. Bhutada, learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that as the alleged offence has taken place at different
places namely, Bathinda and also Nagpur from where the
purchase order was placed, this Court would have the jurisdiction.
He also submits that prima facie no offence of cheating as
punishable under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is made
out in the present case as the allegations, accepted as they are, do
not disclose any dishonest intention since the beginning of the
transactions.
Kavita
12 wp 866-18-Judgment 5/10
6. The petition is strongly opposed by learned counsel
appearing for respondent nos.5 to 8. Shri. Anand Parchure,
learned counsel appearing for respondent no.8 submits that prima
facie case for registration of the offence of cheating is squarely
made out in the present case against the petitioner and other
persons and that custody of the petitioner is very much required
for the reason that the petitioner is not co-operating with Bathinda
police in any manner. Shri Saurabh Chaudhari, learned counsel
appearing for the respondent nos.5 to 7 submits on the similar
lines. Thus, respondent nos.5 to 8 seek dismissal of this petition.
7. Learned APP adopts the argument advanced by Shri
Anand Parchure learned counsel appearing for respondent no.8.
8. On going through the allegations made in the
complaint, prima facie, we are of the opinion that the place of the
alleged offence in the present matter is Bathinda and it does not
appear to us that the offence or any part thereof has also taken
place at any place situated in Maharashtra including Nagpur. In
order to determine territorial jurisdiction of this Court, what is
Kavita
12 wp 866-18-Judgment 6/10
material is the place of occurrence of the offence and not the
place of residence of the accused person. The law laid down by
the Hon'ble Suprer Court in this regard is well settled. In the case
of Navinchandra N.Majithia Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in
AIR 2000 SC 2966, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in
Paragraph Nos.13,38 and 43 as under:-
"13. We make it clear that the mere fact
that FIR was registered in a particular State, is
not the sole criterion to decide that no cause of
action has arisen even partly within the
territorial limits of jurisdiction of another State.
Nor are we to be understood that any person
can create a fake cause of action or even
concoct one by simply jutting into the territorial
limits of another State or by making a sojourn
or even a permanent residence therein. The
place of residence of the person moving a High
Court is not the criterion to determine the
contours of the cause of action in the particular
writ petition. The High Court before which the
writ petition is filed must ascertain whether
any part of the cause of action has arisen within
the territorial limits of its jurisdiction. It
depends upon the facts in each case.
38. So far as the question of territorial
jurisdiction with reference to a criminal offence
is concerned the main factor to be considered is
the place where the alleged offence was
committed.
43. Tested in the light of the principles
laid down in the cases noted above the
Kavita
12 wp 866-18-Judgment 7/10
judgment of the High Court under challenge is
unsustainable. The High Court failed to
consider all the relevant facts necessary to
arrive at a proper decision on the question of
maintainability of the writ petition, on the
ground of lack of international jurisdiction. The
Court based its decision on the sole
consideration that the complainant had filed the
complaint at Shillong in the State of Meghalaya
and the petitioner had prayed for quashing the
said complaint. The High Court did not also
consider the alternative prayer made in the writ
petition that a writ of mandamus be issued to
the State of Meghalaya to transfer the
investigation to Mumbai Police. The High Court
also did not take note of the averments in the
writ petition that filing of the complaint at
Shillong was a mala fide move on the part of
the complainant to harass and pressurise the
petitioners to reverse the transaction for
transfer of shares. The relief sought in the writ
petition may be one of the relevant criteria for
consideration of the question but cannot be the
sole consideration in the matter. On the
averments made in the writ petition gist of
which has been noted earlier it cannot be said
that no part of the cause of action for filing the
writ petition arose within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court''.
9. It would be clear from the above referred
observations that the High Court would be invested with
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India only
when a complaint or the First Information Report discloses that
Kavita
12 wp 866-18-Judgment 8/10
the place where the alleged offence is committed is within the
territorial jurisdiction of the High Court and that, the place of
residence of the accused persons, is hardly material.
10. Similar is the view taken by Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the case of Rajendra Ramchandra Kavalekar Vs.State of
Maharashtra and anr. reported in (2009) 11 SCC 286.
11. In the present case, the alleged offence consisted of
three parts namely: (1) placing of purchase order and its
acceptance (2) delivery of the purchased articles and (3) payment
to be made to the seller. The articles that were purchased by the
petitioner from respondent no.8 were steel and cement and
although the purchase order was issued from a place in
Maharashtra, it was accepted at a place in Bathinda and so the
transaction of the purchase was completed at a place situated at
Bathinda. Secondly, the articles were supplied and delivered not
at a place anywhere in Maharashtra but at Bathinda only. Thirdly,
the payment was to reach a dealer i.e. respondent no.8 whose
office and place of business was situated at Bathinda. There is no
Kavita
12 wp 866-18-Judgment 9/10
dispute about these facts. These facts, therefore, would show that
all the ingredients of the offence had arisen and had taken place
at Bathinda and therefore, in our considered view, it would only
be the Criminal Court situated at Bathinda which would have
territorial jurisdiction over the alleged offence and therefore, it
would be for Bathinda Police to make investigation into the
offence, if any.
12. In the circumstances, we are of the view that this
Court would not have any jurisdiction to entertain this petition
seeking quashing of the First Information Report and or in the
alternative granting transfer of the investigation to Nagpur Police.
On similar facts in the case of Rajendra Kavalekar Vs. State of
Maharashtra (Supra), a Division Bench of this Court had declined
to entertain the writ petition and the Hon'ble Supreme Court had
found such refusal to entertain the petition by this High Court as
just and proper.
13. In the result, the petition cannot be allowed and it is
rejected on the ground that it is not maintainable before this
Kavita
12 wp 866-18-Judgment 10/10
Court. Rule is discharged.
14. Shri Bhutada, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner has made a request for continuation of the interim relief
granted by this Court on 10.09.2018 for a further period of two
weeks to enable the petitioner to take appropriate steps in the
matter. The prayer is opposed by Shri. Anand Parchure, learned
counsel for the respondent no.8 and by Shri. Saurabh Chaudhari,
learned Counsel appearing for respondent nos.4 to 7.
15. Considering the fact that interim order is in operation
for a period of one and half year, we are of the view that its
further continuation for another two weeks more would not
prejudice any of the parties here and as such interim relief granted
on 10.09.2018 is further extended for a period of two weeks from
the date of the order.
JUDGE JUDGE
Kavita
