Shashikant Ananat Kale vs Mumbai Municial Corporation And ...
2021 Latest Caselaw 3351 Bom

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             Sharayu Khot.
                         IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                            ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

                                  WRIT PETITION NO.1370 OF 2020
                                                WITH
                             INTERIM APPLICATION (L) NO. 3024 OF 2021
                                                   IN
                                  WRIT PETITION NO.1370 OF 2020


                  Shashikant Anant Kale                              ...Petitioner

                         Versus

                  1.   Mumbai Municipal Corporation
                  2.   The State of Maharashtra                      ...Respondents

                                                ----------
                  Mr. Sandesh Patil, i/by Mr. Chintan Shah for the Petitioner.
                  Mr. A.V. Bukhari, Senior Advocate a/w Mr. B. Bukhari, Ms.
                  Rupali Adhate for the Respondent-MCGM.
                  Mr. S.B. Gore, AGP for the Respondent-State.
                  Mr. H.D. Parab, Dy. Chief Fire Offcer, C.F.O. Dept.
                  Mr. S.D. Sawant, Dy. Chief Fire Offcer, I/c CFO Dept.
                  Mr. Kashish Mainkar, i/by Wadia Ghandy & Co. for the
                  Applicant in IAL/3024/21.
                                                ----------
Sharayu
P. Khot
                                                CORAM :          K.K. TATED &
Digitally
signed by
                                                                 R.I. CHAGLA, JJ.

Sharayu P.

Khot Date:

2021.03.16
17:48:11
+0530
                                               DATE          :   23 February 2021

                  JUDGMENT : (Per R.I. Chagla, J.)

1. The present Petition is fled under Article 226 of the

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Constitution of India, the Petitioner challenges the order dated

25th November 2020 ("the impugned order") issued by the

Joint Municipal Commissioner as well as by the Municipal

Commissioner of the Respondent No. 1, by which additional

charge of Chief Fire Offcer given to the Petitioner has been

withdrawn with effect from 25th November 2020.

2. The other fnal prayers in the Petition have been

deleted by the amendment carried out today. A brief

background of facts is necessary.

3. The Petitioner was appointed as Assistant Offcer in

the Mumbai Fire Brigade on 16th February 1989. Thereafter,

the Petitioner was promoted on 1st April 1996 to the post of

Station Offcer and subsequent to that on 1st November 2005

was promoted to the post of Assistant Divisional Fire Offcer

and in 2009 to the post of Divisional Fire Offcer. On 22nd May

2012, the Petitioner was promoted to the post of Deputy Chief

Fire Offcer.

4. On 10th August 2020 the Petitioner was given

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temporarily additional charge of Chief Fire Offcer. The post of

Chief Fire Offcer held by one Mr. Prabhat Rahangdale felt

vacant on 28th August 2020 and accordingly, the departmental

promotion committee consisting of 6 members (5 IAS offcers)

headed by the Commissioner considered the name of the

Petitioner to be eligible for appointment to the post of Chief Fire

Offcer. This was at a meeting of committee dated 28th August,

2020 of which minutes were prepared. In the minutes it is

mentioned that for the post of Chief Fire Offcer, the Petitioner

is required to be considered as eligible.

5. The Petitioner has stated in the Petition that on

31st October 2020 the decision of the departmental promotion

committee recorded in the minutes of the meeting dated 28th

August 2020 was forwarded for being placed before the Works

Committee in the meeting held on 31st October 2020. This

decision was approved by the Works Committee. An order was

passed to this effect by the Works Committee of the Respondent

No. 1-Municipal Corporation ("Respondent - Corporation").

6. The Petitioner has further stated that the proposal

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to promote the Petitioner as Chief Fire Offcer was placed before

the General Body Meeting of the Corporation and the General

Body Meeting of the Corporation approved the proposal under

Item No. 144 and ultimately resolution was passed in the

General Body Meeting of the Respondent No. 1-Corporation

approving the proposal to promote the Petitioner to the post of

the Chief Fire Offcer on 24th November 2020.

7. On 25th November 2020 the impugned order was

passed withdrawing the additional charge of Chief Fire Offcer

given to the Petitioner with effect from the same date. It was

mentioned in the impugned order that Shri. Kailash D.

Hiwarale, who was currently Deputy Fire Offcer (Circle-2)

shall handle the present assignment and shall also take charge

as Chief Fire Offcer till further orders.

8. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has during

the arguments relied upon the communication dated 3rd

December 2020 (communication is part of compilation as it

was addressed after the fling of the Petition) addressed by the

Secretary, Respondent-Corporation to the Administrative

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Offcer wherein it is mentioned that the appointment of the

Petitioner to the offce of Chief Fire Offcer is approved by the

Respondent - Corporation with effect from 24th November

2020. This has been relied upon during the arguments by the

learned Counsel for the Petitioner to show that inspite of what

is termed by the Petitioner as "Demotion" of the Petitioner from

the post of Chief Fire Offcer by the Municipal Commissioner of

the Respondent -Corporation vide the impugned order, the

Respondent -Corporation which was the appointing authority

had issued appointment letter dated 3rd December 2020.

9. Being aggrieved by the impugned order dated 25th

November 2020, the Petitioner has fled the present Petition.

10. An Affdavit in Reply has been fled by the

Respondent No. 1-Corporation which is dated 8th January

2021 and which Affdavit in Reply has been affrmed by Mr.

Kailash Vitthalrao Hiwarale working as Chief Fire Offcer (I/C)

in the Mumbai Fire Brigade Department of the Respondent -

Corporation. Paragraph 6 of the said Affdavit in Reply reads

thus:-

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"6. I say that by an Order No. MPS/7869 (840) dated 10/08/2020 issued by the Hon'ble Municipal Commissioner, Petitioner was given additional charge of Chief Fire Offcer. Over and above his duty of Deputy Chief Fire Offcer, he was given additional charge of Chief Fire Offcer. The said additional charge of Chief Fire Offcer was withdrawn by the Municipal Commissioner, vide an Order No. MGC/F./2961 dated 25/11/2020, which was communicated to the Petitioner vide Order dated 25/11/2020. I say that there is no order of demotion as alleged by the Petitioner as he was given only additional charge of Chief Fire Offcer over and above his duties of Dy. Chief Fire Offcer and which was withdrawn by the Municipal Commissioner for valid and justifed reason. The Petitioner has no vested right on the post of Chief Fire Offcer as he was merely holding additional charge. I say that since the Municipal Commissioner has issued the Order giving additional charge of Chief Fire Offcer to Petitioner, the Municipal Commissioner was entitle in law to withdraw the said additional charge. Thus the action of the Municipal Commissioner is perfectly legal, valid as per the law and within his jurisdiction. Hereto annexed and marked as Exhibit "A" is the copy of the said Order dated 10/08/2020 issued by the Municipal Commissioner giving additional charge of Chief Fire Offcer to the Petitioner and Exhibit "B" and "B1" colly are the copies of the Orders dated 25/11/2020,

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withdrawing the additional charge. I say that in compliance to the said order dated 25/11/2020, Petitioner has handed over additional charge of Chief Fire Offcer to Mr. Kailash V. Hiwarale, without any objection and protest. Hereto annexed and marked as Exhibit "C" is the copy of the hand over charge letter dated 25/11/2020 duly signed by the Petitioner and Mr. Kailash V. Hiwrale."

11. It is thus, stated in the Reply that there was

no order of demotion as claimed by the Petitioner as he was

given only additional charge of Chief Fire Offcer over and above

his duties of Deputy Chief Fire Offcer. This additional charge

was withdrawn by the Municipal Commissioner for a valid and

justifed reason. It has thereafter, been stated in the Reply that

on 25th November 2020 the Petitioner himself handed over the

charge to the Deponent of that Affdavit, who was the then

Deputy Chief Fire Offcer and who had been given additional

charge of Chief Fire Offcer by the impugned order dated 25th

November 2020. It has further been stated in the Reply that

the promotion committee of the Respondent - Corporation had

considered the Petitioner as an eligible candidate for promotion

to the post of Chief Fire Offcer. However, this would be purely

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on temporary basis for six months. This was only a proposal to

appoint the Petitioner as Chief Fire Offcer which was

thereafter, approved and was considered by the Works

Committee (City) who gave its recommendation to the said

proposal for sanction by the General Body of the Municipal

Corporation vide Resolution No. 52 passed in the meeting held

on 31st October 2020. The proposal with the recommendation

of the Works Committee was placed before General Body of the

Municipal Commissioner under Item No. 71 and the General

Body of the Municipal Corporation in its meeting held on 24th

November 2020, passed Resolution No. 144 according the

sanction to the said proposal for flling of the probable vacant

post of Chief Fire Offcer by promotion to the Petitioner for

temporary period of six months subject to concurrence of the

Maharashtra Public Service Commission. This was the decision

communicated to the offcer of the Municipal Commissioner by

the Municipal Secretary vide intimation dated 3rd December

2020. There is no offcial order for promotion issued to the

Petitioner and communicated to him and no charge of Chief

Fire Offcer has been given till today to the Petitioner.

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12. Mr. Sandesh Patil, learned Counsel for the

Petitioner has submitted that the Petitioner's appointment as

Chief Fire Offcer was approved by the Respondent -

Corporation contrary to the impugned order passed by the

Municipal Commissioner which sought to take away the

additional charge as Chief Fire Offcer given to the Petitioner.

He has submitted that it is the General Body of the Respondent

- Corporation who has appointed the Petitioner. He has placed

reliance on Section 80A of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation

Act, 1888 (for short "the Act"), which provides that a person

who is above rank of executive engineer, as in the present case,

has to be appointed by the General Body of the Respondent -

Corporation. He has submitted that only the General Body of

the Respondent -Corporation could in exercise of Section 80A

of the Act appoint the Petitioner as a Chief Fire Offcer.

13. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has further

submitted that from the facts of the case, it is clear that the

Municipal Commissioner had recommended the Petitioner for

the purpose of appointment as Chief Fire Offcer on 20th

August 2020 on the ground that the scheduled post was

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vacant. The post being singular would thus have permanency

and that the post of Chief Fire Offcer has never be treated as a

temporary post as per the State Government Circular of 2017

which was applicable where the number of vacant post is more

than one and promotion in reservation policy is applicable. It

has been mentioned in the said Circular that the post of Chief

Fire Offcer is a vacant singular post and the policy of

reservation is not applicable. Hence, the said post is

permanent.

14. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has

further submitted that the contention of the Respondent -

Corporation that the Petitioner was never appointed to the post

of Chief Fire Offcer and was not holding the charge of Chief Fire

Offcer is totally false and contrary to the facts on record which

show that the Petitioner was in fact appointed as Chief Fire

Offcer.

15. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has further

drawn reference to Section 83 of the Act which mentions that

the Authority which has power to appoint shall have the power

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to remove. He has submitted that in the present case, the

Municipal Commissioner who had never appoint the Petitioner

would have no power to remove the Petitioner from the post of

Chief Fire Offcer by issuance of the impugned order. He has

submitted that the contention of the Respondent that the

Petitioner was holding additional charge, is watered down in

the light of the facts on record.

16. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has

thereafter, contended that assuming without admitting that the

Petitioner was not appointed as a Chief Fire Offcer and was

merely holding additional charge of Chief Fire Offcer, the

reasons for his removal are unjustifed. He has submitted that

the Petitioner had given information regarding Deputy Chief

Commissioner Mr. Rahangdale who also happened to be the

Director of the fre services under the Fire Act. Although

certain allegations have been made by the Petitioner against

Mr. Rahangdale, this has not been to the liking of the

Respondent - Corporation, who chose to withdraw the charge of

Chief Fire Offcer from the Petitioner. He has submitted that the

action taken by the Respondent - Corporation which was by

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way of demotion of the Petitioner from the charge of Chief Fire

Offcer showed undue haste as on the same day of demotion, the

impugned order was circulated and signed by as many six

offcers of the Respondent - Corporation.

17. The action of the Respondent - Corporation

was sought to be justifed on the ground that the Petitioner had

supplied incorrect information of his services for the purpose of

obtaining the presidential award. The learned Counsel for the

Petitioner has submitted that the Petitioner contrary to the

assertions of the Respondent -Corporation had never signed

the character certifcate nor the integrity certifcate and had

not misguided the Authorities regarding his gradation. It has

been alleged by the Respondent - Corporation that although he

did not have outstanding grade for the years 2012-13 and 2013-

14 yet he had misguided the Authorities with attempt to obtain

the integrity certifcate. He has submitted that these are false

assertions to justify his demotion as Chief Fire Offcer which

had been done by the Municipal Commissioner, although he had

no power under the Act to do so. Accordingly, he has submitted

that the Petition be made absolute by setting aside the

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impugned order.

18. Mr. A.V. Bukhari, the learned Senior Counsel

appearing for Respondent - Corporation has submitted that

there was no order of demotion of the Petitioner from the post

of Chief Fire Offcer, as the charge of Chief Fire Offcer was only

by way of an additional charge given to the Petitioner by the

Municipal Commissioner on 10th August 2020. This additional

charge of Chief Fire Offcer given to the Petitioner was over and

above his duties of Deputy Fire Offcer and the withdrawal of

additional charge by the Municipal Commissioner was for valid

and justifed reasons. He has submitted that the Petitioner had

no vested right to the post of Chief Fire Offcer since he was

merely holding additional charge. Since the Municipal

Commissioner had issued the order giving the additional

charge of Chief Fire Offcer to the Petitioner, it was the

Municipal Commissioner who was entitled in law to withdraw

the additional charge.

19. The learned Senior Counsel for the

Respondent - Corporation has in this context relied upon

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Section 64(3)(b) of the Act. Section 64(3)(b) of the Act

provides that the entire executive power for the purpose of

carrying out the provisions of the Act vests in the Municipal

Commissioner who shall prescribe the duties of, and exercise

supervision and control over the acts and proceedings of all

municipal offcers and servants, other than the municipal

secretary and the municipal offcers and servants immediately

subordinate to him. He has submitted that it is in exercise of

such executive power that the Municipal Commissioner had

given additional charge of Chief Fire Offcer to the Petitioner

and upon considering that there were valid and justifable

reasons for withdrawal of such additional charge of Chief Fire

Offcer given to the Petitioner, has withdrawn the additional

charge.

20. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent -

Corporation has further submitted that in compliance with the

impugned order, the Petitioner had handed over the additional

charge of Chief Fire Offcer to Mr. Kailash Hiwarale without any

objection and protest. He has submitted that inspite of handing

over the additional charge of Chief Fire Offcer to Mr. Hiwarale,

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the Petitioner had by way of after thought, fled the present

Petition on 1st December 2020. He has submitted that the only

prayer in this Petition is for quashing and setting aside of the

impugned order. He has submitted that by the impugned order

only the additional charge as Chief Fire Offcer which had been

given to the Petitioner on 10th August 2020 was being

withdrawn / terminated by the Municipal Commissioner with

effect from 25th November 2020.

21. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent -

Corporation has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court

in Ramakant Shripad Sinai Advalpalkar Vs. Union of India &

Ors.1 in support of his submission that the Petitioner who was

holding a lower post was merely asked to discharge the duties

of the higher post which cannot be treated as a promotion. The

Petitioner continues to hold his substantive lower post and only

discharges the duties of the higher post essentially as a stop-

gap arrangement. It has been held that such situation of asking

the offcer of holding a lower post merely to discharge the

duties of a higher post are contemplated where exigencies of

public service necessitate such arrangements and even

1 1991 Supp (2) SCC 733

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consideration of seniority do not enter into it. He has submitted

that in the present case, initially the charge conferred by the

Municipal Commissioner on the Petitioner as Chief Fire Offcer

could not be treated as a promotion and was merely a stop-gap

arrangement, which could purely on the basis of exigencies of

public services be withdrawn.

22. The learned Senior Counsel for the

Respondent - Corporation has thereafter, drawn the attention

of this Court to the proposal for approval of the Petitioner as

Chief Fire Offcer. He has submitted that the Petitioner was

found eligible to occupy the post of Chief Fire Offcer purely on

temporary basis for six months only. However, this was only a

proposal and this proposal had been considered by the Works

Committee of the Respondent - Corporation and upon their

recommendation, placed before General Body of the

Respondent - Corporation under Item No. 71 in this meeting

held on 24th November 2020. Resolution No. 144 was passed in

meeting held on 24th November 2020 which accorded sanction

to the said proposal for flling the vacant post of Chief Fire

Offcer by promotion to the Petitioner for a temporary period of

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six months. However, this was subject to concurrence of the

Maharashtra Public Service Commission. This decision was

communicated by the offce of the Municipal Corporation by the

Municipal Secretary vide intimation dated 3rd December 2020.

He has further clarifed that neither the promotion committee

nor Works Committee nor the General Body of the Municipal

Commissioner granted the promotion to the Petitioner as has

been falsely alleged. It is only the proposal dated 2nd

September 2020 of the Municipal Commissioner which was

approved and sanctioned and before proceeding further in the

matter for issuance of offcial promotion to the Petitioner, the

acts of the Petitioner came to the notice of the Respondent -

Corporation particularly with regard to the Petitioner's giving

incorrect information for the purpose of obtaining the

presidential award by not disclosing the fact that the Petitioner

did not have outstanding grade for the years 2012-13 and 2013-

14. In view of which there has been no offcial order of

promotion issued to the Petitioner and communicated to him

and no charge has been given to the Petitioner of Chief Fire

Offcer. He has submitted that there is no merit in the Petition

which challenges only the impugned order withdrawing the

additional charge of the Chief Fire Offcer to the Petitioner and

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the Petition be dismissed.

23. Having considered these submissions, it

would appropriate to consider the surviving prayers sought for

in the Petition prayers namely (d) and (e), which read thus:-

"d) By an appropriate writ direction order of the Hon'ble Court, the offce order dated 25/11/2020 issued by the Joint Municipal Commissioner of the respondent No. 1 annexed to "Exhibit E" to this petition be quashed and set aside.

e) By an appropriate writ direction order of the Hon'ble Court, the offce order dated 25/11/2020 issued by the Municipal Commissioner of the respondent No. 1 referred to in "Exhibit E" above, be quashed and set aside."

24. The fnal prayers viz. (a) to (c) were deleted

on 23rd February 2021 (today). It is clear from the surviving

prayers that the Petitioner has confned himself to a challenge

to the impugned order. Thus, it would be appropriate to

understand the purport of the impugned order by which the

Petitioner claims that he was demoted from the post of Chief

Fire Offcer.

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25. From the impugned order it is clear that the

Petitioner had been given additional charge as Chief Fire Offcer

on 10th August 2020 and which additional charge was

withdrawn with effect from 25th November 2020. The

additional charge had been given by the Municipal

Commissioner which was by the impugned order withdrawn by

the Municipal Commissioner. It is thus, necessary to see

whether the Municipal Commissioner had in fact power to

withdraw such additional charge from the Petitioner. Under

Section 64 of the Act the function of several Municipal

Authorities have been provided. Under Sub-Section 3 of Section

64 the entire executive power for the purpose of carrying out

the provisions of this Act has been vested in the Commissioner.

In Clause (b) of Sub-Section 3 of Section 64, it is provided as

under:-

"64(3)(b) prescribe the duties of, and exercise supervision and control over, the acts and proceedings of all municipal offcers and servants, other than the municipal secretary and the municipal offcers and servants immediately subordinate to him and subject to regulations at the time being in force under section 81 dispose of all questions relating to

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the service of the said offcers and servants and their pay, privileges and allowances"

26. Thus, it is clear from this provision that the

Municipal Commissioner exerts the power to carry out the

provisions of the Act including prescribing the duties and

exercise of supervision and control over the acts and

proceedings of all municipal offcers and servants, other than

the municipal secretary and the municipal offcers and

servants immediately subordinate to him. Thus, the Municipal

Commissioner would have the power to prescribe the duties of

the Municipal Offcers and servants which included the

Petitioner and which would further include conferring

additional charge of Chief Fire Offcer to the Petitioner such as

in the present case. This would clearly be within the power to

be exercised by the Municipal Commissioner and likewise the

withdrawal/termination of the additional charge of Chief Fire

Offcer given to the Petitioner would be within the powers of the

Municipal Commissioner.

27. We do not fnd any lack of jurisdiction on the

part of the Municipal Commissioner of Respondent -

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Corporation in issuance of the impugned order.

28. We are of the view that Section 80A, 83 of the

Act are not applicable in the present case, particularly since

the additional charge of Chief Fire Offcer had been given to the

Petitioner by the Municipal Commissioner and not by the

General Body of the Respondent - Corporation. Section 80A

provides the power of appointment and this would be the power

to appoint Municipal Offcers whether temporary or permanent

to the post and equivalent to or higher than the post of

executive engineer which vests in the Corporation. Likewise

Section 83 of the Act provides all powers of suspending,

reducing, removing or dismissing and imposing other penalties

in respect of any Municipal Offcer and servant which shall vest

in the Respondent - Corporation. This follows from the

principle that the Authority who has the power to appoint, shall

have the power to remove. Considering that the scope of

challenge in the Petition is limited to a challenge to the

impugned order which has led to the withdrawal/termination

by the Municipal Commissioner of the additional charge of

Chief Fire Offcer given to the Petitioner by the Municipal

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Commissioner himself, in our view, Section 80A and Section 83

of the Act would have no application.

29. We further fnd that the learned Counsel for

the Petitioner has sought to contend that apart from the

withdrawal of the additional charge of Chief Fire Offcer given

to the Petitioner, the Petitioner was infact appointed as Chief

Fire Offcer by the General Body of the Respondent -

Corporation. This was pursuant to Resolution No. 144 passed

by the General Body of the Municipal Corporation meeting held

on 24th November 2020. However, in view of the facts on

record this Resolution could never be stated to be an

appointment of the Petitioner as Chief Fire Offcer. The said

Resolution was only an approval to the proposal for flling the

probable vacant post of Chief Fire Offcer by promoting the

Petitioner for a temporary period of six months. This was to be

subject to concurrence of the Maharashtra Public Service

Commission. It was this Resolution passed at the General Body

of the Respondent No. 1-Corporation at the meeting held on

24th November 2020, which was communicated by the

Municipal Secretary of the Respondent - Corporation vide

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intimation dated 3rd December 2020.

30. We fnd much substance in the submission of

the learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent - Corporation

that it was only the proposal for appointment of the Petitioner

as Chief Fire Offcer which was approved and sanctioned and

neither the Promotion Committee nor the Works Committee

nor the General Body of the Municipal Corporation had granted

the promotion to the Petitioner. It was in fact due to certain

fndings of impropriety on the part of the Petitioner in his

Application for the gallantry award including his not disclosing

that he had failed to achieve the outstanding grade for the

years 2012-13 and 2013-14 that the General Body of the

Respondent - Corporation found it ft not to issue any offcial

order of promotion or proceed further in respect of promotion

of the Petitioner as Chief Fire Offcer. However, the contention

of the Petitioner that he was appointed as Chief Fire Offcer

goes beyond what has been sought for by way of the prayers in

the Petition which restrict itself to the setting aside of the

impugned order withdrawing/terminating the additional

charge of Chief Fire Offcer given to the Petitioner by the

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Municipal Commissioner.

31. The decision of the Supreme Court in

Ramakant Shripad Sinai Advalpalkar (supra) would be

applicable in the facts of the present case. Paragraph 5 of this

decision reads thus:-

"5. The arrangements contemplated by this order plainly do not amount to a promotion of the appellant to the post of Treasurer. The distinction between a situation where a government servant is promoted to a higher post and one where he is merely asked to discharge the duties of the higher post is too clear to require any reiteration. Asking an offcer who substantively holds a lower post merely to discharge the duties of a higher post cannot be treated as a promotion. In such a case he does not get the salary of the higher post; but gets only what in service parlance is called a "charge allowance". Such situations are contemplated where exigencies of public service necessitate such arrangements and even consideration of seniority do not enter into it. The person continues to hold his substantive lower post and only discharges the duties of the higher post essentially as a stop-gap arrangement."

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32. It is clear that from this decision, that

additional charge of a higher post such as the Chief Fire Offcer

in the present case which was given to the Petitioner by the

Municipal Commissioner was only a stop-gap arrangement and

could not be treated as promotion. The Supreme Court has

observed that such situations are contemplated where

exigencies of public service necessitate such arrangements and

even considerations of seniority do not enter into it. It is clear

that such a stop-gap arrangement can always be withdrawn by

the Municipal Commissioner as has been done by the impugned

order.

33. We are of the view that there is no infrmity in

the impugned order issued by the Municipal Commissioner and

the Joint Municipal Commissioner. The impugned order has

been validly issued by the Municipal Commissioner in exercise

of powers under the Act. Considering that it was the Municipal

Commissioner himself who had conferred the additional charge

of the Chief Fire Offcer upon the Petitioner, he could in exercise

of his powers take away such additional charge from the

Petitioner. Thus, we fnd no merit in the present Petition.

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Hence, the following order is passed:-

(i) The Writ Petition is dismissed.

(ii) There shall be no order as to costs.

(iii) Interim Applications fled in the Writ Petition will not

survive and are disposed of.

[R.I. CHAGLA J.]                                 [K.K. TATED, J.]