Bombay High Court
Sunita @ Neha Machhindra Chandne ... vs The State Of Maharashtra on 9 August, 2021
Bench: Mangesh S. Patil
CrAppeal 794 19J.odt
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 794 OF 2019
1) Sunita @ Neha Machhindra Chandne,
Age 24 years, Occ.
R/o. Sirasdevi Phata, Tq. Georai,
Dist. Beed.
2) Sharda Machindra Chandne,
Age 60 years, Occ.
R/o. Sirasdevi Phata Tq. Georai,
District Beed.
... Appellants.
VERSUS
1) The State of Maharashtra
Through Police Station Talwada,
Tq. Georai, Dist. Beed.
In Police Station Officer.
2) XYZ... ... Respondents.
...
Advocate for the Appellants : Mr. Aniket Vagal.
APP for the Respondent No. 1/State : Mr. S. N. Morampalle.
Advocate for Respondent No. 2 : Mrs. Rashmi S. Kulkarni.
CORAM : MANGESH S. PATIL, J.
RESERVED ON : 30.07.2021.
PRONUNCED ON : 09.08.2021.
JUDGMENT :
This is an appeal under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
against conviction of the appellants for the offences punishable under
Section 370 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, under Section 5
and 6 of the Immoral Traffic Prevention Act, 1956 (hereinafter ' the PITA' )
and under Section 4 read with Section 17 of Protection of Children from
Sexual Offences Act (hereinafter 'the POCSO Act') and sentencing them to
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substantive sentences and fine, maximum of which is 10 years rigorous
imprisonment.
2. The allegations of the prosecution as can be discerned from the F.I.R.
and the record are to the effect that the appellants are mother and daughter.
P.S.I. Gite (P.W. 4) of Anti Human Trafficking Unit Superintendent of Police
Office Beed received an information that the appellants were running a
brothel at Sirasdevi Phata Georai, on 05.01.2018. She verified the
genuineness of the information and after it was confirmed, reported the
matter to the Superintendent of Police. Police Inspector Jadhav of the Anti-
Human Trafficking Unit was directed to conduct a raid. He arranged for
panch witnesses, one of whom was a woman, Kamal (P.W.2). A Pre-trap
panchnama was conducted (Exh. 24). Police Constable Bahirwal (P.W. 3)
and Constable S.S. Shaikh were sent as decoy customers. Accordingly, Police
Inspector Jadhav conducted the raid in presence of panchas at 5 p.m. in the
house of the appellants. The respondent No.2 who was then 17 years of age
was found in a room with constable Bahirwal (P.W.3). A specified
denomination currency note of Rs. 500/- was found in possession of the
appellant No. 2. Five to six used condoms and 200 pieces of unused
condoms in a packet were found. Those were seized under a panchnama
(Exh. 25). The appellants and the respondent No. 2 were taken to the Police
Station and P.S.I. Gite ( P.W. 4) lodged the complaint and the crime was
registered as Crime No. 5/2007 for the offencs punishable under Section
366A, 370, 372 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 3, 4,
5, 6 and 7 of the PITA and Section 12 and section 4 read with Section 17 of
the POCSO Act.
3. The respondent No. 2 (victim P.W. 1) was then got medically examined
and then lodged in an Observation Home. Her statement was recorded
under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. She alleged that she
was in search of work. Sister of the appellant No. 1 by name Shantabai
assured to fetch her work and under that pretext took her to Georai where
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from she was taken to the house of appellants and was confined there and
forced into prostitution. After completing the investigation, the charge-sheet
was filed. At the end of the trial the learned Special Court convicted and
sentenced the appellants as mentioned herein above. It is necessary to note
that the appellants were acquitted of the offences punishable under Section
366A and 372 of the Indian Penal Code, of Section 12 of the POCSO Act and
of Section 7 of the PITA.
4. The learned advocate Mr. Vagal for the appellants would submit that
the age of the victim (P.W. 1) has been in dispute. There is no concrete
evidence to reach a conclusion that she was a child within the meaning of
Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act on the date of the incident. Though some
attempt was made to prove her date of birth by examining Head Master of
School Mrs. More (P.W. 5), there is no evidence to demonstrate as to at
whose instance it was recorded in the school register. He would further
submit that though some kind of ossification test was undertaken, there is
no uniformity in the opinions of the Dentist and Radiologist. The
approximate range of her age is stated to be 14 to 16 ½ years and bearing in
mind the margin of error of two or three years, benefit of doubt ought to
have been extended to the appellants. The parents of the victim were also
not examined to prove her date of birth and in the absence of such concrete
evidence it could not have been concluded that she was a child so as to
invoke the provisions of POCSO Act. In support of such submission he
would place reliance on the following decisions :
(1) Balasaheb Vs. The State of Maharashtra;
1994 Cri.L.J. 3044.
2) Domnic Misquita and etc. Vs. The State;
1996 Cri. L.J. 2799
(3) Shaikh Feroz s/o Shaikh Jainoddin Vs. State of
Maharashtra;
2011 ALL MR (Cri.) 538.
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(4) Sunil Vs. State of Haryana;
(2010) 1 Supreme Court Cases 742.
(5) Smt. Jaya Rama Gauda & Oth Vs. The State of
Maharashtra in Criminal Appeal No. 596/2009
decided on 11.12.2012
5. The learned advocate Mr. Vagal then submitted that there is a basic
flaw in not undertaking the investigation strictly in accordance with the
mandate of Sections 13 to 15 of the PITA. By referring to the provisions of
the PITA he would point out as to how the investigation of any offence
under it can only be conducted by a Special Police Officer and since the
investigation in the matter in hand has not been undertaken by any such
Special Police Officer, the trial in its entirety stands vitiated. He would refer
to the majority decision of the Supreme Court in the cases of Delhi
Administration Vs. Ram Singh; AIR 1962 Supreme Court 63 and Mumtaj
alias Behri Vs. The State (Govt of NCT Delhi); 2003 Cri. L. J. 533. The
learned advocate Mr. Vagal would then submit that no independent witness
has been examined to substantiate the interested version of the witnesses
who are primarily from the Police Department to substantiate the allegations
regarding conduct of the raid even though P.S.I. Gite (P.W. 4) admitted that
about 10 to 12 persons had gathered at the time of raid.
6. Learned advocate Mr. Vagal would further point out that though it is
being alleged that it was one Shantabai who had lured the victim (P.W. 1)
she has not been arrayed as an accused. Though the appellants have been
convicted for the offence punishable under Section 370 of the Indian Penal
Code there is no proof regarding selling and purchase. Similarly, he would
submit that the conduct of the victim (P.W. 1) is such that she had willingly
indulged in such trade of her own freewill and if there is a serious doubt
about her being a child her such conduct would not only be relevant but
would be eloquent enough to prove that she was not forced into the trade.
7. He would further submit that the learned Special Judge has miserably
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failed to appreciate the evidence in the proper perspective. There is non-
application of mind. The appellants have been sentenced to suffer 10 years
rigorous imprisonment for the offence punishable under Section 370 of the
Indian Penal Code when the law prescribes maximum of seven years of
imprisonment. Abetment which is an offence punishable under Section 17
of the POCSO Act has not been brought home inasmuch as no independent
witness on that point has been examined. He would therefore submit that
there is not enough evidence to convict and sentence the appellants. The
impugned judgment be quashed and set aside and they may be acquitted.
8. The learned A.P.P. and the learned advocate for the respondent No. 2
Mrs. Kulkarni would vehemently submit that the provision of Section 94 of
the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of children) Act ( hereinafter 'J.J.
Act') has to be followed even in respect of a dispute regarding age of the
victim as laid down in the case of Jarnail Singh Vs. State of Haryana;
MANU/SC/0626/2013. Depending upon the degree of proof the preferences
have been laid down in that provision. It is the birth certificate or the school
record which has to be considered as a primary evidence and in the absence
of which ossification test is to be resorted to. They would submit that in the
matter in hand there is not only a school record but even an ossification test
has been undertaken and duly establishes that the victim (P.W. 1) was a child
at the time of the incident.
9. They would therefore submit that in the light of such evidence, a
presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act will have to be raised and
the onus would shift to the appellants to prove that they have not committed
any offence under that Act. They would therefore submit that once it is
established that the victim (P.W. 1) was a child at the time of incident, by
referring to the presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act several
facts and circumstances which have come on record should have been met
by the appellants but they have miserably failed to do so.
CrAppeal 794 19J.odt
10. A decoy customer was sent, a specified currency note was found in
possession of the appellant No. 2, the used and unused condoms were
found, the decoy customer along with the victim was found in a room and
all these circumstances have not been squarely met by the appellants and
are sufficient to give rise to presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO
Act which in turn is sufficient to uphold the conviction.
11. The learned A.P.P. and learned advocate Mrs. Kulkarni would then
submit that the very fact that the raid was conducted by Police Inspector
Jadhav, who at the relevant time was appointed as a Special Police Officer
in the Anti Trafficking Cell in the Office of the Superintendent of Police
Beed is sufficient to demonstrate that he was duly authorised to conduct the
investigation under the provisions of the PITA. They would also point out
that the Trial Court in paragraph No. 23 has specifically referred to a
Government Resolution/notification and the transfer order of Police
Inspector Jadhav. This would clearly indicate that it has objectively
examined this aspect and has rightly held that there was no error of non-
compliance with the provision of the PITA.
12. The learned APP and the learned advocate Mrs. Kulkarni would, lastly,
submit that once it is concluded that the victim (P.W. 1) was a child at the
time of incident, there is no escape from the conclusion that she was forced
into the trade, her consent or willingness being irrelevant. They would
therefore submit that there is no error or illegality committed by the learned
Special Judge in appreciating the evidence and convicting and sentencing
the appellants.
13. Since these are the matters involving the provisions of the POCSO Act
and the PITA the provisions of Section 2(a) and 2(aa) of those acts
respectively would be relevant. It will have to be at the outset determined as
to if the victim (P.W.1) who was less than 18/16 years of age so as to be a
child within the meaning of those provisions. The further consequences
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would ensue depending upon the answer to this question.
14. Suffice for the purpose to remember at the outset that even though it
is the victim (P.W.1) whose age is to be determined, in view of the decision
of the Supreme Court in the case of Jarnail Singh (supra), the age of a
victim also has to be determined by following the provisions contained in
the J.J. Act 2015. It is to be noted that since Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act 2007 was then relevant and therefore it was
observed that the age of a victim will have to be determined by following
Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules
2007, the provision contained in that Rule is similar to the one prescribed
under Section 94 of the J.J. Act.
15. Though the learned Special Judge in the matter in hand does not
seem to have specifically referred to this position of law she has proceeded
to determine this issue apparently in accordance with the provision of
Section 94 of the J.J. Act. She has initially referred to the evidence in the
form of school record and thereafter proceeded to conclude that the victim
(P.W.1) was a child by seeking a corroboration from the medical evidence.
This is what has been precisely laid down under Section 94(2) of the J.J.
Act. It inter alia lays down that the process of age determination is to be
undertaken by seeking evidence by obtaining :
(i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the
matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned
Board and in the absence thereof;
(ii) the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or a
Municipal Authority or a Panchayat;
(iii) and only in the absence of the above two, age shall be
determined by resorting to ossification test or any other
medical age determination test.
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The Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the J.J. Act further mandates that
the age of a person determined by following the above procedure shall
be deemed to be the true age of that person.
16. Bearing in mind the above position of law, let us proceed to
examine the evidence led before the Special Judge regarding proof of
victim's age. The prosecution has examined Mrs. More (P.W. 5), who
happens to be the Headmaster of Chatrapati Shahu Primary School
Beed. She had brought original School Register (Exh. 44) and by going
through it confirmed that the date of birth of the victim recorded in her
school was 26.10.2002 at Sr. No. 8873. She further stated that earlier
the victim was studying in one Yashwant Prathmik Vidyalaya Beed and
by obtaining a School Leaving Certificate (Exh. 41) from that school she
was admitted in her school where the victim studied up to 7 th standard
and thereafter left the school. The witness further identified the School
Leaving Certificate (Exh. 46) issued by her school. Such evidence is not
only in accordance with the requirements of the provisions of Section
94(2) of the J.J. Act but is also relevant and admissible under Section 35
of the Indian Evidence Act. The learned Special Judge has rightly
referred to such provision and by relying upon the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the case of Ranjeet Goyal Vs. State of Jkharkhand;
2014 (1) SCC 588 and Ashwani Kumar Saxena vs. State of M.P.;
2012(9) SCC 750 has reached a well reasoned conclusion that such
evidence was sufficient to conclude that the birth date of the victim was
26.10.2002 meaning thereby that she was less than 16 years of age
when she was allegedly subjected to sexual exploitation.
17. The learned advocate for the appellants submitted that the source
of information recorded in the school record has not been duly
established and therefore the benefit of doubt should have been
extended to them. He would point out that neither of the parents of the
victim have been examined as a witness. Even if her father was
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mentally challenged, her mother could have been examined. In the
absence of their such direct account, the date of birth cannot be merely
proved on the basis of the school record.
18. When Section 94 of the J.J. Act and Section 35 of the Indian
Evidence Act govern the situation regarding proof of age, the submission
of the learned advocate for the appellant is liable to be discarded. When
entries in the school record have been made in due course much prior to
the occurrence of the alleged offence, possibility of the school record
being tampered with can easily be ruled out. Therefore, even if the
prosecution, for the reasons best known to it has not examined the
parents of the victim, still that would not make any material difference
in view of the clinching antecedent school record.
19. Going by the preferences of the evidence regarding date of birth
of the victim laid down in Section 94(2) o the J.J. Act ossification test or
medical age determination test is to be resorted to only as a last resort.
Now that, as has been demonstrated herein above, there is sufficient
evidence in the form of school record disclosing the date of birth of the
victim, since the prosecution has also taken care to resort to the age
determination test which exercise was undertaken by Dr. Shahane (P.W.
6) one may deal with it as well, as has been done by the learned Special
Judge. Dr. Shahane (P.W. 6) specifically submitted that the victim was
brought to him for medical examination. The OPD papers (Exh. 50 and
51) were prepared as also he prepared a medical examination report
(Exh. 49). She was referred for radiological and dental examination.
The Dentist objectively assessed her age to be between 15 to 17 years
and the Radiologist assessed that she was less than 16 and half years.
Pertinently, Dr. Jain (P.W. 7) who is the Radiologist has also been
examined to substantiate his conclusions. Conspicuously nothing could
be elicited during their cross examination to doubt much less discard
their objective conclusion.
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20. The decisions cited by the learned advocate for the appellants in
my considered view do not strictly govern the fact situation and
evidence in the matter in hand. In the case of Balasaheb (supra), unlike
in the matter in hand, the Court was called upon to determine the age of
the victim by resorting to ossification test. In the matter in hand, as is
mentioned herein above, a clinching school record to prove the birth
date of the victim (P.W. 1) has already been established. It is only by
way of a corroboration that the prosecution has resorted to the
ossification test which certainly takes a back seat if one has to follow the
provisions of Section 94 of the J.J. Act. In addition, there was evidence
to show that the victim in that case was admitted to a school in all
probability after she had attained six years of age and commensurate
with the date of her admission to school coupled with the margin of
error required to be taken into account according to medical
jurisprudence that it was held that the victim in that case was more than
16 years of age.
21. In the case of Domnic Misquita (supra) , again, the provisions of
Section 94 of the J.J. Act were not governing a situation and the age of
the victim was determined on the basis of the ocular version and a
radiological test.
22. In case of Shaikh Feroz s/o Shaikh Jainoddin (supra) the evidence
of an illiterate and rustic father of the victim was subjected to scrutiny
and depending upon the answers given by him an objective inference
was drawn about the age of the victim. True it is that the Single Judge
of this Court discarded the school record and the entry regarding birth
date mentioned therein but apparently, the father of the victim who was
examined as a witness had not stated if the date of birth entered in the
school record was correct and as per his personal knowledge. Again, the
Medical Officer who was examined during trial had admitted that the
age of a person cannot be determined without radiological examination.
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Ultimately, on the basis of the medical evidence indicating that she was
17 years of age, giving benefit of margin of error, it was held that she
was not a child.
23. In the case of Sunil (supra) the Supreme Court specifically held
that where there was a dispute as regards the minority of prosecutrix at
the time of alleged incident, the clinical examination of the prosecutrix
for verification of her age would be more relevant. Since, such medical
examination has been resorted to in the matter in hand, these
observations in the case of Sunil (supra) cannot be taken aid of by the
appellants.
24. In view of such state of affairs, when there is ample evidence in
the form of school record which duly stands corroborated by the medical
age determination test, though the latter is only an approximation, the
former being concrete is sufficient to determine and conclude, as has
been rightly done by the Special Court that the victim was less than 16
years of age at the relevant time and was therefore a child under POCSO
Act as also under the PITA.
25. Having concluded as above, let us turn to the other evidence to
ascertain as to how far the prosecution has been able to establish and
bring home the charge.
26. At the cost of repetition one may point out that the appellants
have been acquitted of the offences punishable under Section 366A, 372
of the Indian Penal Code, Section 12 of the POCSO Act and Section 7 of
the PITA. They have been convicted for the offences punishable under
Section 370 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 4
read with Section 17 of the POCSO Act and Section 5 and 6 of the PITA.
As is rightly pointed out by the learned advocate for the appellants there
are ample circumstances and evidence to demonstrate that the victim
(P.W. 1) had apparently willingly succumbed to the sexual exploitation.
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A no point of time she seems to have made any attempt to escape. Even
according to her she was lodged in the house of the appellants for a
period of about a month and was subjected to sex twice a day. Not only
this but even while narrating the history to the Medical Officer Dr.
Shahane (P.W. 6) she disclosed that she was willingly working as a sex
worker for a month. However, having concluded on the basis of the
evidence as discussed herein above that she was a child within the
meaning of Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act and Section 2(aa) of the
PITA, her consent becomes irrelevant and it is not a consent in the eye of
law. Therefore, no weight can be attached to this fact as to if the victim
(P.W. 1) had willingly entered into the trade.
27. If such is the state of affairs, certainly, in view of the provisions of
Section 29 of the POCSO Act, a presumption regarding commission of
the offences under the Act needed to be raised as has been rightly done
by the learned Special Judge. The appellants have miserably failed to
displace the burden cast upon them.
28. According to the learned advocate for the appellants, prescribed
procedure contained in Section 15(2) of the PITA has not been followed
of calling upon two or more respectable inhabitants of the locality in
which the place to be searched situate.
29. The prosecution has examined a Social Worker Kamal (P.W. 2)
who has stated about having been called upon and acted as a witness
not only for verification panchnama (Exh. 23) but for pre-trap
panchnama (Exh. 24), post trap panchnama (Exh. 25) and the spot
panchnama (Exh. 26). Since she is a woman, the substantive provision
contained in Section 15(2) of the PITA which admits of an exception in
the form of proviso appended thereto would clearly demonstrate, as has
been shown by the learned Special Judge in paragraph No. 24 that the
appellants are not entitled to take any benefit and the submission of
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their learned advocate in this respect is not tenable.
30. Nothing could be elicited during cross-examination of Kamal
(P.W.2) so as to disbelieve her version. She is a social worker and as has
been elicited she is not in the Government employment. She works
under some NGO. She has duly established as to how she had
participated in the entire process preceding lodging of the F.I.R. There is
nothing to disbelieve her version which clearly establishes the
prosecution case regarding the appellants having solicited customers
and subjected the victim (P.W. 1) to sex trade. The currency note of
specified denomination mentioned in pre-trap panchnama (Exh. 24)
was recovered from the appellant No. 2 during post-trap panchnama
(Exh. 25), a huge stock of used and unused condoms was seized from
their house. Mr. Bahirwal (P.W 3) had acted as a decoy customer and
was found in the house of the appellants along with the victim. Kamal
(P.W. 2) was a witness to all this. Once it is established that all these
circumstances have been duly proved by her, naturally, by virtue of
Section 29 of the POCSO Act the burden was on the appellants to
dislodge the presumption but neither during the cross-examination of
victim (P.W. 1) or during their examination under Section 313 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure have they been able to do that.
31. This takes us to other legal objections being raised on behalf of
the appellants. According to the learned advocate for the appellants the
entire investigation is faulty since it has not been carried out by a
Special Police Officer or Trafficking Police Officer as is required by
Sections 13 to 15 read with Section 2(i) and 2(j) of PITA. Certainly, in
view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Delhi
Administration and that of Delhi High Court in case of Mumtaj alias
Behri (supra), these provisions are mandatory and any investigation
carried out in breach of such mandate is illegal.
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32. However, it is important to note that according to P.S.I. Gite (P.W.
4) she was specially employed and posted in the Anti Human Trafficking
Unit in the Office of the Superintendent of Police Beed. She had
received the information pursuant to which she verified the fact and
informed the matter to the Superintendent of Police who in turn
directed Police Inspector Jadhav to conduct the raid and accordingly the
raid was conducted by Police Inspector Jadhav. She specifically stated
that Police Inspector Jadhav was from the Anti Human Trafficking Unit.
Conspicuously, her such version has not been specifically disputed
during her cross-examination.
33. Apart from the above state of affairs, as is pointed out by the
learned Special Judge, a Government Resolution was also produced on
record along with the transfer and posting orders, though belatedly,
along with application /list (Exh. 64) showing that by the Government
Resolution dated 19.07.2013 the appointments of Officers in Anti
Human Trafficking Unit at Beed was followed by the transfer order of
P.S.I. Gite (P.W. 4) and Police Inspector Jadhav dated 31.05.2016 and
31.10.2017 respectively. As per the resolution the Inspector of Police
working under Anti Human Trafficking Unit was identified in view of the
provisions of Section13 of the PITA. It further notified all the Police
Officers including the women Police Officers subordinate to such Police
Inspector to be the Special Officers. It is in view of such clinching
record, in my opinion the learned Special Judge had reached the
conclusion that there was no flaw much less any illegality in carrying
out the investigation by Police Inspector Jadhav who unfortunately was
not alive when the matter had gone for trial. Since P.S.I. Gite (P.W. 4)
was also a Special Officer who had participated in the raid and
ultimately lodged the F.I.R. (Exh. 36) , I do not find any illegality and
non-compliance of the provisions of Section 13 to 15 of the PITA. The
submission of learned advocate for the appellants on this count,
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therefore, is not tenable.
34. Coming to the ingredients for the individual offences for which the
appellants have been convicted, so far as Section 370 of the Indian Penal
Code is concerned, i.e. for trafficking of person, even if it is concluded that
since Shantabai has not been arrayed as an accused and therefore there is
no evidence in respect of actual sale by her and purchase by the appellants
of the victim (P.W. 1), on overall appreciation of the evidence it is quite
apparent that the victim was induced into trade for the obvious monetary
gain which is nothing but a trafficking as defined in Clause Sixthly of Sub
Section 1 of Section 370 of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, no fault can
be found in the impugned judgment and order convicting the appellants
under that Section.
35. Submission of the learned advocate for the appellants that the offence
is punishable only up to seven years is incorrect. As can be seen from Sub
Section (2) of Section 370 of the Indian Penal Code the offences of
trafficking invites a rigorous imprisonment, the minimum of which shall not
be less than seven years but which may extend to 10 years. Therefore the
submission is not legally tenable.
36. So far the provisions of Section 5 and 6 of PITA are concerned, the
former punishes procurement or inducement or taking a person for the sake
of prostitution whereas Section 6 is concerned obviously the victim (P.W. 1)
was detained in the house of the appellants with intent that she may have
sexual intercourse with the persons who were not her spouse which is
sufficient to constitute the offence.
37. Now turning to the offence punishable under Section 17 read with
Section 4 of the POCSO Act, Section 17 provides for punishment for
abetment of any offence under the POCSO Act. Whereas Section 4
provides for punishment for penetrative sexual assault. Section 3
defines penetrative sexual assault to mean the different acts provided for
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therein. Since the victim (P.W.1) was made to succumb to the penetrative
sexual assault by various customers and the appellants had induced her
into that trade, one can easily conclude that they have committed an
offence punishable under Section 17 and have been rightly convicted
and sentenced by the Special Judge.
38. Having concluded thus, I find no illegality in the impugned
judgment and order convicting and sentencing the appellants as
mentioned herein above.
39. The Appeal fails and is liable to be dismissed.
40. The Appeal is dismissed.
41. Advocate Mrs. Kulkarni has been appointed to represent the
victim. Her fees is quantified at Rs. 5000/- (Rs. Five Thousand only),
(MANGESH S. PATIL, J.)
mkd/-
