Sicom Ltd vs State Of Mah Through The Collector ... on 30 October, 2017
Bench: S.B. Shukre
FA 248/04 1 Judgment
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
FIRST APPEAL N
O
.
/20
SICOM Limited, through its
Regional Manager, Uddyog
Bhavan, Civil Lines, Nagpur. APP ELL
ANT
.....VERSUS.....
1. The State of Maharashtra,
through Collector, Wardha.
2. Special Land Acquisition Officer,
(MIW), Wardha.
3. Nagorao S/o Dashrath Waghe
(Since deceased through L.R.)
*A) Laxmibai Wd/o Nagorao Barai
(*Deleted as per Courts Order
dated 25.04.2016)
B) Hiraman S/o Nagorao Barai,
Aged about 59 Years, Occ: Cultivator.
C) Pandurang S/o Nagorao Barai,
Aged about 51 Years, Occ: Cultivator.
D) Chanpat S/o Nagorao Barai,
Aged about 45 Years, Occ: Cultivator.
E) Ramchandra S/o Nagorao Barai,
Aged about 45 Years, Occ: Cultivator.
Respondent Nos. (A) to (E) R/o Tah. Seloo,
District Wardha.
F) Sitaram S/o Nagorao Barai,
Aged about 42 Years, R/o Pulgaon,
Tah. Deoli, Dist. Wardha.
FA 248/04 2 Judgment
G) Doma S/o Nagorao Barai,
Aged about 39 Years, Occ: Service,
R/o Wardha.
H) Sushila D/o Nagorao Barai,
Aged about 56 Years, Occ: Household,
R/o Sindhi Railway, Tah. Seloo,
District Wardha. RESPONDE
NT
S
Shri Rohit Vaidya H/f Adv. Anand Parchure, counsel for the appellant.
Shri N.D. Dubey, A.G.P. for the respondent Nos.1 & 2.
Shri S.R. Deshpande, Counsel for the respondent No.3.
CORAM : S.
B. SHUKRE, J
.
DATE : 30 OCTO BER , 2017 .
TH
ORAL JUDGMENT
This is an appeal questioning the legality and correctness of
the award passed under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
(L.A. Act for short) in Land Acquisition Case No.89/1991 by the Joint
Civil Judge, Senior Division, Wardha.
2. The land of the original claimant, deceased Nagorao-
represented in this appeal by his legal heirs, was acquired compulsorily
for public purposes. The Collector passed his award under Section 11 of
the L.A. Act on 29.03.1988. Not being satisfied with the same, the land
owner/original claimant filed an application under Section 18 for making
a reference to the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Wardha for
FA 248/04 3 Judgment
granting appropriately enhanced compensation for the acquired land.
This application was contested on merits by the State, which was the
acquiring body. It appears that this appellant came into picture much
later when the acquired land was transferred to it by the State. Be that as
it may, the fact remains that the reference application was strongly
opposed by the State. One of the objections was that the reference
application was barred by limitation. After hearing the contesting parties
on merits, the reference court partly allowed the application and granted
enhanced compensation to the original claimant. In the process, needless
to say, the objection regarding bar of limitation was also rejected by the
reference court. The judgment and award in this regard were passed on
21.01.2002. As the present appellant was of the opinion that the
reference application filed under Section 18 of the L.A. Act was barred by
limitation, on this narrow aspect, the appellant has preferred the present
appeal.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the notice
under Section 12(2) of the L.A. Act was indeed issued to the original
claimant and that it was also received by the original claimant and
therefore, the reference application was clearly barred by limitation.
According to learned counsel for the legal heirs of the original claimant,
even if such notice was issued, it was never received by the original
FA 248/04 4 Judgment
claimant and there is no evidence to show that the notice was received on
a particular date by the original claimant and therefore, as per Section
18(2)(b) of the L.A. Act, the limitation period in the present case would
be reckoned from the date of the award passed by the Collector, which
was 29.03.1988 and when so reckoned, the reference application filed on
21.06.1988 would have to be said as within limitation.
4. The only point which arisen for consideration is, whether the
reference application filed under Section 18 of the L.A. Act was within
limitation ?
5. In the present case, there is no dispute about the fact that
even though the award under Section 11 was physically signed by the
Collector on 29.03.1988, on that date, the original claimant was not
present before the Collector, either personally or through his
representative. Therefore, Clause (a) of Section 18(2), which stipulates
limitation period of six weeks from the date of the Collector's award,
would have no application here. If this is so, we would have to turn to
Clause (b) of Section 18(2) of the L.A. Act.
6. Clause (b) of Section 18(2) of the L.A. Act envisages two
situations. The first situation is that, a notice issued by the Collector
FA 248/04 5 Judgment
under Section 12(2) is received by the land owner. In case of the first
situation, limitation period of six months has been prescribed and it has
to be reckoned from the date of receipt of the notice. In the second case,
the limitation period of six weeks has been stipulated and it starts
running from the date of the Collector's award. Having considered the
two distinctive limitation periods applicable to two different situations,
now it would be necessary for us to examine as to in which of these two
situations, the present case falls.
7. On going through the evidence available on record, one can
very well see that there is a notice issued under Section 12(2) of the L.A.
Act by the Collector. This notice is at Exh.47. A perusal of Exh.47 notice
does not show that it was accompanied by any copy of award. There is
also no evidence brought on record by the appellant or the State
establishing that on a particular date, this notice was received by the
original claimant. The period of six weeks applicable to the situation
where notice under Section 12(2) is issued, as found earlier, has to be
reckoned not from the date of issuance of the notice, but from the date of
its receipt. So, presence of evidence showing a particular date on which
such a notice was received by the claimant or the land owner, is
necessary. But, that evidence is conspicuously absent in this case. Upon
perusal of the record, I may also say that there is not even a pleading
FA 248/04 6 Judgment
particularly made by the appellant that there was a particular date on
which the notice was received by the original claimant. On being asked
about such a pleading, learned counsel for the appellant also could not
show to me presence of any such pleading. This would lead me to hold
that although notice under Section 12(2) of the L.A. Act was issued, it
was not received by the original claimant. Such being the position, the
first situation prescribing period of six weeks under Section 18(2)(b) has
not arisen in the present case. Then, what remains is the second situation
of absence of notice under Section 12(2) and period of six months of
limitation to be computed from the date of the Collector's award.
8. In the present case, the physical date of the award passed by
the Collector is 29.03.1988. There is no dispute about this fact. But,
following the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Premji Nathu Vs. State of Gujarat & Anr., reported in AIR 2012
Supreme Court, 1624, the date of the award is not to be understood as
the date on which the award is physically signed and it is to be
comprehended as the date on which the communication of passing of the
award to the land owner takes place. In the present case, there is no
dispute about the fact that the application for grant of certified copy of
the award was filed by the land owner on 16.05.1988. In the absence of
any other evidence regarding communication of the passing of award to
FA 248/04 7 Judgment
the land owner, this date of 16.05.1988, by following the law laid down
in the case of Premji Nathu (Supra), would have to be taken as the actual
date of the award, because on that date, it could be said that the award
was meaningfully passed. So, the period of limitation in the present case,
as per the second situation as envisaged under Section 18(2)(b) of the
L.A. Act, would have to be reckoned from the date of 16.05.1988. Even if
the date of the award is taken to be 29.03.1988, on which date it was
physically signed by the Collector, still the reference application filed on
21.06.1988, was within limitation.
9. Having found thus, I do not see any merit in this appeal. The
point is answered accordingly. The appeal deserves to be dismissed.
The appeal stands dismissed.
Parties to bear their own costs.
Legal heirs of the original claimant are permitted to withdraw
the amount deposited in this Court together with interest, if any.
The first appeal stands disposed of accordingly.
JUDGE
SHRIPAD
