Bombay High Court
Smt. Gangubai Maruti Jadhav vs Dattatraya Tukaram Pharane on 22 March, 2017
Bench: S.C. Gupte
sg 1/18 sa302-92.doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SECOND APPEAL NO.302 OF 1992
WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO.2988 OF 1992
IN
SECOND APPEAL NO.302 OF 1992
Smt. Gangubai Maruti Jadhav,
since deceased, through her legal heirs
and legal representatives. ...Appellants
vs.
Dattatraya Tukaram Pharane
since deceased, through his legal heirs
and legal representatives. ...Respondents
AND
SECOND APPEAL NO.164 OF 1992
Kisabai Ramu Pharne And Anr. ...Appellants
vs.
Dattatraya Tukaram Pharane
since deceased, through his legal heirs
and legal representatives. ...Respondents
....
Mr. R.R. Salvi, for the Appellants in SA/302/1992 and CAS/2988/1992.
Mr. N.V. Walawalkar, Senior Advocate, a/w. A.M. Savagave, for the
Appellants in SA/164 of 1992.
Mr. Sukand R. Kulkarni, for Respondent No.1(A) to 1(E).
.......
CORAM : S.C. GUPTE, J.
DATED : 22 MARCH 2017
sg 2/18 sa302-92.doc
(ORAL JUDGMENT) :
. Second Appeal No.164 of 1992 impugns a judgment and
order passed by the District Court at Kolhapur in Regular Civil Suit No.15
of 1986. By the impugned judgment and order, the learned District
Judge allowed the first Respondent's (Original Defendant No.1) appeal
and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court in
Regular Suit No.185 of 1979 filed by the Appellants (Original Plaintiffs).
Second Appeal No.302 of 1992 is preferred by Original Defendant No.3
to that suit.
2. The subject matter of controversy in these Second Appeals
concerns the right of a Hindu widow under Section 14(1) of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 ("Act"). Possession of the suit property in the
present case, which was claimed by original Plaintiff and Defendant No.2
as being referable to their right of maintenance as widows of deceased
coparceners, was held by the Trial Court to have matured into full
ownership under that provision. The Appeal Court denied such full
ownership on the ground that the widows were not limited owners of
the property. Substantial questions of law arise in the Second Appeals in
connection with the kind of title or right necessary to be established by a
Hindu widow so as to claim full ownership under Section 14(1) of the
Act - both from the standpoint of what is the correct law on the subject,
and whether such law is correctly applied by the lower Appellate Court.
3. The Plaintiffs' case is that the suit properties are ancestral
sg 3/18 sa302-92.doc
properties, held by them jointly between themselves and Defendant
Nos. 1 to 3. The genealogical tree given by the Plaintiffs, and which is
not disputed in the present case, is as follows :-
Babaji Fharne (deceased)
|
|
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | |
Bhau (deceased) Tukaram (deceased) Nana (deceased)
| | |
Ramu Bhau Fharne Son-Dattatray Yamunabai
(Deceased) Tukaram Fharne. (Deft. No.2)
| (Deft. No.1)
| |
Wife Kisabai Daughter-Gangubai
(Plaintiff No.1) (Deft. No.3)
|
Daughter: Akkatai
(Plaintiff No.2)
It is the case of the Plaintiffs and Defendant No.3 (who
claims through Defendant No.2) that Plaintiff No.1 and Defendant No.2,
who were widows of the deceased coparceners, Ramu and Nana, were in
separate possession and enjoying the suit property under a family
arrangement, their separate cultivating possession being reflected in the
revenue records since the year 1952-53. They prayed for partition of the
suit properties in three shares - 1/3rd share to Plaintiffs, 1/3rd share to
Defendant No.1 and the remaining 1/3rd to Defendant Nos. 2 and 3.
4. Though Defendant No.1 admits the genealogy as well as
the ancestral status of the property, his case is that after the demise of
sg 4/18 sa302-92.doc
Ramu and Nana, the suit properties came in possession of his father,
Tukaram, as an exclusive owner. It is his case that Plaintiff No.1 and
Defendant No.2 were residing separately during the life time of his
father, Tukaram, having only a right of maintenance. Tukaram,
accordingly, allowed one room each to them in the suit house and also
paid maintenance allowance to them. Tukaram died on 29 August 1968
and, after his demise, Defendant No.1 became exclusive owner of the suit
properties. It is denied that Plaintiff No.1 or Defendant No. 2 were ever
cultivating the suit lands. It is the case of Defendant No.1 that Plaintiff
No.1 and Defendant No.2 got their names entered in the record of rights
by furnishing false information. Alternatively, he submits that his father,
Tukaram, was in possession and, after his demise, Defendant No.1 came
into possession of the suit properties and became owner by adverse
possession. Further alternatively, it is submitted that Tukaram, Nana and
Ramu had mortgaged the suit land to one Krishna Satu Kanchanale; that
the mortgage was redeemed by Tanibai, mother of Defendant No.1, on
22 November 1951 by paying a sum of Rs.215/- and obtaining
possession thereof; and that since then the suit properties were in her
exclusive possession and, after her death, the lands came in his hands as
legal heir of Tanibai. On these pleadings, the parties went to trial. The
Trial Court in its judgment and decree in favour of the Plaintiffs held that
the Plaintiffs had proved that they had 1/3rd share in the entire suit
property; that Defendant No.1 had failed to prove that he had acquired
title to the suit property by adverse possession or as successor in interest
of Tanibai, who redeemed the suit property from Krishna Satu
Kanchanale. The Trial Court, in the premises, decreed the respective
shares of the parties, namely, Plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 together, Defendant
sg 5/18 sa302-92.doc
No.1 and Defendant No.3 each having 1/3rd share in the suit property.
The Trial Court, accordingly, passed a preliminary decree and ordered
partition of the property by metes and bounds. On the main
controversy in the suit, namely, full ownership of Plaintiff No.1 and
Defendant No.2 as widows in possession under Section 14(1) of the Act,
the Trial Court held that the two widows were possessed of the suit
property within the meaning of Section 14(1) of the Act and after the
coming into force of the Act, became full owners of their respective
shares in the suit property. The lower Appellate Court did not disagree
with the conclusion of the Trial Court, insofar as the acquisition of title
by Defendant No.1 either by adverse possession or as a successor-in-
interest of Tanibai was concerned. The lower Appellate Court, however,
held that mere possession of the suit properties by the widows did not
make them full owners of the property under Section 14(1) of the Hindu
Succession Act. The Court held that the widows had to prove that their
possession was referable to some legitimate claim or title as limited
owner of the suit property. The lower Appellate Court held that there
was no such proof. It accordingly allowed the appeal and dismissed the
suit.
5. Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 provides as
follows :-
"14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property.-
(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired
before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her
as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.
Explanation.-In this sub-section, "property" includes both movable
and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by
sg 6/18 sa302-92.doc
inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance
or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a
relative or not, before, at or after the marriage, or by her own skill
or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other
manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as
stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act.
(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any
property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other
instrument or under a decree or order of a civil Court or under an
award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the
decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such
property."
6. In Eramma vs. Veerupana1, the Supreme Court, explaining
the provisions of Section 14 of the Act, held that it was not attracted
where a female Hindu came in possession of the property without any
right to it. The law was stated by the Supreme Court in the following
words:-
"The property possessed by a female Hindu as contemplated in
the section, is clearly property to which she has acquired some
kind of title whether before or after the commencement of the
Act. It may be noticed that the Explanation to section 14(1)
sets out the various modes of acquisition of the property by a
female Hindu and indicates that the section applies only to
property to which the female Hindu has acquired some kind
of title, however restricted the nature of her interest may be.
The words "as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner"
as given in the last portion of sub-section (1) of section 14
clearly suggest that the legislature intended that the limited
ownership of a Hindu female should be changed into full
ownership. In other words, section 14(1) of the Act
contemplates that a Hindu female who, in the absence of this
provision, would have been limited owner of the property, will
now become full owner of the same by virtue of this section."
(Emphasis supplied)".
1 AIR 1966 SC 1879
sg 7/18 sa302-92.doc
7. This position was also affirmed in the later case of Bai Vajja
v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai2, where the Supreme Court stated the law
thus:
"A plain reading of sub-section (1) makes it clear that the
concerned Hindu female must have limited ownership in
property, which limited ownership would get enlarged by the
operation of that sub-section. If it was intended to enlarge any
sort of a right which could in no sense be described as ownership,
the expression "and not as a limited owner" would not have been
used at all and becomes redundant, which is against the well-
recognised principle of interpretation of statutes that the
Legislature does not employ meaningless language."
8. Relying on these observations, it was submitted before the
Supreme Court in Gulwant Kaur vs. Mohinder Singh3 that what was
enlarged by sub-section (1) of Section 14 into a full estate was the
limited estate known as "Hindu woman's estate" as under Section 3 of
the Hindu Womens' Rights to Property Act, 1937. The Supreme Court
negatived this contention in Gulwant Kaur's case holding that the words
"limited estate", were used to connote a right in the property, to which
the possession of the female Hindu may legitimately be traced, but which
is not a full right of ownership. The Court proceeded to hold that if a
female Hindu is put in possession of the property pursuant to, or in
recognition of, a right to maintenance, it cannot be denied that she
acquires a limited right in the property and once that position is
accepted, it follows that this right gets enlarged into full ownership
under Section 14(1) of the Act. In Gulwant Kaur's case, the properties
2 (1979) 3 SCR 291 : AIR 1979 SC 993
3 (1987) 3 Supreme Court Cases 674
sg 8/18 sa302-92.doc
belonged to the coparcener, Major General Gurbux Singh. His wife,
Gulwant Kaur, was estranged and living apart with their son and
daughter-in-law. The evidence before the Court indicated that lands was
given to Gulwant Kaur in lieu of maintenance. Based on such
possession, Gulwant Kaur claimed absolute ownership of the land under
Section 14 of the Act. A learned Single Judge, who heard the Second
Appeal, held that the land was indeed given to her in lieu of maintenance
and that by virtue of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, she had
become full owner. On an appeal under the Letters Patent, a Division
Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana held that Gulwant Kaur
was merely allowed to receive the proceeds of the land in dispute "in
order to meet her day-to-day expenses" and that she did not at all acquire
any right or interest in the property as could be termed 'limited
ownership' so as to allow her the benefit of Section 14(1) of the Act. The
Division Bench held that Major General Gurbux Singh never had any
intention to give away the land to Gulwant Kaur. The Division Bench,
accordingly, reversed the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The
Supreme Court disagreed with the conclusions of the Division Bench.
The Court observed that the question was not whether Major General
Gurbux Singh intended to give away the land absolutely to Gulwant Kaur
but "whether the land was given to her in lieu of maintenance". The
Supreme Court held that the record before the Court clearly established
that the land was given to Gulwant Kaur by Gurbux Singh in lieu of
maintenance, the Court expressing its inability to understand the
distinction made by the High Court between 'day-to-day expenses' and
'maintenance'. The Supreme Court, in terms, repelled the contention on
the part of successor-in-interest of Gurbux Singh that even if the land
sg 9/18 sa302-92.doc
was given to Gulwant in maintenance, it must be established that what
was given to her was a limited estate in the sense of ownership without
the right of alienation and that under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession
Act only such a limited estate would blossom into an absolute estate.
The Supreme Court analysed Section 14 of the Act in the following
words:
"4. It is obvious that sec. 14 is aimed at removing restrictions
or limitations on the right of a female Hindu to enjoy, as a full
owner, property possessed by her so long as her possession is
traceable to a lawful origin, that is to say, if she has a vestige
of a title. It makes no difference whether the property is
acquired by inheritance or devise or at a partition or in lieu of
maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift or by her
own skill or exertion or by purchase or by prescription or in
any other manner whatsoever. The explanation expressly
refers to property acquired in lieu of maintenance and we do
not see what further title the widow is required to establish
before she can claim full ownership under sec. 14(1) in
respect of property given to her and possessed by her in lieu
of maintenance. The very right to receive maintenance is
sufficient title to enable the ripening of possession into full
ownership if she is in possession of the property in lieu of
maintenance. Sub-sec. 2 of sec. 14 is in the nature of an
exception to sec. 14(1) and provides for a situation where
property is acquired by a female Hindu under a written
instrument or a decree of court and not where such
acquisition is traceable to any antecedents right."
9. The Supreme Court also referred to the dicta of the Court in
Tulasamma vs. Sesha Reddy4 which clearly laid down that Section
14(1) would be applicable to the property given to a female Hindu in
lieu of maintenance. The following observations in the case of
Tulasamma were quoted by the Supreme Court:
"It will, therefore, be seen that sub-section (1) of Section 14 is
4 AIR 1977 SC 1944
sg 10/18 sa302-92.doc
large in its amplitude and covers every kind of acquisition of
property by a female Hindu including acquisition in lieu of
maintenance and where such property was possessed by her at
the date of commencement of the Act or subsequently acquired
and possessed, she would become the full owner of the
property. Now, sub-section (2) of Section 14 provides that
nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to another
property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any
instrument or under a decree by order of a civil court or under
an award when the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or
the decree, order or award prescribed a restricted estate in such
property. This provision is more in the nature of a proviso or an
exception to sub-section (1) and it was regarded as such by this
court in Badri Pershad v. Kanso Devi (supra) .... It is, therefore,
clear that under the Shastric Hindu Law a widow has a right to
be maintained out of joint family property and this right would
ripen into a charge if the widow takes the necessary steps for
having her maintenance ascertained and specifically charged in
the joint family property and even if no specific charge is
created, this right would be enforceable against joint family
property in the hands of a volunteer or a purchaser taking it
with notice of her claim. The right of the widow to be
maintained is of course not a jus in rem, since it does not give
her any interest in the joint family property but it is certainly
jus ad rem, i.e., a right against the joint family property.
Therefore, when specific property is allotted to the widow in
lieu of her claim for maintenance, the allotment would be in
satisfaction of her jus ad rem, namely, the right to be
maintained out of the joint family property. It would not be a
grant for the first time without any preexisting right, in the
widow. The widow would be getting the property in virtue of
her pre-existing right, the instrument giving the property being
merely a document effectuating such pre-existing right and not
making a grant of the property to her for the first time without
any antecedent right or title. There is also another
consideration which is very relevant to this issue and it is that,
even if the instrument were silent as to the nature of the
interest given to the widow in the property and did not, in so
many terms, prescribe that she would have a limited interest,
she would have no more than a limited interest in the property
under the Hindu Law as it stood prior to the enactment of the
Act and hence a provision in the instrument prescribing that
she would have only a limited interest in the property would
be, to quote the words of this Court in Nirmal Chand's case
sg 11/18 sa302-92.doc
(supra), "merely recording the true legal position" and that
would not attract the applicability of sub-section (2) but would
be governed by sub-section (1) of Section 14. The conclusion is,
therefore, inescapable that where property is allotted to a
widow under an instrument, decree, order or award prescribes
a restricted estate for her in the property and sub-section (2) of
Section 14 would have no application in such a case."
10. Based on the law stated by the Supreme Court, as noted
above, it is quite apparent that a property given to a female Hindu in lieu
of her maintenance, which is in her possession on the date of coming into
force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, matures into full ownership by
virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act.
11. Coming now to the facts of our case, it is pertinent to note
that both the Trial Court as well as the lower Appellate Court came to a
concurrent finding that the widows were in possession of the properties
by virtue of a family arrangement. Apart from the conclusion of family
arrangement in favour of the widows, there were 7/12 extracts and land
revenue assessment receipts on record, which showed the names of the
widows in the revenue record in respect of the suit land. The Trial
Court, in fact, proceeded to hold that from the extracts of the lands, it
seemed that the lands were Inami lands which were not partible and
accordingly the names of Plaintiff No.1, Defendant No.2 and Tukaram,
father of Defendant No.1, were entered into the revenue record as joint
owners and possessors in respect of the suit lands from the year 1953
and there was no partition of the suit lands, which were still joint and it
seemed "from the 7/12 extracts and the land revenue assessment that the
parties to this suit are in possession of the suit property by mutual
sg 12/18 sa302-92.doc
agreement". The lower Appellate Court noted that learned Counsel for
Defendant No.1 did not, during the course of his submissions, challenge
the observations made by the Trial Court that Plaintiff No.1 and
Defendant No.2 were in possession of the suit properties to the extent of
their 1/3rd share each. The lower Appellate Court also did not dispute
the case of family arrangement, holding in terms that the lower
Appellate Court found itself "in concurrence with the observations made by
the Court below that there was no partition as such by metes and bounds in
between coparceners and it was family arrangement". Based on this
evidence before the Courts below, it is quite clear that the possession of
the widows was not a matter of dispute before the lower Appellate Court.
The lower Appellate Court, however, denied the benefit of Section 14(1)
to the widows on the ground that mere possession of a female Hindu of
any property does not make her a full owner of the property under that
Section. The Court, relying on the decision of a learned Single Judge of
our Court in the case of Narayanrao vs. The State of Maharashtra5,
also observed that a female Hindu, for claiming full ownership under
Section 14(1), must show that she has "got vested in herself at least
limited ownership of the property" and there must be something to prove
that "such right to the property was transferred to her."
12. In Narayanrao's case, the question before the Court was
whether the suit lands were correctly included in the aggregate holding
of the plaintiff. The argument before the Court was that the suit lands
were given by the plaintiff into the possession of Sarubai, his wife, and
even mutation entries to that effect had been made prior to 1956, and
5 AIR 1981 Bombay 271
sg 13/18 sa302-92.doc
Sarubai, being in possession of the lands in the year 1956 (when the Act
came into force), became a full owner thereof. The contention was that
the lands were given in lieu of her right of maintenance. A learned
Single Judge of this Court negatived the contention that the suit lands
became her absolute property with effect from the coming into force of
the 1956 Act. The learned Single Judge held that the legal
consequences contemplated by Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act
arose only when the property is "acquired" by a female Hindu before or
after the commencement of the Act. The learned Judge observed that
the property might be acquired by a female Hindu under a compromise
decree or under a decree in invitum or by any instrument of transfer.
The learned Judge held that "mere handing over of the property by the
husband to the wife does not amount to her having 'acquired' the said
property." The learned Judge went by the strict dichotomy maintained
by the said section between possession of the property as 'full owner' on
the one hand and as 'limited owner' on the other. He held that this
dichotomy postulated that the female Hindu concerned has got vested in
herself at least 'limited ownership' of the property and there must be
something to prove that such right of the property was transferred to her.
The learned Judge reiterated this position in the following words :- "The
possession must refer to some legitimate claim of title as owner may be as
full owner or limited owner." The binding authority in the Supreme
Court in the case of Tulasamma (supra), which was quoted by the
Supreme Court in the later case of Gulwant Kaur (supra), was not
brought to the notice of the learned Judge. The observation of the
learned Judge that the property might be acquired by the female Hindu
under a compromise decree or under a decree in invitum or by any
sg 14/18 sa302-92.doc
instrument of transfer, are, with utmost respect, misplaced in the context
of sub-section (1) of Section 14. There is a separate provision contained
in Sub-section (2) in respect of such acquisitions. In fact, as the Supreme
Court laid down in Tulasamma's case and later reiterated in Gulwant
Kaur, Section 14 was aimed at removing restrictions or limitations on a
right of a female Hindu to enjoy, as a full owner, property possessed by
her "so long as her possession is traceable to a lawful origin", or, in other
words, so long as she had "a vestige of a title". In a property given to her
and possessed by her in lieu of maintenance she had sufficient title to
enable the ripening of her possession into full ownership. The learned
Judge in Narayanrao's case does not appear to have considered fully the
plaintiff's case of giving of the lands to his wife in lieu of maintenance.
He rather appears to have merely laid emphasis on the mutation entries
placed before the Court which showed title and possession of Sarubai.
He held that the "revenue records may at the most serve as evidence of
possession and, on occasions, even as presumption of title but ..... mere
possession by a female Hindu of any property does not make her a full
owner of the said property under said Section 14 of the Hindu Succession
Act." So far so good. But the judgment in Narayanrao's case cannot be
said to be laying down any law to the effect that even if a female Hindu's
possession, reflected in the revenue records, is traceable to her right of
maintenance, it cannot mature into full ownership under Section 14(1)
of the Act, because it does not refer to "some legitimate claim of title as
owner." For if it were to state the law thus, such law would be clearly
contrary to the binding Supreme Court cases referred to above.
13. In the present case, the cultivating possession of the
sg 15/18 sa302-92.doc
properties by the widows is not a matter of dispute. It is not only
evidenced by the revenue record available since 1952-53, but actually
found by both Courts below. Both attribute it to a family arrangement.
This possession is clearly referable to their right of maintenance out of
the family properties. Neither of the Courts below accepted the case of
Defendant No.1 that the widows were being provided for financially by
Tukaram or later by Defendant No.1 by way of maintenance otherwise
than out of the suit properties. At the same time, it was not disputed by
Defendant No.1 that they had the right to be maintained. If the widows
had the cultivating possession of the suit property coupled with a right to
be maintained out of it, if not otherwise provided for, and the case of
Defendant No.1 that they were separately maintained, that is to say,
otherwise than out of the suit properties, was not accepted, there would
be a presumption that their possession is referable only to their right of
maintenance. Even otherwise, from the material before the Court, i.e.
the family arrangement, the admitted possession of the widows, and the
7/12 extracts and other revenue record showing the widows' cultivating
possession of the suit properties, the inescapable conclusion would be
that the possession of the widows must be referable to their right of
maintenance. A family arrangement (which is supported by a long-
standing revenue record) can only be on the basis of antecedent rights
and the only antecedent right the widows had was their right of
maintenance from out of the family properties. There is nothing to
suggest that possession, such as the widows have in the present case,
cannot be traced to a lawful origin or that there is no vestige of a title.
14. Learned Counsel for the Respondents also relies on the
sg 16/18 sa302-92.doc
judgments of our Court in the case of Bhagirathibai w/o Chandrabhan
Nimbarte vs. Tanabai w/o Ramchandra Zanzad (dead)6 and
Gangabai w/o Krishnarao Mandalik vs. Janabai w/o Somaji Patil 7 in
support of his contention that there is no full ownership of the property
on the part of the widows. In the case of Bhagirathibai (supra), the
Court was simply considering the devolution of interest of a co-parcener.
The Court held that considering the fact that the co-parcener died before
the coming into force of the 1937 Act, undivided interest in the
coparcenary property devolved on the other coparcener by survivorship
and as such the surviving co-parcener became the absolute owner of the
entire property. The Court was, in other words, concerned with
acquisition of property following the coparcener's death. There was no
case of possession in lieu of maintenance on the part of the widows in
that case. It is in that context that the Court held that the widows were
possessing no vestige of title, and the mere fact of their possession did
not attract Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. In the case of
Gangabai (supra), a learned Single Judge of our Court, in fact, noted
that after coming into force of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act,
1956, the widow became absolute owner of the suit properties left by her
deceased coparcener husband. The only question before the Court was
whether the daughter of the deceased was similarly entitled to succeed
to the joint family properties in satisfaction of her right of maintenance.
The argument before the Court was that the daughter had to be treated
on par with her widowed mother, and with that analogy and by giving a
wider meaning to the word "possessed", it should be held that along
with her mother, the daughter also acquired and possessed the properties
6 2013(2) Mh.L.J. 502
7 2012(5) Mh. L.J. 639
sg 17/18 sa302-92.doc
left by her father in satisfaction of her right of maintenance. This was
negatived by the learned Single Judge holding that the word "possessed",
occurring in sub-section (1) of Section 14, was intended to cover not only
actual or constructive possession but also possession in law. The Court
held that by no stretch of imagination can it be said that the daughter
having right to receive maintenance acquires a limited ownership of the
joint family property or part thereof. In her case, the learned Judge
observed, "the requirements of a female Hindu having had "possessed" the
property on the date of coming into force of Hindu Succession Act, can be
said to be fulfilled" in the event the property is settled upon the daughter
under any instrument or otherwise in lieu of her right to maintenance.
None of these judgments, accordingly, supports the Respondents' case.
15. In the premises, the impugned judgment and order of the
lower Appellate Court cannot be sustained. The Second Appeals are,
accordingly, allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment and order
passed by the District Court on 10 February 1992 and restoring the
judgment and decree passed by the Court of Civil Judge, Senior
Division, Ichalkaranji in Regular Suit No.185 of 1979. In the facts of the
case, there will be no order as to costs.
16. Learned Counsel for the Respondents seeks an order of
continuation of status-quo for a limited period. On his application, it is
directed that all parties shall maintain status-quo for a period of four
weeks from today. The record and proceedings of the Court, along with
an authenticated copy of this order, be transmitted to the Court of Civil
Judge, Senior Division, Ichalkarnji after this period of four weeks.
sg 18/18 sa302-92.doc
17. In view of the dismissal of the Second Appeals, the civil
application does not survive and the same is also disposed of.
( S.C. GUPTE, J. )
