Citation : 2017 Latest Caselaw 9857 Bom
Judgement Date : 20 December, 2017
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR
First Appeal No. 701 of 2017
Appellant : Vasant Gulabrao Dhoke, aged about 47 years,
Occ: Agriculturist, resident of Bamarda, Tahsil
Warora, District Chandrapur
Versus
Respondents: 1) State of Maharashtra, through
District Collector, Chandrapur
2) Executive Engineer, Patbandhare Division,
Medium Project No. I, Chandrapur
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Shri Ranjit Bhuibhar, Advocate for appellant Shri M. A. Kadu, Asst. Govt. Pleader for respondent no. 1 Shri K. D. Deshpande, Advocate for respondent no. 2
Coram : S. B. Shukre, J
Dated : 6th December 2017
Oral Judgment
1. Heard. Admit. Shri M. A. Kadu, learned Assistant
Government Pleader waives notice for respondent no. 1 while Shri K. D.
Deshpande, learned counsel waives notice for respondent no. 2. There is
no need to call for Record and Proceedings. Heard finally by consnt of
parties.
2. The only point that arises for determination is as under :
Whether the Reference Application filed under Section 18
of the Land Acquisition Act was barred by limitation ?
3. On going through the impugned judgment and order, I find
that the Reference Court has misdirected itself in dealing with the issue of
limitation. The Reference Court in the impugned judgment and order
dated 24th February 2017 has observed that as the appellant failed to
adduce any evidence to prove his contention that the notice issued to him
under Section 12 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act was not accompanied by
the copy of impugned Award, there was no substance in the said
statement and as such, the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division has found
that the Reference Application was beyond limitation, having been filed
almost a year after passing of the Award.
4. This observation of the Reference Court is not consistent with
the pleadings of the parties as well as evidence available on record. It
was specifically pleaded by the appellant that the notice issued under
Section 12 (2) of the Act was received by him, but it was not
accompanied by any copy of the Award and, therefore, he was required to
take inspection of the record of the Land Acquisition officer on
20.11.1999 when he came across the Award passed by the Land
Acquisition Officer and thereafter on 2.12.1999 i.e. in or about two
weeks, appellant preferred an application under Section 18 of the Act.
The pleading that notice issued under Section 12 (2) of the Act was not
accompanied by the Award, was not specifically denied by the
respondents. The law is that whenever any pleading is not specifically
denied, it is deemed to be admitted. Even in this backdrop, a contention
has been raised by the respondents that copy of the notice was indeed
accompanied by Award. This contention is worthy of rejection forthwith
for three reasons. There was no specific denial of appellant's pleading
that no award copy was sent along with the notice. Secondly, there was
no such pleading specifically made by the respondent to support the
contention, now made. Thirdly, evidence whatsoever, was also not
adduced by the respondents.
5. In Premji Nathu v. State of Gujarat & anr reported in 2012
(5) Mh. L. J. (SC) 514, it is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that
unless it is proved that notice issued by the Collector under Section 12 (2)
was accompanied by copy of Award, the claimant would not be in a
position to effectively exercise the right vested in him to seek reference
under Section 18 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act. The law settled by the
Apex Court is followed by this Court in Ashok s/o Namdeorao Nagpure
(D), through L.Rs. v. State of Maharashtra & ors reported in 2017 (6)
Mh. L. J. 73 where it is held that what is essential for the respondents (the
State), is to show that the notice issued under Section 12 (2) of the Act
was accompanied by copy of Award and where there is absence of copy of
Award, it is no notice under Section 12 (2) of the Act in the eye of law.
6. In the present case also, the facts being what they are, as just
discussed, would show that the law as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in Premji's case (supra) and followed by this Court in Ashok
(supra) squarely applies to them and, therefore, this Court has no other
option than to find that the Section 18 Reference Application which was
filed on 2.12.1999, in about two weeks after acquiring knowledge of the
Award, passed on 14.7.1999, was well within limitation.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant has invited my attention to
the common judgment in LAC No. 625 of 2008 and other cases rendered
on 24th February 2017 by the same Court and the same Judge in respect
of the same Award wherein a contrary view has been taken. On going
through this common judgment, I find that the learned Judge was well
aware of the legal position settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Premji
(supra) and applying that legal position, he arrived at a conclusion that
those Land Acquisition Cases were well within limitation. In paragraph 73
of the said common judgment, the same learned Judge has held that now
it is settled law that date of passing of the Award is not at all material in
computing the period of limitation. It is further held that if the person
aggrieved is not present before the Collector at the time of passing of the
Award, then there must be proof tendered by the State about receipt of
notice along with copy of Award by the land-owner. However, in the
impugned judgment and order herein, the same learned Judge took a
contrary view, inspite of being aware of the correct legal position that the
burden of proof in this regard is on the non-applicant or the State, but the
appellant or the land-owner. The reasons for taking such diametrically
opposite views in two different judgments delivered on the same day, are
not known, though must be known to the learned Judge, which any
prudent man would expect to be revealed least now by the learned Judge
in order to do justice according to law, and not according to whims, at
least to avoid a repeat of such an unpleasant situation. After all, litigants
should not be made to face the double whammy of fanciful justice and
long delay, inevitable as it is, when appeal is required to be filed, in
getting what is due to them as of right.
8. Having found that the Reference Application has been filed
within the period of limitation, the point is answered as in the affirmative.
It would then follow that this appeal deserves to be allowed and the
matter remitted back to the Reference Court for a decision afresh. Point
is answered accordingly.
9. The appeal is allowed. Impugned judgment and order are
quashed and set aside. The matter is remitted back to the Reference
Court for a decision afresh. The Reference Court shall decide the
Reference Application within six months from the date of appearance of
the parties. Parties shall appear before the Reference Court on 14 th
January 2018. Record and Proceedings be sent back immediately. No
order as to costs.
S. B. SHUKRE, J
joshi
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