Govind Baliram Mugle And Another vs Govind Narsingrao Kunale
2017 Latest Caselaw 9647 Bom

                                        1                               FA-2220-16


           IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                       BENCH AT AURANGABAD

                       FIRST APPEAL NO. 2220 OF 2016
                                  WITH
                    CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8628 OF 2015

 1.       Govind s/o Baliram Mugle,
          Age : 52 Years, Occ. Service,
          R/o. Halgara, Tq. Nilanga,
          Dist.Latur.

 2.       Khandu s/o Piraji Hendge,
          Age : 55 Years, Occ. : Service,
          R/o Halgara, Tq. Nilanga,
          Dist. Latur.                                    .. APPELLANTS

             VERSUS

 1.       Govind s/o Narsingrao Kunale
          Age : 50 Years, Occ. : Agril.,
          R/o Borsuri, Tq. Nilanga,
          Dist. Latur.

 2.       Rajesh s/o Shinde,       Died.

 3.       The Assistant Charity Commissioner,
          Latur, District : Latur.                         ..RESPONDENTS

                                            ..

 Mr. A. N. Subnis, Advocate h/f Mr. V.D. Gunale, Advocate for appellant.
 Mr. Nitin Jagdale, Advocate h/f Mr. V. D. Salunke, Advocate for
 respondent No.1.
 Respondent No. 2 - served.
 Respondent No. 3 - served.
                                    ...

                                        CORAM : K.K. SONAWANE, J.

RESERVED ON : 8 th AUGUST, 2017.

PRONOUNCED ON : 15th DECEMBER, 2017.

JUDGMENT :-

1. This is an first appeal filed under section 72(4) of the

Maharashtra Public Trust Act, 1950 (for short "Act of 1950") by the

2 FA-2220-16

appellants to agitate validity and legality of the findings expressed by

the learned Assistant Charity Commissioner, Latur ( for short "ACC") in

the Inquiry of change report No. 313 of 1997 under section 22 of the

Act of 1950. The Principal District Judge, Latur after exercising the

powers under section 72 of the Act of 1950 upset the findings of the

learned Joint Charity Commissioner, Latur (for short "JCC") in revision

No. 17 of 2004 and restore the decision of learned ACC under section

22 of the Act of 1950. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order of

the Principal District Judge for restoration of status-quo ante in regard

to change report No. 313 of 1997, the appellants preferred the present

appeal to redress their grievance.

2. The genesis of the appeal culled out in brief is that, the present

appellants were the members of Educational Institution known as

"Jaihind Shikshan Sanstha," Halgara, Ta. Nilganga, District Latur ( for

short '' Trust"). The institution was registered as Trust under the Act of

1950 bearing No. F-1386-Latur. The appellants were the President and

Executive President of the alleged Institution/Trust prior to year 1997.

But, in the General Body Meeting of the Trust held on 19-01-2017 the

membership of four Office bearers/trustees including appellants came

to be terminated and other four persons were inducted as new

members of the Trust. The change occurred in the list of members of

the Trust was reported to the learned ACC under section 22 of the Act

of 1950. In order to ascertain the validity of change occurred, the

learned ACC carried out the inquiry bearing No. 313 of 1997. In

response to notices of inquiry the appellants appeared before learned

ACC and denied the occurrence of any such change as alleged on behalf

3 FA-2220-16

of Trust. After considering submissions on behalf of both sides, the

learned ACC accepted the change report and directed for requisite

amendment in the scheduled-I of the Trust.

3. The appellants-opponents did not satisfy with the findings of

learned ACC for acceptance of change occurred relating to membership

of alleged Educational Trust. In the result, appellants - opponents

approached to learned JCC under section 70(A) of the Act of 1950 for

exercising revisional jurisdiction to set aside and quash impugned order

of learned ACC passed under section 22 of Act of 1950. The learned

JCC after hearing came across with some sort of perversity in the

findings of ACC and consequently, allowed the revision application. The

impugned order of learned ACC accepting alleged change in the list of

members of the Trust came to be set aside and quashed. However,

then verdict of learned JCC passed in the revision application was put

in controversy under section 72(1) of the Act of 1950. The Principal

District Judge, Latur dealt with the rival submissions and proceeded to

upset the findings of learned JCC and consequently restored the

findings expressed by learned ACC passed under section 22 of the Act

of 1950. But, the litigation did not came to an end. The appellants

rushed to this Court by resorting to remedy under section 72(4) of the

Act of 1950 and preferred the present first appeal to redress their

grievance about validity and legality of the impugned order of learned

ACC for accepting the change occurred in the list of membership of

Educational Institution in this case.

4. Learned counsel for the appellants submit that Principal District

4 FA-2220-16

Judge, Latur did not appreciate the facts and circumstances of the

matter in its proper perspective and committed error in restoration of

status-quo ante by accepting impugned change report. He alleged that

so-called General Body Meeting dated 19-01-1997 was not at all

convened by the respondents/Trust. The documents of meetings

produced on record all were fake, forged and fabricated one. According

to learned counsel, after election of the Trust held in the year 1996,

there were in all 26 valid members of the Trust. The appellant Govind

Mugle was the President and one Rajesh Shinde was Secretary of the

Trust. But, before completion of five years stipulated tenure the

Secretary played the mischief and by fabricating spurious documents,

the membership of appellants and others were shown terminated under

the pretext of their absence in three consecutive meetings of the Trust.

It was also alleged that member Suresh Role tendered his resignation

which came to be accepted in the Meeting of Managing Committee

dated 25-12-1996. The appellant Khandu Hendge did not deposit

requisite fees for renewal of his membership and in view of rules of the

Scheme of Trust, his membership came to be terminated. According to

learned counsel for appellants, there was no General Body meeting of

the Trust convened on 19-01-1997, but the entire documents came to

be prepared and fabricated to terminate the membership of the

appellants. Learned counsel harped on the circumstances that, the

appellant Khandu Hendge was the life member of the Trust and as per

clause (4) of the Scheme of Trust, it was not necessary for life member

to pay fees for renewal of membership. The clauses No. 5 and 6 of the

Scheme of Trust relating to continuous absence in three meeting were

5 FA-2220-16

for general members and not applicable to office bearers of the Trust.

The appellant Govind Mugle was the Office bearer being President and

therefore his membership cannot be revoked for his absence in three

consecutive meeting of the Trust. Learned counsel further pointed out

that as per scheme of the Trust five days clear notice of General Body

Meeting of the Trust was required to be given to the appellants. But,

the notice of the impugned General Body Meeting dated 19-01-1997

was served on the appellant Govind Mugle a day before meeting i.e. on

18-01-1997. Therefore, General Body Meeting dated 19-01-1997 was

illegal, invalid and not as per provisions of law. The illegalities

committed following non compliance of Rules and Regulations of the

Scheme of Trust vitiated entire business carried out in the meeting of

the Trust. The Principal District Judge, Latur did not consider all these

aspects and erroneously upheld the findings of learned ACC for

accepting change report in enquiry No. 313 of 1997. Therefore,

learned counsel fervidly urged that the appeal be allowed and

impugned judgment and order passed by Principal District Judge as

well as learned ACC in enquiry No. 313 of 1997 be quashed and set

aside. The findings of the learned JCC be restored and alleged change

shown occurred in the membership of Trust, vide change report

Inquiry No. 313 of 1997 be rebuffed and turned down in the interest of

justice.

5. Mr. V.D. Salunke, learned counsel for respondent No. 1

vociferously opposed the contentions put forth on behalf of appellants

and supported the findings expressed by the Principal District Judge,

upholding the verdict of learned ACC in the Inquiry No. 313 of 1997.

6 FA-2220-16

The learned counsel elaborately discussed the circumstance on record

and submits that there is no merit in the appeal and same be

dismissed.

6. Before adverting to merits of the matter, it is worth to mention

that the present first appeal is filed under section 72(4) of the Act of

1950. The full Bench of this Court in the case of Prabhakar Sambhu

Chaudhary and another Vs. Laxman Baban Mali and others

reported in 2016(3) Bom. L.R. 714 held in paragraph No. 54 as

below:

"54. In view of the reasons recorded above our answer to the questions formulated for consideration, this reference is:-

(1) Appeal provided under sub-section 72(4) of the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950 is not subjected to the restriction and limitations imposed under the provisions of section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the scope of appeal extends to reconsideration of decision of the lower forum on questions of fact and questions of law with a jurisdiction to reverse, modify the decision or remand the matter to the lower forum for fresh decision in terms of its directions. Appeal to the High Court under sub- section (4) of section 72 of the Act of 1950 is an appeal against the decree under sub-section(2) of section 72 [The decision of Court under section 72(2)is a decree for limited purposes of maintaining an appeal to the High Court].

                 (2)    Consequently, there is no obligation for the





                                        7                                FA-2220-16

appellant to state substantial questions of law involved in the memorandum of appeal and High Court is also not bound to formulate substantial questions of law while admitting the appeal or before posting the appeal for hearing.

. In view of aforesaid legal guidelines, there is no impediment for

reappraisal of the decision of Courts below on the question of facts as

well as legal issues and it would not subject to restriction and limitation

as laid down under section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code in regard to

substantial question of law.

7. Intense scrutiny of the factual aspects as well as record and

proceedings of the matter reflects that the argument canvassed on

behalf of appellants appears not sustainable and considerable one. The

basic objection raised in the proceeding pertains to termination of

membership of one Sayed S. Saudagar, Suresh Role, the present

appellants Shri Govind Mugle as well as Shri Khandu Hendge in the

General Body meeting dated 19-01-1997. It is to be noted that the

member Sayyed S. Saudgar did not come forward and put into

controversy the issue of termination of his membership by resolution

passed in General Body meeting dated 19-01-1997. The member

Suresh Role tendered the resignation on 05-12-1996, which came to be

accepted in the Executive Committee Meeting dated 25-12-1996. He

attempted to protest the said action by filing proceeding before learned

JCC, but, later-on he retreated and withdrawn the proceedings.

8. Now, the matter in issue remained for deliberation only to the

extent of membership of appellants Govind Mugle and Khandu Hendge

8 FA-2220-16

in this appeal. There are two fold objections raised on behalf of

appellants in support of their claim. First, objection raised on behalf of

appellants was in regard to General Body Meeting dated 19-01-1997

itself. It was alleged that no such meeting was convened at all but the

entire documents of the meeting came to be prepared and fabricated to

suit the purpose. The another objection was pertaining to Rules and

Regulations of clauses No. 4, 5 and 6 of Scheme of Trust.

9. While dealing with the first objection as referred supra, it reveals

that the Office Bearers of the Trust/Institution produced entire relevant

documents of the meetings before the learned ACC for consideration.

The appellants were directed to take inspection of the documents

maintained and preserved in the office of the Trust. But, they did not

avail the opportunity nor they produced any document in support of

their claim. The record adumbrates that out of 22 members of the

trust, 18 members attended the General Body Meeting held on 19-01-

1997. They put their signatures on the original proceeding book of the

meeting. They unanimously passed the resolution for termination of

membership of the appellant Govind Mugle and one Sayed Saudaar for

their absence in three consecutive meetings dated 21-07-1996, 14-09-

1996 and 25-12-1996. In such circumstances, it is fallacious to arrive

at the conclusion that there was no such General Body Meeting of the

Trust convened on 19-01-1997. The allegations propounded on behalf

of appellants in regard to alleged forged and fabricated documents

appears to be rest on figment of imagination and except bare version,

there are no circumstances brought on record to point out needle of

suspicion towards affairs of the Trust during relevant period.

9 FA-2220-16

10. The alleged Educational Institution has its own scheme for

better administration and management. The relevant clauses in regard

to memberships as well as mode and manner in which meeting of the

Trust to be convened, are reproduced here to facilitate for just and

proper adjudication of the matter in issue on merit ;

dye ua-4 lHkklnRo %& vBjk o"kkZojhy dks.kR;kgh ukxjhdkl laLFksus Bjowu fnysyh oxZ.kh vkf.k dk;Zdkjh eaMGkus laerh fnY;kl R;k laLFksps lHkkln gksrk ;sbZy- lHkkln [kkyhy izdkjps jkgrhy-

v½ vkfto lHkkln %& laLFksus ,d osGh fdaok fru o"kkZr Bjowu fnysY;k gIR;kr ns.kxh #i;s [email protected]& ns.kkjs o R;kis{kk tkLr ns.kxh ns.kkjs loZ lHkkln gs vktho lHkkln Eg.kwu x.kys tkrhy-

c½ lk/kkj.k lHkkln %& lk/kkj.k lHkklnkauk ,dk osGh fdaok fru o"kkZr Bjowu fnysY;k gIR;kr ns.kxh #-3]551 fdaok R;kis{kk tkLr ns.kxh ns.kkjs gs loZlk/kkj.k lHkkln jkgrhy-

d½ lUekufu; lHkkln %& lUekufu; lHkkln gks.;klkBh ,dkosGh fdaok Bjowu fnysY;k gIR;kr #- 551 fdaok R;kis{kk tkLr ns.kxh ns.kkjk vls lHkkln lUekufu; lHkkln Eg.kwu x.kys tkrhy-

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                                                   10                                     FA-2220-16


                   dye ua- 5 lHkklnRo dsOgk j| gksbZy %&
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'kS{kf.kd o"kZ laiY;kiklwu lgk efg.;kP;k vkr laLFksP;k loZlk/kkj.k lHksph cSBd cksykoyh ikghts-

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                   vkf.k pkj ;kaph uksan vl.ks ca/kudkjd vkgs-

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                   vlrk ikghts-             R;kyk v/;{k] dk;kZ/;{k] lfpo]



                                               11                                        FA-2220-16

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                   izek.ks dzekdzekus fuoM.kwdk gksrhy-

                               loZ lk/kkj.k lHksr v'kk inkf/kdk&;kapk fuoM
                   dj.;kr ;sbZy- ;klkBh [email protected] lHkkln                    cSBdhl        gtj
                   vlY;kl x.kiwrhZ iw.kZ >kyh vls letys tkbZy-
                   vlk lHksl         x.kiwrhZ vl.ks vko';d jkghy- x.kiqrhZ

iw.kZ u >kY;kl lHkk v/;{kkaP;k ijokuxhus rgdwc djrk ;sbZy- v'kh rgdqc >kysyh lHkk v/;{kkaP;k ijokuxhus rkcMrksc R;kl fBdk.kh nksu rklkauh rhp lHkk ?ksryh tkbZy- v'kk lHksl x.kiwrhZph vV ykxw jkg.kkj ukgh-

dk;Zdkjh eaMGkyk vko';d okVY;kl fo'ks"k loZlk/kkj.k lHkk cksykÅ 'kdrs- fo'ks"k loZlk/kkj.k lHksph uksVhl dehr deh ikp fnol vxksnj fnyh ikghts o R;kr lHksph rkjh[k] osG fo"k; o LFkG fyg.ks ca/kudkjd jkghy- x.kiwrhZlkBh lk/kkj.k lHksph fu;e ;k lHksyk ykxw iMrhy-

11. On the backdrop of aforesaid Rules and Regulations as

contemplated in the scheme of the Trust, it would be justifiable to

proceed further for assessment of facts and circumstances to resolve

the controversy emanated amongst the parties to litigation. The

appellants raised objection that, the co-appellant Shri Khandu Hendge

was the founder member of the Trust and being life member, it was not

incumbent on his part to pay charges for renewal of his membership.

It is to be noted that as per clause (4) of the scheme of Trust, there

was only three categories of the members (1) Life Member, (2)

Ordinary Member and (3) Honorary Member of the trust. There was no

such category of membership known as "Founder Member". Therefore,

12 FA-2220-16

co-appellant Khandu Hendge's membership cannot be considered being

founder member of the Trust. At the most he can be considered as life

member, but for that purpose he has to pay Rs. 5551/- or more by way

of donation as prescribed under clause (4) of the aforesaid scheme.

Learned ACC in his finding expressed that co-appellant Khandu Hendge

filed affidavit (Exhibit-16) on record and deposed that the person, who

paid donation of Rs. 2551/- would be the ordinary member and

therefore, it was not necessary for him to pay renewal charges for his

membership. It was observed that he has not filed any documentary

evidence in support of his claim. Admittedly, except his bare version

there were no any documents produced on record to show that

appellant -Khandu Hendge was the life member of the Trust.

12. Moreover, during the course of Inquiry under section 22 of the

Act of 1950 the opportunity was provided by the learned ACC to the

appellants for inspection of record of the Trust, but they did not avail

the opportunity. In case, the appellants would have carried out

inspection of the record of Trust, they would be in a position to point

out some sort of legal infirmity in the record. But, the appellants failed

to seize the opportunity. In such circumstances, it would be

cumbersome to accept the bare version of appellant that the co-

appellant Khandu Hendge was the life member of the Trust. It was not

established that he had deposited the total sum of Rs. 5551/- towards

donation to become life member of the Trust. When he did not deposite

requisite sum of Rs. 5551/-, it would inappropriate to ask the Trust to

produce such documents on record, which are not in existence at all.

There is no substance found in the objections raised to the termination

13 FA-2220-16

of membership of Khandu Shendge, who has failed to deposit renewal

charges of his membership of the Trust.

13. The another objection propounded on behalf of appellants is in

regard to issuance of notice of Special General Body Meeting of the

Trust. Admittedly, circumstances demonstrate that the appellants

Govind Mugle remained absent in the General Body Meeting held on

21-07-1996 as well as in the Executive Committee Meetings dated 14-

09-1996 and 25-12-1996. It has been alleged that he was continuously

remained absent in three consecutive meetings of the Trust. In view of

sub-clause (6) of clause (5) of the Rules and Regulations of scheme of

Trust, his membership was liable to be terminated automatically. The

factum of absence of appellant Govind Mugle in the three consecutive

meetings did not put in question seriously on behalf of appellants. It

has been contended that provisions of Rule 5(6) of the Scheme was

meant for ordinary members only and not applicable to office bearers

of the Trust. The appellant Govind Mugle was one of the office bearers

being President of the Trust. Therefore, Rule 5(6) of the Scheme

relating to continuous absence in three meetings would not applicable

to him. In view of facts and circumstances of the matter, this kind of

objection appears to be preposterous and incomprehensible one. The

clause 5 sub-clause (6) contemplates termination of membership in

absence of the members of Trust in three consecutive meetings. It has

not qualified that the members are only ordinary members and not

office bearers. It is to be borne in mind that the office bearer of the

Trust has to become members of the Trust first and thereafter only

authority would be given to him to look after the management of Trust

14 FA-2220-16

being office bearers. Therefore, it is hard to appreciate that clause 5(6)

of the Scheme of Trust would not applicable to the office bearers of the

Trust. Moreover, clause 5(6) does not specifically referred its

applicability to the General Body Meeting only and not to the Executive

Committee Meeting. The said clause does not refer any specific kind of

meeting as well as exemption for office bearers to attend the meeting.

In such circumstances, the objections raised appear unsustainable and

not considerable one.

14. Learned counsel for the appellants has given much more

emphasis in regard to validity and legality of Special General Body

Meeting held on 19-01-1997 and submits that as per clause (6) of the

Scheme of the trust, the notice of Special General Body Meeting should

be issued prior to minimum five days of the date of meeting. In the

instant case, notice of Special General Body Meeting dated 19-01-1997

was issued on 10-01-1997 i.e. prior to nine/ten days of the date of

meeting. However, it came to be served to the appellant Govind Mugle

on 18-01-1997 i.e. a day before the alleged meeting. According to

learned counsel for appellants, there was no five days clear notice to

the appellants and there was violation of clause (6) of the scheme of

the Trust, which would vitiate entire business of the Special General

Body Meeting. The notice of the meeting was bad-in-law for non-

compliance of the provisions of clause (6) of the Scheme of the Trust.

Learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the ratio laid down by

the learned Single Judge of Karnatka High Court in the case of

Jintendra Mannulal Dubey Vs. State of Karnanatka by its

Secretary, Department of Rural Development and Panchayath

15 FA-2220-16

Raj and others reported in ILR 2002 Kar. 3216.

15. Admittedly, provisions of clause (6) of the scheme of the Trust

contemplates that notice of Special General Body Meeting should be

issued to every members not less than five days prior to the date of

meeting. In the instant case, proposed Special General Body Meeting

was scheduled to be held on 19-01-1997. The notice to appellant

Govind Mugle was issued on 10-01-1997 through RPAD. However,

postal acknowledgment shows that appellants received the notice on

18-01-1997 i.e. a day before the Special General Body Meeting. The

question for consideration would arose as to "whether the notice issued

to the appellants for their attendance in the Special General Body

Meeting dated 19-01-1997 was bad-in-law as it was not in conformity

with the clause (6) of the Scheme of the Trust ?" After appreciating

factual score in the light of provisions laid down in the scheme, the

answer to this question would obviously in negative.

16. The clause (6) of the scheme of Trust prescribed mode and

manner in which Special General Body Meeting would be convened. It

lays down procedure to be observed before holding Special General

Body Meeting. In case of any contingency arises, the discretion was

given to the Executive Committee to convene the Special General Body

Meeting. Clause (6) postulates prior notice of Special General Body

Meeting to be issued to every member not less than five days of the

date of meeting. The object and purpose of clause (6) of the Scheme

of Trust for stipulation to issue five clear days notice prior to date of

Special General Body Meeting was to communicate well in advance the

16 FA-2220-16

details of the meeting comprising date of meeting, particulars of the

subject, venue of the meeting etc. to the every members to make it

convenient for them to attend the meeting.

17. As referred supra, the impugned notice to the appellants was

issued on 10-01-1997 through RPAD i.e. prior to nine/ten days of the

scheduled meeting, but it came to be served a day before the

scheduled meeting. It is worth to mention that, despite service of

notice, the appellants did not prefer to attend the meeting. In such

circumstances, it cannot be said that impugned notice issued and

served to the appellants was not in conformity with the clause (6) of

the Scheme of Trust. The Judicial Pronouncement relied upon by the

learned counsel for the appellants in Jintendra Dubey's case referred

above, do not advance to the contentions propounded on behalf of

appellants in this case. The ratio laid down by learned Single Judge

appears to be 'per in curiam' in nature. The learned Single Judge while

interpreting Rule 3 of the Karnatka Panchayat Raj Rules 1994 gave

much more emphasis on the interpretation of word "Giving" instead of

word "Send" which was used in the provisions of rule 3 for stipulation

of specific period for sending notice to the members. There was no

reference about service of notice in the rules but there was mandate to

send notice of the date so fixed to every member not less than seven

days prior to the date of meeting. The rule prescribed clear gap of

seven days in between the period of sending notice and the day of

proposed meeting. In view of textual facts of the matter, the judicial

pronouncement would not render any assistance to the appellants in

this case.

17 FA-2220-16

18. In the instant case, it is imperative to give priority to the period

of issuance of notice which shall not be less than five days prior to date

of Special General Body Meeting. It would be absurd and illogical to

give more weightage to the factum of actual service of notice on the

members of the Trust. Had there been any intention of the scheme for

actual service of notice not less than five clear days certainly it would

specify in clear terms in the scheme. But, there is reference only

about issuance of notice and not actual service of notice in clause (6)

of the scheme. If there would have any mandate to take care for

service of notice of meeting not less than clear five days to every

member, in such eventuality, it would be tedious and tiresome job for

the Trust to collect all sort of evidence showing service of notice to

each and every member of the Trust. The possibility of avoiding the

service of notice within stipulated period by the members of the trust

with purported motivation, could not be ruled out. It may cause

multiplicity of litigation and also create complication while convening

Special General Body Meeting for better administration and

management of the Trust. Definitely, it would not the intention of

Clause (6) of scheme, but mandate is only for issuing prior notice well

in advance to the members to facilitate them to attend the meeting

without any inconvenience to them. Therefore, it cannot be said that

period for actual service of notice to the members would be the

essence of valid and legal notice as prescribed in clause (6) of the

scheme. In the aftermath, it would difficult to digest the argument

canvassed on behalf of appellants in this case.

19. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it would be concluded that

18 FA-2220-16

there was no legal infirmity in the Special General Body Meeting held

on 19-01-1997. The learned ACC has correctly appreciated the

attending circumstances on record. The verdict of learned ACC for

acceptance of change report appears just, proper and within the

provision of law. The findings of learned ACC and learned Principal

District Judge deserves to be made confirmed and absolute. In

addition to the aforesaid circumstances, it is also imperative to take

into consideration that the appellants remained absent continuously in

three consecutive meetings of the Trust and as per clause 5 sub-clause

(6) of the Scheme of the Trust, their membership required to be

terminated automatically. Therefore, on this aspect also there is no

propriety to cause any interference in the findings expressed by the

learned Principal District Judge, Latur and learned Assistant Charity

Commissioner in this matter.

20. In the result, for the reasons discussed above, the appeal stands

dismissed. No order as to costs.

21. The pending civil application is hereby disposed of.

Sd/-

[ K. K. SONAWANE ] JUDGE

MTK.

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