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Rukminbai Shlok Kandgule & Ors vs The State Of Mah
2017 Latest Caselaw 9458 Bom

Citation : 2017 Latest Caselaw 9458 Bom
Judgement Date : 8 December, 2017

Bombay High Court
Rukminbai Shlok Kandgule & Ors vs The State Of Mah on 8 December, 2017
Bench: S.P. Deshmukh
            IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                       BENCH AT AURANGABAD

                     CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 421 OF 2006

1.     Rukminbai shlok Kandgule,
       Age : 36 years, Occu.; Household,

2.     Suman Dattu Pasare,
       Age : 65 years, Occu.: Household,

3.     Bharat s/o. Dattu Pasare,
       Age : 26 years, Occu.: Agri.,
       All R/o. Padoli (A), 
       Tq. and Dist. Osmanabad                                 APPELLANTS
                                                               (Accused) 

       VERSUS

The State of Maharashtra                                   RESPONDENT
                                                         (Prosecution)

                         ----
Mr. Satej S. Jadhav, Advocate for the appellants
Mrs.A.V. Gondhalekar, Addl. Public Prosecutor, for the 
respondent/State
                         ----

                                       CORAM : SUNIL P. DESHMUKH AND
                                               SANGITRAO S. PATIL, JJ.

                                       DATE  : 8th December, 2017


JUDGMENT (PER : SANGITRAO S. PATIL, J.):

One Bibhishan Premraj Gund (original accused

No.1) and the present appellant No.1, hereinafter

referred to by her first name i.e."Rukminbai" were

chargesheeted by Police Station, Bembli for the

2 criapl421-2006

offences punishable under Sections 306 and 498-A read

with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code ("IPC", for

short), on the allegations that Bibhishan had illicit

relations with Rukminbai prior to and even after the

marriage of Bibhishan with the deceased Shivnanda and

therefore, both of them were beating and illtreating the

deceased Shivnanda. The deceased Shivnanda always used

to ask both of the accused to abstain from keeping

illicit relations. Ultimately, because of the

illtreatment meted out to her by both of these accused,

the deceased Shivnanda committed suicide by setting

herself ablaze in her house on 27th June, 2000 at about

12.00 noon.

2. The deceased Shivnanda was taken to the Civil

Hospital at Osmanabad for treatment by her brother-in-

law namely Dilip. Her statement was recorded by PHC

Patil, attached to police outpost of Civil Hospital,

Osmanabad on the same day at about 2.10 p.m., after

getting it verified from the Medical Officer that she

was in a fit condition to give statement. In that

statement, she alleged that on 27 th June, 2000, when her

husband i.e. accused No.1 Bibhishan had gone to the

field for sowing and when she was sleeping in her house

3 criapl421-2006

at about 12.00 noon, Rukminbai, her parents and brother

i.e. appellant no.3 namely Bharat, came there. Rukminbai

was holding a kerosene can. All of them hurled abuses

against her and beat her by kicks and fists. Rukminbai

poured kerosene from the can on her person and the

mother of Rukminbai, i.e. appellant no.2 namely Suman,

set her on fire by igniting a matchstick. When she was

caught by fire, all of them ran away. She tried to

extinguish fire from her person by pouring water. She

sustained extensive burns on various parts of her body.

Her brother-in-law namely Dilip Gund took her to the

Civil Hospital at Osmanabad for treatment.

3. PHC Patil sent the above mentioned statement of

the deceased Shivnanda to Police Station, Osmanabad, on

the basis of which a crime came to be registered for the

offences punishable under Sections 307, 323, 504, read

with Section 34 of the IPC under "0" number, since the

incident had taken place within the local limits of

jurisdiction of Bembali Police Station. Shivnanda died

in the hospital on 28th June, 2000 at 2.05 a.m. The

inquest of the body of the deceased Shivnanada was

prepared. Her body was referred to the Medical Officer

for the postmortem. The Medical Officer found 98% of

4 criapl421-2006

burns on her body. He opined that she died of shock due

to 98% of burns. After her demise, the offence under

Section 307 of the IPC came to be substituted by the

offence under section 302 of the IPC. The statements of

the deceased Shivnanda and inquest panchanama were sent

by PHC Patil from Police Station, Osmanabad to Police

Station, Bembli with his forwarding letter. On the basis

of that letter, Crime No.43 of 2000 was registered in

Police Station, Bembli, for the offences punishable

under Sections 302, 323 and 504 read with Section 34 of

the IPC.

4. The investigation followed. The spot panchanama

was prepared. Statements of the witnesses were recorded.

Considering the evidence collected during investigation,

the Investigating Officer found sufficient grounds to

proceed against Bibhishan and Rukminbai only for the

offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 306 read

with Section 34 of the IPC. Accordingly, he submitted

chargesheet against them in the Court of Chief Judicial

Judicial Magistrate, Osmanabad.

5. The offence under Section 306 of the IPC being

exclusively triable by the Court of Session, the learned

Chief Judicial Magistrate committed the case to the

5 criapl421-2006

Court of Session, Osmanabad.

6. The learned Trial Judge initially framed

charges against Bibhishan and Rukminbai for the offences

punishable under Sections 498-A and 306 read with

Section 34 of the IPC vide Exh.50 on 5 th December, 2005

and explained the contents thereof to them in

vernacular. They pleaded not guilty and claimed to be

tried. After PHC Patil and one more witness were

examined and the during declaration of the deceased

Shivnanda was proved before the Trial Court on 16 th

January, 2006, the learned Trial Judge framed charges

afresh against Bibhishan for the offence punishable

under Section 498-A of the IPC and against Rukminbai,

her mother Suman and brother Bharat, for the offence

punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the

IPC vide Exh.88 on 6th March, 2006. He explained the

contents of those charges to the accused persons to

which they pleaded not guilty. Their defence is that of

total denial and false implication.

7. The prosecution examined six witnesses to

establish guilt of the above named accused persons for

the above mentioned offences. After evaluating the said

evidence, the learned Trial judge found that the dying

6 criapl421-2006

declaration of the deceased Shivnanda was voluntary and

truthful. He, therefore, relied on that dying

declaration and convicted Rukminbai, Suman and Bharat

(original accused Nos.2, 3 and 4, respectively) only for

the offence punishable under Section 302 read with

Section 34 of the IPC. He acquitted Bibhishan (original

accused No.1) of the offence punishable under Section

498-A of the IPC. The original accused Nos.2 to 4 are

the appellants before this Court. The learned Trial

Judge sentenced each of them to suffer imprisonment for

life and to pay a fine of Rs.5000/-, in default to

suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year each.

8. The learned counsel for the appellants submits

that the case of the prosecution is solely depending on

the alleged dying declaration of Shivnanda recorded by

PHC Patil (PW1). According to him, the deceased

Shivnanda had sustained 98% burns. She was not a fit

state of mind to give any statement much less the

detailed and exhaustive dying declaration (Exh-63). He

submits that the language used and the manner in which

the events have been narrated in the said dying

declaration themselves make it clear that the deceased

Shivnanda is not the author of the said dying

7 criapl421-2006

declaration. Admittedly, the brother-in-law of the

deceased Shivnanda namely Dilip Gund had taken her to

the Civil Hospital for treatment after the incident. He

would have been the best witness to state as to whether

the deceased Shivnanda was in a condition to speak and

whether she had any allegation to make against anybody

behind the incident of burning. However, the

prosecution has not examined him without assigning any

reason. The daughter of the deceased Shivnanda was

present at her house at the time of the incident.

However, she has been given up by the prosecution vide

purshis (Exh.99). According to the learned counsel, the

daughter of the deceased Shivnanda was knowing that the

deceased Shivnanda had committed suicide and therefore,

her evidence was suppressed by the prosecution. He

submits that the house in which the incident took place

is situate abutting a main road of the village. There

were a number of houses and shops in front of or

adjacent to that house. However, no independent witness

has been examined by the prosecution. He submits that

as stated in the dying declaration, the husband of the

deceased Shivnanda had illicit relations with accused

No.1 since before the marriage of the deceased Shivnanda

which had taken place prior to about seven years of the

8 criapl421-2006

incident. The prosecution has not produced any evidence

to show as to what happened on the day of the incident

which prompted the appellants to go to the house of the

deceased Shivnanda and to set her on fire. According to

him, the very genesis of the incident as stated in the

dying declaration is not natural and probable. No motive

has been attributed against the appellants for setting

the deceased Shivnanda ablaze. The learned counsel

further submits that the Medical Officer has not

endorsed on the dying declaration that deceased

Shivnanda was conscious, oriented and in a fit condition

to give statement. This fact also creates doubt about

fit mental condition of the deceased Shivnanda. In the

circumstances, according to him, the dying declaration,

which is surrounded by suspicion, could not have been

used by the Trial Court for basing conviction against

the appellants for a serious offence like murder. He

submits that the Investigating Officer, after

considering the statements of the witnesses recorded by

him, formed an opinion that the appellants were liable

to be prosecuted for the offence punishable under

Section 306 of the IPC. All these witnesses have not

been examined by the prosecution without assigning any

reason. This fact also creates doubt about truthfulness

9 criapl421-2006

of the contents of the dying declaration of the deceased

Shivnanda. He, therefore, submits that the appellants

are entitled to get benefit of doubt.

9. As against this, the learned A.P.P. submits

that there is positive and dependable evidence of PHC

Patil and Dr. Alangekar to show that the deceased

Shivnanda was in a fit state of mind to give statement

at the time when it was recorded by PHC Patil. She

submits that when PHC Patil and Dr. Alangekar deposed

before the Court that the deceased Shivnanda was in a

fit state of mind to give statement, even in the absence

of any specific endorsement that the deceased was

conscious, oriented and in a fit state of mind to give

statement, the competency of the deceased Shivnanda to

give statement cannot be questioned. She relief on the

judgment in the case of Laxman Vs. State of Maharashtra

AIR 2002 SC 2973, wherein it is held that even absence

of certification of doctor as to fitness of mind of

declarant at the time of giving declaration would not

have any adverse effect on the veracity of the dying

declaration. A certification by the doctor is

essentially a rule of caution and therefore, voluntary

and truthful nature of the dying declaration can be

10 criapl421-2006

established otherwise. It is further observed that what

essentially required is that the person who records a

dying declaration must be satisfied that the declarant

was in a fit state of mind. Where it is proved by the

testimony of the Magistrate that the declarant was fit

to make the statement, even without examination of the

doctor the declaration can be acted upon provided the

Court holds the same to be voluntary and truthful.

10. The learned A.P.P. further relied on the

judgment in the case of Atbir Vs. Government of N.C.T.

of Delhi, AIR 2010 SC 3477, in support of her contention

that if a dying declaration is found to be voluntary and

truthful, it can form the sole basis of conviction even

without corroboration. She submits that that the

deceased Shivnanda gave the dying declaration (Exh.63)

when she was in a fit state of mind. It was voluntary

and truthful. It was not influenced by any other person

or the outcome of imagination. It creates great

confidence. She, therefore, submits that the learned

Trial Judge has rightly believed the said dying

declaration and rightly convicted the appellants on the

basis thereof.

11 criapl421-2006

11. The husband of the deceased Shivnanda, who was

original accused No.1, has been acquitted of the offence

punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC. The said

acquittal has not been challenged by the prosecution and

as such, has attained finality.

12. As seen from the evidence produced by the

prosecution, the case is solely based on the dying

declaration (Exh.63) of the deceased Shivnanda.

13. PHC Patil (PW3) (Exh.101) deposes that on 27 th

June, 2000, after receiving the MLC intimation (Exh.102)

from the doctor of Civil Hospital, he went to the burns

ward alongwith the doctor and requested the doctor to

examine the deceased Shivnanda and to opine whether she

was able to give statement. Accordingly, the doctor put

his endorsement that she was conscious. Thereafter, he

recorded the statement of the deceased as per her say

which is at Exh.63. He read over the contents thereof to

her whereon she stated that they were as per her say.

Then he obtained her thumb mark below it and then put

his own signature. Thereafter, the doctor made

endorsement thereon and signed it. He sent that

statement alongwith his forwarding letter (Exh.102) to

City Police Station, Osmanabad.

12 criapl421-2006

14. Dr. Alangekar (PW3) (Exh-94) deposes that on

the request of a Police Constable, he went to the burns

ward in the Civil Hospital and examined the deceased

Shivnanda. He found her to be conscious and able to give

statement. Therefore, he asked the police to record her

statement. Accordingly, he put endorsement on the

statement on the top thereof. After her statement was

recorded, he again examined her and found her to be

conscious. He then put his endorsement as "in front of

me" and signed it.

15. There is no dispute that the deceased Shivnanda

had sustained 98% of burns. One can imagine the

physical and mental condition of a person suffering from

98% of burns. The case papers of the deceased Shivnanda

have not been produced on record. Therefore, the

appellants could not get an opportunity to point out the

medicines which were being administered to the deceased

Shivnanda when her dying declaration (Exh-63) is stated

to have been recorded. Generally, the history of the

incident is asked to the patient when he/she is admitted

in the hospital. In the absence of those case-papers,

the said history also was not made available to the

appellants. The history of the incident given by the

13 criapl421-2006

deceased Shivnanda at the time of her admission would

have been of a great help to the Court also to consider

the state of mind of the deceased Shivnanda and her

first version about the incident in which she sustained

burns. The prosecution has withheld this material

evidence without assigning any reason. Therefore,

adverse inference will have to be drawn and accordingly

drawn that had the said evidence been produced, it would

not have supported the case of the prosecution.

16. Dilip Gund, the brother-in-law of the deceased

Shivnanda had brought her to the Civil Hospital at

Osmanabad after the incident. In the natural course,

the deceased Shivnanda would have disclosed him the

reason of her sustaining burns. He would have been the

best witness to prove the oral dying declaration of the

deceased Shivnanda which certainly would have thrown

light on the factual position leading to the incident of

burning. The prosecution did not examine him without

assigning any reason though his statement was recorded

by the Investigating Officer as seen from the

particulars of witnesses given in the chargesheet.

17. The daughter of the deceased Shivnanda was

present at the house at the time of the incident. She

14 criapl421-2006

appeared before the Court. However, the prosecution did

not examine her and informed the Court vide Pushis (Exh-

99) that she was given up as she was not supporting the

case of the prosecution. The evidence of the daughter

of the deceased Shivnanda also would have made the

factual position clear. However, her evidence has been

withheld by the prosecution.

18. From the evidence of Sahebrao (PW2) (Exh-96),

who happened to be a panch to the spot of incident, it

is clear that there was a main road running from near

the spot of incident. There were shops in front of that

house. There were other houses adjacent to that house.

None of the witnesses residing near the house, where the

incident took place, has been examined by the

prosecution without assigning any reason.

19. The dying declaration (Exh-63) of the deceased

Shivnanda reads as under :

"Patient is conscious Sd/- 2.10 pm. fu-63

t ck c fnukad [email protected]@2000

eh f'kouank Hkz-fcHkh"k.k xaqM o; 27 o"kZ /kank ?kjdke jk- ikMksGh rk-ft- mLekukckn-

15 criapl421-2006

le{k ljdkjh nok[kkuk mLekukckn ;sFks vkS"k/k mipkj pkyw vklrkauk fopkjsyo:u lkaxrs dh] eyk ,d eqyxh vklwu ,d nhj o tkow vklwu lklw o ek>s irh vkls loZt.k vkEgh ,d= jkgrks- ek>s ekyd 'ksrh djrkr ek>s ekgsj fHklsy fiaijh rk-ykrwj ;sFkhy vklwu ek>s yXu gksowu lkr o"kZ >kyh vkgsr- ekÖ;k uo&;kus vkeP;k xkokrhy :Deh.kh /kuxj ;k ukokph j[ksy Bsoysyh vkgs- o R;kaps izse laca/k ekÖ;k yXukiwohZiklwu pkyw vkgsr o R;keqGs ek>h o :Deh.khckbZph usgeh HkkaM.k raVk gksr vkls-

vkt [email protected]@2000 jksth ek>s ekyd gs ,sdchyk isj.kh dj.;klkBh xsys vkgsr eh tsou [kku d:u ?kjh >ksiys gksrs- rsOgk nqikjh ckjk okt.;kP;k lqekjkl ekÖ;k uo&;kph j[ksy :Deh.kh o rhph vkbZ] oMhy nRrw /kuxj o Hkkm vkls ekÖ;k ?kjh vkys rsOgk :Deh.khP;k gkrkr jkWdsyps dWUM gksrs- rsOgk lokZauh eyk f'kohxkG dsyh o ykFkk&cqD;kauh ekjgk.k dsyh o :Deh.khus gkrkrhy jkWdsy dWUM ekÖ;k vaxkoj vksrys o frP;k vkbZus dkMh vks<wu ekÖ;k lkMhl ykoyh rsOgk ekÖ;k loZ vaxkl tkG ykxyk rsOgk rs loZt.k iGwu xsys- ekÖ;k vaxkl iksGw ykxys rsOgk eh iGr tkmu ?kjkrhy jkat.kkrhy ik.kh rkaC;kus ekÖ;k vaxkoj vksrwu ?ksrys eyk tkG ykxY;kus ekÖ;k Mksdhps v/kZoV dsl] psgjk xGk] Nkrh] iksV nksUgh ik;] gkr ikB vkls Hkktys vkgs- uarj ek>s fnj fnyhi xaqM ;kauh [kktxh thi d:u vkS"k/k mipkjkdfjrk l-n-mLekukckn ;sFks vkuys- l/;k ekÖ;koj vkS"k/k mpkj pkyw vklwu eh iw.kZi.ks 'kq/nhoj vkgs-

rjh vkt fnukad [email protected]@2000 jksth nqikjh ckjk okt.ksP;k lqekjkl :Deh.kh /kuxj] frph vkbZ&oMhy o Hkkm ;kauh eyk ekjgk.k d:u thos ekj.;klkBh jkWdsy vksrwu dkMh vks<wu isVowu eyk tkGys vkgs- rjh ojhy pkj tukfo:/n ek>h dk;ns'khj rØkj vkgs- :Deh.khP;k vkbZps o Hkkokps ukao eyk ekfgr ukgh-

ek>k tckc fygyk rks eyk okpwu nk[kfoyk rks eh lkafxrys izek.ks cjkscj o [kjk vkgs-

                          le{k                                      fu-vka-
                        [email protected]&
               l-n-pkSdh vaeynkj] iks-LVs-                f'kouank Hkz-fcHkh"k.k xaqM
                    mLekukckn ¼'k½                               ;kapk vls-
           Infront of me
                Sd/-
           M.O.G.H.Os'bad
           27/6/2000 2.35 p.m."



                                      16                         criapl421-2006


20. The contents of the dying declaration (Exh-63),

which is in a narrative form, exfacie show that the

manner of narration therein is not expected of an

illiterate woman like the deceased Shivnanda. It seems

to be in the language of PHC Patil (PW1). The deceased

Shivnanda, who had sustained 98% of burns, would not

have given such a detailed and exhaustive statement.

Moreover, in the natural course, after stating the

events those took place at the time of the incident, the

deceased Shivnanda would not have repeated the same.

However, the last paragraph of the dying declaration

(Exh-63) again contains the summary of the preceding

paragraph. This fact creates strong doubt about

authorship about the dying declaration (Exh-63) as that

of the deceased Shivnanda.

21. Even if the dying declaration (Exh-63) is

accepted as that of the deceased Shivnanda for a while,

it will be clear therefrom that she was residing jointly

with her brother-in-law Dilip, mother-in-law and the

wife of Dilip in the house where the incident took

place. It is not the case of the prosecution that the

mother-in-law and the wife of the brother-in-law of the

deceased Shivnanda were not present in the house at the

17 criapl421-2006

time of the incident. None of them has been examined by

the prosecution. As seen from the contents of the dying

declaration (Exh-63), the husband of the deceased

Shivnanda had illicit relations with original accused

No.1 since before the deceased Shivnanda got married

with accused No.1. Indisputably, the marriage had taken

place prior to about seven years of the incident. There

is nothing on record to show that during the said period

of seven years, appellant No.1 or anybody from her

family had illtreated the deceased Shivnanda at any

point of time on any count. There is nothing in the

dying declaration (Exh-63) to show as to why the

appellants had been to her house on 27th June, 2000 and

what prompted the appellants to think of visiting house

of the deceased Shivnanda having made preparation for

setting her ablaze on 27th June, 2000. In the natural

course, there would have been some other incident

preceding the incident of burning, which would have made

the appellants to think of setting the deceased

Shivnanda on fire.

22. The incident took place at about 12.00 noon. A

number of persons were residing near the house where the

incident took place. None of them has come forward to

18 criapl421-2006

state that he/she had seen the appellants visiting the

house of the deceased Shivnanda. The deceased Shivnanda

would not have kept total silence after seeing the

appellants coming to her house with any oblique motive.

She would have tried her level best to resist them. She

would have tried to run away out of the house. In any

case, she would have at least raised shouts to attract

attention of the others so as to seek their assistance

to save herself. Nothing that of sort seems to have

been done by her. In the circumstances, the incident as

has been narrated by the deceased Shivnanda, does not

appear to be natural and probable. It does not inspire

confidence.

23. The evidence of PSI Chavan (PW7) (Exh-113), who

recorded the statements of the witnesses and after

completion of investigation filed chargesheet, shows

that it transpired in his investigation that the

deceased Shivnanda committed suicide, in the

circumstances of the case, assumes importance. He

cannot state before the Court as to what was stated

before him by the witnesses, but being the

Investigating Officer, after considering the evidence

collected by him, he was supposed to form an opinion as

19 criapl421-2006

to what offence was disclosed against the accused

persons. Accordingly, he formed an opinion that

the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC was

disclosed. If that be so, the theory of the prosecution

that the appellants themselves set the deceased

Shivnanda on fire, cannot be believed.

24. In the above circumstances, the sole dying

declaration (Exh-63) of the deceased Shivnanda was not

sufficient to hold the appellants guilty for a serious

offence like murder for which the minimum punishment is

imprisonment for life. It was incumbent on the part of

the prosecution to produce corroborative evidence to

establish the facts narrated in the dying declaration

(Exh-63). The prosecution has suppressed the evidence

of material witnesses, which itself creates a great

doubt about the truthfulness of the contents of the

dying declaration (Exh-63). In the circumstances, the

learned Trial Judge should not have believed the dying

declaration (Exh-63) and should not have convicted the

appellants solely on the basis of the said dying

declaration. The learned Trial Court committed a grave

error in holding the appellants guilty of the offence of

murder of the deceased Shivnanda on the basis of the

20 criapl421-2006

dying declaration (Exh-63) without seeking corroboration

thereto. The evidence of record creates doubt about

the case of the prosecution. Therefore, the benefit of

doubt necessarily would have to be given to the

appellants.

25. The prosecution failed to adduce sufficient,

cogent and dependable evidence to establish guilt of the

appellants for the offence of murder of the deceased

Shivnanda, beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence on

record is not free from doubt. The appellants are

entitled to get benefit of doubt. The impugned judgment

of conviction and sentence passed against the appellants

are liable to be quashed and set aside. In the result,

we pass the following order:

O R D E R

(A) The Criminal Appeal is allowed.

(B) The impugned judgment and order are quashed and

set aside.

(C) The appellants are acquitted of the offence

punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.

                                      21                        criapl421-2006

(D)              The bail bonds of the appellants are cancelled. 

They are set at liberty.


(E)              The   fine   amount,   if   deposited   by   the 

appellants, be refunded to them.


(F)              The appeal is accordingly disposed of.      

 

        [SANGITRAO S. PATIL]              [SUNIL P. DESHMUKH]
                JUDGE                             JUDGE

 
npj/criapl421-2006





 

 
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