Citation : 2017 Latest Caselaw 9396 Bom
Judgement Date : 7 December, 2017
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 270 OF 2006
Vijaysing Gulabsing Devre,
age : 25 years, Occup.: Labour,
R/o Maharana Pratap Housing Society,
Chalisgaon, Taluka Chalisgaon,
District Jalgaon PETITIONER
(Accused No.1)
VERSUS
The State of Maharashtra,
Through Public Prosecutor RESPONDENT
(Prosecution)
----
Mr. Vijay Sharma, Advocate for the appellant
Mrs. A.V. Gondhalekar, Addl. Public Prosecutor for the
respondents/State
----
CORAM : SUNIL P. DESHMUKH AND
SANGITRAO S. PATIL, JJ.
DATE : 7th DECEMBER, 2017
JUDGMENT (PER : SANGITRAO S. PATIL, J.):
The appellant has challenged his conviction and
sentence for the offences punishable under Sections
498-A and 302 of the Indian Penal Code ("IPC", for
short), recorded by the learned 1 st Adhoc Additional
Sessions Judge, Jalgaon, in Sessions Case No.172 of 2004
on 22.03.2006.
2 criapl270-2006
2. The deceased - Ashabai and the appellant got
married prior to about six years of the incident, which
took place on 17.06.2004. The deceased - Ashabai has
begotten two daughters from this wedlock. The original
accused No.2 is the brother, accused No.3 is the
brother-in-law (husband of the sister), accused No.4 is
the mother, while accused No.5 is the sister of the
appellant (accused No.1).
3. It is the case of the prosecution that the
appellant and original accused Nos.2 to 5 subjected the
deceased - Ashabai to cruelty with a view to compel her
to bring cash amount from her maternal home for
purchasing agricultural land and motor vehicle. When the
deceased - Ashabai was preparing food inside her
matrimonial home on 17.06.2004 at about 10.00 a.m.,
quarrel took place between the appellant and the
deceased - Ashabai. The appellant was asking her to
bring Rs.6000/- from her maternal home for being paid to
his landlord. He started hurling abuses against her and
also threatening her. The deceased - Ashabai expressed
inability to bring cash amount from her brother on the
say that her father was no more and her brother was
3 criapl270-2006
anyhow maintaining his family. The appellant then
started beating her. He expressed that her being alive
would of no use and therefore, he would kill her. He
picked up kerosene can that was near the burning stove
and poured kerosene therefrom on her person. He pushed
her on burning stove. He, further ignited a match stick
and set fire to her Saari, due to which her clothes
started burning causing her burn injuries. The appellant
then ran away from the house. The deceased - Ashabai
also followed him and raised shouts. The neighbours came
and extinguished fire. Thereafter, the appellant also
sprinkled water on her person and took her to the
Municipal Hospital from where she was referred to the
private hospital of Dr. Devre.
4. After receiving intimation from the hospital of
Dr. Devre, PSI Ahir recorded the statement of the
deceased - Ashabai somewhere between 11.20 a.m. and
12.15 p.m. on 18.06.2004. The said statement was treated
as the First Information Report (for short, "FIR"). On
the basis of the FIR, Crime No.141 of 2014 came to be
registered against the appellant and accused Nos.2 to 5
for the offences punishable under Sections 307, 498-A,
4 criapl270-2006
504, 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC.
5. The investigation followed. Spot panchanama was
prepared. The kerosene stove, a plastic can smelling of
kerosene, the match stick box and burnt pieces of Saari
of the deceased - Ashabai came to be seized under the
same panchanama. Statements of the witnesses were
recorded. The deceased - Ashabai was referred to Civil
Hospital at Jalgaon from the hospital of Dr. Devre on
21.06.2004. She died there on 25.06.2004. The inquest
panchanama of the body of the deceased was prepared and
the dead body was referred to the Medical Officer for
postmortem. There were 87% burns on the body of the
deceased - Ashabai. The Medical Officer opined that she
died of septic shock due to burn injuries. Therefore,
the offence punishable under Sections 302 came to be
substituted for the offence punishable under Section 307
of the IPC. After completion of the investigation, the
appellant and accused Nos.2 to 5 came to be
chargesheeted for the offences punishable under Sections
302, 498-A, 504, 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC, in
the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class at
Chalisgaon.
5 criapl270-2006
6. The offence punishable under Section 302 of the
IPC being exclusively triable by the Court of Session,
the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class committed
it to the Additional Sessions Court at Jalgaon for
trial. The learned Trial Judge framed charges against
the appellant and accused Nos.2 to 5 for the offences
punishable under Sections 498-A read with Section 109
and under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian
Penal Code, vide Exh.12 and explained the contents
thereof to them in vernacular. The appellant and accused
Nos. 2 to 5 pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
Their defence is that of total denial and false
implication. According to them, the deceased Ashabai
sustained burns accidentally, as a result of which she
died.
7. The prosecution examined five witnesses to
establish the guilt of the appellant and accused Nos.2
to 5 for the above-mentioned offences. The learned Trial
Judge evaluated the said evidence and found that there
was sufficient and dependable evidence to hold the
appellant only guilty for the offences punishable under
6 criapl270-2006
Sections 498-A and 302 of the IPC. He, therefore,
convicted the appellant for the said offences and
sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two
years and pay a fine of Rs.1000/- in respect of the
offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and to
suffer imprisonment for life and pay a fine of Rs.1000/-
in respect of the offence punishable under Section 302
of the IPC. The learned Trial Judge did not find
sufficient evidence to connect accused Nos.2 to 5 with
the above-mentioned offences. He, therefore, acquitted
accused nos.2 to 5. The judgment of acquittal of accused
Nos.2 to 5 has not been challenged by the prosecution
and as such, attained finality.
8. The learned counsel for the appellant submits
that the deceased - Ashabai sustained burns accidentally
when she was preparing food. After hearing her shouts,
the appellant and his friend Chhotu, who were sitting
out of the house, extinguished fire from her person and
took her to the hospital of Dr. Devre for treatment.
After receiving intimation from the hospital of
Dr. Devre, an Assistant Sub-Inspector (ASI), of Police
Station Chalisgaon, recorded the statement of the
7 criapl270-2006
deceased Ashabai on 17.06.2004 at about 3.00 p.m. The
Executive Magistrate also recorded her statement on the
same day at about 3.20 p.m., after getting it verified
from Dr. Devre that she was in a fit condition to give
statement. In both of these statements the deceased -
Ashabai consistently stated that when she was preparing
food, her Saari was caught by fire accidentally due to
which she sustained burn injuries and that the appellant
extinguished fire from her person and took her to the
hospital of Dr. Devre for treatment. However, the
prosecution had suppressed both of these dying
declarations. He then submits that the brother of the
deceased Ashabai attended the hospital on the day of the
incident at about 1.00 p.m. He tutored and influenced
Ashabai to falsely involve the appellant and accused
Nos.2 to 5 in the incident and therefore, the third
dying declaration came to be recorded at the instance of
the brother of the deceased - Ashabai. He submits that
the third dying declaration allegedly recorded on
18.06.2004 is not at all voluntary and truthful.
However, the learned Trial Judge wrongly believed that
dying declaration and wrongly convicted the appellant.
He submits that since there are inconsistent statements
8 criapl270-2006
made by the deceased - Ashabai, the earlier two dying
declarations which are voluntary and depicting the
factual position, ought to have been relied on by the
learned Trial Judge. He submits that the evidence on
record is not at all sufficient and believable to hold
the appellant guilty for the above-mentioned offences.
9. On the other hand, the learned A.P.P. submits
that the earlier two dying declarations were given by
the deceased - Ashabai under the pressure of the
appellant. Nobody was in the hospital from the side of
her maternal home to encourage her to state factual
position. However, subsequently, she gathered courage to
state the factual position. Accordingly, she gave the
third dying declaration involving the appellant in the
incident in question. It was truthful and voluntary. It
inspires great confidence. This dying declaration gets
corroboration from the evidence of the brother of the
deceased - Ashabai. According to the learned A.P.P., the
theory of accidental burning, setup by the appellant, is
not natural, proper and believable. The prosecution
established guilt of the appellant for the above-
mentioned offences beyond reasonable doubt. The learned
9 criapl270-2006
A.P.P. therefore supports the impugned judgment and
order.
10. It has come in the evidence of Dr. Devre (PW1)
(Exh.43) that the deceased - Ashabai was admitted in his
hospital by the appellant on 17.06.2004 at about 12.14
p.m. She had sustained 82% burn injuries. It has come in
his cross-examination that he had informed about the
admission of Ashabai in his hospital to the police
station on 17.06.2004. One ASI, of Police Station,
Chalisgaon came to his hospital on that day at about
3.00 p.m. and asked whether Ashabai was in a fit
condition to give statement. After he opined that she
was in a fit mental condition to give statement, the
said ASI recorded her statement (Exh.47). His
endorsement shows fitness of the deceased - Ashabai to
give statement. He states that the said ASI recorded the
statement (Exh.47) of the deceased - Ashabai. It has
further come in his cross-examination that on the same
day, the Executive Magistrate of Chalisgaon also
recorded the statement (Exh.49) of the deceased -
Ashabai at about 3.20 p.m. It also bears his endorsement
about fitness of Ashabai to give statement. He deposes
10 criapl270-2006
that the deceased - Ashabai put her thumb impressions on
the statements at Exhs. 47 and 49.
11. PSI Ahir (PW5) (Exh.71), who conducted the
investigation, states that an ASI of Police Station,
Chalisgaon, recorded dying declaration (Exh.47) and
Executive Magistrate recorded dying declaration (Exh.49)
of the deceased - Ashabai. However, the prosecution has
not examined both of these witnesses. The execution of
the dying declarations Exhs.47 and 49 has been proved by
Dr. Devre (PW1) before whom they were recorded and the
deceased - Ashabai put her thumb impressions thereon.
The appellant admitted the contents of the said dying
declarations.
12. In the dying declarations (Exh. 47 and 49), the
deceased - Ashabai specifically stated that on
17.06.2004 at about 10.00 a.m., she ignited kerosene
stove for preparing food when she was leaning while
sitting down, a part of her Saari (called padar)
accidentally fell down on the flames of the burning
stove, due to which she was caught by fire. She raised
shouts. The appellant was sitting outside the house
11 criapl270-2006
alongwith one Chhotu. Both of them came towards her
immediately, extinguished fire from her person and
admitted her in the hospital of Dr. Devre for treatment.
She specifically stated that she neither set herself on
fire nor anybody set her on fire. From the dying
declarations (Exh.47 and 49), it is clear that the
deceased - Ashabai sustained burns accidentally.
13. Dr. Devre (PW1) deposes that on 17.06.2004 at
about 9.00 p.m., the deceased - Ashabai expressed her
desire to again give statement in respect of the
incident. Therefore, he informed the police vide letter
(Exh.46) at about 9.20 p.m. From the endorsement made on
the letter (Exh.46), it is clear that it was received in
the Police Station at about 9.45 p.m. on 17.06.2004. PSI
Ahir (PW5) states that after receiving letter (Exh.46),
he had deliberations with his higher authority on
18.06.2004 at 11.45 a.m. Thereafter, he visited Dr.
Devre's hospital. He requested Dr.Devre (PW1) to opine
as to whether Ashabai was in a fit mental condition to
give statement. Accordingly, Dr. Devre examined her and
opined that her statement could be recorded. Thereafter,
he recorded the statement (Exh.45) of the deceased -
12 criapl270-2006
Ashabai as per her say in the presence of Dr. Devre
(PW1) and one of the members of Mahila Dakshata
Committee. He read over the contents of the said
statement to the deceased - Ashabai which she admitted
to be correct and thereafter, he obtained her thumb
impression thereon. The Member of Mahila Dakshata
Committee and himself put their signatures thereon. Dr.
Devre (PW1) corroborates the version of PSI Ahir (PW5)
and states that PSI Ahir (PW5) recorded dying
declaration (Exh.47) of the deceased - Ashabai, when she
was in a fit condition to give statement.
14. In the dying declaration (Exh.45) the deceased
- Ashabai states as under:- "
"nsojs gkWLihVy pkGhlxkao [email protected]@2004
tckc % lkS- vk'kkckbZ fot;kflax ikVhy o; 22 /kank & ?kjdke jk- egkjk.kk gkSlhax lkslk- IykWV ua-106 pkGhlxkao-
le{k fopkjys o:u iwUgk fygqu nsrs dh ek>k ;kiwohZ dky [email protected]@04 jksth iksyhlkadMsl fnysyk tckc tGkys ckcrpk ek>k uojk le{k gtj vlY;kus o ek>s ekgsjps dks.khgh gtj ulY;kus eh tckckr lkaxhrysyh gdhxr uo&;kps nckck[kkyh lkaxhryh gksrh rh eyk ekU; ulqu eh vkrk lnj /kDD;krqu FkksMh lkojY;kus eyk lR; ijhLFkhrh lkaxko;kph vkgs rh [kkyhy izek.ks-
13 criapl270-2006
ojhy fBdk.kh eh irh fot;flax ikVhy o nksu eqyhalg jkgrs- lnj fBdk.kh vkEgh 1 o"kkZiklqu HkkM;kus jkgkrks uojk vkeph ekjksrh dkj u- MH-20 U 6726 gh izoklh HkkM;koj pkyforks o R;koj vkEgh mnjfuokZg djrks-
dky [email protected]@04 jkth ldkGh 10-00 ok- ps lq-kk ?kjkr Loa;ikd djhr vlrkauk irh fot;flax xqykc ns;js ¼ikVhy½ ;kaps'kh HkkaM.k >kys rsOgk HkkaM.kkr irh eyk Eg.kkys dh ?kjekydkps lgk gtkj :i;s ns.ks vkgs rs rq>s vkbZ ofMykadMwu ekxqu ?ks- vls Eg.kqu eyk f'kohxkG o nenkVh d: ykxys- R;koj eh R;kauk lkaxhrys dh rqeph vkbZ vk.kh cfg.k gs usgeh ek>s vkbZ ofMykadMwu iS'kkph ekx.kh djrk gs cjkscj ukgh- ,d rj eyk ofMy ukgh- ek>k Hkkm R;kaps dqVwac dls rjh pkyorks- vkrk isj.khpk VkbZe vkgs dqBwu iSls vk.ksy- vls EgVY;koj irhus eyk f'kohxkG d:u ekjgk.k d: ykxyk o rq vkrk txqu mi;ksx ukgh rqyk ek:u Vkdrks vls Eg.kqu R;kus LVksOg toG vlysyk jkWdsypk Hkjysyk IyWLVhdph dWu mpyqu ek>s vaxkoj vksryk o pkyq LVksOgoj <dywu fnys- rlsp LVksOg toG iMysyh ekphl isVhrhy dkMh vks<wu ek>s lkMhyk ykoyh- R;keqGs ek>s vaxkojhy diM;kauh isV ?ksrY;kus eh tGkyh vlqu R;kr ek>s nksUgh gkr] nksUgh ik; Nkrh iksV o xqIr vax tGkys vkgs- rlsp eyk irhus isVfoys uarj irh ?kjkrwu ckgsj iGkys- eh R;kaps ekxs iGkyh o tksj&tksjkus vkjksG;k ekjY;k- R;keqGs xYyhrhy leksj jkg.kkjs czkEg.k o R;kaps ?kjkrhy brj yksd ?kjkckgsj vkys o R;kauh eyk fo>foys- uarj irhus ek>s vaxkoj ik.kh Vkdys gksrs- eh tGkY;kus eyk ek>s irhus vkS"k/k mipkjklkBh u-ik-nok[kkuk 40xko ;sFks vk.kys oj rsFkhy MkWDVjkauh ykxyhp MkW-nsojs ;kaps gkWLihVy e/;s VªkWULQj dsys vkgs-
;kiwohZ ek>k irh lklq fla/kqckbZ xqykc nsojs u.kan lkS- eaxykckbZ lqesjflax uanksbZ lqesjflax f=flax ikVhy o tsB egsanzflax xqykc nsojs gs Ik.k osGksosGh Hkkm o vkbZ ;kapsdMwu 'ksrh o xkMh lkBh iSls vk.kkos Eg.qku eyk
14 criapl270-2006
ekjBksd djhr gksrs Eg.kqu ek>h ojhy yksdkaps fo:/n fQ;kZn vkgs-
ek>h ojhy fQ;kZn eyk okpqu nk[kfoyh rh ek>s lkax.ks izek.ks cjkscj fyfgyh vkgs-
le{k gs fygqu fnys lgh
Lok{[email protected]& [email protected]@04
iks-mi-fujh-40 xkao lkS-vk'kkckbZ fot;flax ikVhy
iks-LVs- fu-Mk-va-**
15. The contents of dying declaration (Exh.45) show
that on 17.06.2004 at about 10.00 a.m., when Ashabai was
preparing food, the appellant picked up quarrel with her
and asked her to bring Rs.6000/- from her maternal home
for being paid to his landlord. When she expressed
inability to bring the amount from her brother, the
appellant said that her being alive was of no use and
that he would kill her. Thereafter, he poured kerosene
on her person and pushed her on burning stove. He
further ignited a match stick and set her Saari on fire
due to which she sustained burns on various parts of her
body. He ran away from the house. The neighbours
extinguished fire from her person. Then the appellant
also sprinkled water on her person and took her
initially to the Municipal Hospital for treatment and
then to the hospital of Dr. Devre. As such, the deceased
15 criapl270-2006
Ashabai blamed the appellant for setting her ablaze.
16. PSI Ahir (PW5), who recorded dying declaration
(Exh.45) admits in his cross-examination that he was
aware that the dying declaration (Exh.45) was not the
first statement that was given by the deceased -
Ashabai. He denies that the deceased - Ashabai told him
that prior to recording of her dying declaration
(Exh.45), two authorities had recorded her statements.
However, the first paragraph of dying declaration
(Exh.45) makes it clear that she had specifically stated
that her statement was recorded by the police on
17.06.2004. When it is the case of the PSI Ahir (PW5)
that the said fact was not stated by the deceased -
Ashabai before him, a strong doubt gets created about
the authorship of the statement of the deceased -
Ashabai. The first paragraph seems to have been
incorporated in the dying declaration (Exh.45) at the
instance of somebody else than the deceased - Ashabai.
17. Zumbarsing (PW7) (Exh.57) is the brother of the
deceased - Ashabai. He states that on the day of the
incident at about 10.00 a.m., he came to know from his
16 criapl270-2006
younger brother Mahendrasing that he received telephonic
message from Munna Patil that the deceased Ashabai
sustained burns and was admitted in Devre hospital at
Chalisgaon. He went to Devre hospital at Chalisgaon
alongwith his relatives at about 12.35 p.m. to 1.00 p.m.
He met her in Intensive Care Unit (ICU). On being
enquired by him, she told that on that day in the
morning quarrel took place between the appellant and
herself on the ground of demand of money for discharging
the debts incurred for purchasing of vehicle. She was
preparing food on kerosene stove. The appellant came
there and poured kerosene on her person and pushed her
on the burning stove, due to which she was caught by
fire. He further states that the appellant set her
ablaze by means of burning match stick.
18. The prosecution has relied on the evidence of
Zumbarsing (PW2) to prove the above mentioned oral dying
declaration of the deceased - Ashabai. He states that he
was present in Devre hospital, after reaching there on
17.06.2004 at about 1.00 p.m. till she was discharged
from that hospital and admitted in the civil hospital at
Jalgaon on 21.06.2004. He states in paragraph No.6 of
17 criapl270-2006
the cross-examination that in response to the intimation
given to the police from Dr. Devre's hospital, police
reached that hospital on 17.06.2004 at about 3.00 p.m.
However, he shows ignorance as to whether the police and
Executive Magistrate recorded the statements of the
deceased - Ashabai on that day on 3.00 p.m. and 3.20
p.m. respectively. The evidence of Dr.Devre (PW1)
clearly shows that the dying declarations Exh.47 and 49
were recorded by an ASI and the Executive Magistrate on
17.06.2004 at about 3.00 p.m. and 3.20 p.m.
respectively, in his hospital. It is, thus, clear that
Zumbarsing (PW2) tried to feign ignorance about the fact
of recording dying declarations (Exh.47 and 49) by
police personnel and the Executive Magistrate, since
they were disclosing that the deceased - Ashabai
sustained burns accidentally.
19. The evidence of Zumbarsing (PW2) that the
deceased Ashabai gave oral dying declaration before him
as stated above, itself does not inspire confidence. If
the deceased - Ashabai had given such oral dying
declaration before him at about 1.00 p.m. on that day,
Zumbarsing (PW2) certainly would have complained against
18 criapl270-2006
the appellant to the Police Station or at-least before
the police personnel who visited the hospital at about
3.00 p.m. He did not whisper about the oral dying
declaration until his statement was recorded by police.
He states that his statement was recorded by the police
about 15 days of the day of incident. He specifically
states that he did not make any complaint until his
statement was recorded by the police. However, he adds
that on the day of incident, he had gone to the Police
Station, Chalisgaon and lodged the report but police
told that the deceased - Ashabai had already given
statement. The version of this witness about having
approached the Police Station to lodge report against
appellant, has not at all been corroborated. It seems
that after he came to know that the deceased - Ashabai
stated before the police personnel as well as before the
Executive Magistrate that she sustained burns
accidentally, he tried to influence the deceased -
Ashabai by insisting upon her to involve the appellant,
his family members and other relations in the incident
in question. It seems that he succeeded in implicating
the appellant and accused Nos.2 to 5 at about 9.00 p.m.
and therefore, the deceased - Ashabai seems to have
19 criapl270-2006
expressed that she wanted to give one more statement and
accordingly, her statement i.e. dying declaration
(Exh.45) came to be recorded by PSI Ahir (PW5) on
18.06.2004 around 12.00 noon.
20. It is well settled that when there are multiple
dying declarations or inconsistent dying declarations,
each dying declaration has to be considered
independently with respect to the facts of the case and
the other attending circumstances. In this regard a
reference may conveniently be made to paragraphs 13 and
14 of the judgment in the case of Raju Devade Vs. State
of Maharashtra AIR 2016 SC 3209, in which it has been
held as follows:
"13. When there are multiple dying declarations, each dying declaration has to be considered independently on its own merits so as to appreciate its evidentiary value and one cannot be rejected because of the contents of the other. In the cases where there are more than one dying declarations, it is the duty of the Court to consider each one of them in its correct perspective and satisfy itself that which one of them reflects the true state of affairs.
20 criapl270-2006
14. In the case of Shudhakar Vs. State of M.P. AIR 2012 SC 3265, it is observed that in the cases involving multiple dying declarations, for determining which of the various dying declarations should be believed by the Court, the test of common prudence would be to first examine which of the dying declarations is corroborated by other prosecution evidence. Further, the attendant circumstances, the condition of the deceased at the relevant time, the medical evidence, the voluntariness and genuineness of the statement made by the deceased, physical and mental fitness of the deceased and possibility of the deceased being tutored are some of the factors which would guide the exercise of judicial discretion by the Court in such matters."
21. In view of the above cited judgment of the
Hon'ble Apex Court, the judgment in the case of Shri
Rajendra Madhukar Kadam Vs. The State of Maharashtra,
2016 ALL MR (Cri) 1022; Govind Narain and another Vs.
State of Rajasthan, AIR 1993 SC 2457 and Sunder Gounder
Vs. State of Goa, 2015 ALL MR (Cri) 698, cited by the
learned counsel for the appellant, wherein it has been
observed that where there are multiple dying
21 criapl270-2006
declarations and acceptance of one dying declaration
falsifies the other, the dying declarations have to be
necessarily rejected, would not be helpful to the
appellant to seek rejection of all the dying
declarations of the deceased - Ashabai referred to
above.
22. In view of the above-mentioned legal position
in respect of multiple dying declarations, it will have
to be considered with respect to the evidence on record
as to whether dying declaration (Exh.45) is believable.
In the opening paragraph of dying declaration (Exh.45),
the deceased Ashabai is stated to have mentioned that
when her dying declaration was recorded on 17.06.2004 by
the police, the appellant was present there and none
from her maternal home was present. Therefore, she
stated before the police under the pressure of the
appellant. As stated above, PSI Ahir (PW5) himself
states that the said statement was not made before him
and that her statement was recorded previously by two
authorities. From the evidence of Zumbarsing (PW2), it
is clear that he was present in Dr.Devre hospital right
from 1.00 p.m. on 17.06.2004 till 21.06.2004, when the
22 criapl270-2006
deceased Ashabai was shifted to the Civil Hospital at
Jalgaon from Dr. Devre's hospital. Thus, the contents of
this paragraph that nobody from her maternal home was
present in the hospital cannot be believed. From the
evidence of Dr. Devre (PW1), it is clear that the
appellant was not present when the dying declarations
(Exh.45 and 49) were recorded by the police and the
Executive Magistrate. If that be so, the dying
declarations (Exh.45 and 49) cannot be said to have been
given by the deceased Ashabai under the pressure of the
appellant.
23. In the dying declaration (Exh.45), the deceased
- Ashabai stated to have alleged that the appellant was
asking her to bring Rs.6000/- from her maternal home for
being paid to his landlord. However, Zumbarsing (PW2)
states that the deceased Ashabai told him that on the
day of the incident, in the morning, quarrel took place
between the appellant and herself on account of demand
of money to satisfy the debt of purchase of vehicle.
Thus the reasons for demanding money stated in the dying
declaration (Exh.45) and the alleged oral dying
declaration given before Zumbarsing (PW2), are not
23 criapl270-2006
consistent. As such, the evidence of Zumbarsing (PW2)
does not corroborate the contents of the dying
declaration (Exh.45) in respect of the reason for demand
of money which was the very cause of the alleged quarrel
between the appellant and the deceased Ashabai.
24. The contents of the dying declaration (Exh.45)
that the appellant pushed the deceased Ashabai on a
burning stove and again set her ablaze by igniting a
matchstick, suffer from inherent improbability. If a
person is pushed on a burning stove after pouring
kerosene, he immediately would be caught by fire.
Thereafter, it would not be natural and probable on the
part of the person setting the victim on fire to again
to pick-up matchstick and ignite it to set the victim on
fire.
25. The dying declaration (Exh.45) shows that the
neighbours came and extinguished fire from her person
and the appellant had sprinkled water on her person.
However, none of the said neighbours has been examined
by the prosecution. The evidence of the neighbours
certainly would have made the position clear as to what
24 criapl270-2006
was the reaction of the deceased Ashabai and that of the
appellant after she was caught by fire. The prosecution
suppressed the evidence of these material witnesses,
which creates strong doubt of truthfulness of the
contents of the dying declaration (Exh.45).
26. There is a specific mention in the dying
declaration (Exh.45) that the appellant also poured
water on the person of the deceased Ashabai and admitted
her initially in the Municipal Hospital and then in the
hospital of Dr. Devre for treatment. Dr. Devre (PW1)
also states that the appellant admitted the deceased
Ashabai in his hospital. Had the appellant set the
deceased - Ashabai on fire and wanted to kill her, he
would not have tried to extinguish fire by pouring water
on her person and further would not have taken her to
any hospital for treatment.
27. It has come in the evidence of Zumbarsing (PW2)
that the deceased - Ashabai had been to his house for
the second delivery and that she stayed there for 30 to
35 days. He states that the appellant had been to his
house to take the deceased Ashabai to his house, when
25 criapl270-2006
her newly born daughter was 15 days old. He further
states that the incident took place about 3 days
thereafter. Thus prior to about 3 days of the incident,
the deceased Ashabai and the appellant were at his
house. There is no mention in his evidence to show that
during the said visit, the appellant asked for money
from him on any count either personally or through the
deceased Ashabai. He does not state that the deceased -
Ashabai was reluctant to go with the appellant on any
count.
28. Zumbarsing (PW2) states that the deceased -
Ashabai stated him that the accused persons (appellant
and accused Nos.2 to 5) used to demand money, as they
were indebted due to purchase of vehicle and on that
count, she was being subjected to cruelty. However, it
has come in the evidence of PSI Ahir (PW5) that
Zumbarsing (PW2) has not stated the said fact before him
when his statement was recorded. As such, this is the
material omission in the version of Zumbarsing (PW2). It
is, thus, clear that he has tried to add something more
for the first time before the Court, which is not even
stated before the police.
26 criapl270-2006
29. There is absolutely no evidence on record to
show that the appellant ever ill-treated on any
particular occasion, the deceased - Ashabai on any
count. As such, the contents of dying declaration
(Exh.45) do not find corroboration. Moreover, for the
reasons mentioned above, dying declaration (Exh.45)
seems to have been recorded at the instance of
Zumbarsing (PW2) with a view to involve the appellant
and his other relatives, i.e. accused Nos.2 to 5, by way
of an afterthought.
30. The evidence on record shows that the appellant
himself tried to extinguish fire from the person of the
deceased - Ashabai. He himself took her to the hospital
for treatment. There was no reason for him to set the
deceased Ashabai on fire. In the circumstances, dying
declarations (Exh.47 and 49) cannot be said to have been
recorded at the instance of the appellant or under his
pressure. The dying declarations (Exh.47 and 49) seem to
be voluntary and truthful. The dying declaration
(Exh.45) does not inspire confidence for the reasons
mentioned above. The dying declarations (Exh.47 and 49)
27 criapl270-2006
show that the decased-Ashahabi sustained burns
accidentally.
31. In view of the above facts and circumstances of
the case, it cannot be said that the prosecution
established that the appellant subjected the deceased -
Ashabai to cruelty and ultimately committed her murder
by setting her on fire. The learned Trial Judge did not
appreciate the evidence on record correctly, properly
and wrongly convicted the appellant relying on the dying
declaration (Exh.45) and the evidence of Zumbarsingh
(PW2), which, in fact, does not inspire confidence. The
impugned judgment and order convicting and sentencing
the appellant, are not sustainable. They are liable to
be quashed and set aside. In the result, we pass the
following order:-
O R D E R
(1) The appeal is allowed.
(2) The impugned judgment and order are quashed and
set aside.
28 criapl270-2006 (3) The appellant is acquitted of the offences
punishable under Sections 498-A and 302 of the
Indian Penal Code.
(4) The bail bonds of the appellant are cancelled.
He is set at liberty.
(5) Fine amount, if deposited by the appellant, be
refunded to him.
(6) Appeal is accordingly disposed of.
Sd/- Sd/-
[SANGITRAO S. PATIL] [SUNIL P. DESHMUKH]
JUDGE JUDGE
sam/criapl270-2006
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