Mr Rajesh Sud And Others vs The State Of Maharashtra And Anr
2017 Latest Caselaw 9276 Bom

                                 1                    Cri.W.P.1142-16.odt

      IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                 BENCH AT AURANGABAD


             CRIMINAL  WRIT PETITION
                                      NO.
                                         1142
                                              OF 201
                                                    6
                                                      

     1.      Mr. Rajesh Sud,
             Age 46 years, 
             Occu : Managing Director & CEO,
             Max Life Insurance Co. Ltd.,
             11th Floor, DLF Square,
             Jacaranda Marg, DLF City, 
             Phase-II, Gurgaon-122002.

     2.      Mr. Analjit Singh,
             Age 62 years, 
             Occu : Founder and Chairman Emeritus,
             Max Life Insurance Co. Ltd.,
             11th Floor, DLF Square,
             Jacaranda Marg, DLF City, 
             Phase-II, Gurgaon-122002.

     3.      Mr. Rajit Mehta,
             Age 54 years, Occu : Director,
             Max Life Insurance Co. Ltd.,
             11th Floor, DLF Square,
             Jacaranda Marg, DLF City, 
             Phase-II, Gurgaon-122002.            ...  Petitioners

                      Versus

     1.      The State of Maharashtra.

     2.      Sapankumar P. Satyanarayan Rathi,
             Age 31 years, 
             R/o New Bazaar, Jalna,
             Tah. & Dist. Jalna.          ...  Respondents

                                WITH




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                                   2                   Cri.W.P.1142-16.odt

            CRIMINAL  WRIT PETITION
                                     NO.
                                        1368
                                             OF 201
                                                   6
                                                     

     1.      Mr. Rajan Kalia,
             Co-Founder, Salto Dee Fe,
             C 220, Nirvana Courtyard,
             Nirvana Country,
             South City 2,
             Gurgaon-122018.

     2.      Ms. Marielle Theron,
             R/o Switzerland,
             Age 54 years, Occu : Director,
             Max Life Insurance Co. Ltd.,
             11th Floor, DLF Square,
             Jacaranda Marg, DLF City, 
             Phase-II, Gurgaon-122002.

     3.      Mr. Rajesh Khanna,
             Age 55 years, Occu : Director,
             Max Life Insurance Co. Ltd.,
             11th Floor, DLF Square,
             Jacaranda Marg, DLF City, 
             Phase-II, Gurgaon-122002.

     4.      Mr. Anuroop Singh,
             Age 62 years, Occu : Ex-Vice Chairman,
             Max Life Insurance Co. Ltd.,
             R/o W-74, Greater Kailash-1,
             Delhi.                          ...  Petitioners

                      Versus

     1.      The State of Maharashtra.

     2.      Sapankumar P. Satyanarayan Rathi,
             Age 31 years, 
             R/o New Bazaar, Jalna,
             Tah. & Dist. Jalna.          ...  Respondents




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                                        3                 Cri.W.P.1142-16.odt

                                ...
     Mr. Sanjay Kumar a/w Mr. Amit A.Yadkikar, Mr. Soham 
     Kumar,   Mr.   Shyam   Jawale,   Mr.   Ashish   Manglani   - 
     Advocates for Petitioners.
     Mr. V.M.Kagne, APP for  Respondent No.1 - State.
     Respondent No.2 - Mr. Sapankumar - in person.
     Mr. Dr. S.D.Tawshikar, Advocate as Amicus Curiae.
                                ...

                            CORAM :        S.S.SHINDE AND
                                           MANGESH S. PATIL, JJ.

RESERVED ON : 15th November, 2017 PRONOUNCED ON : 05th December, 2017

JUDGMENT : (Per Mangesh S. Patil, J.) :-

Rule. The Rule is made returnable forthwith.

Heard finally with the consent of learned Advocates for

the Petitioners, learned APP for Respondent-State.

Respondent No.2 in person and the learned amicus

curiae.

2. These are the Writ Petitions filed under Articles

226 and 227 of the Constitution of India praying to

quash and set aside one and the same order passed by

the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jalna (hereinafter

referred to as 'CJM') dated 27.07.2016 in Criminal

Miscellaneous Application No.151 of 2010, directing

4 Cri.W.P.1142-16.odt

investigation under section 156(3) of the Criminal

Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as 'Cr.P.C.') and

also to quash and set aside the FIR registered with

Sadarbazar Police Station, District Jalna on 08.08.2016

pursuant to such order and registered for the offences

punishable under Sections 406, 420, 464, 469, 470,

471, 504, 506, 323 read with Section 34 of the Indian

Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as 'IPC') and the

offences added subsequently punishable under Sections

191, 193, 195, 196, 197, 499, 500, 501 of the IPC. Since

Respondent No.2 in both these petitions is the original

complainant at whose instance the impugned order was

passed and the FIR has been registered against the

persons holding the post in the Management of the

same Company, we propose to dispose of these Writ

Petitions by this common judgment.

3. In Criminal Writ Petition No.1142 of 2016,

petitioner No.1 is the Managing Director and the Chief

Executive Officer of the Max Life Insurance Co. Ltd.

(hereinafter referred to as 'Company'). Petitioner No.2

therein is the Founder and presently the Chairman

5 Cri.W.P.1142-16.odt

Emeritus of the Company. Petitioner No.3 therein is the

Executive Director of that Company. Whereas in

Criminal Writ Petition No.1368 of 2016, Petitioner No.1 is

the Ex-Head of the Human Resource Department,

Respondent No.2 is the Independent Director and

Petitioner No.3 is the Director of the same Company.

4. Shorn of details the facts leading to the filing of

these Writ Petitions can be summed up as under :

Respondent No.2 was appointed as 'Manager Sales'

in Band 4 in the Company with effect from 13.09.2008.

Lastly, he was posted at Jalna. Since there was some

dispute about his performance and behaviour, by the

letter dated 15.05.2009, it was informed to him that his

services stood terminated with immediate effect. By

another letter dated 21.05.2009, which was styled as

'Relieving letter', it was informed to him as under :

"With reference to your letter of resignation dated May 21, 2009 this is to inform you that your resignation has been accepted.

You will be relieved from the services of the Company at the close of business hours of May 21, 2009.

On behalf of MNYL, I wish you all the best for your future endeavors

6 Cri.W.P.1142-16.odt

Regards."

5. Apparently, Respondent No.2 was shocked since

he had not tendered any resignation as mentioned in

the letter dated 21.05.2009 (Exh-I). The partner,

Operation Head of the Company by name Mr. Rajesh

Ramavatar Dubey lodged a complaint with Sadarbazar

Police on 08.06.2009 alleging that Respondent No.2,

inspite of having been terminated from the employment

by the company, was coming and trying to forcefully

enter the office regularly and was also giving threats on

phone. Pursuant there to, an offence was registered

under Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC. On 11.06.2009,

Respondent No.2 also lodged a complaint Exh-K to the

same Police Station alleging that Rajesh Ramavatar

Dubey had orally informed him about he having been

removed from the employment. But his dues were not

cleared and when he tried to reach him, the watchman

at the office abused and drove him out.

6. Later on Respondent No.2 served a notice

addressed to Mr. Rajan Kaliya, Executive Vice President

7 Cri.W.P.1142-16.odt

and Head Human resource and Mr. Rajesh Ramavatar

Dubey Office Head (Partner) dated 08.07.2009 (Exh-M)

through his Advocate Mr. R.C. Saboo alleging that the

services of Respondent No.2 were terminated illegally

and that all his dues were not cleared, he was not

allowed to enter the office from 21.05.2009, that it was

falsely mentioned in the earlier correspondence about

he having resigned from the job when he had not and

that a cheque for Rs.83,385.34/- was sent to him as full

and final payment. It was also mentioned that a

balance amount which was due to Respondent No.2 till

20.06.2009 amounting to Rs.65,810/- should be cleared

in 8 days of the notice.

7. There was further correspondence between the

parties i.e. the company on the one hand and

Respondent No.2 on the other hand. The bitterness

increased and finally Respondent No.2 filed

Miscellaneous Application No.151 of 2010 against the

present petitioners as also Mr. Rajesh Ramavatar Dubey

and few other Directors of the company who are not

8 Cri.W.P.1142-16.odt

before us. After repeating the above facts it is alleged in

this complaint that he had not resigned from the job

and he was terminated illegally by preparing false

documents. He was abused and restrained from coming

to the office. Some other allegations were also made

against Mr. Rajesh Ramavatar Dubey to which we are

presently not concerned since he is also not before us.

Respondent No.2 supported his allegations with an

affidavit. After going through the affidavit and the

contents of the application, by the order dated

01.04.2010, the learned CJM issued a direction under

Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. to the P.I. of Sadarbazar

Police Station either to submit charge-sheet or to submit

report on or before 22.04.2010.

8. It is necessary to note that this order passed by

the learned CJM was challenged before this Court and

the learned Single Judge by his judgment and order

dated 31.03.2016 in Criminal Writ Petition No.437 of

2010 and Criminal Writ Petition No.505 of 2010 set aside

the order of the learned CJM and directed the learned

9 Cri.W.P.1142-16.odt

CJM to pass the order afresh after hearing the

complainant, since the order suffered from non-

application of mind. Pursuant to such direction, the

learned CJM by the impugned order once again directed

the matter to be investigated by invoking the power

under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. This is how these Writ

Petitions have been filed impugning the order dated

27.07.2016 and the FIR registered in pursuance thereof.

9. We have heard the learned Advocate for the

petitioners, Respondent No.2 in person and the learned

APP. We have also heard Advocate Mr. Tawshikar, who

has been appointed as an amicus curiae.

10. According to the learned Advocate for the

petitioners, a purely civil dispute resulting from

termination of employment of Respondent No.2 is

illegally being brought under criminal law. Even going

by the facts which are broadly admitted, a mistaken

reference in the relieving letter dated 21.05.2009

wherein apparently out of human error word

10 Cri.W.P.1142-16.odt

'resignation' was used, has been tried to be made capital

of, to pressurize the company and its officials to recover

alleged dues. There is absolutely no criminality involved.

The allegations are inherently improbable. Even if they

are accepted at their face value, they do not constitute

necessary ingredients of the offences registered against

these petitioners. The allegations in the complaint qua

the petitioners are vague and general in nature. The

complaint has been lodged to wreck vengeance and is

prompted by mala fides of Respondent No.2. It would be

sheer abuse of the process of law if the petitioners who

are not even remotely connected with the alleged

offences are made to face the trial. The petitioners who

are directors and have no control over the day-to-day

affairs of the office of the company at Jalna cannot be

fastened with criminal liability vicariously.

11. The learned advocate for the petitioners also cited

catena of decisions in support of his various arguments.

He particularly referred to the decisions in the cases as

mentioned in the list as follows :

                                         11                   Cri.W.P.1142-16.odt

     (a)     State   of   Haryana  and   others  Vs.   Bhajan   Lal   and  
     others [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335].

     (b)     Pepsi Foods Ltd.  And another  Vs.  Special Judicial  

Magistrate and others [(1998) 5 SCC 749].

(c) Madhav Jiwajirao Scindia Vs. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [(1988) 2 SCC 692].

(d) V.Y.Jose and another Vs State of Gujarat and another [(2009) 3 SCC 78].

(e) Indian Oil Corpn. Vs. NEPC India Ltd. [(2006) 6 SCC 736].

(f) G. Sagar Suri Vs State of UP [(2000) 2 SCC 636]

(g) Maksud Saiyed Vs State of Gujarat and others [(2008) 5 SCC 668].

(h) Thermax Ltd and others Vs. KM Johny [(2011) 13 SCC 412].

(i) S.K. Alagh Vs. State of U.P. and others [(2008) 5 SCC 662].

(j) Union of India Vs. Purnandu Biswas [(2005) 12 SCC 576].

(k) S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs. Jagannath [(1994) 1 SCC 1].

     (l)     K.S.Bhatnagar  Vs.   State   and   others   [2015   SCC  





                                      12                  Cri.W.P.1142-16.odt

     online DEL 8188].

     (m)     Manoj   Kumar   Sharma   Vs.   State   of   Chhattisgarh  
     [(2016) 9 SCC 1].

     (n)     Thulia  Kali Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu  [(1972) 3 
     SCC 393].

     (o)     Mahommed Ibrahim and others Vs. State of Bihar  
     and another [(2009) 8 SCC 751].

     (p)     Rajiv   Thapar   and   others   Vs.   Madan   Lal   Kapoor  
     [(2013) 3 SCC 330].

     (q)     Rajiv Thappar Vs. Madan Lal Kapoor [(2013) 3 SCC  
     330].

     (r)     All   Cargo   Movers   (India)   (P)   Ltd.   Vs.   Dhanesh  

     Badarmal Jain [(2007) 14 SCC 776].

12. Respondent No.2 in person repeated the

allegations levelled against the petitioners by taking us

through the contents of the complaint and harped upon

the fact that even without there being any resignation

tendered by him, attempt has been made to blemish him

of tendering resignation to avoid payment of all

legitimate dues. Thus according to him, the learned

CJM, having passed the impugned order after scanning

13 Cri.W.P.1142-16.odt

all the material on the record, it may not be interfered

with.

13. It is necessary to note at the inception that the

powers of this Court to quash FIR have been crystalized

by various judgments of the Supreme Court and the

High Court and the decision in the case of Bhajan Lal

(supra) has been followed as a Bench mark though it

has been made clear that the instances for quashing

enlisted therein in paragraph No.108 are not exhaustive.

The observations to our mind are guiding factors and we

deem it proper to follow them as indeed we are bound

by. The observations read thus :

"108] In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines of rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

              1]      Where   the   allegations   made   in   the   First 





                                             14                    Cri.W.P.1142-16.odt

Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

2] Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155 (2) of the Code.

3] Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

4] Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the Code.

5] Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

6] Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

7] Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and / or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

14. It is also necessary to note that no objection has

15 Cri.W.P.1142-16.odt

been raised on behalf of the Respondents as to the

powers of the High Court to quash a criminal

proceeding by invoking the powers under Articles 226

and 227 of the Constitution of India and Section 482 of

the Cr.P.C., even without seeking a remedy of appeal or

revision. In other words no objection has been raised

that the petitions are not maintainable since an

efficacious remedy is available of preferring a revision

under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. against the impugned

order. Therefore, we can safely proceed to decide the

matters on merit.

15. A careful reading of the complaint lodged by

Respondent No.2 reveals that after narrating the facts

as to how he was appointed in the company it is alleged

that Accused No.4 therein i.e. Mr. Rajesh Ramavatar

Dubey was his superior in the office at Jalna. Mr.

Dubey, in collusion with other employees, started

harassing him. He had not resigned. The accused had

not followed any legal procedure before terminating him.

It is alleged that the accused without any reason started

16 Cri.W.P.1142-16.odt

mentally harassing him. Accused No.4 (Mr. Dubey)

pressurized him to execute certain writings and at the

instance of all the accused, Accused No.4 (Mr. Dubey)

prepared false reports and by misusing his post,

physically and mentally harassed him. The other

accused without conducting any verification of the facts

and by accepting whatever was being informed to them

by Mr. Dubey to be true indirectly instigated him. When

he sent letter to accused Nos.1 to 3 informing them

about the harassment being meted out to him, they

ignored it. As a result, Accused No.4 (Mr. Dubey)

continued to harass him more. Accused Nos.1 to 3 and

5 to 12 (which include the present petitioners) are the

directors of the Company and consequently all the

Officers and the Managers are following the directions of

these directors. Relying upon the appointment letter

issued to him, he had joined the employment. It is also

alleged that Accused No.4, Mr. Dubey was envying him

and with the aid of rest of the accused harassed him

persistently and finally accused No.4 did not allow him

to work when he went to the office on 21.05.2009 at

17 Cri.W.P.1142-16.odt

9.30 a.m. It is alleged that Accused No.4, Mr. Dubey

told him orally that on the instructions of accused nos.1

to 3 he was terminated from the employment.

Respondent No.2 has then referred to the subsequent

correspondence, issuance of legal notices.

16. We are referring to all these contents in detail to

ascertain as to if all the necessary ingredients for

constituting the offences or any of them are discernible.

We are alive that the FIR is not an encyclopedia and

may not come out with all the details. However, going

by the facts in the matter in hand, we do not see as to

what else could have been incorporated in the complaint

other than what has been mentioned therein.

Therefore, what we find from the averments in the

complaint that a very broad and vague statements have

been made against the rest of the accused and

particularly the petitioners herein. Primarily, the

allegations have been levelled against the Accused No.4

(Mr. Dubey) alone and it has been only vaguely

mentioned that Accused No.4 (Mr. Dubey) was acting at

18 Cri.W.P.1142-16.odt

the instance of the rest of the accused. We are unable

to comprehend as to how Respondent No.2 who was

serving in the office of the Company at Jalna could have

been so important for the company that all the Directors

of the Company, who hail from distant places would

consider him to be of such importance that they would

even try to terminate him by personally looking into the

matter. As has been rightly submitted by the learned

Advocate for the Petitioners, the concept of vicarious

liability is unknown to criminal liability. When there are

no specific allegations attributed to any of the

petitioners which would even remotely suggest of any

criminal activity, the petitioners cannot be fastened with

such a criminal liability when they have had no role or

involvement.

17. The very emphasis of the allegations levelled by

Respondent No.2 which are germane to this dispute is

the reference in the 'Relieving letter' dated 21.05.2009

that his resignation was being accepted, when he had

not tendered any such resignation. It is apparent that

19 Cri.W.P.1142-16.odt

this letter which we have reproduced herein before does

mention that Respondent No.2 had tendered a

resignation and when even according to the petitioners,

no such resignation was tendered and it was a sheer

mistake committed by the concerned person in writing

the contents in this manner. We, therefore, deem it

necessary to consider this aspect of the matter which

indeed is crucial and decisive.

18. It is apparent that in this letter subject has been

written as 'Relieving letter' and it is thereafter in the

contents it has been mentioned that resignation has

been accepted. It is apparent that if it was supposed to

be a relieving letter, there could not have been logically

any question of communication of acceptance of the

resignation. Therefore, to our mind it seems to be clearly

a human error.

19. There is another aspect of the matter to which we

must refer and which clinchingly points out that

Respondent No.2 was also aware that it was only

20 Cri.W.P.1142-16.odt

mistake. In response to such relieving letter (Exh-I),

dated 21.05.2009, when Respondent No.2 lodged a

written complaint (Exh-K) with the P.I. of Sadarbazar

Police Station, Jalna on 11.06.2009, he did not

conspicuously mention about any resignation and only

mentioned in the complaint that on 21.05.2009 Mr.

Rajesh Ramavatar Dubey, Branch Manager had orally

informed him that he was removed from the job. Again,

according to Respondent No.2, along with letter dated

21.05.2009 a cheque for an amount of Rs.83,385.34/-

was paid to him towards full and final settlement. It is

thereafter that Respondent No.2 sent a letter dated

08.07.2009 (Exh-M) through his advocate Mr. Saboo and

addressed to Mr. Rajan Kalia, Executive Vice President

and Head Human Resource and Mr. Rajesh Dubey,

Office Head Partner. Even in this letter, it was alleged

that the services of Respondent No.2 were terminated

illegally and Mr. Dubey was not allowing him to work, to

enter the premises and with an intention to harass and

defame Respondent No.2 Mr. Dubey had lodged a false

complaint with police. Even there is a reference in this

21 Cri.W.P.1142-16.odt

letter about Respondent No.2 having received the notice

on 22.05.2009 from Mr. Anurag Bhartiya, Senior Vice

President Human Resource, which is nothing but the

letter (Exh-H), dated 15.05.2009 whereby services of

Respondent No.2 were terminated. Pertinently even it

has been questioned in this letter as to how without

there being any resignation tendered by Respondent

No.2 it was being informed in that manner. It is thus

quite clear that since inception Respondent No.2 has

been aware that reference to resignation in the relieving

letter was a sheer mistake and he was in writing

informed that his services were being terminated and

even according to him, Mr. Dubey had also orally

informed him that his services were terminated.

20. If such is the state of affairs, we are unable to

apprehend as to what else was there to constitute

making of a false documents or forgery. There are

absolutely no allegations about there being any other

instance of forgery indulged into by the accused named

in the complaint and the impugned FIR.

22 Cri.W.P.1142-16.odt

21. We now deem it appropriate to refer to another

important circumstance which would demonstrate the

intention of Respondent No.2 in lodging the complaint,

which to our considered view speaks in volumes about

the complaint having been engineered to wreck

vengeance. Admittedly, Respondent No.2 through his

Advocate Mr. Saboo had repeatedly issued letters /

notices and also issued a publication in a newspaper.

Similarly, even Respondent No.2 himself personally

lodged a complaint on 11.06.2009 with the P.I. of the

Sadarbazar Police Station and followed it up by lodging

similar subsequent complaint. In the initial complaint

(Exh-K) lodged on 11.06.2009, he has conspicuously

mentioned only about he having been terminated from

the employment and his dues were not being paid and

that he was not allowed to enter the office and was

driven out. Then in the first letter sent through

Advocate Mr. Saboo dated 08.07.2009 a grievance is

only made about such wrongful termination and no

resignation have been tendered and that the company

was liable to pay the balance amount of his dues

23 Cri.W.P.1142-16.odt

amounting to Rs.65,810/-. By the reply dated

31.07.2009 to the letter of Advocate Mr. Saboo, it was

inter alia informed that it was a sheer typographical

error in mentioning that the resignation was accepted in

the relieving letter dated 21.05.2009. There was no

question of any compulsion to tender any resignation

and the services of Respondent No.2 were terminated.

Advocate Mr. Saboo again sent another letter dated

01.09.2009 on behalf of Respondent No.2 and even in

this complaint the allegations were repeated by saying

that the termination was illegal and the company

should clear his dues. Later on, Respondent No.2 lodged

a complaint with CJM, Jalna bearing S.T.C.No.1764 of

2016 on 16.11.2009 against Mr. Rajesh Ramavatar

Dubey alleging that Mr. Dubey had abused and

threatened him. Repeating the allegations that Mr.

Dubey was preventing him from entering the office and

was harassing him and that since last six months he

was not allowed to come to the office on the ground that

his services were terminated. It is then alleged that Mr.

Dubey abused and beaten him and threatened of

24 Cri.W.P.1142-16.odt

consequences. We are pointing out these circumstances

to show that in none of these complaints Respondent

No.2 had even remotely alleged about the present

petitioners having indulged in any criminal activity.

Even he had not alleged that any forgery was committed

even by Mr. Dubey. In all probabilities, if at all there

would have been such a forgery or other acts involving

criminality, the Respondent No.2 would not have

hesitated even for a moment to make allegations against

them.

22. Similarly, even in a subsequent complaint (Exh-W)

lodged with Sadarbazar police on 03.02.2010, after a

lapse of almost 9 months he had simply alleged that on

21.05.2009 at the instance of Accused Nos.1 to 3 therein

i.e. Analjit Sing, Rajesh Sud and Rajan Kalia, accused

No.4 Mr. Rajesh Dubey had abused him and by

informing him orally about his services having been

terminated he was not allowed to enter into office. It was

also alleged that a false complaint was lodged against

him and inspite of repeated notices issued through his

25 Cri.W.P.1142-16.odt

lawyer his dues were not cleared. Again, even in this

complaint no allegations have been levelled constituting

any offence like forgery using a forged document. The

role of rest of the accused, which is attributed to them

is that they had directed Accused No.4, not to allow

Respondent No.2 to work.

23. The fore going circumstances referred to herein

above clearly show that even if the contents of the

complaint are taken at their face value, no offences can

be made out against the petitioners. The contents are

inherently improbable. The allegations are prompted by

mala fides and it would be a sheer exercise in futility if

the petitioners are allowed to face the prosecution / trial

in such set of facts. Thus, the instant case, in our view

is duly covered by the directions in the case of Bhajan

Lal (supra). The learned CJM has apparently committed

a gross error in not appreciating all the afore mentioned

facts and circumstances in their proper perspective and

has passed the order directing investigation under

Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. by the impugned order

26 Cri.W.P.1142-16.odt

which is not sustainable in law.

24. As has been rightly submitted by the learned

Advocate for the Petitioners, a pure Civil dispute

touching termination of the employment of Respondent

No.2 has been attempted to be blown out of proportion

and a lame attempt is made to bring it in the purview of

criminal law. It would be sheer abuse of the process of

the law if we do not intervene by quashing the impugned

order and the FIR.

25. In the result, both the Writ Petitions succeed and

are allowed. The impugned FIR is quashed and set

aside to the extent of the present petitioners only. The

rule is made absolute accordingly.

(MANGESH S. PATIL, J.) (S.S.SHINDE, J.)

...

vmk/-