The State Of Maharashtra vs Krishnath Janardan Gaikwad & Ors
2017 Latest Caselaw 6370 Bom

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         IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
             CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

               CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.663 OF 2003


The State of Maharashtra                                  ....Appellant
      V/s.
1 Krishnath JanardHan Gaikwad, 39 yrs.,
2 Haribhau Janardhan Gaikwad, 30 yrs.,
3 Hanmant Janardhan Gaikwad, 47 yrs.,
3 Janardhan Narayan Gaikwad, 70 yrs.,
All R/o. Hol, Tal: Phaltan, Dist. Satara.                 ....Respondents


Mr. J.P.Yagnik, APP for the Appellant-State.
Mr. R.R.Moray i/by Shri V.S.Talkute,                        Advocates           for
Respondent Nos.1 to 4.

                                      ******

                       CORAM :-       SANDEEP K. SHINDE, J.

                       DATE    :-     18TH AUGUST,           2017.


ORAL JUDGMENT :-

This appeal under Section 378(1) of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 is preferred by the State against the

judgment and order passed by the learned VIIth Additional

Sessions Judge, Satara in Sessions Case No.133 of 2001

whereby the respondents-accused, were acquitted of the

offence punishable under Section 306 read with Section 34 of

the IPC.

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2 Chhaya Ramchandra Gaikwad, wife of deceased

lodged complaint with the police on 10.4.2001 alleging that

the respondents-accused intentionally instigated/aided and

abetted her husband to commit suicide by causing recurring

harassment. On her complaint, FIR was registered against the

respondents-accused of which the respondent nos.1 to 3 are

brothers and the respondent no.4 is father of the deceased.

Respondent no.4, i.e, the father of the deceased died during

the pendency of this appeal, thus, the appeal against him

stands abated. It is the complainant's case that her husband

had undivided share in land bearing block no.697. It is her

case that her husband had dug bore-well in the land which was

in his possession. There were quarrels and disputes between

her husband and his brothers on account of use of bore-well

water. It is her case that on 5.4.2001, her husband went to

install electric motor on the well. However, his brothers and

father restrained him from doing so. The complainant would

say that on account of installing electric motor on the well,

quarrel arose between the deceased and the accused no.1.

Resultantly, the deceased could not install electric motor on

the well. It is her case that her husband felt frustrated and in

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the state of frustration, he consumed poison. He was removed

to the hospital but he died on the next date, i.e., on 6.4.2001.

The cause of death certified by medical officer was asphyxia

due to organo-phosphorus poisoning. It is not in dispute that it

was suicidal death. Soon after the incident, accidental death

enquiry was held under Section 174 of the Cr.P.C.;

whereunder panchanama of empty bottle of pesticide Rogar

was seized and four days thereafter, i.e., on 10.4.2011, wife of

the deceased lodged the complaint with Phaltan Police Station

whereupon Crime No.80 of 2001 was registered under Section

306 read with Section 34 of the IPC. After completing the

investigation, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions.

3 Prosecution in support of its case examined 8

witnesses. P.W.1-Chhaya (Complainant) is wife of the

deceased. P.W.2-Kishor is son of the deceased. P.W.6-Dr.

Madhuri Jagtap is medical officer and P.W.5-Somnath Adsul

was an electrician, who was present on the spot where the

deceased wanted to install the electric motor. The learned

Trial Judge, after appreciating the evidence on record,

acquitted respondent nos.1 to 4-accused vide judgment and

order dated 11.2.2003 against which the present appeal is

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preferred by the State.

4 Heard Mr. Yagnik, the learned APP for the State

and Mr. Moray, the learned counsel for respondents. Perused

the evidence. It is not in dispute that the deceased suffered

suicidal death. The only question falls for consideration as to

whether evidence on record proves beyond a reasonable

doubt, "as to whether the respondents-accused herein are

guilty of abetment of commission of suicide by their brother

Ramchandra?".

5 To constitute abetment, the intention and

involvement of the accused to aid or instigate the commission

of the suicide is imperative. Any severance or absence of of

any of these constituents would militate against this

indictment. Remoteness of the culpable acts or omissions

rooted in the intention of the accused to actualise the suicide

would fall short as well of the offence of abetment essential to

attract the punitive mandate of Section 306 IPC. Contiguity,

continuity, culpability and complicity of the indictable acts or

omission are the concomitant indices of abetment. Section 306

IPC, thus criminalises the sustained incitement for suicide.

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6 That after going through the evidence on record, I

am of the view that the trial Court has not committed any

error in appreciating the evidence and has given cogent

reasons for acquitting the respondents-accused. It is settled

law that an order of acquittal is to be interfered only when

there are "compelling and substantial reasons " for doing

so; and if the order is clearly unreasonable, it is compelling

reason for interference. In the case in hand, I do not find any

compelling and substantial reason to interfere with the order

of acquittal for more than one reason.

P.W.1-Chhaya, wife of the deceased in her evidence had

stated that there were quarrels between her husband and

respondent-accused no.1 on account of use of bore-well since

before couple of years of the incident (emphasis

supplied) and the rest of the respondents-accused were also

quarreling with her husband on account of division of land.

That as such, evidence of P.W.1-Chhaya did not establish

determinative existence of live link or nexus between the

propelling causative factor and commission of suicide. P.W.1-

Chhaya narrated the incident dated 5.4.2001, saying that on

the given date when her husband went to install electric

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motor, accused no.1 offered the resistance and slapped her

and rushed towards her husband brandishing the sickle. She

deposed that Nana Anna Bhosale, Ashok Sudam Bhosale and

Somnath Adsul pacified the quarrel. She further deposed that

as her husband was unable to install the electric motor, he felt

frustrated and in that state of mind, he committed suicide. As

stated here-in-above, so far as the incident dated 5.4.2001 is

concerned, no role was attributed to accused nos.2 to 4. That

even otherwise, P.W.1-Chhaya did not disclose any such

incident at the behest of the respondent nos.2 to 4 from which

it can be inferred that they had either abetted or intentionally

aided her husband to commit suicide. Merely because there

were some disputes as regards the enjoyment of common

property and that too such disputes were ongoing for last

many years would certainly not fall within the expression of

abetment as defined under Section 107 of IPC. Now the

question is whether the alleged incident dated 5.4.2001 and

the acts of the respondent-accused no.1 would amount to

abetment within the meaning of Section 107 of IPC. It is

admitted fact that there were disputes and differences

between the deceased and his brothers either on account of

enjoyment of family property or on account of use of well

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water. These disputes and differences were on going for last

many years. The incident of 5th April, 2001 has been pressed

in service which according to the prosecution has triggered the

situation and prompted the deceased to commit suicide. P.W.1-

Chhaya in her evidence for the first time deposed before the

Court that accused no.1 was present near the well and he

rushed towards her husband brandishing the sickle. She

further deposed in her evidence that one Nana Anna Bhosale

and Ashok Sudam Bhosale were present at the spot besides

P.W.5-Somnath Adsul. In the cross-examination, P.W.1-Chhaya

could not explain as to why she did not tell police about the

presence of Nana Bhosale and Ashok Bhosale on the spot and

that the accused no.1 rushed towards her husband

brandishing the sickle. In view of this fact, it can be safely

inferred that P.W.1-Chhaya has improved her version before

the Court and could not give any plausible explanation as to

why she omitted to say these vital facts to the police when the

complaint was lodged. In addition thereto, she did not tell

police that her son was also present on the spot. Prosecution

examined her son, Kishor Gaikwad as P.W.-2 and attempted to

corroborate the evidence of P.W.1-Chhaya through him. More

so, the complaint was lodged four days after the incident and

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no explanation has been offered for lodging the complaint

belatedly. Be that as it may, fact remains that evidence of

prosecution is not cogent and reliable to hold that the accused

no.1 intentionally abetted and/or aided the deceased to

commit suicide. Quarrels and the differences between the

deceased and the accused no.1 on the one hand and other

family members on the other hand were ongoing for many

years together and prosecution could not establish that alleged

quarrels/differences between accused and the deceased

prompted and/or instigated the deceased to commit suicide.

There is nothing on record to hold that the respondents herein

had intentionally and knowingly abetted the deceased to

commit suicide. Evidence on record certainly does not warrant

to hold that the respondents-accused were guilty of offence

punishable under Section 306 of IPC. In view of the evidence

on record, I do not see any reason to interfere with the

judgment and order passed by the learned Sessions Judge

whereby he has acquitted the respondents-accused herein of

the offence punishable under Section 306 of IPC.

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7 In the result, appeal fails and accordingly, is

dismissed.

(SANDEEP K. SHINDE, J)

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