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M/S. Pravi Auto Swing Pvt. Ltd vs Ashok Kisan More And Ors
2016 Latest Caselaw 5576 Bom

Citation : 2016 Latest Caselaw 5576 Bom
Judgement Date : 26 September, 2016

Bombay High Court
M/S. Pravi Auto Swing Pvt. Ltd vs Ashok Kisan More And Ors on 26 September, 2016
Bench: R.M. Savant
                                                                wp-7742-16-(23)


                  IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION




                                                                       
                         WRIT PETITION NO. 7742 OF 2016 




                                               
    M/s. Pravi Auto Swing Pvt Ltd.         )
    L-41, Additional M.I.D.C. Sataram      )
    415004 through its Managing Director   )         ..Petitioner

          Vs.




                                              
    1 Ashok Kisan More                     )
    Residing at and post Rajarapuri        )
    Taluka and District Satara             )




                                        
    2 Hanmant Kisan Katkar                 )
    At and Post Wade, District Satara
                                    ig     )

    3 Anantkumar Sadashiv Pawar            )
    1443, Sambhaji nagar MIDC, Satara      )
                                  
    4 Dada Bhanudas Katkar                 )
    C/o B. H. Pawar, Shrinagar Colony,     )
    Sangamnagar, Satara                    )
            


    5 Ashok Uttamrao Nikam                 )
         



    At and Post Kumathe,                   )
    District Satara                        )

    6 Ganesh Nathuram Kumbhar              )





    At and Post Navipeth, Taluka Patan     )
    District Satara                        )

    7 Uttam Govind Tilave                  )
    329/3/2, Plot No.15                    )





    Shivnagar, MIDC, Satara                )

    8 Rajesh Vinayakrao More               )
    Sagar Housing Society, Kodoli,         )
    Satara                                 )

    9 Uttam Atamaram Lade                  )
    Tejaswi Bungalow, Ahire Colony,        )
    Degaon Road, Satara                    )


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    10 Jayawant Dhondiba Jadhav                          )
    At and Post Kodoli, Satara                           )




                                                                                           
    11 Vijay Babanrao Jangam                             )
    Bilvadal Ahire Colony,                               )




                                                                   
    Degaon Road, Satara                                  )

    12 Shrikant Hanmant Kulkarni                         )
    923, B-2, Anantlaxmi Nivas,                          )
    Shaniwar Peth, Satara                                )               ..Respondents




                                                                  
    Mr. Kiran Bapat i/b M/s Desai & Desai Associates for the Petitioner
    Mr. Vaibhav Gaikwad for the Respondent No.1  




                                                    
                                      ig          CORAM :        R. M. SAVANT, J.
                                                  DATE   :       26th SEPTEMBER, 2016

    ORAL JUDGMENT
                                    
    1               Rule.   With   the   consent   of   the   Learned   Counsel   for   the   parties 
            

    made returnable forthwith and heard.
         



    2               The Writ Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked against the judgment 





and order dated 21-3-2016 passed by the Learned Member of the Industrial

Court by which order, the complaint in question being Complaint ULP No.54 of

2005 came to be allowed resultantly a declaration came to be issued that the

Petitioner herein who was the Respondent in the Complaint has engaged in

unfair labour practice under Item 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act

1971. A further direction came to be issued to the Petitioner to pay the

remaining subsistence allowance @ 75% for the period between 90 days to

180 days and thereafter @ 100% for the period beyond 180 days.

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    3               It is not necessary to burden this order with unnecessary details 




                                                                                           

having regard to the nature of the final directions to be issued. The

Respondents herein were in employment with the Petitioner. It seems that on

account of certain incidents which had taken place in the factory premises of

the Petitioner that a charge sheet came to be issued to each of the Respondents

alleging misconduct against them. In view of the situation prevailing in the

factory premises and outside it, which was on account of the acts of the

Respondents, the Petitioner had filed Complaint ULP No.59 of 2004 and in the

said Complaint, the Petitioner had filed an application for interim relief. In the

said application, an exparte ad-interim order came to be passed against the

Union representing the Respondents on 18-11-2004, and the interim relief

granted was that the Respondents Union and its office bearers, striking

workers their representatives, agents etc, were restrained from wandering,

sitting and loitering within the periphery of 1500 meters from the gate of the

factory of the Petitioner and the surrounding vacant area. They were further

restrained from obstructing the moments, jobs, material discharge, vehicles

visitors etc. It seems that though the said order was passed in the Complaint

ULP filed by the Petitioner, since a domestic inquiry had commenced against

the Respondents, the Petitioner vide its letter dated 14-2-2005 (similar letter

was addressed to all the Respondents) had informed the Respondents that the

interim order passed by the Industrial Court would not come in the way of the

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Respondents from attending the inquiry proceedings. The Respondents replied

to the said letter vide their reply dated 21-2-2005 and in the said reply, it was

stated that in view of the interim order passed by the Industrial Court, it was

not possible for the Respondents to remain present in the inquiry proceedings.

It seems that the Petitioner thereafter applied for modification of the interim

order vide application Exhibit C-2. The said application came to be allowed

and the injunction was restricted to 500 meters from 1500 meters which was

originally granted. Upon this the Petitioner addressed another letter dated 2-6-

2005 to one of the Respondents (similar letters were addressed to all the

Respondents) intimating the Respondents that the subsistence allowance was

reduced to 50% of their entitlement. It seems that between 23-2-2005 and 29-

4-2005 the inquiry was held on 7 days when none of the Respondents had

remained present in the inquiry and this prompted the Petitioner to reduce the

subsistence allowance.

4 The reduction of the subsistence allowance resulted in the

Respondents filing Complaint ULP No.54 of 2005 under Item 9 and 10

Schedule IV of the said Act. In the said Complaint, the case of the Respondents

was based on standing order 25(5A) which postulates payment of 50% of the

wages as subsistence allowance for the first 90 days thereafter 75% for the

period from 90 days to 180 days and 100% for the period beyond 180 days. It

was the case of the Respondents in the said Complaint that the reduction in

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the subsistence allowance in the teeth of the injunction obtained by the

Petitioner in the Complaint filed by it was not justified.

5 Per contra it was the case of the Petitioner in its Written Statement

that inspite of the notice issued to the Respondents to remain present in the

inquiry notwithstanding the order of injunction passed by the Industrial Court

the Respondents had refused to remain present and therefore the Petitioner

was entitled to reduce the subsistence allowance having regard to the proviso

to Standing Order 25(5A). The parties led evidence in respect of their

respective assertions. In so far as the Petitioner is concerned, it examined its

Managing Director, whereas on behalf of the Respondents one of the

Respondents deposed in the said Complaint.

6 The Learned Member of the Industrial Court ventured to

adjudicate upon the said Complaint on the basis of the material on record and

has accordingly allowed the said Complaint and issued the directions to the

extent mentioned in the earlier part of this order. The gist of the reasoning of

the Learned Member of the Industrial Court was that in the teeth of the order

of injunction obtained by the Petitioner, the Respondents could not be blamed

for not attending the inquiry in the period during which the injunction was

operating. The Learned Member of the Industrial Court therefore deemed it

appropriate to allow the Complaint and has directed the payment of

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subsistence allowance to the Respondents to the extent mentioned in the

operative part of the impugned order.

    7                 Heard the Learned Counsel for the parties.




                                                                
    8                 On behalf of the Petitioner it was the submission of the Learned 

Counsel Mr. Bapat that though the Respondents were issued notice to remain

present notwithstanding the order of injunction passed by the Industrial Court,

they having not remained present and thereby delayed the inquiry, the

Petitioner was within its right to reduce the subsistence allowance having

regard to the priviso to Standing Order 25(5A). It was the submission of Mr.

Bapat that the Respondents were not entitled to 100% subsistence allowance

in view of Section 10A of the Standing Orders Act. It was the submission of Mr.

Bapat that Section 10A being the substantive provision would superimpose

itself upon Standing Order 25(5A) in the matter of payment of subsistence

allowance. In support of the said contention the Learned Counsel place

reliance on the Judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in the matter of

May and Baker Ltd. Vs. Kishore Jaikishandas Icchaporia & Anr 1 and the

Judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of B. D. Shetty & Ors. Vs. Ceat Ltd

& Anr.2

9 Per contra the Learned Counsel Mr. Gaikwad appearing on behalf

of the Respondent No.1 would seek to support the impugned order. It was the

1 1991 MhLJ 1070 2 (2002) 1 Supreme Court Cases 193

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submission of Mr. Gaikwad that in terms of Section 10A(3) the Respondents

are entitled to 100% subsistence allowance under Standing Order 25(5A) as

the said Standing Order is "any other law" contemplated by Section 10A(3).

Hence in so far as the Respondents are concerned, they were claiming 100%

subsistence allowance by placing reliance on Section 10A(3).

10 Having heard the Learned Counsel for the parties, I have

considered the rival contentions. The first issue which arises for consideration

in the above Petition is whether the Petitioner was entitled to reduce the

subsistence allowance payable to the Respondents. In so far as the said aspect

is concerned, the same is governed by Standing Order 25(5A). The said

Standing Order provides for the payment of the subsistence allowance and the

rate at which it is required to be paid. For the said purpose, there are three

time frames mentioned in the said Standing Order, as indicated above for the

first 90 days the subsistence allowance is payable @50% of the wages,

whereas for the period of 90 and 180 days its 75% and beyond 180 days it is

@ 100%. The proviso to the said provision carves out an exception in as much

as it confers power on the employer to reduce the subsistence allowance if the

delay in the inquiry is on account of the delinquent workman. In the instant

case, it is required to be noted that the Petitioner had filed a Complaint ULP

invoking provisions of the MRTU and PULP Act 1971 in view of the prevailing

situation in its factory premises and surrounding area. In the said Complaint,

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wp-7742-16-(23)

the Petitioner had filed an application for interim reliefs. The said application

came to be allowed and the interim relief by way of injunction restraining the

Union representing the Respondents came to be granted restraining them from

wandering, sitting and loitering within 1500 meters of the factory premises.

The said injunction thereafter came to be restricted to 500 meters by an

application for modification made thereafter. However, the fact remains that

there was an injunction operating against the Union of which the Respondents

are the members. Hence letters addressed by the Petitioner to the Respondents

asking them to attend the inquiry proceedings would be of no avail in the light

of the fact that the Petitioner had obtained an injunction against the

Respondents. Hence the blame for not attending the inquiry proceedings

would not lie solely with the Respondents so as to dis-entitle them to part of

the subsistence allowance. Conversely the Petitioner obviously could not have

reduced the subsistence allowance by taking recourse to the provisio to

Standing Order 25(5A). Hence in so far as the said aspect is concerned, this

court endorses the view taken by the Industrial Court and therefore does not

deem it appropriate to interfere with that part of the impugned order.

11 Now comes the question whether the Respondents are entitled to

to 75% in the maximum or 100% of the subsistence allowance. As indicated

above Standing Order 25(5A) is the provision in contention which was

brought into service before the Industrial Court. However, during the course of

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the hearing of the above Petition, the Learned Counsel appearing for the

Petitioner sought to place reliance on Section 10A of the said Act. Though the

adjudication before the Industrial Court was on the touchstone of Standing

Order 25(5A). However, in view of the fact that the entitlement of the

Respondents to the subsistence allowance is a question of law, this Court

deemed it appropriate to permit the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner to raise

the said contention and to deal with the said contention.

In so far as Standing Order 25(5A) is concerned, the same

provides for the payment of the subsistence allowance at the maximum of the

100% of the wages i.e. for the period 180 days. In so far as Section 10A is

concerned, it provides for the payment of subsistence allowance at 75% in the

maximum. However the provisio carves out an exception that if any other law

contains a more beneficial provision, then that provision would apply.

In so far as Standing Order 25(5A) of the Model Standing Order is

concerned, it is not "any other law" mentioned in Section 10A. The said issue

is no more resintegra and is covered by the Judgment of the Apex Court in

B.D. Shetty's case (Supra) wherein the Apex Court has referred to the

judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in May and Baker Ltd. (supra). The

Apex Court held that the "any other law" necessarily refer to the law other

than one covered by the very Act and Rules made thereunder, meaning thereby

the Standing Orders. The Apex Court has lastly held in the said case that the

contention urged on behalf of the workman that they are entitled to 100&

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subsistence allowance cannot be accepted in view of the specific provision

contained in Section 10-A of the said Act. Hence the Apex Court has impliedly

held that Section 10A would over ride or superimpose itself on Standing Order

25(5A) and hence the workman would be entitled to the payment of

subsistence allowance at the maximum of 75%.

12 Having regard to the judgment of the Apex Court in B. D. Shetty's

case (supra) the contention urged on behalf of the Respondents by the Learned

Counsel Mr. Gaikwad, cannot be accepted. The Respondents would therefore

be entitled to payment of subsistence allowance at the maximum of 75%. The

impugned order passed by the Learned Member of the Industrial Court would

accordingly have to be modified to the extent that for the period beyond 90

days the Respondents would be entitled to subsistence allowance at the

maximum of 75%. Clause (3) of the impugned order would accordingly stand

modified.

13 The Petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent. Rule is accordingly

made absolute with parties to bear their respective costs of the Petition.

                                          

                                                                        [R.M.SAVANT, J]




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