Pradnya Education Society Mumbai ... vs Sangarinath Revanappa Satanure ...
2016 Latest Caselaw 6563 Bom

                                         1




                                                                          
             IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY   
                         BENCH AT AURANGABAD




                                                  
                            WRIT PETITION NO.2860 OF 2016

    1.     Pradnya Education Society,
           Mumbai, through its Chairman




                                                 
           Anant s/o Shankarrao Jagatkar,
           Age-63 years, Occu-Business,
           'Pradnya', Parali Road,
           Ambajogai, Tq.Ambajogai,




                                        
           Dist. Beed,

    2.     Milind Junior College,
                              
           Parali-Vaijnath, Taluka
           Parali-Vaijnath, Dist.Beed,
           through its Principal
                             
           Ratnakar S/o Ramrao Dhondge                 - PETITIONERS

    VERSUS

    1.     Sangarinath Revanappa Satanure,
      


           Age-45 years, Occu-Service,
           as Assistant Teacher,
   



           R/o Parth Complex,
           Near Rani Zanshi Chowk,
           Taluka and District
           Aurangabad





    2.     The Deputy Director of Education,
           Aurangabad Division,
           Aurangabad                                  - RESPONDENTS

WITH WRIT PETITION NO.3134 OF 2016

Sangarinath Revanappa Satanure, Age-46 years, Occu-Jr.Lecturer/Teacher, R/o : Ekte Niwas, Ambe ves, Prali-Vaijnath, Tq.Parli-Vaijnath, Dist.Beed, (Parth Complex Flat No.7 Zanshi Chauk Nageshwarwadi Aurangabad) - PETITIONER

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VERSUS

1. Pradnya Education Society, Mumbai, Through its Chairman, A.S.Jagatkar, 'Pradnya' Parli Road, Ambajogai, Dist.Beed,

2. Milind Junior College, Parli-Vaijinth, through its Principal,

3. Dy.Director of Education, Aurangabad Division, Aurangabad ig - RESPONDENTS

Mr.S.R.Barlinge, Advocate for the petitioners. Mr.R.J.Godbole, Advocate for respondent No.1.

Mr.S.P.Sonpawale, AGP for respondent No.2.

( CORAM : RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J.)

DATE : 21/11/2016

ORAL JUDGMENT :

1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and heard finally by the

consent of the parties.

2. I have heard the strenuous submissions of Mr.Godbole, learned

Advocate for the employee, the learned AGP on behalf of the Deputy

Director of Education and Mr.Barlinge on behalf of the Management.

Since both these petitions are filed by the same litigating sides

against the same impugned judgment dated 27/10/2015 in Appeal

No.30/2006, I have heard both these petitions together.

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3. Considering the order that I intend to pass, I am not required

to deal with the entire submissions of the learned Advocates.

4. By the impugned judgment, the Appeal filed by the employee

has been partly allowed. The impugned order of termination dated

02/04/2006 w.e.f. 04/04/2006 and the enquiry has been quashed

and set aside. The Management is directed to conduct the enquiry

afresh from the stage of constitution of the Enquiry Committee.

5. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the matter of Vidya Vikas

Mandal and another Vs. Education Officer, 2007(3) Mh.L.J. 801 has

observed in paragraph Nos. 8 and 9 are as under :-

"8. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the

appellants, Rule 37 (6), which is mandatory in nature, has not been strictly complied with. The Inquiry Committee comprising of three members, as already noticed, only one member nominated by the Management has submitted his Inquiry report within the

time stipulated as per Rule 37 (6) and admittedly, the other two members nominated by the employee and an independent member have not submitted their report within the time prescribed under Rule 37 (6). However, the learned Judges of the Division Bench, though noticed that the two members out of three found the employee not guilty, failed to appreciate that the said

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findings by the two members of the committee were submitted after the expiry of the period prescribed under Rule 37(6). In our

opinion, the report submitted by individual members is also not in accordance with the Rules. When the Committee of three members are appointed to inquire into a particular matter, all the

three should submit their combined report whether consenting or otherwise. Since the report is not in accordance with the mandatory provisions, the Tribunal and the learned Single

Judge and also the Division Bench of the High Court have

committed a serious error in accepting the said report and acted on it and thereby ordering the reinstatement with back wages.

Since the reinstatement and back wages now ordered are quite contrary to the mandatory provisions of Rule 37 (6), we have no hesitation in setting aside the order passed by the Tribunal, and

learned Single Judge and also of the Division Bench of the High

Court. In addition, we also set aside the order passed by the Management based on the report submitted by the single member of the Committee, which is also quite contrary to the

Rules.

9. In view of the order now passed by this Court, the Rule 36(2)

(a) is now to be invoked and as per the said Rule, one member from amongst the members of the Management is to be

nominated by the Management or by the President of the Management if so authorised by the Management, and one member is to be nominated from amongst the employees of any private school and the third member to be chosen by the Chief Executive Officer from the panel of teachers on whom State/National Award has been conferred. We direct the

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Management of the School to constitute the Committee in accordance with sub-Rules (i) (ii) & (iii) of Rule 36(2)(a) to go into

the matter afresh. The respondent no.2, the employee, will be now treated under suspension and he will be entitled to the subsistence allowance as per rules with effect from the date of

termination of his services. The inquiry shall be completed by the Committee within a period of six months from the date of their nomination/constitution."

6.

However, the fact that the appellant/employee has taken up

fresh employment on 12/10/2007 as a "Shikshan Sevak" on

consolidated pay of Rs.5,000/- per month and his subsequent

confirmation in service on 09/04/2012 in a reputed educational

institution cannot be ignored.

7. It is trite law that subsistence allowance would be payable to

the employee after the Management is directed to conduct a fresh

enquiry in the light of paragraph No.9 of Vidya Vikas (supra). This

payment of subsistence allowance is on the condition that the

employee does not take up new employment elsewhere. Considering

the same, the appellant/employee would be entitled for

subsistence/suspension allowance at the rate of 50% of the gross

salary for a period of 4 months under Rule 34 of the MEPS Rules

from 04/04/2006 till 03/08/2006. He would then be entitled for

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75% allowance from 04/08/2006 to 11/10/2007 when the

appellant/employee has taken up fresh employment.

8. On 19/09/2016, a statement was made on instructions from

the appellant/employee that as he is a permanent employee of a

highly reputed educational institution and he is not inclined to quit

the said employment. He would not pursue his remedies against the

Management herein if he is paid full back wages.

9. Mr.Godbole submits today that as the appellant/employee is

not interested in continuing with the employment of the present

Management, he would press for his suspension allowance till this

date. Mr.Barlinge submits that the Management may consider the

grant of suspension allowance till the date the appellant was

unemployed. By paying him the said suspension allowance, the

entire litigation can be brought to an end. Though Mr.Godbole

submits that the litigation can be brought to an end as he would not

press for the implementation of the impugned judgment, suspension

allowance needs to be paid till this date with continuity of service

from 04/04/2006.

10. In the light of the above and considering the submissions of

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the litigating sides, I find that this entire litigation can be brought to

an end keeping in view that the appellant/employee is now a

permanent teacher with a highly reputed educational institution in

this part of the state and therefore would be at a disadvantage if the

departmental enquiry is reopened by the Management herein.

11. As such, both these petitions are disposed of with a direction

that the Management herein shall pay subsistence allowance based

on the last drawn salary of the appellant/employee as on

03/04/2006 at the rate of 50% for the period 04/04/2006 till

03/08/2006 and at the rate of 75% from 04/08/2006 till

11/10/2007.

12. Needless to state, he shall be treated as being in continuous

employment from 04/04/2006 till 11/10/2007 keeping in view that

he is employed from 12/10/2007. This order is passed in the light of

the submissions of the learned Advocates and with a view to ensure

that the litigation is brought to an end and the ends of justice are

met. The request by the appellant/employee for full wages till this

date cannot be entertained.

13. The abovesaid amount shall be paid by the Management herein

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within a period of 3 months from today to the appellant/employee.

With this order, there shall be no stigmatic termination of the

appellant/employee and as such there shall be no blot in his service

record in so far as this aspect of the litigation is concerned.

14. Since the Management herein is a grant-in-aid institution and

the suspension allowance is to be paid to the appellant/employee in

the light of Vidya Vikas (supra), the Management shall be at liberty to

forward a proposal for reimbursement of the suspension allowance

being paid to the appellant/employee and the Education Department

shall accordingly sanction the reimbursement. It be noted that the

suspension allowance is to be paid for the abovesaid periods, if not

already paid.

15. With this, the impugned judgment of the School Tribunal

stands modified by the consent of the parties.

( RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J.)

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