Citation : 2016 Latest Caselaw 2974 Bom
Judgement Date : 17 June, 2016
915-J-WP-5715-15 1/8
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
WRIT PETITION NO. 5715
OF
2015
Shyamsunder Ramsamuj Mishra
Aged about 55 yrs. Occ. Agriculturist,
Resident of Godhani,
Tah. And Dist. Yavatmal. ... Petitioner.
Vs.
1. The State of Maharashtra,
Thr. Department of Revenue and Forest,
Mantralaya, Madam Cama Road,
Mumbai 400 032.
2. The Collector, Yavatmal,
Tahsil and Dist. Yavatmal.
3. Sub Divisional Officer, Yavatmal,
Tahsil and Dist. Yavatmal.
4. Rukmini Pandurang Sansthan Trust at
Yavatmal, Thr. Its President/Trustee
Madhav Diwakar Damle,
R/o Shri Rukmini Pandurang Mandir,
Gandhi Chouk, Yavatmal,
Tahsil and Dist. Yavatmal. ... Respondents.
Shri H. S. Chitaley, Advocate for petitioner.
Shri K. L. Dharmadhikari, Assistant Government Pleader for respondent
Nos.1 to 3.
Shri M. G. Bhangde, Senior Advocate with Shri S. S. Bhalerao, Advocate
for respondent No.4.
CORAM : A.S.CHANDURKAR, J.
DATE : JUNE 17, 2016
Oral Judgment :
Heard.
915-J-WP-5715-15 2/8
The challenge in the present writ petition is to the certificate issued
in favour of the respondent No.4-Trust under provisions of Section 129 of
the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act,
1958 (for short, the said Act). This certificate is dated 30/10/1964.
2. It is the case of the petitioner that his father was inducted as a
tenant of the agricultural land owned by the respondent No.4-Trust. He
was in cultivating possession since the year 1948-49. His possession was
continuous for a period of almost 55 years. The petitioner's father
expired on 30/01/1992 after which he continued in possession. The
respondent No.4-Trust initiated proceedings against the petitioner under
provisions of Section 120 of the said Act. The application filed by the
Trust came to be allowed by the Sub-Divisional Officer and the revision
petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the Maharashtra Revenue
Tribunal. Writ Petition No.2081 of 2014 filed by the petitioner
challenging aforesaid orders was dismissed on 24/08/2015. During
pendency of aforesaid proceedings, the petitioner had filed the present
writ petition seeking to challenge the exemption certificate that has been
issued in favour of the respondent-Trust.
3. Shri H. S. Chitaley, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted
that the certificate in question had been issued in a manner contrary to
915-J-WP-5715-15 3/8
law. The procedure prescribed before issuing such certificate had not
been followed and the father of the petitioner was not noticed before the
same was issued. He submitted that as per the judgment of the Division
Bench of this Court in 1990(2) Mh.L.J. 1183 Keraba Dattu Borachate
and ors. vs. Shri Sheshshai and Vishnu Trust, judgments of learned
Single Judge in 2002 (1) Mh.L.J. 125 Bhimrao Chandru Patil and ors.
vs. Balkrishna Dattatraya Joshi and ors., 2009 (3) Mh.L.J. 117
Hirabai Baburao Shidankar and anr. vs. Rayat Shikshan Sanstha,
Satara and ors. and 2010 (6) Mh.L.J. Mahadeo Sanstha, Wadali vs.
Syed Turab s/o Syed Jaffar and ors., it was mandatory for the Collector
while holding an inquiry in the matter of issuance of exemption certificate
to give notice to the tenant in question. No such notice was issued to the
father of the petitioner. Similarly, the certificate in question was issued
by the Sub-Divisional Officer who was not competent to do so. The
basis on which the said certificate was issued and the purpose for the
grant of exemption certificate was also not mentioned therein.
According to the learned counsel, the knowledge of the aforesaid
certificate was got only in the year 2009 after which the petitioner took
steps to challenge the same.
It was then submitted that even though the order under Section
120 of the said Act was passed against the petitioner and the same had
become final, said adjudication would not come in the way of the
915-J-WP-5715-15 4/8
petitioner in his challenge to the exemption certificate. According to the
learned counsel, the challenge to the exemption certificate and the
challenge raised in the eviction proceedings under Section 120 of the said
Act was mutually exclusive and both the proceedings were required to be
adjudicated on their own merits. He referred to the documents placed on
record leading to the issuance of the exemption certificate with a view to
indicate the fact that there was no proper notice nor grant of proper
opportunity to the father of the petitioner. He therefore submitted that
the course as followed in the case of Hirabai B. Shindankar (supra) of
remanding the proceedings for reconsideration of the exemption
certificate deserves to be followed.
4. Shri M. G. Bhangde, the learned senior counsel along with Shri S.
S. Bhalerao, the learned counsel for the respondent No.4 opposed the
aforesaid submissions. It was submitted that the challenge to the
exemption certificate at the instance of the petitioner who had suffered
an order of eviction under Section 120 of the said Act was not tenable. It
was submitted that in fact the father of the petitioner had been duly
noticed in the exemption proceedings and he had refused ownership
rights. As the tenancy rights were not heritable, the petitioner had no
locus whatsoever to challenge the exemption certificate. It was then
submitted that while challenging the order of eviction under Section 120
915-J-WP-5715-15 5/8
of the said Act, the exemption certificate was relied upon by the Trust but
the same was not challenged by the petitioner immediately. The
possession of the petitioner having been held to be wrongful, he had no
locus to challenge the said certificate. In that regard reliance was placed
on the order dated 30/03/2015 passed in Writ Petition No.1645 of 2015
(Ramdas Y. Bhoyar and anr. vs. Rukhmini Pandurang Sansthan and ors.)
wherein it was held that challenge of the present nature after finalisation
of the eviction proceedings was academic. It was therefore urged that
entertaining the challenge to the exemption certificate in the present
proceedings would have effect of going behind the orders passed under
Section 120 of the said Act. Moreover, it was only the petitioner's father
who could have challenged the exemption certificate and not the
petitioner. It was therefore urged that the writ petition deserves to be
dismissed.
Shri K. L. Dharmadhikari, the learned Assistant Government Pleader
appeared for respondent Nos.1 to 3.
6. It is not in dispute that exemption certificate under Section 120 of
the said act came to be issued in favour of the respondent No.4-Trust on
30/10/1964. It is further not in dispute that proceedings under Section
120 of the said Act were initiated against the petitioner and the same
have attained finality by virtue of order dated 24/08/2015 in Writ
915-J-WP-5715-15 6/8
Petition No.2081 of 2014.
The effect of aforesaid proceedings attaining finality would
have to be first taken into consideration while considering the challenge
as raised by the petitioner. Under Section 120 of the said Act, any person
who is unauthorisedly occupying or wrongly in possession of any land, is
liable to be summarily evicted after due inquiry. Under Section 120(c) of
the said Act, if the use and occupation of the land in question is found to
be by a person who is not entitled to such use and occupation, he is liable
to be evicted. In Writ Petition No.2081 of 2014, the case of the
petitioner that he was a tenant of the field in question alongwith his
father prior to the deemed date of 01/04/1961 and 01/04/1963 was
considered. It was observed that the petitioner might have been aged one
year on the deemed date. On that basis, the stand of the petitioner that
the respondent-Trust entered into an agreement on lease with the
petitioner who was a minor was not accepted. It was then found that
there was no material on record to prove that the present petitioner was a
tenant of the suit field in his own right prior to the deemed date.
Thereafter it was held that tenancy rights were not inheritable in a case
where a certificate of exemption was granted under Section 129 of the
said Act. After recording these findings, the writ petition came to be
dismissed.
915-J-WP-5715-15 7/8
7. In the present proceedings, the petitioner has now come up
with a case that his father ought to have been noticed before issuance of
the exemption certificate. It is relevant to note that after the exemption
certificate dated 30/10/1964 under Section 129-B of the said Act came to
be issued, further proceedings for conferring ownership rights on the
petitioner's father came to be initiated. The petitioner's father was
noticed in said proceedings as is clear from the documents on record. An
order thereafter was passed on 28/04/1968. Even in subsequent
proceedings an order dated 30/11/1970 was passed of which the
petitioner's father had knowledge on 07/08/1971. The aforesaid
exemption certificate dated 30/10/1964 was the basis of these
proceedings. However, no steps whatsoever were taken by the
petitioner's father during his life time to challenge the orders passed
either granting exemption certificate or refusing to grant ownership
rights.
After failing in his challenge to the order of eviction under Section
120 of the said Act wherein a specific case was raised that the petitioner
was a tenant in his own right alongwith his father and which case was not
accepted, the petitioner has now come up with a case that his father
ought to have noticed in the exemption certificate proceedings. This
stand which is contrary to the stand which was taken in the earlier
915-J-WP-5715-15 8/8
proceedings, cannot be entertained in the aforesaid facts.
8. The legal position as reflected in the decisions relied upon by the
learned counsel for the petitioner does not assist his case. Moreover,
when it is found that the petitioner was not a tenant on the deemed date
as claimed by him initially, he cannot be now permitted to turn around
and challenge the exemption certificate on the ground that no notice was
issued to his father. The observations in the order dated 30/03/2015 in
W.P.No.1645 of 2015 (Ramdas Y. Bhoyar) (supra) that the challenge in
such situation becomes academic are applicable to the case in hand. In
view of aforesaid, I do not find that any case has been made out to
interfere at the instance of the petitioner. The writ petition is therefore
dismissed with no order as to costs.
JUDGE
Asmita
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