Citation : 2016 Latest Caselaw 1701 Bom
Judgement Date : 21 April, 2016
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
WRIT PETITION NO . 4568 OF 2016
Aurangabad Municipal Corporation,
Aurangabad
Through its Municipal Commissioner ... PETITIONER
VERSUS
M/s Shalaka Engineering & J. V.,
A Registered Partnership firm having
its office at Edge Archade, Sant Eknath
Mandir Road, Osmanpura, Aurangabad
Through its Partner-Smt.Suwarna Sunil Raka
Age: 45 years, Occu.Business
Having the address as above ...RESPONDENT
.....
Mr. Atul M. Karad, Advocate for petitioner
Mr. Anil S. Bajaj, Advocate h/f Mr. Aditya N. Sikchi, Advocate
for respondent
.....
CORAM : SUNIL P. DESHMUKH, J.
DATE : 21st APRIL, 2016
ORAL JUDGMENT :
1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and heard finally
with consent of learned advocates for the parties.
2. The petitioner - Aurangabad Municipal Corporation
(herein after referred to as "AMC"), aggrieved by judgment
and order dated 30th March, 2016, of the District Judge-7 at
Aurangabad in Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 35 of 2016 is
before this court, whereunder, District Judge-7 has directed
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petitioner - Aurangabad Municipal Corporation to maintain
status-quo ante, as had been existing on 25 th July, 2015 by
removing seal affixed to the suit property bearing C.T.S. No.
16261 situated at Jyotinagar, Aurangabad (herein after
referred to as "suit premises" for convenience) and to restore
the possession of the same until final hearing of the suit and
further purporting to restrain the petitioner - AMC temporarily
from disturbing ig possession of the respondent without
following due process of law. Respondent had also been
restrained from raising any kind of structure without
permission of competent authority. Operation of this order has
been stayed for appeal period, upon an application on behalf
of AMC (Exhibit-15) by the appellate court.
3. Learned counsel Mr. Atul M. Karad appearing for
petitioner and Mr. Anil S. Bajaj learned counsel holding for
learned advocate Mr. Aditya N. Sikchi, for respondent, were
heard extensively in the writ petition.
4. From submissions of the learned counsel and documents
as have been appended to the writ petition, factual position
emerges, around 2009, petitioner had entered into an
agreement with the respondent dated 10th October, 2009
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(BOT agreement for lease) for lease of suit premises with an
intention to develop and manage swimming pool and
amenities complex. This agreement appears to have been
preceded by an agreement/document dating back to 2007. In
the agreement of 2009, petitioner has been referred to as
Aurangabad Municipal Council [AMC], whereas respondent has
been referred to as "occupant/concessionaire". Said
agreement, inter-alia, contains following two terms viz;
clauses 5.6 and 7.19, which are extracted from annexure to
writ petition and reproduced herein-below for ready
reference;
...........................
"5.6 In the occupant even of default after the concession
period, AMC shall serve upon the occupant a notice in writing mentioning therein the default and shall time, as may deem fit and proper considering the nature of default,
to the occupant for removal / rectification of the default. In case the occupant does not remove / rectify the default, AMC is empowered to terminate this lease agreement by
giving a one month notice in this regard." ...........................
"7.19. That the Occupant shall not carry on any illegal activity in the leased premises. In case he/she/it does so, the lease granted under this agreement shall liable to be terminated forthwith without notice."
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5. Around July, 2015, upon visits, petitioner contendedly
found some irregularities, unauthorised user and/or illegal
activities being carried on/out over the suit premises. Some
panchnamas were drawn. The property had been sealed,
respondent purportedly had taken steps for corrective action
and/or to carry out rectifications in respect of alleged
irregularities, unauthorised user and/or illegal activities.
6.
It appears that respondent had been before Division
Bench of the High Court under Writ Petition bearing No. 6834
of 2015 and under order dated 10 th July, 2015 the High Court,
upon statement of the parties directed that panchnama be
drawn on 11th July, 2015, de-sealing the suit premises.
Pursuant to said order, AMC had liberty to take appropriate
action in accordance with the BOT lease agreement and in
consonance with the provisions of law.
7. It appears that notice dated 7th July, 2015 was issued by
petitioner, imputing that the alleged activities by the
respondent are in breach of terms and conditions of the
agreement and as such, written explanation had been sought
and the respondent was directed to be present before the
authorised officer on 9th July, 2015.
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8. It is contended that pursuant to the notice, respondent
had submitted his reply. Thereafter, on 17 th July, 2015, a
communication/notice had been issued by the petitioner-AMC
to the respondent stating that the alleged activities are in
serious contravention and breaches of terms and conditions of
the agreement. Said notice/communication was purportedly
issued referring to clause 5.6 as reproduced hereinabove. It
appears that respondent had submitted two responses to the
notice/communication and the proceedings culminated into
order dated 24th July, 2015 by petitioner, invoking clause 7.19
terminating the agreement dated 16 th October, 2009 alleging
commission various irregularities/ unauthorised/illegal
activities, breaches and deficiencies by the respondent.
9. Immediately on 25th July, 2015, it appears that by
drawing panchnama, seal had been put on the property and
had been taken in possession by petitioner-AMC. It appears
that the respondent had been to Division Bench of this court
against aforesaid in Writ Petition No. 7796 of 2015 and under
order dated 29th July, 2015 the respondent had been granted
leave to withdraw the writ petition with liberty to file
appropriate proceedings.
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10. It appears that respondent also is being prosecuted in
respect of alleged commission of certain offences and in
respect of the same the respondent had applied, seeking
anticipatory bail etc.
11. It also appears after withdrawal of writ petition No.
7796 of 2015, the respondent had been before the District
Judge-1 by way of filing Municipal Appeal No.02 of 2015
against the
order/communication dated 24th July, 2015
purporting to be appeal under Section 81 (F) of the
Maharashtra Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949. Said
appeal was dismissed under order dated 27 th October, 2015
finding that the appeal is predominantly directed against the
order of taking over possession and did not challenge
termination of lease agreement and the action taken by
Aurangabad Municipal Corporation was not liable to be faulted
with.
12. After aforesaid order dated 27th October, 2015, the
respondent has instituted Regular Civil Suit No. 119 of 2015
in the court of Civil Judge, Senior Division - Corporation Court
at Aurangabad, wherein, petitioner herein is the sole
defendant and respondent herein is plaintiff. [The parties
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hereto hereinafter are referred to by their status in Regular
Civil Suit No. 119 of 2015 viz; respondent as plaintiff and
petitioner as defendant].
13. The plaint prayers read as under;
" The suit of the Plaintiff be decreed with cost as under:-
a) By Decree of Declaration it be declared that the order dated 24.7.2015 passed by the Defendant terminating the
Agreement of Lease dated 16.10.2009 is illegal, null and void and be quashed.
b) By Decree of Mandatory Injunction the Defendant be directed to remove the seal affixed from the suit property
as described in the claim clause and description clause of the plaint on 25.7.2015, vide Panchanama of the even
date.
c) By decree of Perpetual Injunction the Defendant be
restrained from creating any sort of third party interest in the suit property of any nature and also from causing obstruction and interference in the peaceful possession of
the Plaintiff of the suit property as described in the claim clause and description clause of the plaint.
d) any other relief be granted which the court deems fit in favour of the Plaintiff and oblige. "
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14. Along with plaint, the plaintiff had also filed an
application under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 read with
Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for temporary
injunction praying for following reliefs:-
" The temporary injunction application be allowed
with costs as prayed for till disposal of the suit by following orders and in following terms:-
a) By an order of Ex-party Temporary Injunction and Ad-
interim Injunction the Defendant be directed to remove the seal affixed on the suit property as described in the claim clause and description clause of the plaint and Injunction
Application on 25.7.2015, vide Panchanama of the even date.
b) By an order of ex-parte Temporary Injunction and Ad- interim Injunction the Defendant be restrained from
creating any sort of third party interest in the suit property of any nature and also from causing obstruction and interference in the peaceful possession of the Plaintiff of
the suit property as described in the claim clause and description clause of the plaint and Injunction Application.
c) Any other relief be granted which the court deems fit in favour of the Plaintiff and oblige. "
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15. The trial court, in proceedings pursuant to aforesaid
application, had framed points for determination; whether the
plaintiff has prima-facie case, whether balance of convenience
lies in favour of plaintiff and whether plaintiff will suffer
irreparable loss. Answering all the points framed partly in the
affirmative, the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Corporation
Court, Aurangabad has rejected the request for temporary
mandatory injunction finding that the action has been taken
by the defendant cancelling the agreement, invoking clause
7.19. Circumstances do not warrant grant of temporary
injunction directing removal of affixed seal to the suit
premises. However, having regard to the facts and
circumstances, the defendant would not be able to create any
third party interest over the suit premises, and as such, has
granted relief to the plaintiff-respondent under order dated
11th February 2016 in Regular Civil Suit No. 119 of 2015 as
under;
......................
" 02. Defendant corporation or anybody claiming through it are hereby temporarily restrained from creating any sort of third party interest of any nature over the suit property, till disposal of the suit."
......................
Rest of the prayers were rejected.
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16. As such, plaintiff had been before District Judge-7 in
aforesaid Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 35 of 2016
challenging the order dated 11th February, 2016 passed by
Civil Judge, Senior Division, Corporation Court, Aurangabad
for reliefs to the extent which were refused to be granted by
the trial court.
17. The appellate court had framed a point for
determination as to whether the order of the learned lower
court calls for interference.
18. The appellate court under its judgment and order dated
30th March, 2016 directed the corporation - petitioner to
maintain status-quo ante as it was existing on 25th July, 2015
by removing the seal affixed on the suit property, passing
following order.
" 1. The appeal is allowed and the impugned order under challenge is hereby set-aside with following directions:
The respondent Corporation is directed to maintain status quo ante as it was existing on 25.7.2015 by removing the seal affixed on the suit property bearing No. C.T.S.No.16261 at Jyoti nagar, Aurangabad i.e. premises 'Raka Life Style' and to restore the possession until the final hearing of the suit.
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2. The respondent Corporation is temporarily
restrained from disturbing the possession of the Appellant
without following due process of law.
3. The appellant is also temporarily restrained from
raising any kind of structure without permission of Competent Authorities.
4. Parties to bear their respective costs.
Dictated and pronounced in open Court."
As such, the present petition against aforesaid order by
petitioner - original defendant.
19. Learned counsel Mr. Karad appearing for the petitioner
contends that while the suit premises were visited and
explanation considered, it surfaced that the situation has
been grave and the damage/illegalities will have to be
arrested, and as such, the order dated 24th July, 2015 had
been issued. He submits that it cannot be said that the action
is ultra-vires the terms and conditions of the agreement. The
AMC was well within its power under the terms and conditions
of agreement. The appellate court has not at all given due
regard to the object, purport and underlying intention of the
terms and conditions of agreement.
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20. It is contended by learned counsel for petitioner that
clause 7.19 of the agreement, enables the corporation to
terminate the lease agreement forthwith for illegal activities
on the leased premises and it was noticed that the respondent
had been carrying on illegal activities over the leased suit
premises. The agreement has been terminated as per terms
of agreement.
21.
Mr. Bajaj, learned counsel for respondent contends that
the sequence of events as occurring is clear indication of that
the order dated 24th July, 2015 is capricious. The plaintiff had
initially issued a communication on 7th July, 2015 calling
explanation which was duly given. Thereafter, AMC purported
to move on with reference to clause 5.6 requiring giving of
time to remove deficiencies/irregularities etc. and suddenly
veered around and passed order dated 24th July, 2015
purporting to invoke clause 7.19 without giving any inkling
whatsoever about such an action being mooted. Petitioner is
estopped from approbating and reprobating. Such an action is
abhorable in the facts and circumstances and in law.
22. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that the
action of the corporation is high handed, without letting any
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opportunity to the occupant and in breach of principles of
natural justice, alleging breaches against the occupant
without giving any notice as to consequential drastic action.
In fact, there are no breaches and as such, the occupant is
entitled to repossession of the property, possession of which
has been taken high handedly, by taking law in hand.
23. Learned counsel further submits that having regard to
the facts and circumstances. The order dated 24 th July, 2015
is not only capricious, but is also whimsical and fanciful. The
appreciation of facts and circumstances and treatment to the
same cannot be as per the wishes of officials. The facts and
circumstances require to be objectively looked at and not
subjectively as is done by defendant in the present case. He,
therefore, submits that the appellate court has seen the
matter in its correct perspective, gauged its tenability and
consequences, and has rightly passed the order, which does
not deserve any disturbance/interruption.
24. It emerges that the action of petitioner - corporation
dated 25th July, 2015 has been considered by the appellate
court to be without following principles of natural justice.
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25. With reference to certain citations which have
been relied upon on behalf of the parties, the order has been
passed, considering that process of fair action with due
information does not appear to have been adhered to and as
such, order has been passed directing the corporation -
petitioner to maintain status-quo ante as it was existing on
25th July, 2015 by removing the seal affixed on the suit
property, by passing following order.
1. The appeal is allowed and the impugned order under challenge is hereby set-aside with following
directions:
The respondent Corporation is directed to maintain status quo ante as it was existing on 25.7.2015 by
removing the seal affixed on the suit property bearing No.
C.T.S.No.16261 at Jyoti nagar, Aurangabad i.e. premises 'Raka Life Style' and to restore the possession until the final hearing of the suit.
2. The respondent Corporation is temporarily restrained from disturbing the possession of the Appellant without following due process of law.
3. The appellant is also temporarily restrained from raising any kind of structure without permission of Competent Authorities.
4. Parties to bear their respective costs.
Dictated and pronounced in open Court."
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26. Perusal of the impugned judgment and order shows that
although the appellate court had been apprised of the
notices/communications dated 7th July, 2015 and 17th July,
2015, while it came to giving reasons, it had been in oblivion
in respect of notice/communication dated 17 th July, 2015.
Both the notices/communications alleged irregularities/
unauthorised user/illegal activities. The appellate court
appears to have
ig been overwhelmed by that the
communication dated 7th July, 2015 does not ask plaintiff to
show cause against consequences from failure to tender
satisfactory/acceptable/proper explanation. It is discernible,
the appellate court appears to have overlooked that one of
the communications refers to clause 5.6 which sufficiently
indicates the likely fall out of the communications/notices.
The matter would not be looked at pedantically at this stage,
wherein allegations have been made and further that the
allegations of acts of violation and breaches of the terms of
the contract veracity or otherwise of which would emerge on
evidence. The matter appears to have been looked at only
from a perspective of seeming breach of principles of natural
justice. It is a debatable aspect, having regard to the events
as those have occurred hitherto and would have to be
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resolved upon evidence by parties. Lot of fact finding in the
course appears to be involved. Forming judgment, at this
stage appears to be premature even in respect of principles of
natural justice.
27. Prima-facie, clause 7.19 appears to authorise the AMC
to act without notice. Whether clause No. 7.19 could have
been invoked in the facts and circumstances of the case is a
question to be determined upon evidence.
28. Granting such relief at preliminary stages in a matter
which would require decision on issues arising after leading
evidence, may not be warranted in given facts and
circumstances.
29. Looking at the prayer clauses, which have been
reproduced hereinabove as well as temporary injunction
application and the impugned order passed by the appellate
court, it appears that impugned order would tantamount to
deciding the lis between the parties, at preliminary stage.
Such order can be passed only in very exceptional and rare
cases where the situation demands such an order. One may
not be able to say that the present matter gives rise to such a
situation wherein such an order is required to be passed at
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the interim stage.
30. Having regard to aforesaid, the order, directing to
maintain status-quo ante as was existing on 27th July, 2015 is
set aside. So also clause No.2 from the impugned order that
the Corporation is temporarily restrained from disturbing the
possession of the appellant without following due process of
law, is set aside. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer
clause (C).
31. It is, however, made clear that the petitioner -
Corporation - defendant would abide by the order passed by
the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Corporation Court,
Aurangabad about non creation of any third party interest
over the suit property and further that the parties would
maintain status-quo in respect of the suit property during the
pendency of the suit.
32. In the circumstances, it would be appropriate that the
suit itself which is pending between the parties be decided
expeditiously. As such, the trial court to proceed with and
decide the same as expeditiously as possible preferably within
a period of three months from the date of receipt of writ of
this order.
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33. It is made clear that observations appearing in this
judgment and order are only prima-facie in nature and shall
not at all influence and/or impress on the decision making in
the suit or any other proceeding. The observations have
efficacy limited only for decision in writ petition and no
further.
34. Learned counsel agree to co-operate with the trial court
for expeditious disposal of the suit.
35. As such, writ petition stands disposed of.
( SUNIL P. DESHMUKH, J. )
sms
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