Citation : 2013 Latest Caselaw 134 Bom
Judgement Date : 12 November, 2013
(j)1211wp2762.12 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR
Writ Petition No.2762/2012
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
through its Divisional Controller, Wardha.
.. Petitioner.
Versus
1] Diwakar Madhukarrao Malkapure
aged about 60 years,
2] Rupesh s/o Diwakar Malkapure
aged about 28 years,
Both resident of Post Colony,
Ward No.2, Ner Pratap Nagar,
Wardha.
3] The Member, Industrial Court,
Nagpur. Respondents
...
Mr. R. S. Charpe, Advocate for petitioner. Mr. C. V. Jagdale, Advocate for respondents 1 and 2.
Mr. S.M. Ghodeswar, AGP for respondent no.3.
...
CORAM : Z.A. Haq, J
DATE : 12th November, 2013.
ORAL JUDGMENT : (Per Z.A. Haq, J.) :
1] Heard Mr. Charpe, learned Advocate for the
petitioner, Mr. Jagdale, learned Advocate for respondents
1 and 2 and Mr. Ghodeswar, learned AGP for respondent
no.3.
2] Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith.
3] Writ Petition is filed by the Maharashtra State
Road Transport Corporation, body Corporate constituted
under the ig provisions of the Road Transport Act,
challenging the order passed by the Industrial Court,
Nagpur, in Complaint (ULP) No. 262/2006 on
6th September, 2011 by which the Industrial Court has
declared that the Corporation is engaged in unfair labour
practice under Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra
Recognition of Trade Union and Prevention of Unfair
Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as
"MRTU & PULP Act") by not providing alternate
employment to respondent no.1. The Industrial Court has
directed the petitioner to pay wages to respondent no.1
for the period 2nd August 2002 till the date of attaining
the age of superannuation, further imposing costs of
Rs. 2000/- on the petitioner.
4] The relevant facts are as follows:-
Respondent no.1 was working as driver in the
employment of the petitioner from 1979. During the
course of the employment, respondent no.1 was referred
to Medical Officer for visual acuity test and the Medical
Officer declared unfit to drive the vehicle and, therefore,
the petitioner issued the order dated 8th February 2002
terminating the services of respondent no.1 with effect
from 15th January 2002 with retrospective effect. It was
the case of respondent no.1 that the petitioner did not
offer him alternate job in spite of the specific stipulation
to the effect in the settlement between the petitioner
and the employees. Respondent no.1 had submitted an
application requesting for appointment of his son-
Respondent no.2 on compassionate ground. The
petitioner had asked respondent to get the medical
certificate from the Medical Board, Nagpur to the effect
that he was totally unfit for discharging any sort of duty.
The petitioner had not given any letter to the Medical
Board to examine the respondent no.1 and, therefore,
he could not get himself examined by the Medical Board.
In this factual background, respondent nos. 1 and 2 filed
application before the Industrial Court under Item 9 of
Schedule IV of MRTU & PULP Act.
5] The petitioner opposed the claim, as made by
respondents 1 and 2, on the ground that respondent no.2
was not employee of the petitioner, therefore, complaint
on his behalf was not maintainable. The petitioner
admitted that respondent no.1 was removed from the
service on account of his visual acuity and it is
submitted that respondent no.1 had not applied for the
alternate employment and, therefore, there was no
question of providing him alternate employment.
Respondent no.1 submitted that he had not submitted
the certificate of the Medical Board showing that he was
unfit for discharging any sort of duty, therefore,
employment could not have been given to respondent
no.2.
6] Learned Member of the Industrial Court
proceeded with the matter and concluded that
respondent no.2 is not entitled to claim the job in place
of his father. The learned Member concluded that the
petitioner has committed unfair labour practice under
Item 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act and that
respondent no.1 is entitled to get wages from
8th February 2002 till the age of attaining of
superannuation for the post of driver.
7] Learned Advocate for the petitioner has
submitted that the impugned order suffers from patent
irregularity and illegality and is not sustainable in law.
The learned Advocate for the petitioner has submitted
that respondent no.1 had accepted the termination order
and wanted to secure job for his son on compassionate
ground and it is only when the petitioner refused to
accept his request for giving compassionate appointment
to his son that the respondent no.1 has filed complaint
after about three years of the termination order. It is the
submission on behalf of the petitioner that the conduct of
respondent no.1 estops him from claiming reliefs as
prayed for him and the Industrial Court could not have
granted the relief to respondent no.1 overlooking these
aspects. It is the submission on behalf of the petitioner
that in any case respondent no.1 has not worked for the
period for which the back wages are granted and the
impugned order to that effect is contrary to the principle
"no work no wages" and, therefore, unsustainable in law.
The learned Advocate for the petitioner has relied on the
judgment reported in 2013(1)ALL MR 290 (Prakash
Vinayak Naik Vs. Pune Municipal Corporation) and has
submitted that the conclusions of the Industrial Court on
the basis of Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities
(Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full
Participation) Act, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as
"Persons with Disabilities Act 1995" are misconceived.
The learned Advocate for the petitioner has
submitted that the facts in the above referred judgment
are identical to the facts of the present case and,
therefore, the impugned order has to be quashed.
8] Mr. Jagdale, learned Advocate for respondents 1
and 2 has submitted that the petitioner has not only
acted contrary to clause 46 of the Settlement between
the petitioner and the employees but also has violated
the mandate of Section 47 of the Persons with
Disabilities Act, 1995 and, therefore, the petitioner is not
entitled for any relief from this Court specially in exercise
of extraordinary writ jurisdiction. The learned Advocate
for respondents 1 and 2 has submitted that the Industrial
Court has considered the matter in the right perspective
and has recorded proper findings, and it does not require
any interference by this Court.
9] I have considered the submissions made on
behalf of the respective parties and have examined the
record with the assistance of learned Advocates
appearing for the parties.
10] The Persons with Disabilities Act 1995 has been
enacted to give effect to the Proclamation on the Full
Participation and Equity of People with Disabilities in the
Asian and the pacific Region. The statement of objects
and reasons of the Persons with Disabilities Act 1995
states that the meeting to launch the Asian and Pacific
Decade of the Disabled Persons 1993-2002 was
convened by the Economic and Social Commission for
Asian and Pacific Region, and held at Beijing on 1st to 5th
December, 1992 and it adopted the Proclamation on the
Full Participation and Equality of People with Disabilities
in the Asia and the Pacific region. It states that India is a
signatory to the said proclamation and therefore, it was
necessary to enact a suitable legislation to provide for
the following:-
(i) to spell out the responsibility of the State towards
the prevention for disabilities, protection of rights,
provision of medical care, education, training,
employment and rehabilitation of persons with
disabilities;
(ii)to create barrier free environment for persons with
disabilities;
(iii)to remove any discrimination against persons with
disabilities in the sharing of development benefits,
vis-a-vis non-disabled persons;
(iv)to counteract any situation of the abuse and the
exploitation of persons with disabilities;
(v)to lay down a strategy for comprehensive
development of programmes and services and
equalisation of opportunities for persons with
disabilities; and
(vi)to make special provision of the integration of
persons with disabilities into the social mainstream.
11] Though the Persons with Disabilities Act
1995 has been enacted and is enforced since 1st
January 1996 it has been consistently noticed by the
Courts that there has been constant attempt by the
employers to deprive the persons with disabilities,
from the benefits of the Act. Looking to the blatant
violation of the mandate of the Persons with
Disabilities Act 1995 for the period of 17 years, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the matter
in the case of Union of India & anr. Vs. National
Federation of the Blind & Ors. in Civil Appeal No.
9096 of 2013 and has observed as follows:-
"49. Employment is a key factor in the empowerment and inclusion of people with
disabilities. It is an alarming reality that the disabled people are out of job not because
their disability comes in the way of their functioning rather it is social and practical barriers that prevent them from joining the workforce. As a result, many disabled people
live in poverty and in deplorable ig conditions.
They are denied the right to make a useful contribution to their own lives and to the
lives of their families and community. "
12] The Hon'ble Supreme Court has issued
directions in paragraph 54 of the judgment as follows:-
"54. In our opinion, in order to ensure proper implementation of the reservation policy for the
disabled and to protect their rights, it is necessary to issue the following directions :
(i) We hereby direct the appellant herein to
issue an appropriate order modifying the OM dated 29.12.2005 and the subsequent OMs consistent with this Court's Order within three months from the date of passing of this judgment.
(ii) We hereby direct the
"appropriate Government" to compute
the number of vacancies available in all the
"establishments" and further identify the posts for disabled persons within a period of three months from today and
implement the same without default.
(ii)The appellant herein shall issue
instructions to all the departments/public
sector companies undertakings, declaring that Government the non-
observance of the scheme of reservation for persons with disabilities should be considered as an act of
non-obedience and Nodal Officer in department/ public sector undertakings/
Government companies, responsible for the proper and strict implementation of
reservation for persons with disabilities, be departmentally proceeded against for the default."
13] The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
judgment reported in 2013 (8) Scale 171
(Geetaben Ratilal Patel Vs. District Primary
Education Officer) emphasized on the rigor of the
mandate of the provisions of Section 47 of the
Persons with Disabilities Act 1995 and relying on
the proviso to Section 47(1) of the Persons with
Disabilities Act 1995 directed the employer to get
opinion of a Government Doctor and to assign
appropriate duty to the employee suffering with
disabilities.
ig In the case of Geetaben Ratilal Patel
Vs. District Primary Education Officer (supra)
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has again considered
the rigor of the mandate of the provisions of
Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities Act ,1995
and has recorded in paragraph 18 as follows:-
"Therefore, even it is presumed that
the appellant became insane, as held by the Inquiry Officer, mentally illness being one of the disabilities under
Section 2(i) of the Act, 1995, under Section 47 it was not open to the respondents to dispense with, or reduce in rank of the appellant, who acquired a disability during his service. If the appellant, after
acquiring disability was not suitable
for the post he was holding, should have been shifted to some other post
with the same pay scale and service benefits. Further, if it was not possible to adjust the appellant
against any post, the respondents ought to have kept the appellant on a supernumerary post until a suitable
post is available or, until the appellant igattained the age of superannuation whichever was earlier."
14] Similarly, the Division Bench of this Court
at the Principal Seat is also required to consider the
issues relating to the Persons with Disabilities Act,
1995 in Writ Petition No.3294/2010 (Mrs.Nilima
Ananat Surve Vs. The State of Maharashtra and
others) and Public Interest Litigation No 70 of 2002
(ILS Legal and Centre and ors Vs. The State of
Maharashtra and others) and Public Interest
Litigation No.139 of 2006 and in paragraph 11 of
the order, it recorded as follows:-
"11. The Health Department of State of
Maharashtra shall issue instructions to all the Medical Boards and Superintendents of
the Public Hospitals that when a candidate, selected for a post which is reserved for a physically challenged person, appears for
medical examination, he cannot be declared unfit or unsuitable for the post by the concerned Medical Board or
Superintendent of the Public Hospital on
the ground that he is medically unfit because of that particular disability. "
15] Section 47 of the Persons With Disabilities
Act, 1995 reads as under:-
"Section 47. Non-discrimination in Government
employments -(1) No establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service:
Provided that, if an employee, after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other post with the same pay
scale and service benefits:
Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier".
16] The mandate of Section 47 of the Persons
Disabilities Act, 1995 casts an obligation on the
employer to provide an alternate employment to the
employee, who acquired disability during his
service, in some other post with same pay scale and
service benefits. It lays down that if the employer
finds that the employee after acquiring the disability
is not suitable for the post he was holding then the
employee should be kept on a supernumerary post
until a suitable post is available or he attains the
age of superannuation, whichever is earlier. In the
present case, the petitioner-employer has directly
terminated the services of respondent no.1 on the
ground of his physical disability. It is not in dispute
that respondent no.1 acquired disabilities during the
course of his employment. Thus, the petitioner-
employer has violated the mandate of proviso to
Section 47(1) of the the Persons with Disabilities Act,
1995.
17] The second proviso to Section 47(1) of the
Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 lays down that if
it is not possible to adjust the employee against any
post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until
a suitable post is available or he attains the age of
superannuation, which is earlier. It is clear that
provisions of Section 47 of the Persons with
Disabilities Act, 1995 does not only casts an
obligation on the employer to provide alternate
employment but the second provision to Section
47(1) of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995
makes it clear that the employee, who has acquired
disabilities during the service cannot be removed
from the service on the ground of unfitness and the
employer is under an obligation to accommodate
him on supernumerary post till the suitable post is
available or till he attains the age of
superannuation. Therefore, the petitioner-employer
could not have terminated the services of
respondent no.1 overlooking the mandate of the
provisions of Section 47(1) of the Persons with
Disabilities Act, 1995.
18] The learned Member of the Industrial Court
has dealt with the factual aspects and rightly
recorded finding in favour of respondent no.1.
19] The petitioner has submitted that
respondent no.1 had accepted the termination order
and sought compassionate appointment of his son
and it is only when the petitioner did not give
compassionate appointment to his son that the
respondent no.1 has made complaint and, therefore,
the complaint should not have been entertained by
the Industrial Court, is misconceived. The
petitioner-employer could not have wriggled out of
the mandate of the provisions of Section 47(1) of
the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 and could not
have shirked its liabilities to provide an alternate
employment to respondent no.1 and, therefore, in
my view, the findings of the Industrial Court are in
accordance with the mandate of the provisions of
Section 47 (1) of the Persons with Disabilities Act,
1995.
20] Reliance placed on behalf of the
petitioner on the judgment given in the case of
Prakash Vinayak Naik Vs. Pune Municipal
Corporation (supra) is also not proper. In that case,
the employee was terminated and the employee's
son made representation dated 10th October 2002
and 26th September 2005 seeking compassionate
appointment ig and these representations were
rejected on 7th March 2006. Shri Prakash Vinayak
Naik (employee) had filed writ petition in August
2009 challenging the termination of his services
which was effected in 2005. In that petition, the
reasons given for the delay was that his son had
filed writ petition which was rejected on 29th June
2006 and the review petition was also dismissed on
12th February 2008. Special Leave Petition was filed
which was dismissed on 30th March 2009 and after
this writ petition was filed by the employee. Further
more, it is recorded in the above referred judgment
that Shri Prakash Vinayak Naik (employee) had
attained the age of superannuation on 30th June
2007 and the writ petition was filed practically after
two years from the date of his retirement. It is in
this factual background that the High Court refused
to consider the grievance of Shri Prakash Naik in the
above referred judgment. The facts of the above
referred judgment are totally different from the
present case. In the present case respondent no.1
was aged about 54 years when the complaint was
filed before the Industrial Court and respondent no.1
had not made grievance against the petitioner after
being unsuccessful in the Courts seeking
compassionate appointment for his son as was the
fact in the the case of Shri Prakash Naik. The
judgment given in the case of Shri Prakash Naik is
not of any assistance to the petitioner. Therefore,
the impugned order has to be upheld and the writ
petition has to be dismissed.
21] The facts on the record show that the
petitioner-employer has not only deprived
respondent no.1 from his legitimate claim but the
petitioner-employer has no regards to the mandate
of the provisions of Section 47(1) of the Persons with
Disabilities Act, 1995 and law laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court. The
petitioner-employer is a body corporate and is State
within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution
of India and, therefore, it has to act as a Model
Employer. The conduct of the petitioner-employer is
highly deprecable and, therefore, in my view the
exemplary costs of Rs. 20,000/- have to be imposed
on the petitioner-employer so that similar persons
with physical disabilities are not deprived of their
legitimate claim and the rights conferred by the
provisions of Persons Disabilities Act, 1995 in future.
In view of the above, the writ petition is dismissed
with costs of Rs. 20,000/-. The costs be paid by the
petitioner-employer to respondent no.1 within one
month from today.
JUDGE Ambulkar
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