Citation : 2012 Latest Caselaw 58 Bom
Judgement Date : 3 October, 2012
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 918 OF 2012
Allauddin @ Nigro @ Babu Chand Sayyed
Indian Citizen, Aged 27 years, Occu. Nil,
R/at Sathe Nagar, Near Sulabh Souchalaya,
Sitaram Ghanshyam Chawl,
Mankhurd, Mumbai - 400 043 at present
at Nashik Road Central Jail,
Nashik Road 422 101 .. Petitioner
v/s.
1. The State of Maharashtra, through the
Government Pleader, having his office at
PWD Building, High Court, Fort,
Bombay - 400 032.
2. Commissioner of Police, Brihan Mumbai
Deonar Police Station ..Respondents
Mrs A.M.Z. Ansari, learned Amicus Curiae for the petitioner
Mrs. P.H. Kantharia, APP for respondents
Mr. K.M. Gaikwad, PSI, Devnar Police Station Mumbai present
CORAM : A.M. KHANWILKAR &
R.Y.GANOO, JJ.
DATE ON WHICH JUDGMENT IS RESERVED : 14 th SEPTEMBER, 2012. DATE ON WHICH JUDGMENT IS PRONOUNCED : 3rd OCTOBER, 2012.
JUDGMENT : (Per R.Y. Ganoo, J.)
1. The petitioner is detained pursuant to detention Order
No.13/PCB/BP/Zone-VI/2011 dated 13th December, 2011 passed under the
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Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers,
Drug-offenders, Dangerous Persons and Video Pirates Act, 1981 (For short
"Act of 1981"). The said order is passed by the Commissioner of Police,
Briham Mumbai. The said order is approved on 20 th December, 2011 by
the State Government.
2. The grounds of detention have been served upon the petitioner by
communication dated 13th December, 2012 itself. On perusal of the
grounds of detention, it is noticed that the order of detention is passed on
the basis of following material :-
(i) Alleged involvement of the appellant in C.R. No.115 of 2011 under
Section 324 and 504 of Indian Penal Code registered at Deonar Police
station in regard to incident dated 17th July, 2011, wherein it is alleged
that one Mr. Mithun Sathe was assaulted by the petitioner causing him
injuries and that said Sathe had taken treatment at Shatabdi Hospital.
(ii) C.R. No.267 of 2011 of Chembur Police Station under Section 324,
506 r/w Section 34 of IPC in regard to the incident alleged to have taken
place on 30th July, 2011 wherein Rajaram P. Babar was assaulted by the
petitioner with iron rod and that said Rajaram was treated at Dhanvantari
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Hospital at Chembur.
(iii) C.R. No.145 of 2011 of Deonar Police Station under Section 392,
323 r/w Section 34 of the I.P.C. being the incident alleged to have taken
place on 28th August, 2011, wherein the petitioner and his associates are
alleged to have robbed Mohd. Shakil Shafiq Shah of his mobile and a sum
of Rs.700/-.
(iv) In-camera statement rendered by witness "A" on 22 nd October, 2011
in regard to an incident, which have taken place in the third week of
August, 2011.
(v) In-camera statement rendered by witness "B" on 26 th October, 2011
in regard to an incident, which have taken place in second week of July
2011.
(vi) It is also noticed that action under Section 37(1)(a) r/w Section 135
of the Bombay Police Act was initiated against the petitioner on two
counts. In the grounds of detention, a general reference is made about the
preventive action taken against the petitioner under Section 110 of the
Criminal Procedure Code on three occasions.
3. A perusal of the grounds of detention at paragraph 6 would go to
show that the Detaining Authority was convinced on the basis of the
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material placed before it that the petitioner had unleashed a reign of terror
and had become a perpetual danger to the society at large in the localities
of Gaikwad Nagar, P.L. Lokhande Marg, Indira Nagar, Govandi Deonar,
Mumbai and areas adjoining thereto in the jurisdiction of Mankhurd,
Chembur and Tilak Nagar in Brihan Mumbai. Further contents of
paragraph 6 also indicate that people residing and carrying out their daily
vocations in the above localities were terror stricken and their normal life
was affected adversely. It is also recorded that the activities of the
petitioner were found to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order
in the localities mentioned aforesaid in Brihan Mumbai.
4. Paragraph 7 of the ground of detention indicate that the fact of
release of the petitioner on bail in various cases, was considered while
arriving at subjective satisfaction. The respective respondents have filed
reply-affidavit in as much as Mr. Arup Patnaik, the then Commissioner of
Police of Brihan Mumbai, Detaining Authority has filed affidavit dated 19 th
July, 2012. Mr. P.H. Wagde, Deputy Secretary, Government of Maharashtra
has filed affidavit dated 20th July, 2012. Dr. Satyapal Singh, present
Commissioner of Police has filed additional affidavit dated 29 th August,
2012. These affidavits have been duly considered in the course of hearing
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of this petition.
5. This petition raises challenge to the detention order on various
counts. We shall deal with those objections ground-wise.
6. Learned advocate Mrs. Ansari appearing on behalf of the petitioner
submitted that though the grounds of detention referred to injuries caused
to Mr. Mithun Sathe, concerning C.R. No.115 of 2011 of Deonar Police
station and Mr. Rajaram P. Babar, concerning C.R. No.267 of 2011 of
Chembur Police Station, the medical certificates in regard to the injuries
suffered by so called victims have not been supplied and that material is
not placed before the Detaining Authority and consequently the subjective
satisfaction of the Detaining Authority is vitiated. According to learned
advocate Mrs. Ansari, it was necessary for the Detaining Authority to
produce these certificates to enable the petitioner to effectively put up his
representation in the matter of the impugned detention order.
7. Learned advocate Mrs. Kantharia appearing on behalf of the
respondents submitted that Mr. Sathe, as well as Mr. Babar, the victims had
suffered the injuries was apparent on the basis of the text of the FIR in as
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much as in the FIR itself the information was disclosed that Mr. Mithun
Sathe had treatment for injuries suffered by him in Shatabdi Hospital. In
so far as injuries suffered by Mr. Rajaram P. Babar, the said information was
available on the basis of the FIR, which discloses that treatment was
received by Mr. Babar from Dhanvantari Hospital. Learned advocate Mrs.
Kantharia submitted that the Medical Certificates concerning these two
victims were not relied upon and that is how those documents were not
supplied and no fault, therefore, can be found for not supplying the said
Medical Certificates to the petitioner. Learned advocate Mrs. Kantharia
pointed out that the additional affidavit-in-reply filed by Dr. Satyapal Singh
deals with this aspect of the matter and in the said affidavit in paragraph
9, the above position is clarified.
8. We have considered the submissions advanced on both the sides. We
are inclined to accept the submissions advanced by learned advocate Mrs.
Kantharia. Paragraph 9 of the affidavit filed by Dr. Satyapal Singh clearly
indicates that in the FIR itself, appropriate information is divulged so as to
show that the concerned victims had suffered injuries and had taken
treatment from the Shatabdi Hospital and Dhanvantari Hospital
respectively. It is apparent that the documents in the nature of medical
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certificates were not relied upon by the Sponsoring Authority and as such,
the same were not placed before the Detaining Authority for the purposes
of considering the case of the petitioner. In our view, the subjective
satisfaction of the Detaining Authority about the necessity to detain the
petitioner inter alia arrived at on the text of the FIR and in coming to the
conclusion that the victims namely Mr. Mithun Sathe and Mr. Rajaram
Babar had suffered injuries was proper. The Detaining Authority is not
expected to enquire into the truthfulness of the allegations in the FIR. In
our view, the subjective satisfaction was properly arrived at. The Detaining
Authority did consider the material placed before him in the proper
prospective so far as the point namely injuries suffered by the victims. We
reject the argument of learned advocate Mrs. Ansari that the subjective
satisfaction of the Detaining Authority is vitiated.
9. Learned advocate Mrs. Ansari had next contended that the in-
camera statements were recorded on 22nd October, 2011 and 26th October,
2011 respectively. She had submitted that the petitioner was in custody at
the time when the in-camera statements were recorded. According to her,
in-camera statements are false and fabricated and have been placed on
record only to justify the order of detention. Learned advocate Mrs. Ansari
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had submitted that the two in-camera statements relating to incidents of
August, 2011 and July, 2011 should not have been considered by the
Detaining Authority for the purposes of recording the subjective
satisfaction. According to her on this count, the subjective satisfaction is
vitiated.
10. Learned advocate Mrs. Kantharia appearing on behalf of the
respondents submitted that the in-camera statements were recorded while
the petitioner was in custody. She submitted that this fact reinforces the
stand of the respondents that no person was prepared to come to give his
statement against the petitioner. According to her the in-camera
statements were in fact given by the persons and have been truthfully
recorded. According to her the in-camera statements were rightly used for
the purposes of arriving at the subjective satisfaction by the Detaining
Authority.
11. We have considered this point. We are not impressed by the stand
taken by the petitioner. It is true that the in-camera statements have been
recorded while the petitioner was in custody. However, that by itself is not
sufficient to discard the same. On perusal of the relevant portions of the
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grounds of detention, it is clear that the persons who have given the in-
camera statements, have referred to the incidents, wherein they were the
victims at the hands of the petitioner. In this connection, a reference will
have to be made to paragraph 6 of the grounds of detention. A perusal of
paragraph 6 of the grounds of detention clearly indicates as to how the
members of the public in the various localities mentioned in the various
areas were scared of the activities of petitioner and as to how the activities
of the petitioner were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in the
aforesaid localities. It will be proper to reproduce the relevant portion of
paragraph 6 of the grounds of detention as, in our view, the said portion
indicates as to how the Detaining Authority was satisfied about need to
take action against the petitioner. The relevant portion is as follows.
"6...... You have unleashed a reign of terror and have become a perpetual danger to the society at large in the localities of Gaikwad Nagar, P.L. Lokhande Marg, Indira Nagar, Govandi Deonar,
Mumbai and areas adjoining thereto in the jurisdiction of Mankhurd, Chembur and Tilak Nagar Police Station in Brihan Mumbai. People residing and carrying out their daily vocations in the above localities and areas and terror stricken and their normal life is affected adversely. Your activities are, therefore, prejudicial
to the maintenance of public order in the above localities in Brihan Mumbai."
12. It is worth noting that the two persons who came forward to give in-
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camera statements while the petitioner was in custody. This justifies the
stand of the respondents that persons in the aforesaid localities were not
prepared to come forward to depose against the petitioner, when the
petitioner was moving in the society on the basis of bail orders secured by
him.
13. It was next contended by learned advocate Mrs. Ansari that the
Detaining Authority has relied upon the actions initiated against the
petitioner on two occasions under the provisions of Bombay Police Act.
She pointed out to us the provisions of Section 2(b-1) of the Act of 1981
and submitted that in order to call a person as a "dangerous person" within
the meaning of Section 2(b-1) actions initiated under the provisions of the
Bombay Police Act, cannot be considered. Learned advocate Mrs. Ansari,
therefore, submitted that the material placed before the Detaining
Authority has not been properly appreciated and the subjective satisfaction
arrived at is vitiated on the ground that the Detaining Authority has
considered the material, which is not a germen for the purposes of
deciding whether the petitioner should be detained under the Act of 1981.
14. Learned advocate Mrs. Kantharia appearing on behalf of the
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respondents submitted that in addition to the three incidents covered
under the provisions of the I.P.C. and two in-camera statements, the action
initiated against the petitioner under the Bombay Police Act was placed
before the Detaining Authority in order to place before the Detaining
Authority the over all conduct of the petitioner. She submitted that merely
because the material concerning the action initiated under the Bombay
Police Act is placed before the Detaining Authority, the subjective
satisfaction is not vitiated.
15. We have considered this contention. We are not impressed by the
argument advanced by learned advocate Mrs. Ansari. A perusal of the
grounds of detention would clearly indicate that the Detaining Authority
has arrived at the conclusion that the petitioner is required to be detained
by relying upon the incidents covered under the provisions of IPC and two
in-camera statements. The Detaining Authority has based its subjective
satisfaction on the aforesaid material. The placement of the material
concerning action under the Bombay Police Act against the petitioner
should be treated as placing additional material for the purposes of
showing the overall conduct of the petitioner. In this view of the matter,
the objection to the detention order raised in terms of this ground cannot
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be sustained.
16. Learned advocate Mrs. Ansari appearing on behalf of the petitioner
raised another point so as to challenge the order of detention by
contending that the acts alleged against the petitioner are not in any
manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. She took us
through the incidents quoted by the Detaining Authority, which are alleged
to have taken place on 17th July, 2011, 13th July, 2011 and 28th August,
2011. By relying upon the grounds of detention so far as these incidents
are concerned, she submitted that the incidents alleged to have taken place
on 17th July, 2011 as well as on 13 th July, 2011 indicate that the said
incidents are allegedly between the petitioner and the respective
complainant namely Mr. Mithun Sathe and Rajaram P. Babar. Learned
advocate Mrs. Ansari submitted that members of the public were not
involved in the said incidents and these two incidents are qua the aforesaid
two persons and therefore, there was no breach of public order when these
incidents are alleged to have taken place. Same was the argument so far
as incident, which is said to have been taken place on 28th August, 2011.
17. Learned advocate Mrs. Ansari had further submitted that there is a
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marked difference between breach of law and order and breach of public
order. According to her the three incidents alleged against the petitioner
would fall within the term "breach of law and order" and not under the
"breach of public order". She submitted that since the incidents on which
reliance is placed for the purpose of passing the order of detention fall
under category "breach of law and order", an order of detention under the
Act of 1981 could not have been passed because the power to pass
detention order under the Act of 1981 can be used for the purposes of
maintenance of public order. Learned advocate Mrs. Ansari relied upon
the judgment in the case of Ajay Dixit Vs. State of U.P. And Ors. (1984) 4
Supreme Court Cases 400 to support the contention that there is a
distinction between breach of law and order and threat to public order.
Learned advocate Mrs. Ansari had submitted that even if it is accepted that
out of three incidents, incident of 28 th August, 2011 is the one on which
reliance can be placed by the Detaining Authority for the purpose of
passing detention order, as causing breach of public oder, still solitary
incident alleged against the petitioner would not be sufficient to pass an
order of detention. According to her the detention order based on the
solitary incident of 28th August, 2011, cannot sustain. Learned advocate
Mrs. Ansari clarified that this argument is advanced on the strength of her
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earlier arguments that in-camera statements rendered while the petitioner
was in custody should not be relied upon. Learned advocate Mrs. Ansari
had relied upon the judgment in the case of Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya
Shaikh Vs. M.M. Mehta, Commissioner of Police and Ors. (1995) 3
Supreme court Cases 237 to submit that in order to come to the
conclusion that the order of detention is required to be passed, the
Detaining Authority should be satisfied that the acts alleged to have been
committed by the person who is sought to be detained should disturb the
even tempo of life of people. According to her, acts alleged against the
petitioner were not of such a nature as would result in causing disturbance
to the public order and that the even tempo of life of the people was not
disturbed. She, therefore, submitted that the impugned order of detention
is required to be set aside.
18. Learned advocate Mrs. Kantharia appearing on behalf of the
respondents opposed the submission advanced by learned advocate for the
petitioner. Learned advocate Mrs. Kantharia pointed out to the Court that
the petitioner did indulge in offence under the I.P.C. punishable under
Chapter XVI and Chapter XVII being three incidents namely, incident of
17th July, 2011, 13th July, 2011 and 28th August, 2011. She pointed out
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that the petitioner participated in three incidents within a span of 1 ½
month. She submitted that the 3 incidents quoted against the petitioner
clearly indicate that the petitioner was habitually committing offences
punishable under Chapter XVI and XVII of the I.P.C. She submitted that as
the petitioner successively indulged in the commission of offences on three
occasions, the petitioner will have to be termed as a "dangerous person"
within the meaning of Section 2(b-1) of Act of 1981. Learned advocate
Mrs. Kantharia further submitted that reading of Section 2(a) and
explanation attached to Section 2(a) of Act of 1981, it will be clear that the
Detaining Authority was right in passing the detention order by relying
upon the three incidents and two in-camera statements. Learned advocate
Mrs. Kantharia submitted that for consideration of the question whether
the petitioner could be said to be a "dangerous person", it is necessary to
read the definition of the term in Section 2(b-1) of Act of 1981 and the
provisions of Section 2(a-iv) of Act of 1981 which defines the term "acting
in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" as
applicable to category of person viz. "dangerous person". Learned
advocate Mrs. Kantharia submitted that the legal fiction in the explanation
must be read conjointly with Section 2 (a-iv), which defines the term
"acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order".
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According to her, if a person is found to be repeatedly commits or
habitually engages in the activities mentioned in Section 2(b-1), he would
be covered by the term "dangerous person" and an order of detention can
be passed in exercise of the power conferred on authorities under Section
3 of the Act of 1981. Learned advocate Mrs. Kantharia in support of this
proposition relied upon the judgment in the case of Phulwari Jagdamba
Prasad Pathak (Smt) Vs. R.H. Mendonca and Ors. (2000) 6 Supreme
Court Cases 751.
19. Learned advocate Mrs. Kantharia further submitted that even if for a
moment the incidents alleged to have taken place on 17 th July, 2011 and
13th July, 2011 are said to have resulted in breach of law and order, still the
incident alleged to have taken place on 28 th August, 2011 will have to be
treated as one resulting into threat to public order thereby giving an alarm
to the members of the society. Learned advocate Mrs. Kantharia pointed
out that the petitioner is alleged to have created a terror in the minds of
the members of the public who were present at the scene of offence.
Learned advocate Mrs. Kantharia pointed out that Mr. Roshan Pawaskar
and one more associate of the petitioner also joined the petitioner at the
relevant time. Learned advocate Mrs. Kantharia pointed out from the
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grounds of detention necessary material which shows that the petitioner
used knife in the course of incident and administered threats to the
members of the public who were around. She submitted that on account
of this conduct of the petitioner, people ran away helter skelter and the
petitioner tried to escape. Learned advocate Mrs. Kantharia relied upon
the ground no.5(e)(i) and submitted that the incident, which is alleged to
have been taken place on 28th August, 2011 is described in the said ground
and a perusal of the same would go to show that the said incident resulted
in breach of public order. Learned advocate Mrs. Kantharia had submitted
that in addition to this incident of 28 th August, 2011, the Detaining
Authority has relied upon two in-camera statements and has passed the
detention order. Learned advocate Mrs. Kantharia had submitted that the
Detaining Authority has rightly considered the material placed before it
and has passed an order after it was convinced that the petitioner is a
"dangerous person" within the meaning of Section 2(b-1) of the Act of
1981 and that the overt acts committed by the petitioner were prejudicial
to the maintenance of the public order as defined in Section 2 of the Act of
1981. Learned advocate Mrs. Kantharia had, therefore, submitted that the
detention order has rightly passed by the Detaining Authority.
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20. We have considered the rival submissions and the judgment cited by
both the sides. We have perused the judgment in the case of Ajay Dixit Vs.
State of U.P. & Ors. (Supra). In the said judgment the Supreme Court at
paragraph 16 has observed as follows :-
"It is, therefore, necessary in each case to examine the facts to determine, not the sufficiency of the grounds nor the truth of the grounds, but nature of the grounds alleged and see whether these are relevant or not for considering whether the detention of
the detenu is necessary for maintenance of public order."
21.
A reading of this observation of the Supreme Court would clearly go
to show that question whether overt acts alleged against the person
amount to "breach of law and order" or "breach of public order" would
depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. So far as record of
the present case is concerned, even if it is accepted for a moment that the
incidents said to have been committed on 17 th July, 2011 and 13th July,
2011 are referable to "breach of law and order", still the incident of 28 th
August, 2011 alleged against the petitioner and two in-camera statements
are sufficient to hold that the Detaining Authority did cause threat to
public order and the Detaining Authority has rightly come to the
conclusion that the detention order is required to be passed against the
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petitioner. In this view of the matter, the judgment relied upon by the
learned advocate Mrs. Ansari in the case of Darpan Kumar Sharma Vs.
State of T.N. and Ors. 2003 Supreme Court Cases (Cri.) 537 would have
no application.
22. The incidents of 17th July, 2011 and 13th July, 2011 alleged against
the petitioner indicate that the petitioner committed offence punishable
under Chapter XVI of the I.P.C. These two incidents coupled with the
incident alleged to have been taken place on 28 th August, 2011 covered by
Chapter XVII of the I.P.C. and the incidents quoted in the two in-camera
statements clearly indicate that the petitioner was rightly termed as a
"dangerous person" within the meaning of Section 2(b-1) of the Act of
1981.
23. Learned advocate Mrs. Kantharia appearing on behalf of the
respondents had relied upon the judgment in the case of Sujit Suresh
Menpal Vs. A.N. Roy & Ors. 2007(1) Bom. C.R. (Cri.) 938 and had
submitted that detention order passed on the basis of one FIR and two in-
camera statements was confirmed by this Court. She relied upon the
judgment in the case of Jafar Ahmed alias Jafar Fantoosh Mohamad
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Razzak Khan Vs. M.N. Singh and Ors. 2002 Cri. L.J. 1723 and submitted
that in this case detention order passed on the basis of two in-camera
statements only, was accepted by this Court as properly passed. Learned
advocate Mrs. Kantharia submitted that in the present case, the detention
order is passed on the basis of three incidents covered under the IPC
pertaining to offences punishable under Chapter XVI of the I.P.C. and two
in-camera statements. She, therefore, submitted that no fault can be
found in the detention order.
24. We have perused the judgments quoted above. We are in agreement
with the submission of learned advocate Mrs. Kantharia. We see no
reason to differ from the view taken by this Court in the judgments in the
case of Sujit Suresh Menpal Vs. A.N. Roy & Ors. (Supra) and Jafar Ahmed
alias Jafar Fantoosh Mohamad Razzak Khan Vs. M.N. Singh and Ors.
(Supra).
25. On consideration of the incidents quoted in the grounds of
detention, we hold that the same were germane to arrive at the subjective
satisfaction that the even tempo of life of people was disturbed and these
incidents quoted against the petitioner, resulted in breach of public order.
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In our view, the Detaining Authority has rightly appreciated the material
placed before it and has passed an appropriate order. For these reasons,
we are not inclined to interfere with the order of detention on the
argument under consideration.
26. Learned advocate Mrs. Ansari next contended that there was a delay
in passing the detention order and on that count, the detention order is
required to be set aside. Learned advocate Mrs. Ansari took us through the
relevant dates concerning the incidents alleged against the petitioner as
well as the relevant dates when the two in-camera statements were
recorded. Learned advocate Mrs. Ansari submitted that there has been a
delay in passing the order of detention and as such the same should be
quashed and set aside. In support of her contention that delay in passing
the detention order vitiates the subjective satisfaction, she relied upon the
judgment in the case of Austin William Luis Pinto Vs. Commissioner of
Police, Greater Mumbai & Ors. 2005, All MR (Cri) 28.
27. Learned advocate Mrs. Kantharia appearing on behalf of the
respondents opposed this submission. We have considered the relevant
dates. We have also perused the affidavit filed by Mr. Arup Patnaik, the
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then Commissioner of Police, who had passed the detention order. It is
noticed that the material relied upon by Sponsoring Authority in terms of
three incidents have taken place between the period 17 th July, 2011 to 28th
August, 2011 and the two in-camera statements, which are recorded on
22nd October, 2011 and 26th October, 2011 respectively. After the aforesaid
material was placed before the Detaining Authority, the order of detention
has been passed on 13th December, 2011. It is true that the two in-camera
statements relate to the incidents, which have taken place in the month of
August, 2011 and July, 2011 respectively. However, we are inclined to
note that the persons came forward to give in-camera statements only
when the petitioner was in custody. Hence, though the in-camera
statements relate to the period namely July, 2011 and August, 2011, it
cannot be said that there was a delay in recording the in-camera
statements.
28. After considering the relevant dates, we are inclined to observe that
the Detaining Authority had attended to the matter as expeditiously as
possible and in any case there has been no delay much less intentional
delay on the part of the Detaining Authority. Hence, the judgment relied
upon by the learned advocate Mrs. Ansari in the case of Austin William
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Luis Pinto Vs. Commissioner of Police, Greater Mumbai (Supra) will have no
application to the facts of this case.
29. For the aforesaid reasons we are inclined to observe that the
Detaining Authority has rightly considered the material placed before it
and the order of detention is properly passed. For these reasons, we are of
the view that no interference is required with the impugned order of
detention. Hence, we are inclined to dismiss the petition. Accordingly, the
petition is dismissed.
30. We express word of gratitude and commendation for the industry
and able assistance given by learned advocate Mrs. Ansari, who was
appointed by the Court as Amicus Curiae.
[R.Y.GANOO, J.] [A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.] U.S.Jagtap 23 of 23
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