Citation : 2011 Latest Caselaw 41 Bom
Judgement Date : 11 November, 2011
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1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO. 4255 OF 2011
Jairaj Devidas
and others ... Petitioners
Versus
Hirabai Shinwar Jadhav
and others ... Respondents
Mr. A. Y. Sakhare, Senior Advocate with Mr. Sudhir Prabhu for the
Petitioners
Mr. A. A. Kumbhakoni, with Mr.Ramchandra Yadav for Respondent Nos.
1(1) to 1(3) and 3 to 20
Mr. Owen Menezes i/by Mr. R. S. Tripathi for Respondent Nos. 21 and 22
CORAM: R. M. SAVANT, J.
DATED : 11th November, 2011 ORAL ORDER:
1. Rule made returnable forthwith. By consent, the Petition is taken
up for hearing.
2. The above Petition takes exception to the order dated 9th March,
2011 passed by the learned Ad-hoc District Judge-1, Thane by which order
the Appeal being Misc. Civil Appeal No. 142 of 2010, filed by Respondent
Nos. 1 to 20 herein came to be allowed and resultantly, the order dated
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31st July, 2010 passed by the 7th Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Thane
below Exh.5 in Regular Civil Suit No. 144 of 2010, granting temporary
injunction, is quashed and set aside.
3. The controversy in question relates to the land bearing Survey No.
10/1 at village Mira, District Thane to the extent of 6350 square meters.
The genesis of the controversy brought to this Court lies in Regular Civil
Suit No. 144 of 2010 which has been filed by the Petitioners herein, inter
alia, for the following reliefs:
a) to be declared that the Plaintiffs are the Owners of the Suit
Property and Def Nos. 1 to 24 have no right over the same.
b) The Def Nos. 1 to 25 may be directed to hand over vacant possession of the Suit property by removing the piling work done over the Suit property to the Plaintiffs.
c) The Defendant Nos. 1 to 24 may be restrained by an order of permanent prohibitory injunction from carrying out the work of construction, creating third party interest in the proposed construction or over Suit property.
d) Interim injunction in terms of prayer clause 'c' above.
e) Cost of the Suit may be awarded to the Plaintiff.
f) Any other just and proper order may be passed in favour of the Plaintiffs.
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4. In the said Suit, an application Exh.5 for temporary injunction
restraining Defendant Nos. 1 to 24 from carrying out construction and
creating third party rights in respect of the Suit property came to be filed by
the Plaintiffs-Petitioners. It was the case of the Plaintiffs-Petitioners herein,
that Respondent Nos. 21 to 24 who claim through Respondent Nos. 1 to 20
cannot have any such right since Respondent Nos. 1 to 20 themselves have
no right qua the property in question. Reliance was placed by the
Plaintiffs on a copy of the order dated 29th May, 1963 passed by the
Agricultural Land Tribunal by which the application under section 32 (G)
of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act , 1948, filed by the
protected tenant- one Somwarya Kolya Jadhav, came to be rejected. The
Plaintiffs also placed reliance on various orders passed by the revenue
authorities whereby the mutation entries, effected in favour of Respondent
Nos. 1 to 20 came to be set aside. It is significant to note that the
averments in the plaint, in turn, disclose that the cause of action for filing
of the said Suit arose some time in the year 2006 i.e. on the mutation entry
being effected in favour of Defendant Nos. 21 to 24. The said Exh.5-
application for temporary injunction- was replied by Defendant Nos. 21 to
24, by filing their written statement, in the said Suit which was their reply
to the application for temporary injunction also. The Defendant Nos. 21 to
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24, have referred to the agreement dated 6th February, 2006 in their
favour which was executed by Respondent Nos. 1 to 20. In so far as the
said documents dated 29th May, 1963 is concerned, the said Defendants
have, in turn, stated that no such authenticated record of the said
proceedings was filed on record and claim was based on a uncertified copy
and that too having no signature of the concerned authority. The 7th Joint
Civil Judge, Junior Division, Thane, by his order dated 31st July, 2010,
allowed the said application Exh.5 for temporary injunction.
5. The gist of the reasonings of the learned Judge while allowing the
said application Exh. 5 was that Defendant Nos. 1 to 20 could not have
any right qua the property in question in view of the said order dated 29th
May, 1963 passed by the Revenue Tribunal by which order the application
of the protected tenant under Section 32(G) of the Bombay Tenancy and
Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 came to be rejected. The learned Judge also
relied upon the orders of the revenue authorities setting aside the mutation
entries, which were made in favour of Respondent Nos. 1 to 20 herein,
whilst allowing the said application Exh.5.
6. Aggrieved by the said order dated 31st July, 2010, passed by the 7th
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Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Thane allowing the said application
Exh.5, the Respondent Nos. 1 to 24 i.e. Defendants to the said Suit filed
Misc. Civil Appeal No. 142 of 2010. The learned Ad-hoc District Judge-1,
Thane (the First Appellate Court), by the impugned order dated 9th March,
2011, set aside the said order dated 31st July, 2010. The First Appellate
Court, whilst allowing the said Appeal, has, inter alia, held that the reliance
placed by the trial Court on the order dated 29th May, 1963 was misplaced
in view of the fact that no certified copy of the said order was placed on
record by the Plaintiffs and what was placed on record was only a copy of
the said order. The First Appellate Court was of the view that the trial
Court, whilst granting application Exh.5 for temporary injunction, has not
considered the material on record in its proper perspective. The First
Appellate Court, inter alia, held that the Plaintiffs have not come to the
Court with clean hands, inasmuch as the fact that the earlier Suit filed by
the Plaintiffs being Regular Civil Suit No. 530 of 2004 claiming the same
relief as claimed in the present Suit has not been disclosed. The First
Appellate Court observed that the parties have sought to place reliance on
the orders passed by the Revenue Authorities which were in favour of
either of the parties, and applying the principle that the revenue entries
only have presumptive value and do not decide the title of the property in
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question. The First Appellate Court was of the view that much reliance
could not be placed on the setting aside of the revenue entries. In the said
context, the trial Court made an observation that the title of the property
need not be considered at the stage of consideration application Exh.5 for
temporary injunction. The First Appellate Court also took into consideration
the fact that a certificate under section 32(M) of the B.T.A.L. Act was
granted in favour of heirs of original protected tenant i.e. Defendants on
31st October, 2002. That certificate still holds good as no steps have been
taken for setting aside the said certificate. In so far as the possession is
concerned, the Appellate Court recorded a finding that since the plaintiffs
have claimed possession, it implies that they have been dispossessed,
however, the date of dispossession has not been mentioned in the Suit.
The First Appellate Court, therefore, held that Defendant Nos. 21 to 24
were in possession of the property in question.
7. In so far as the balance of convenience is concerned, the First
Appellate Court, taking into consideration various permissions obtained by
Defendant Nos. 21 to 24 from the various authorities and considering the
amounts expended by them towards development, has recorded a finding
that the balance of convenience would also be in favour of Defendant Nos.
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21 to 24. In the circumstances as indicated above, the First Appellate Court
has set aside the order dated 31st July, 2010 passed by the 7th Joint Civil
Judge, junior Division, Thane granting temporary injunction.
8. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Sakhare, appearing for the Petitioners,
submits that in the teeth of the order dated 29th May, 1963 of the
Agricultural Lands Tribunal, and setting aside of the mutation entries in
favour of Respondent Nos. 1 to 20, the Respondent Nos. 1 to 20 could not
create any right in favour of the said Respondent Nos. 21 to 24. The
learned senior counsel placed reliance on the orders of the revenue
authorities, a compilation of which was submitted to this Court and
contends that the First Appellate Court has totally grossed sight over the
said material, inasmuch as the setting aside of the mutation entires
confirmed right upto the Appellate authority and also this Court thereafter,
has not been taken into consideration by the First Appellate Court.
9. Per contra, it is submitted by Mr. Menezes, the learned counsel,
appearing for Respondent Nos. 21 and 22, that the Suit itself is not
maintainable as, by formulating the prayers in the form in which they are,
the Plaintiffs, in fact, are seeking setting aside the development agreement
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dated 6th February, 2006 executed by the Respondent Nos 1 to 20 in favour
of the Respondent Nos. 21 and 22. In so far as the order dated 29th May,
1963 is concerned, the learned counsel Menezes submitted that no certified
copy of the said order was produced and what was produced before the
Court was only an ordinary copy of the order which fact has been reflected
in the order passed by the First Appellate Court. The learned Counsel,
relying upon the text of the Probate Petitions being Petition Nos. 571 of
1970 and 728 of 1970, would contend that the land in question which is
the subject matter of the Suit has not been shown to be a part of property in
respect of the original owner in respect of whom the probate petitions were
filed. Mr. Menezes also placed reliance on the document i.e. Khateutara
in Form No. 8A wherein the said land is not shown as the holding of the
plaintiffs. Mr. Menezes also demonstrated as to how the prejudice would
be caused to the said respondents if interim relief is granted, in view of
the permissions that have been obtained by the said respondents from
various authorities as also the amount that has been expended by them.
10. On behalf of Respondent Nos. 1 to 20, learned counsel Mr.
Kumbkoni supported the submissions made by Mr. Menezes and
submitted that the document in question i.e. order dated 29th May, 1963 is
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a highly suspicious document. The learned senior counsel drew my
attention to the letter dated 13th February, 2010 of the Tahsildar by which
letter the Tahsildar has informed one K. N. Joshi who is partner of
Respondent no. 21, that records pertaining to the said proceedings in the
order dated 29.5.1963 are not available in the office.
11. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having given my
anxious consideration to the rival contentions, in my view, there is no merit
in the above Petition. The First Appellate Court considered the material on
record and has rightly set aside the order dated 31st July, 2010 passed by
the 7th Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Thane below Exh.5 in Regular
Civil Suit No.144 of 2010. Since much store has been laid by the
Petitioners/Plaintiffs on the order dated 29th May, 1963, purportedly passed
in the 32(G) proceedings, it would be gainful to refer to and rely upon the
text of said order. Text of the said order discloses a statement which has
been recorded namely of the said Somawarya who claimed to be the
protected tenant the said statement is to the effect, that the land was
never cultivated by him or by his father and the entry in revenue record is
incorrect. It defies logic how such a statement could be made by a person
claiming to be a protected tenant who himself has applied under section
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32(G). The statement itself raises doubt and suspicion as regards the said
order dated 29th May, 1963 is concerned. Though the trial Court has
recorded a finding that a copy of the said order was produced, the First
Appellate Court has held that the said order could not be relied upon as no
certified copy was produced by the Plaintiffs. In my view, the observation
has been rightly made by the First Appellate Court as it appears that only a
certified copy was produced without any signature. In my view in the light
of the contents of the said document and the letter of the Tahsildar dated
13th February, 2010, the said document could not be relied upon at the prima
facie stage.
12. It is well settled that for the grant of injunction which is a
equitable relief, a party who claims such relief has to come to the Court
with clean hands and that there should be no suppression of facts. In the
instant case, it is significant to note that the Petitioners/ Plaintiffs had
already filed Civil Suit No.530 of 2004 admittedly for the same relief as
prayed in the present Suit and for some inexplicable reason, application
for injunction has not been filed in the said Suit and the said Suit was
pending, The instant suit being Regular Civil Suit No. 144 of 2010 has
been filed without disclosing the fact that earlier Suit No. 530 of 2004 for
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the same relief is yet pending. The First Appellate Court, in the said
factual position, has rightly commented adversely against the conduct of the
Plaintiffs, in qua their entitlement to the grant of the said equitable relief.
13. In so far as the orders passed by the revenue authorities are
concerned, no doubt the orders passed by the authorities effecting mutation
entries in favour of Defendant nos 1 to 20 were set aside. However, in
some cases, the matter was remanded back to the revenue authorities for
de-novo consideration. As rightly observed by the First Appellate Court,
the revenue entries do not decide the title to the property and are only of
presumptive value. However, the fact remains that the certificate under
section 32(M) has been issued in favour of the heirs of the protected tenant
on 31st October, 2002 and the record discloses that the said certificate has
not been challenged and therefore holds the field as on date. The contention
of the learned senior counsel for the Petitioners that the said certificate
under section 32 (M) cannot stand in the eyes of law in view of the order
dated 29th May, 1963 passed on the application under section 32(G) cannot
be accepted, in view of what has been stated hereinabove in respect of the
said order dated 29th May, 1963. The First Appellate Court was, therefore,
right in my view in placing reliance on the said 32(M) certificate.
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14. It would be relevant to note that the averments in the plaint
discloses that the cause for filing the Suit has arisen in the year 2006. It is
pertinent to note that by way of prayer clause (b), the Plaintiffs have
sought a relief that the Defendants 1 to 25 may be directed to hand over the
vacant possession by removing the piling work done over the said
property. What is implied in this prayer is acceptance of the fact by the
Plaintiffs that they are aware that Respondent Nos. 21 and 22 are carrying
out the work pursuant to some agreement. Knowledge of the said
development agreement dated 6th February, 2006 would, therefore, have to
be attributed to the Plaintiffs/Petitioners. The Plaintiffs sought the said said
relief by prayer clause (b) without seeking the setting aside of the said
development agreement dated 6th February, 2006 in favour of Defendants
21 and 22. This is obviously done with a view to bring the Suit within
limitation as the agreement dated 6th February 2006 could not have been
challenged by filing a suit in the year 2010 as by that time, the period of
limitation was over, and therefore, it appears that by skillful drafting no
such prayer/reference has been made in the Suit. Learned counsel Mr.
Menezes, therefore, contends that the Suit itself is not maintainable.
However, the question as to maintainability of the suit can be considered at
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the appropriate time.
15. In so far as the probate petitions are concerned though the said
material was not before the Courts below the fact of the matter is that in the
probate petitions the property which is the subject matter of the suit is not
the property shown of the original owner through whom the plaintiffs claim.
The mention of the suit property also does not find place in form 8-A which
is revenue record. The learned trial Court was therefore, right in recording
a finding by relying upon the said form 8-A.
16. Having considered the impugned order dated 9th March,2011
and in the light of the above discussion, no case for interdiction in the writ
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is made out.
Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed.
17. However, it is made clear that the respondent Nos 1 to 22 may
proceed to develop the property in question. No further third party rights
from today would be created by them. The third party rights already
created would be subject to the result of the said Regular Civil Suit no.144
of 2010.
18. With the aforesaid observations, the petition is dismissed. Rule
discharged.
(R. M. SAVANT, J.)
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