Bombay High Court
Vitthal Pandurang Pawar vs The State Of Maharashtra on 11 November, 2011
Bench: R. C. Chavan
1 APEAL-439.91
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.439 OF 1991
1. Vitthal Pandurang Pawar,
Adult, Occupation -
Government Service,
residing at 93/20,
Kachare Vasti, Mundhawa,
Pune-411 036.
2. Ramesh Kaluram Kharat,
Adult, Occ: Service,
residing at 428,
Wanowarigaon,
Pune-411 040.
3. Ravindra alias Raju
Parashuram alias
Prasadrao Gaikwad (ABATED)
4. Rajendra alias Fakira Wagh,
Adult, Occ: Service, .... Appellants/
residing at 74, Rasta Peth, (Ori.Accused
Pune-411 011. Nos.1,2,3 & 4)
- Versus -
The State of Maharashtra .... Respondent
Ms Revati Mohite-Dere for Appellant No.1.
Shri Prakash Naik for Appellant Nos.2 & 4.
Ms P.P. Bhosale, Addl. Public Prosecutor,
for the Respondent-State.
::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:54:45 :::
2 APEAL-439.91
CORAM: R.C. CHAVAN, J.
RESERVED ON : AUGUST 30, 2011
PRONOUNCED ON: NOVEMBER 11, 2011
JUDGMENT:
1. This appeal is directed against the
conviction of the appellants by the learned
Special Judge, Pune for the offences punishable
under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 r/w Section
34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, the
IPC ) and Section 5(2) r/w Section 5(1)(d) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (for
short, the PC Act ) and sentence of RI for 3
years with fine of `500/- or in default RI for
15 days, imposed upon each of them for each of
the offences punishable under Sections 420,
467, 468 and 471 of the IPC, as also RI for 1
year with fine of `250/- and RI for 1 year with
fine of `500/- for the offence punishable under
Section 5(2) r/w Section 5(1)(d) of the PC Act.
Appellant No.2 was also convicted for the
offence punishable under Section 201 of the IPC
and sentenced to RI for 1 year with fine of
`250/- or in default RI for a further period of
7 days.
3 APEAL-439.91
2. Facts which are material for deciding
this appeal are as under:
Appellant Nos.1 and 2 Vitthal Pawar
and Ramesh Kharat were working in Sales Tax
Department at Pune. Accused No.3 Ravindra
Gaikwad and accused No.5 Prakash Bhosale were
working in Social Welfare Department, Pune.
Accused No.4 Rajendra Wagh was working in
Animal
they were
Husbandry
working
Department
in
at
different
Pune. Though
offices,
according to the prosecution, they entered into
a criminal conspiracy of preparing bills for
withdrawal from Government Provident Fund (for
short, GPF ) accounts in the name of
fictitious persons working in the Sales Tax
Department and the Animal Husbandry Department
with fictitious GPF account numbers. They also
forged orders in the names of their Heads of
the Department sanctioning such advances,
submitted bills to the Treasury on the basis of
such false orders after forging the signatures
of the Drawing and Disbursing Officers (for
short, the DDOs ), got the bills passed from
the Treasury, obtained cheques, encashed them
and put the amounts to their own use. Bills for
amounts totaling to `67,120/- were presented to
the Treasury and actually a sum of `64,490/-
4 APEAL-439.91
was withdrawn by the accused persons by
submitting nine bogus bills.
3. This came to light on 30-1-1980 when
Laboratory Assistant Shri Dhanve (PW-2) had
gone to the Treasury for seeing whether the
bills of his office were passed. Shri Dhanve
was told by the employees of the Treasury that,
bill of one V.P. Joshi for a sum of `16,650/-
had also been passed and Dhanve was asked to
collect the cheque. Since Dhanve was not having
token for the said bill with him, he contacted
his superior Shri Muley (PW-1), who told Dhanve
not to accept the cheque. Shri Muley enquired
in his office and found that no such bill of
any V.P. Joshi was submitted to the Treasury
through his office. Muley went to the Treasury,
saw the bill and found that it bore stamp of
his office and also signature similar to his
signature on the bill, as also, a sanctioning
order bearing signature similar to his
signature. He instructed the Treasury Officer
not to handover the cheque to anyone and
informed his superior. Eventually, he lodged a
report with the Bund Garden Police Station on
5-2-1980 and on which an offence was registered
and investigation commenced.
5 APEAL-439.91
4. On 25-2-1980 Madhukar Wagale, who was
in the Sales Tax Department, received a
telephonic message from one Bapat from the
State Bank of India asking him whether any
person by name A.V. Wagh was working in his
office. On Wagale informing Bapat that Wagh was
not working in his office, Bapat asked Wagale
as to whether cheque of `11,630/- was submitted
by Wagale for encashment. Wagale informed him
that he had not submitted any such cheque for
encashment. Bapat asked Wagale to come to the
Bank. After going to the Bank he noticed that
cheque dated 4-2-80 was issued by the Treasury
Office in the name of his office. The cheque
had not been received by his office and he had
not signed the cheque, yet the cheque was
presented to the Bank for encashment. He went
to the Pune Treasury and found that a bill had
been submitted for withdrawal from the GPF
accounts in the names of H.R. Sawant for
`4,680/-, S.D. Falke for `3,600/- and Shripati
Kale for `3,350/-. The bill was shown to have
been signed by D.G. Jadhav, Clerk. Wagale
noticed that these persons were not serving in
his office and the bill was not signed by him
and, therefore, concluded that the bill was
falsely prepared. Therefore, he too reported
the matter to the police.
6 APEAL-439.91
5. On 7-4-1980 Devdatta Limaye, working
as Senior Treasury Officer at the relevant
time, also reported to the police about a
bill in the name of S.T. Joshi by which an
amount of `12,800/- was received as per cheque
issued by the Treasury Officer. He also
informed about withdrawal of `16,650/- in the
name of V.P. Joshi by bill dated 24-1-1980. The
police found, after investigation, that, three
bills from the Sales Tax Department and two
bills from the Animal Husbandry Department had
been submitted for withdrawal from GPF accounts
of fictitious persons, without proper
authorisation by forging orders, signatures as
well as bills.
6. The investigating officer sought
necessary sanction from the learned Judicial
Magistrate, First Class to investigate into the
offences and after it was granted vide
Exhibits-129 and 130 proceeded with the
investigation. After investigation, it was
found that the original accused Nos.1 and 2,
working in the office of the Sales Tax
Department, accused Nos.3 and 5, working in the
Social Welfare Department and accused No.4,
working in the Animal Husbandry Department, had
7 APEAL-439.91
prepared these forged bills, orders and had
also forged the signatures of the authorities
concerned for encashing these bills. Specimens
of hand-writing of these persons were collected
and were sent to a hand-writing expert, who
opined that the disputed writings in the bills
concerned and the office orders were of the
accused persons. Hence, on completion of the
investigation, charge-sheet was sent.
7. The
learned trial Judge charged the
appellants, as also accused No.5 Prakash Anaji
Bhosale of offences punishable under Sections
420, 467, 468, 465, 471 and 201 r/w Section
120-B or Section 34 of IPC and Section 5(2) r/w
Section 5(1)(d) of the PC Act r/w Section 120-B
or Section 34 of IPC. Since the accused pleaded
not guilty, they were put on trial at which the
prosecution examined 30 witnesses in its
attempt to bring home the guilt of the
appellants. After considering the evidence of
these witnesses in the light of defence of
denial taken by all the accused persons, the
learned trial Judge convicted the appellants
for the offences punishable under Sections 420,
467, 468 and 471 r/w Section 34 of IPC and
Section 5(2) r/w Section 5(1)(d) of the PC Act
and sentenced them as already indicated. He
8 APEAL-439.91
also convicted the appellant Ramesh Kaluram
Kharat for the offence punishable under Section
201 of the IPC. He acquitted the appellants of
the offence of criminal conspiracy and
acquitted accused No.5 of all the offences
charged. Aggrieved by their convictions and the
sentences imposed upon them, the appellants
have preferred this appeal.
8. The
appellant Ravindra
Parashuram alias Prasadrao Gaikwad died during
alias Raju
the pendency of the appeal and, therefore, the
proceedings, in so far as they relate to him,
abate.
9. The appeal was in fact heard at length
by Shri Justice J.H. Bhatia and was reserved
for Judgment, when it was noticed that
Exhibit-140, the order sanctioning prosecution
of appellant No.1, was neither admitted by
appellant No.1 nor was it proved by examining
the authority. In view of this, by the order
dated 2-2-2011 the matter was remitted back to
the Special Judge, Pune, for giving an
opportunity to the prosecution to prove the
sanction Exhibit-140. The Special Judge was
directed to record the evidence of the
sanctioning authority and send the said
9 APEAL-439.91
evidence along with the other records, without
giving any findings, to this Court. The
sanctioning authority was reported to have
passed away on 27-5-2011. Therefore, the
Special Judge, Pune, could not record the
evidence of the sanctioning authority and
reported accordingly by the letter dated
29-6-2011.
10.
I have heard Ms Revati Mohite-Dere for
the appellant Vitthal Pandurang Pawar and Shri
Prakash Naik for the appellants Ramesh Kaluram
Kharat and Rajendra alias Fakira Wagh. I have
also heard the learned APP Ms P.P. Bhosale for
the State. I have gone through the entire
evidence with the help of the learned counsel.
11. The first contention of the learned
counsel for appellant No.1 is that since the
sanction itself is not proved, the prosecution
against appellant No.1 must fail. For this
purpose, she placed reliance on a Judgment of
this Court in Jagannath Maruti Tekade v. State
of Maharashtra, reported in 1991 Mh.L.J. Page
976. In that case, the Collector, who was the
sanctioning authority, though cited as a
witness was not examined and instead a Clerk
from the Collector s office was examined, who
10 APEAL-439.91
had deposed about the process which had been
undertaken in according sanction. The Court
held that examination of a Clerk from the
Collector s office is tantamount to examination
of no witness at all because that Clerk was
certainly not a competent witness for the
purpose of deciding the crucial question as to
whether the Collector applied his mind to the
facts of the case and whether he had granted a
valid sanction. The learned counsel, therefore,
submitted that this vitiates not only the trial
but renders the prosecution void ab initio. The
sanction order tendered in the case could not
at all be looked into.
12. The learned APP contested this
proposition and submitted that there could be
cases like the present one where the
sanctioning authority expired and became
unavailable for examination by the Court. In
such a situation, according to the learned APP,
it would be wrong to hold that the sanction
could not be proved by other means or that it
could be held that the sanction was bad for
want of proof of application of mind by the
authority. She submitted that the presumption
that all official acts are done properly would
have to be invoked in such a case. According to
11 APEAL-439.91
the learned APP, none of the parties seem to
have raised any objection to the exhibition of
sanction Exhibit-140 in the course of the
trial. It was nobody s case that the sanction
had not been accorded by Shri N.K. Fadnavis,
the sanctioning authority. The only lacuna
seems to be that Shri Fadnavis was not
examined. Unfortunately, even after this Court
remitted the matter back to the trial Court,
though Shri Fadnavis was alive at that time his
evidence could not be recorded and this is how
the Special Judge came to report, after the
death of Shri Fadnavis, that evidence of Shri
Fadnavis could not be recorded.
13. I have carefully considered the rival
contentions. Section 6 of the PC Act, 1947
prohibits a Court from taking cognizance of an
offence by a public servant under the Act
without the previous sanction of the authority
competent to remove such public servant. The
section itself does not prescribe any mode for
proof of such a sanction. Illustration (e) to
Section 114 of the Evidence Act provides for a
presumption that all official acts have been
regularly performed. Yet a body of judgment law
has evolved over a period of time requiring
that authority which accorded sanction is
12 APEAL-439.91
examined before the Court. A statement by such
person before the Court that he applied his
mind and then accorded sanction is not
conclusive of the matter and Courts are
required to find out if the authority had
indeed applied its mind and then accorded
sanction. Sub-section (3) of Section 19 of the
PC Act, 1988 provides that an error, omission
or irregularity in the sanction would not
warrant
reversal of a
occasioned failure of justice. This provision
finding unless it
is inapplicable to the case at hand, since the
case pertains to events prior to the coming
into force of the 1988 Act. In this context the
question that arises would be whether on non-
availability of authority competent to sanction
prosecution the matter must be relegated back
to square one, since judicial precedents show
that when prosecution is launched without
sanction, it is no prosecution at all, enabling
the authority to accord a fresh sanction and
launch a fresh prosecution. Such a course would
be more vexatious for the appellants rather
than the State, since they would be relegated
to the year 1982 30 years backwards. Apart
from this, there are two reasons why in the
present case, sanction must be presumed to have
been accorded after due application of mind.
13 APEAL-439.91
Vide application Exhibit-94, the Addl. PP had
called upon the parties to admit genuineness of
documents. The sanction by Shri N.K. Phadnavis
is at serial No.20 in the list annexed. On
behalf of appellant Nos.2, 3 and 4 there are
endorsements dated 8-1-1991 to show that they
had admitted the documents except those at
serial Nos.26 and 28. Accused No.1 had not
admitted this document. Even in reply to
question No.133 in his statement under Section
all documents included in that question were
false. But on behalf of appellant No.1, PW-30
I.O. Shri Naik, who stated that he had received
from the concerned departments sanction to
prosecute the accused persons (including
appellant No.1), was not at all cross-
examined. Secondly, appellant No.1 is being
prosecuted and has been convicted for offences
punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471
r/w Section 34 of the IPC as well. The cheating
or forgery allegedly committed by appellant No.
1 could, by no stretch of imagination, be held
to have been committed in discharge of duties
by appellant No.1. Offence punishable under
Section 5(2) r/w Section 5(1)(d) of the PC Act
is only incidental to the offences of cheating
and forgery by which appellant No.1 enriched
14 APEAL-439.91
himself. Therefore, the absence of sanction may
at worst affect appellant No.1 s conviction for
offence punishable under Section 5(2) r/w
Section 5(1)(d) of the PC Act. Therefore,
failure to prove sanction does not matter and
the appeal would have to be decided on merits.
It is, therefore, not necessary to refer to
judgment of this Court in Jagannath Maruti
Tekade v. State of Maharashtra, reported in
1991 Mh.L.J. 976.
14. It may not be inapt to record here
that the investigators seem to have
unnecessarily complicated the matter by joining
together offences independently committed by
officials in different departments by invoking
provision of Section 120-B of the IPC. The
learned trial Judge has rightly acquitted all
the accused of charge of conspiracy.
15. With this I have proceeded to examine
the record with the help of the learned counsel
for the parties. Out of the 30 witnesses
examined, PW-28 Shriniwas Phansalkar was the
Chief Examiner of Questioned documents who had
examined forged bills and orders. His opinion
at Exhibit-172 with supporting documents at
Exhibits-173 to 189 are the foundation of the
15 APEAL-439.91
case built up against the appellants. The
expert had found that several orders, bills are
in the writings of appellant Nos.1 and 2. Some
of the cheques encashed also show writings of
these appellants on the reverse. The expert
also came to similar conclusion about some
documents being in the handwriting of appellant
No.3 Gaikwad (who died during the pendency of
appeal).
16.
The learned counsel for the appellants
submitted that opinion of PW-28 Shriniwas
Phansalkar was not reliable. They submitted
that Phansalkar had admitted in his cross that
he did not have any degree/diploma in
examination of questioned documents and could
not state in how many cases his opinion was
accepted/rejected by Courts. He had also
admitted that science of identification of
handwriting is not perfect and that many times
there are conflicting opinions by experts. As
rightly pointed out by the learned APP there is
nothing wrong in what the witness stated. She
pointed out that the witness had duly
established his credentials by stating that he
had experience of 27 years in examining
documents. I have also gone through elaborate
cross-examination of this witness and find that
16 APEAL-439.91
there is nothing to impeach his opinion.
17. The learned counsel for appellant No.1
submitted that evidence of handwriting expert
in itself could not be sole evidence to base
conviction. For this purpose she relied on a
Judgment of the Supreme Court in Magan Bihari
Lal v. The State of Punjab, reported in AIR
1977 SC 1091, followed by a learned single
Judge
Saindane
of
v.
this Court
Anilkumar
in Krishnamohan
Bherumal Mawani
Ananda
and
another, reported in 2006 (4) Mh.L.J. 563. In
Magan Bihari Lal (supra), in para 7, the Court
held as under:
.... It is true that B.Lal, the
handwriting expert, deposed that the
handwriting on the forged Railway
Receipt Ex. PW 10/A was that of the
same person who wrote the specimen
handwritings Ex. PW 27/37 to 27/57,
that is the appellant, but we think
it would be extremely hazardous to
condemn the appellant merely on the
strength of opinion evidence of a
handwriting expert. It is now well
settled that expert opinion must
always be received with great caution
and perhaps none so with more caution
than the opinion of a handwriting
expert. There is a profusion of
precedential authority which holds
that it is unsafe to base a
conviction solely on expert opinion
without substantial corroboration.
17 APEAL-439.91
This rule has been universally acted
upon and it has almost become a rule
of law. It was held by this Court in
Ram Chandra v. State of U.P., AIR
1957 SC 381 that it is unsafe to
treat expert handwriting opinion as
sufficient basis for conviction, but
it may be relied upon when supported
by other items of internal and
external evidence. This Court again
pointed out in Ishwari Prasad v. Md.
Isa, AIR 1963 SC 1728 that expert
evidence of handwriting can never be
conclusive because it is, after all,
opinion evidence, and this view was
reiterated in Shashi Kumar v. Subodh
Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 529 where it was
pointed out by this Court that
expert s evidence as to handwriting
being opinion evidence can rarely, if
ever, take the place of substantive
evidence and before acting on such
evidence, it would be desirable to
consider whether it is corroborated
either by clear direct evidence or by
circumstantial evidence. This Court
had again occasion to consider the
evidentiary value of expert opinion
in regard to handwriting in
Fakhruddin v. State of M.P., AIR
1967 SC 1326 and if uttered a note of
caution pointing out that it would be
risky to found a conviction solely on
the evidence of a handwriting expert
and before acting upon such evidence,
the court must always try to see
whether it is corroborated by other
evidence, direct or
circumstantial. ....
18 APEAL-439.91
18. There can be no doubt about this
proposition. In view of this, the other
evidence in the case would have to be examined
to find out if it provides adequate
corroboration to the opinion of expert.
19. PWs-29 and 30 are officers who
conducted investigation. Evidence of PW-19
Rajendra Ranka and PW-23 Sadashiv Duse about
production of two typewriters does not throw
much light on the complicity of the appellants.
Evidence of PW-25 Raghunath Zumbade is about
deceased appellant/accused No.3 Gaikwad and
therefore is not required to be discussed.
20. There are reports to police,
Exhibit-45 by PW-1 Shriram Muley of Animal
Husbandry Department, Exhibits-102 and 103 by
D.R. Limaye of the Treasury, Exhibit-96 by
Wagale and Exhibit-103 by D.R. Barve of the
Treasury in respect of forgery and cheating by
appellant Nos.1 and 2 of Sales Tax Department.
Panchnamas pertaining to typewriter and samples
of typewriting at Exhibits-146, 131 and 132,
about samples of handwriting at Exhibits-133 to
136 and 143, house search of the accused,
Exhibit-142, seizures Exhibits-147 and 148 have
been perused. They show the steps taken in
19 APEAL-439.91
course of investigation.
21. PWs-8 V.D. Sant, 9 Sharad Kulkarni, 12
Vilas Wagh, 13 Shrikrishna Natekar and 22 Vimal
Nirgudkar from the Sales Tax Department state
that they had not sought advances/withdrawals
from their GPF accounts and that they are not
P.H. Sant, P.V. Kulkarni, N.V. Wagh, N.V.
Natekar or S.R. Nirgudkar respectively for whom
withdrawals
were made. PW-10 Shankar
from the Sales Tax Department states that bills
Wavale
for withdrawal of `6,500/- (2) for Shri P.H.
Sant and `5,000/- for P.V. Kulkarni are not in
his hand. Three employees from the Treasury,
PW-4 Gandhi, PW-5 Takale and PW-7 Vinaya Naik
state about enquiries made by the accused
persons about cheques. PW-18 Smita Deshpande
states having made payment of cheque Exhibit-91
for `3,600/- to one Shinde who produced the
token. PW-7 Ramani working with the office of
the Accountant General had produced seven
cheques (including the one at Exhibit-88)
before the investigating officer.
22. The evidence of these witnesses would
show that persons for whom amounts were shown
to have been withdrawn were not at all working
in the Sales Tax Department. Persons working in
20 APEAL-439.91
the Departing sharing the same surnames had
account numbers which did not tally with
fictitious account numbers from which amounts
were withdrawn and that these persons had not
received any amounts. As rightly submitted by
the learned APP, this would show that forged
and fabricated bills were submitted to the
Treasury. However, the learned counsel for the
appellants wondered as to how this evidence
could point to first appellant s complicity in
these forgeries.
23. As far as appellant No.2 Ramesh Kharat
is concerned, there is also evidence of PW-26
Pramod Ghangale who stated that he was working
as a Clerk in the State Bank of India and in
February, 1980 had received a cheque for
`11,630/- (Exhibit-101) from a person and had
handed over a token to the person. He then
passed on the cheque to the other officials for
being cleared for payment. This officer Shri
Bapat had told him to ask the person presenting
the cheque to see Bapat. Accordingly, the
person was directed to see Bapat. The person
went away with the token and never returned.
The witness identified the person to be
appellant No.2. Prior to that the witness
stated that he had been called to identify the
21 APEAL-439.91
person at test identification parade and that
he had identified appellant No.2 at the test
identification parade. The learned Magistrate
who conducted the parade had expired and so
could not be examined. But a panch at the
parade Jalinder was examined as PW-27. The
learned counsel for the appellants submitted
that PW-26 Pramod had stated in his cross that
he knew appellant No.2 who had come previously
for collecting cheque amounts. This, as rightly
submitted by the learned APP, does not diminish
the value of the test identification parade or
identification of appellant No.2 by the
witness. Several persons come to Bank for
withdrawing amounts and Bank staff would know
the persons who withdraw/deposit amounts in the
sense that they would be able to identify them.
That does not mean that merely because witness
had seen appellant No.2 receiving moneys in the
past too he could have named appellant No.2
obviating need of a test identification parade.
There is no infirmity in this evidence.
24. This evidence would, according to the
learned APP, receive corroboration from that of
PW-24 Ramchandra Najan, a panch at the failed
attempt to find the token allegedly thrown by
appellant No.2 in a canal. The learned counsel
22 APEAL-439.91
for appellant No.2 may be right in submitting
that since nothing was seized/discovered, the
evidentiary value is greatly reduced. All the
same this attempt only shows that the
investigating officer did try to secure the
token.
25. In any case, in my view,
identification of appellant No.2 by PW-26
Pramod as
the person who
Exhibit-101, would corroborate the opinion of
presented cheque
handwriting expert PW-28 Phansalkar, that
cheque Exhibit-101 bears the writing of
appellant No.2 on the reverse which is marked
as D-39 and D-40 and that the writing marked as
R-35 is not of Wagale (not examined as witness)
whose writing should have been found on
Exhibit-101 if it was to be an official
withdrawal. D-39 and D-40 are the signatures
in the name of P.V. Date. There is an
endorsement above these signatures, as also
forged signature R-35 to the effect that
payment was received through P.V. Date whose
signature was attested. This endorsement was
found by the handwriting expert to be in the
handwriting of appellant No.1 Pawar. On the
bill Exhibit-97 too there is signature in the
name of Wagale which is marked as R-1. The
23 APEAL-439.91
expert found that this too was not in the
handwriting of Wagale. The expert however did
not state that signatures R-1 or R-35 on
Exhibits-97 and 101 were in the handwriting of
appellant No.1 or 2. This shows that his
opinion is unbiased and he has held the
appellants responsible for the writings which
he found to be those of the appellants.
26. The
opinion about
appellant No.1 receives corroboration from the
complicity of
evidence of PW-12 Vilas Wagh who states that
appellant No.1 used to come to his office to
see appellant No.2. While PW-4 Dhanyakumar from
the Treasury stated that appellant No.1 used to
visit to enquire about the cheque, PW-5
Dashrath, also from the Treasury, states about
visits of appellant No.1. The learned counsel
for the appellants submitted that this evidence
may be discarded as the witness stated that
they had seen the appellant while under
investigation. Though it would have been ideal
to parade even appellant No.1 at test
identification parade, given the nature of
allegations, this lapse may not matter. As
rightly submitted by the learned APP, a forger
would not commit forgery in presence of others.
Opinion of the handwriting expert is shown to
24 APEAL-439.91
be objective and cross for the appellants does
not show that the opinion could not have been
formed. This, coupled with evidence about
contacts of appellant Nos.1 and appellant No.2
and appellant No.1 s unwarranted visits to
Treasury would indicate appellant No.1 s
complicity as well.
27. Similar are the findings about
Exhibit-84,
cheque for
endorsement to pay is in the handwriting of
`5,860/- on which
appellant No.1 and the specimen signature
attested is that of appellant No.2. It is not
just one such document but there are several
other documents like Exhibits-98, 100, 109,
110, 111, 112, 113, 114 and 115. Sanction
orders have handwriting of appellant No.1
(Writings marked as N/3 to N/5, N/19, N/24,
N/25, N/28, N/29, N/31, N/34, N/35, N/36, N/37,
N/38, N/39 in the expert s evidence). The
pattern that emerges is that appellant No.1
used to forge writings on orders and
endorsements on cheques and appellant No.2 used
to carry cheques for encashment.
28. Evidence about forgery and cheating in
Animal Husbandry Department, where appellant
No.4 Rajendra Wagh worked, comes from PW-1
25 APEAL-439.91
Muley, who gave report Exhibit-45, PW-2 Dhanve
who was the first to learn about bills not
officially presented being passed by Treasury,
PW-3 Kukde, Deputy Director under whom
appellant No.4 worked and who made available
writings of appellant No.4 and PW-21 Somnath,
all from the Animal Husbandry Department; PW-4
Dhanyakumar from the Treasury who states about
appellant No.4 making enquiries about cheques;
from the
PWs-14 to 16, Joshi, Meera Dongre, Suresh Shah,
State Bank who state having made
payments, but do not state having paid amounts
to appellant No.4. Witnesses from the Animal
Husbandry Department state that persons in
whose names amounts were withdrawn were not
employed in the Department. However,
significantly the evidence of handwriting
expert does not show that any of the disputed
writings are in the hand of appellant No.4.
Many of those writings were in the hand of
deceased appellant No.3. However, unlike the
pair of appellant No.1 and appellant No.2 where
appellant No.1 forged and appellant No.2
presented cheques to Bank, there is nothing
about appellant No.4 being identified as having
presented any cheque. Therefore, the learned
counsel for appellant No.4 may be right in
submitting that there is really no clinching
26 APEAL-439.91
evidence against appellant No.4.
29. The learned counsel for the appellants
submitted that the culprits may in fact be some
others since officials in the Treasury should
have known that officers who are shown to have
signed orders could not have sanctioned non-
refundable advances/withdrawals from the GPF.
They also submitted that bills were passed
without
bill/token
DDO
igCode
registers
and
were
significantly
not produced
the
at
trial. However, as rightly submitted by the
learned APP, failure to trace out others
involved does not absolve the appellants. Also
non-examination of complainant Wagle from the
Sales Tax Department or Treasury Officer Barve
is not significant, since those complaints at
Exhibits-96 and 103 only reported fraud.
30. To sum up, as far as appellant Nos.1
and 2 are concerned, the evidence discloses
that:
(a) appellant No.1 forged entries on
orders and endorsements on cheques,
(b) appellant No.2 presented the cheques
and was caught and identified while
27 APEAL-439.91
presenting one such cheque,
(c) appellant Nos.1 and 2 used to meet
each other,
(d) they used to enquire about the
cheques.
Therefore it cannot be said that the learned
trial Judge erred in concluding that appellant
Nos.1 and 2 indulged in cheating and forgery
for cheating. Since santions to prosecute
appellant No.1 for the offence punishable under
Section 5 of the PC Act is not proved, he could
not have been convicted for the said offence.
Since appellant No.2 had caused a token to be
thrown in canal after State Bank of India
officials had questioned him, his conviction
for the offence punishable under Section 201
also has to be upheld.
31. As far as appellant No.4 is concerned,
the evidence to connect him to the crime is
deficient and benefit of doubt ought to be
extended to him.
32. I have also considered the sentences
imposed upon the appellants. Sentence of RI for
28 APEAL-439.91
3 years for forgery and cheating cannot be
called excessive. Considering the fact that
appellant Nos.1 and 2 had been defrauding the
Treasury, though the incident is 30 years old
and appellant Nos.1 and 2 are living in the
shadow of conviction for the last 20 years,
exemplary sentence is called for and so there
is no case for reduction of sentence.
33.
In view of this, the appeal is partly
allowed. Conviction and sentence of appellant
No.4 Rajendra Wagh for all the offences is set
aside and he is acquitted of those offences.
Conviction of appellant No.1 Vitthal Pawar for
the offence punishable under Section 5(2) r/w
Section 5(1)(d) of the PC Act and sentence
imposed for that offence is set aside. His
conviction for the offences punishable under
Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC and
sentence imposed for those offences, as also
conviction of appellant No.2 Ramesh Kharat and
sentences imposed on him for all the offences
are maintained. The sentences shall run
concurrently.
34. Appellant Nos.1 and 2 shall surrender
to their bail in four weeks and if they do not,
the learned Special Judge shall have them
29 APEAL-439.91
arrested and sent to prison to serve their
sentences, after giving them set-off for the
period of detention, if any, as per rules.
(R.C. CHAVAN, J.)
