Bombay High Court

Kishore Kamlakar Patil vs The State Of Maharashtra on 9 November, 2011

Bench: R. C. Chavan

                                  1

          IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY




                                                                 
               CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION




                                         
                 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.9 OF 1997


     1. Kishore Kamlakar Patil,




                                        
        Age   21 Years,

     2. Abhay Parshuram Bhagat
        Age   21 Years,




                              
     Both R/o At Bhendkhal,
                  
     Post Navghar, Taluka Uran,
     District Raigad.                     ....        Appellants
                 
           - Versus -

     The State of Maharashtra             ....        Respondent
      


     Shri Niteen Pradhan with Ms S.D. Khot
   



     & Ms Ameeta Kuttikrishnan for the
     Appellants.
     Shri J.P. Kharge, Additional Public
     Prosecutor for the Respondent-State.





                      CORAM : R.C. CHAVAN, J.

                      RESERVED ON     : OCTOBER 12, 2011





                      PRONOUNCED ON: NOVEMBER 9, 2011


     JUDGMENT:

1. This is an appeal against the

conviction of the appellants for the offence

punishable under Section 307 r/w Section 34 of

the Indian Penal Code (for short, IPC ) and

sentence of RI for five years and fine of

`500/-, or in default RI for three months,

inflicted by the learned Additional Sessions

Judge, Raigad in Sessions Case No.111 of 1993.

The appeal was dismissed by Judgment

dated 15-11-2010 after perusing the record, as

the learned counsel for the appellants stated

that the appellants had taken away the brief.

One of the appellants carried the matter to

Hon ble Supreme Court. The Hon ble Supreme

Court allowed the appeal by Order dated

15-4-2011 to the following effect:

Leave granted.

We have learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant as well as standing counsel appearing for the State.

The High Court vide its impugned order dated 15.11.2010 disposed of the Criminal Appeal

preferred by the appellant herein

against his conviction for the offence punishable under Section 307

of the Indian Penal Code without hearing any counsel on behalf of the appellant. It was specifically represented by the learned counsel

for the appellant that the appellants have taken away the papers from her office long back and therefore, she was not in a position to assist the Court. In spite of

such representation, the High Court proceeded to dispose of the appeal

with the help of the Additional Public Prosecutor.

Needless to observe that the High Court, in such a situation, at least ought to have arranged the services of an Amicus Curiae on

behalf of the appellant but the High Court had chosen to dispose of the

appeal after hearing the Public Prosecutor, which, in our consideration opinion, is not the correct way of disposing of the

Criminal Appeal.

For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. Criminal Appeal

No.9 of 1997 shall stand restored to its file for its disposal on merits after hearing counsel for the appellant.

Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that the appellant will engage an advocate and proper appearance shall be filed within four

weeks from today.

The appellant is directed to

be released on bail to the satisfaction of the Trial Court.

                  The appeal                is     accordingly,




                                                
          disposed of.

This is how the appeal was heard again and is

being disposed of by this Judgment.

3. Rehearing this appeal by spending

precious judicial time on account of probably

improper understanding of legal requirements in

this behalf by me necessitates an apology and

an explanation. In the era when law makers talk

of judicial accountability and objective

evaluation of performance of Judges, where one

of the parameters suggested is number of cases

in which a Judge was reversed, reversal of a

Judgment, not because the superior Court took a

different view, but because the superior Court

found the Judge wanting in following the

procedure is, if not a stigma, at least,

disapproval of the manner in which the appeal

was dealt with. Therefore, I feel that it would

be appropriate to place on the record the

reasons which prevailed upon me to hear the

appeal in the first place without the

assistance of an Advocate and which has

resulted in loss of scarce judicial time, since

there would be no other occasion for a Judge to

speak otherwise than through a Judgment.

4. Incidentally, after the matter came

back from the Supreme Court, the very same

learned Advocate who had filed the Vakalatnama

on behalf of the appellants even in the trial

Court argued the matter extensively and the

matter is now being decided.

5. With a heavy backlog of cases it would

be the paramount duty of a Judge to dispose of

cases as fast as possible and to ensure that

there is no wastage of precious judicial time.

Yet it is possibly this very thought that has

resulted in my spending double the time for

disposal of this case. When the appeal came up

first for hearing, the counsel for the

appellant stated that the appellant had taken

back the papers. Since the appellant had not

made any arrangement for having his matter

argued, I proceeded to decide the appeal after

considering the record, as is required under

Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

corresponding to Section 423 of the old 1898

Code. Section 386 reads as under:

386. Powers of the Appellate Court.-

After perusing such record and hearing the appellant or his pleader, if he appears, and the Public Prosecutor, if he appears, and in case of an appeal under section 377

or section 378, the accused, if he appears, the Appellate Court may, if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering, dismiss the appeal, or may -

(a) in an appeal from an order of acquittal, reverse such order and direct that further inquiry be made, or that the accused be re-tried or

committed for trial, as the case may

be, or find him guilty and pass sentence on him according to law;

(b) in an appeal from a conviction -

(i) reverse the finding and

sentence and acquit or discharge the accused, or order him to be re-tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such Appellate Court or committed for trial, or

(ii) alter ig the finding, maintaining the sentence, or

(iii) with or without altering the

finding the finding, alter the nature or the extent, or the nature and extent, of the sentence, but not so as to enhance the same;

sentence-

(i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the

accused or order him to be re-tried by a Court competent to try the offence, or

(ii) alter the finding

maintaining the sentence, or

(iii) with or without altering the finding, alter the nature or the extent, or the nature and extent, of the sentence, so as to enhance or reduce the same;

(d) in an appeal from any order, alter or reverse such order;

(e) make any amendment or any consequential or incidental order

that may be just or proper:

Provided that the sentence shall not be enhanced unless the accused

has had an opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement:

Provided further that the Appellate Court shall not inflict

greater punishment for the offence which in its opinion the accused has

committed, than might have been inflicted for that offence by the Court passing the order or sentence

under appeal.

(emphasis supplied)

In view of the words and hearing the appellant

or his pleader, if he appears, in Section 386,

it was felt that if the appellant or his

pleader did not appear, it did not really

matter and the only obligation under Section

386 was to peruse the record.

6. In fact, in Shyam Deo Pandey and

others v. The State of Bihar, reported in AIR

1971 SC 1606, the Supreme Court had considered

the provisions of Section 423 of the 1898 Code.

In para 19 of the Judgment, the Court observed

as under:

19. A reading of Section 423 makes it clear that a criminal appeal cannot be dismissed for default of appearance of the

appellants or their counsel. The court has either to adjourn the

hearing of the appeal in order to enable them to appear or it should consider the appeal on merits and

pass final orders. The consideration of the appeal on merits at the stage of final hearing and to arrive at a decision on merits and to pass final

orders will not be possible unless the reasoning and findings recorded

in the judgment under appeal are tested in the light of the record of the case. After the records are before the court and the appeal is

set down for hearing, it is essential that the Appellate Court should (a) peruse such record, (b) hear the appellant or his pleader, if he appears, and (c) hear the

public prosecutor, if he appears.

After complying with these requirements, the Appellate Court has full power to pass any of the orders mentioned in the section. It is to be noted that if the appellant or his pleader is not present or if the public prosecutor is not present, it is not obligatory on the Appellate Court to postpone the

hearing of the appeal. If the

appellant or his counsel or the public prosecutor, or both, are not

present, the Appellate Court has jurisdiction to proceed with the disposal of the appeal; but that disposal must be after the Appellate

Court has considered the appeal on merits. It is clear that the appeal must be considered and disposed of on merits irrespective of the facts whether the appellant or his counsel

or the public prosecutor is present or not. Even if the appeal is

disposed of in their absence, the decision must be after consideration on merits. Under Section 421 the

Appellate Court has to decide whether the appeal is to be taken on file or dismissed summarily. The obligation of the court at that

stage is only to peruse the petition of appeal and the copy of the order

or judgment appealed against. A summary dismissal of the appeal will then be legal if the Appellate Court considers that there is no

sufficient ground for interference.

But even in such circumstances it has been held that a summary decision is a judicial decision which vitally affects the convicted

appellant and in a fit case, it is also open to be challenged on an appeal before this Court. Though a summary rejection, without giving any reasons, is not violative of any statutory provisions, such a manner of disposal removes every opportunity for detection of errors in the order. It has been further held that when an appeal in the High

Court raises a serious and

substantial point, which is prima facie arguable, it is improper for

an Appellate Court to dismiss the appeal summarily without giving some indication of its view on the point. The interest of justice and fair

play require that in such cases an indication must be given by the Appellate Court of its views on the point argued before it. The earliest decision on this aspect is the one

reported in Mushtak Hussein v. The State of Bombay, 1953 SCR 809 = (AIR

1953 SC 282). The entire case law has been referred to and reiterated in Govinda Kadtuji Kadam v. The

State of Maharashtra, AIR 1970 SC 1033. The recent decision on this aspect is of Challappa Ramaswami v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1971 SC

64. We have referred to the above decisions to show that though a

summary rejection by an Appellate Court under Section 421 may not be violative of the section, nevertheless when an arguable or

substantial question arises for consideration, the Appellate Court in its order should indicate its views on such point. If the position is as indicated above that even

under Section 421, which contemplates dismissal of an appeal summarily, under Section 423, in our opinion, a very rigorous test must be applied to find out whether the Appellate Court has complied with the provisions contained therein. There is no emphasis on the perusal of the record in Section 421, whereas under Section 423 one of the

essential requirement is that the

Appellate Court should peruse the record. There cannot be any

controversy that Section 423 applies to cases in which appeals have been presented and admitted. Though Section 423 does not provide any

limitation on the power of the Appellate Court that it is incompetent to dispose of the appeal, if the appellant or his pleader is not present, nevertheless

there is a limitation. That limitation, which is provided by the

section is that the Appellate Court, before disposing of the appeal, must peruse the record. No doubt if the

appellant or his pleader is present, he must be heard. Similarly, if the public prosecutor is present, he too must be heard. The Legislature in

Section 423 contemplates clearly that in certain cases a criminal

appeal might be disposed of without hearing the appellant or any one on his behalf or the public prosecutor. The expression "after perusing such

record" in the section is, in our opinion, a condition precedent to a proper disposal of an appeal either by dismissing the same or in any other manner contemplated in the

said section. The powers which the Appellate Court in criminal appeals possesses are depicted in Section

423. It has power not only to dismiss the appeal but also pass any one of the orders enumerated in clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) and sub-section (l-A). These provisions show the enormous powers which the Appellate Court possesses in regard

to a criminal appeal. These powers,

it cannot be gainsaid are very vast. Any one of the orders mentioned

above, could be passed by the Appellate Court whether the appeal is disposed of on hearing or without hearing the Appellant or his

pleader. These provisions, in our opinion, clearly indicate the nature of a judgment or order that is expected of the Appellate Court in its judgment. It is in this context

that the expression "after perusing such record"

ig assumes great importance. Absence of those words in Section 421, brings out in bold contrast the difference in the

nature of jurisdiction exercised under the two sections.

(emphasis supplied)

In view of this, there was no doubt in my mind

that it is not necessary to wait for the

appellant or his pleader or even the Prosecutor

for deciding the appeal on merits.

7. Incidentally, there is also a Judgment

of the Supreme Court in Ram Naresh Yadav and

others v. State of Bihar, reported in AIR 1987

SC 1500, which considers the provisions of

Section 386 of the new Code. The Judgment does

not refer to the previous decision of the

Supreme Court in Shyam Deo Pandey s case

(supra) and comes to an exactly opposite

conclusion that, where the appellant or his

Advocate does not appear, the Court could

dismiss the appeal for non-prosecution and

enforce

discipline, whereas the Judgment in

Shyam Deo Pandey s case clearly rules out such

a course of action. In Ram Naresh Yadav s case

(supra), the Supreme Court set aside the order

of conviction and sentence, since the sentence

had been confirmed without hearing the

appellant or the counsel. The Court had also

referred to the possibility of initiating

disciplinary action against the erring

Advocate.

8. Two more Judgments of the Supreme

Court may also be noticed. In Mangat Singh v.

State of Punjab, reported in (2005) 11 SCC 185,

the Supreme Court was considering non-

appearance of counsel for the accused before

the High Court in an appeal against conviction

for the offence punishable under Section 302 of

the IPC. The Court held that though the High

Court had considered the matter elaborately, it

was not a substitute for the Judgment rendered

after hearing the counsel, especially in a case

in which the appellant is convicted under

Section 302. Therefore, the Judgment of the

High Court was set aside and the matter was

remanded to the High Court for fresh disposal

expeditiously after appointing an Advocate as

amicus curiae.

9. In Bapu Limbaji Kamble v. State of

Maharashtra, reported in (2005) 11 SCC 413, the

same Bench held in respect of an appeal against

conviction for an offence punishable under

Section 302 of the IPC that the High Court may

again hear the matter after appointing an

Advocate as amicus curiae. Both the Judgments

do not refer to the Judgment in Shyam Deo

Pandey s case.

10. In Khaili and others v. State of Uttar

Pradesh, reported in 1981 (Supp) SCC 75, when

the appeal was called out before the High

Court, the Advocate appearing on behalf of the

appellants stated that he had no instructions

in the case and he would, therefore, not argue

the case. He stated that he had addressed a

communication to the appellants asking them to

reach him immediately with fees and expenses.

In this background the Hon ble Judge went

through the record of the case and decided the

appeal. The Supreme Court observed that, it

must be remembered by every Advocate that he

owes a duty to the Court, particularly in a

criminal case involving the liberty of the

citizens, and even if he has not been paid his

fees or expenses, he must argue the case and

assist the Court in reaching the correct

decision. The Court also observed that, one

thing was clear that howsoever diligent the

learned Judge might have been and however

careful and anxious to protect the interests of

the appellants, his effort could not take the

place of an argument by an Advocate appearing

on behalf

of the appellants. Therefore, the

Court felt that the Judge should have appointed

an amicus curiae and then proceed to dispose of

the appeal. Therefore, the appeal was again

remanded back to the High Court. The Judgment

in Shyam Deo Pandey s case does not appear to

have been noticed by the Supreme Court while

deciding this case. The provisions of Section

386, particularly the expression if he

appears too have not been considered while

deciding that appeal.

11. While deciding the appeal, I had

considered the question as to whether an

amicus curiae could be appointed and had ruled

out appointment of an amicus curiae because it

would have entailed adjourning the hearing.

Again if the requirement of law was that

appellant had to be heard, the question of the

appellant being represented by a lawyer of his

choice would also arise and it could always be

argued that hearing an amicus curiae was just a

farcical compliance to the requirement of

hearing the appellant.

12. In this context, the question as to

what is a binding precedent and how law evolves

by judicial precedent arises. In the absence of

statute law, common law evolved from precedent

to precedent. But when there is a statute, the

role of judicial precedent would be only to

interpret and explain the provisions of the

relevant statute, should there be any

ambiguity, or to elucidate the manner in which

the statute is to be applied to a fact

situation. In this case, Section 386 of the

Code does not present any difficulty as to

interpretation. The words used in the Section

are very clear. If the Legislature wanted that

appellant must be heard, the Legislature would

not have used the expression, if he appears .

The object was very clear that, whether the

parties or their Advocates appear or not, an

Appellate Court would be obliged to decide the

appeal after perusing the record. This had been

confirmed by the Supreme Court in its Judgment

in Shyam Deo Pandey s case. The doctrine of

precedent itself implies that Judgments given

earlier would bind successive Courts.

Therefore, ordinarily, the Judgment in Shyam

Deo Pandey s case would bind successive

Benches, unless it is expressly over-ruled. It

does not appear that at any point of time the

Judgment in Shyam Deo Pandey s case has been

considered and over-ruled. While judicial law

making is a reality, Judges make law when the

Legislature leaves a gap, when there is a

vacuum. Nullifying words in a statute can occur

only if they affect the validity of the

legislation or if the statute becomes

unworkable without deleting those words. No

such difficulty is presented by the words, if

he appears . In the light of this, the

necessity of hearing a party who had chosen to

take away the brief from the Lawyer had to be

considered.

13. I may also refer to the Bombay High

Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960. Rule 31 in

Chapter XXVI provides for appointment of

Advocate for undefended accused at Government

cost. The appellant s case does not fall under

this category. Rule 8 about engaging Advocates,

in Chapter XXXII of the Rules reads as under:

8. (1) In Civil Cases, the appointment of an Advocate, shall be deemed to be in force to the extent provided in that behalf by Rule 4 of

Order 3 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908.

(2) In Criminal Cases, the appointment of an Advocate, shall be deemed to be in force until determined with the leave of the

Court by writing signed by the client or the Advocate, as the case may be and filed in Court or until the client or the Advocate dies, or until all proceedings in the case

are ended so far as regards the client.ig (3) For the purposes of sub-rule (2), a case shall be deemed to mean

every kind of enquiry, trial or proceeding before a Criminal Court whether instituted on a police report or otherwise. The following shall be

deemed to be proceedings in the case:-

(i) an application for bail or reduction, enhancement or cancellation of bail in the case.

(ii) an application for transfer of the case from one Court to another;

(iii) an application for stay of the case pending disposal of a civil proceeding in respect of the same transaction out of which the case arises;

(iv) an application for suspension, postponement or stay of the execution of the order of sentence passed in this case;

(v) an application for the return, restoration or restitution of

the property as per the order of disposal of property passed in the case;

(vi) an application for leave to appeal against an order of acquittal passed in the case;

(vii) any appeal or application for

revision against any order or sentence passed in the case;

(viii) a reference arising out of the case;

(ix) an application for review of an order or sentence passed in the case or in an appeal, reference or

revision arising out of the case;

(x) an application for making concurrent sentences awarded in the case or in an appeal, reference, revision or review arising out of the

case;

(xi) an application relating to or incidental to or arising in or out of any appeal, reference, revision or

review arising in or out of the case (including an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court);

(xii) any application or act for obtaining copies of documents or for the return of articles or documents produced or filed in the case or in any of the proceedings mentioned herebefore;

(xiii) any application or act for obtaining the withdrawal or the

refund or payment of or out of the moneys paid or deposited in the Court in connection with the case or any of the proceedings mentioned

hereinbefore (including moneys paid or deposited for covering the costs of the preparation, printing and transmission of the transcript record of appeal to the Supreme Court);




                     
     (xiv)   any
             ig     application  for   the

refund of or out of the moneys paid or recovered as fine or for the return, restitution or restoration of

the property forfeited or confiscated in the case or in any appeal, reference, revision or review arising out of the case as per final orders

passed in that behalf;

(xv) any application for expunging remarks or observations on the record of or made in the judgment in the case or any appeal, reference,

revision or review arising out of the cases, and

(xvi) any application or proceeding for sanctioning prosecution under

Chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (now Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) or any appeal or revision arising from and out of any order passed in such an application or proceedings:

Provided that where the venue of the case or the proceedings is shifted from one Court (Subordinate

or otherwise) to another, the

Advocate filing a Vakalatnama referred to in sub-rules (1) and (2)

above shall not be bound to appear, act or plead in the latter Court unless he files a memorandum stating that he has instructions from his

client to appear, act and/or plead in that Court.

(4) When an Advocate who has filed a Vakalatnama for a party

wishes to withdraw his appearance he shall serve a written notice of his

intention to do so on his client at least seven days in advance of the case coming up for hearing before the

Court. Leave of the Court to withdraw appearance may also be applied for if the client has instructed the Advocate to that effect.

The Advocate shall file a

note in writing requesting the Court for permission to withdraw appearance and shall also file along with the note the letter of the client

instructing him to withdraw his appearance or a copy of the intimation given to the client as above together with its written acknowledgement by the client. The

Court if it is satisfied that no inconvenience is likely to be caused to the Court or the client may permit the Advocate to withdraw his appearance and while permitting the Advocate to do so may also impose such terms and conditions as it may deem proper either in public interest or in the interest of the parties.

(5) A party who wishes to

discharge the Advocate engaged by him may apply to the Court for an order

of discharge by following a similar procedure and the Court if it is satisfied may pass order discharging the Advocate and while doing so

impose such terms and conditions as it may deem proper.

It is thus clear that an Advocate who has filed

appearance in the Court cannot be discharged

and his appearance is in force until determined

with the leave of the Court. Thus, a client and

his Advocate cannot themselves decide to stop

the Advocate from appearing. Therefore I had

proceeded to hear the appeal. With this

explanatory prologue I now proceed to deal with

the arguments advanced when the appeal was re-

heard.

14. The facts which are material for

deciding this appeal are as under:

One Rajesh Baburao Thakur was a worker

of Center for Indian Trade Union and was a

member of Communist Party of India (Marxist).

In April, 1992, he had taken up cause of one

Pushpalata Pandharinath Thakur, allegedly

kidnapped by the present appellants. He had

caused a Morcha to be taken out, which led to

arrest of the appellants. The appellants were

prosecuted but had been eventually acquitted in

that case; possibly because of some compromise

worked out between the victim, her family and

the appellants.

15. On 23-5-l993 one Pandurang got married

at Multi Purpose Hall of Jawaharlal Nehru Port

Trust. Rajesh Thakur attended the said

marriage. The marriage and reception ceremonies

were over at about 5:00 p.m.. Rajesh Thakur was

chit-chatting with his friend Ramesh Patil. Two

appellants along with the third accused

Kamlakar Bhoir charged at Rajesh and inflicted

blows on his shoulder, chest and side of

abdomen. The third accused Kamlakar had already

left the place. The accused persons ran away in

a rickshaw. The victim Rajesh was taken to

hospital where he was given necessary

treatment. On the report made by the victim, an

offence was registered and investigation

commenced.

16.

In course of the investigation, police

performed panchnama of the spot and seized some

incriminating articles from the spot. The

accused persons were arrested and at the

instance of the appellants the weapons used in

the commission of the offence were seized.

Incriminating articles were sent to the

Forensic Science Laboratory, which reported

that the blood stains on the weapons as well as

the blood stains on the spot and those on the

victim s clothes were of the blood group of

victim. On completion of the investigation, the

appellants, along with Kamlakar Bhoir, were

charge-sheeted. Upon commitment of the case by

the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class,

Uran, the case came up before the learned

Additional Sessions Judge, Raigad at Alibag.

17. Since the appellants and the third

accused Kamlakar pleaded not guilty to the

charges of the offences punishable under

Sections 307 and 392 r/w Section 34 of the IPC,

they were put on trial, at which the

prosecution examined as many as nine witnesses

in order to prove the guilt of the appellants.

After considering the prosecution evidence in

the light of defence of false implication on

account of previous enmity, the learned

Additional Sessions Judge acquitted the

appellants and the third accused for the

offence under Section 392 r/w Section 34 of the

IPC and also acquitted the third accused

Kamlakar for the offence punishable under

section 307 r/w 34 of the IPC. He convicted and

sentenced the appellants for the offence

punishable under Section 307 r/w Section 34 of

the IPC as mentioned earlier. Aggrieved thereby

the appellants have preferred this appeal.

15. Before the appeal could be re-heard,

it was reported that appellant No.1 Kishor

Kamlakar Patil has expired on 28-2-2000. The

proceedings in so far as they relate to said

Kishor Kamlakar Patil therefore abate.

16. I have heard the learned counsel for

the appellant, the learned APP for the State

and have again perused the entire record with

the help of both the learned counsel.

17. PW-1 was a Revenue Inspector who had

been examined to prove the sketch of the spot

drawn by him at the instance of the police.

This sketch is at Exhibit-15. PW-2 Rajesh

Thakur is the victim himself, who was injured

in the assault by the two appellants. PW-3

Ramesh Patil was with the victim at the time of

the incident and had witnessed the entire

incident. PW-6 Mahadeo was present at the spot

and had seen the appellants leaving the spot

after incident. PW-4 Ramesh Thakur was a panch

at the panchnama of spot. PW-5 Vijay Gajanan

Patil, who was a panch at the panchnama of

seizure of articles recovered at the instance

of the appellants, refused to support the

prosecution, and he turned hostile. PW-7 is the

Investigating Officer, Police Inspector Patil.

PW-8 Hanumant is the driver of the rickshaw

which was allegedly forcibly taken away by the

appellants after incident. He too turned

hostile. PW-9 is Dr. Sunita Arole who had

treated the victim after his admission at Sion

Hospital.

18. PW-9 Dr. Sunita had stated that she

treated the victim and found that the victim

had suffered the following injuries:

(i) incise would over epigastrium 2cm x 1

cm subcutaneous deep.

(ii) incise wound over right hypochondrium 2cm x 1 cm (depth not probed)

(iii) incise wound over right 7th rib 2 cm x 1 cm subcutaneous deep.

(iv) incise wound over right shoulder 2cm

x 1 cm subcutaneous deep.

(v)

incise wound over arm, middle 1/3 exterior aspect 2cm x 1 cm.

(vi) incise wound over left anterior axillary fold 2 cm x 1 cm subcutaneous deep.

She found that entry of air was decreased on

account of his injuries. There was about 300 CC

of blood in the chest cavity. The witness

stated that the injuries were grievous and

could have led to death of the victim. Cross-

examination of this witness shows that the

witness had failed to mention the measure of

dimensions of the injuries, which she clarified

to be centimeters. This is not a very serious

lacuna, though ideally Medical Officer should

have mentioned that the dimensions were in

centimeters. There is nothing else in the

cross-examination which could reduce the

veracity of the evidence tendered by the

witness. It is also worth mentioning that it

was suggested to the victim himself who was

examined as P.W.2 that he had been assaulted by

someone else and because of disputes in the

union, he named the appellants as the

assailants. Thus that suggestion shows that it

has not been disputed at the trial or even at

the hearing of the appeal that the victim had

been seriously injured.

19. Both PW-2 Rajesh and PW-3 Ramesh, the

victim and eye witness, categorically named the

two appellants as the authors of the injuries

inflicted on Rajesh. They state that appellants

Kishor and Abhay inflicted blows by means of

Gupti and knife respectively on the shoulder,

chest and side of abdomen. The only material

discrepancy in the evidence of these two

witnesses pointed out by the learned counsel

for the appellants is as regards the clothes

which the appellants were wearing. PW-2, the

victim Rajesh stated that the appellants were

wearing shirts. PW-3 Ramesh stated that they

were wearing banians. As rightly submitted by

the learned ig APP, this is not a serious

discrepancy warranting disbelief in the victim

and his friend. He submitted that the victim

was unlikely to name a wrong person as

perpetrator of assault on him letting off the

real culprit.

20. The learned counsel for the appellants

submitted that there was no reason for the

appellants to attack the victim. It was

deceased Kishor who was (wrongly) alleged to

have kidnapped a girl. Therefore, appellant

Abhay could not be said to have any grudge. In

the backdrop of the fact that appellant Abhay

had stated in his statement under Section 313

of Code of Criminal Procedure that there was

political rivalry between the victim and the

appellants, as also the fact that it was

suggested to the victim that the appellants

were involved in the case of kidnapping one

Pushpalata because of the victim s speech, it

would be difficult to infer that the appellants

had really no grievance about the victim and,

therefore, no motive to launch such assault. In

view of this, the evidence of PW-2 Rajesh, duly

corroborated by PW-3 Ramesh, would have to be

accepted, as has been rightly done by the

learned Additional Sessions Judge.

21. As rightly submitted by the learned

counsel for the appellants, the evidence about

the discovery of weapons at the instance of the

appellants is deficient. PW-5 Vijay, who was

panch at seizure, has turned hostile. The

Investigating Officer PW-7, Police Inspector

Patil has stated about the seizure in an

extremely casual manner. In his examination-in-

chief he stated that on 27-5-1993 he attached a

Gupti at the instance of accused Kishor Patil

under memorandum of discovery panchnama at

Exhibits-25 and 25-A and he also attached a

knife at the instance of accused Abhay under

memorandum ig of discovery panchnama vide

Exhibits-24 and 24-A. Though the learned trial

Judge in para 22 of the judgment has observed

that the memoranda of discovery have been

proved by the prosecution through the

Investigating Officer, and that solitary

statement of the Investigating Officer, a

retired Police Inspector, can be taken as

sufficient for proving the alleged recovery of

weapons under section 27 of the Evidence Act,

this conclusion has to be disapproved. The

learned Judge should have seen that it was

necessary for the Investigating Officer to

depose as to how the accused came to disclose

about concealment of weapon used in the

commission of crime and how weapons came to be

discovered at the instance of the appellants.

Summary statement of the witness in para 2 of

his deposition hardly satisfies the requirement

of a discovery under section 27 of the Evidence

Act and the learned Judge should have,

therefore, discarded this part of the evidence.

22. The learned APP submits that the

exclusion of discovery of the weapons from

consideration would not affect the merits,

since in this case there is an eye witness

account of the incident given by two witnesses

who would have no reason to name wrong persons

as the perpetrators of the crime. Therefore,

in the face of the evidence of PW-2 Rajesh and

PW-3 Ramesh, which has not been impeached in

spite of vigorous cross-examination, it cannot

be said that the learned Judge erred in

concluding that the appellants were the authors

of the injuries inflicted on the victim.

23. The learned counsel for the appellants

first submitted that considering the nature of

the injuries inflicted, the offence could not

at all be one punishable under Section 307 of

the IPC. He submitted that if at all appellant

Abhay was

to be held as the author of any

injuries on the victim, the offence could be

one punishable under Section 324 of the IPC or

at worst one under Section 308 of the IPC. He

further submitted that deceased appellant

Kishor is alleged to have used a sword stick

and appellant Abhay is alleged to have used a

knife. PW-2 Rajesh had stated in his cross that

he received two blows of sword stick one by

the side of the abdomen and other on the left

shoulder. He received three blows by knife

one on the abdomen, second on the right side of

the abdomen and the third on the right arm. He

submitted that there is nothing to show that

the injuries were caused by knife. He submitted

that appellant Abhay could not therefore be

attributed requisite intention or knowledge for

attracting the charge of attempting to commit

murder.

24. The learned APP submitted, first, that

in an

offence committed in furtherance of

common intention, it would be impermissible to

find out as to who was the author of which blow

or to attribute lethal blows to the appellant

who is no more. Secondly, though PW-9 Dr. Arole

had stated in her cross-examination that she

could not state as to which injury was caused

by which weapon, since both the weapons were

sharp-edged weapons, it could not be said that

the injuries attributed to the appellant could

not have been caused by a knife. Thirdly, he

submitted that more serious injuries were

inflicted by the appellant. He pointed out that

two injuries on the abdomen over the

epigastrium and right hypochondrium could be

those caused by appellant Abhay. I have

examined these contentions. The injury on

abdomen attributed to Kishor could be one

caused over the right 7th rib. Even if

authorship of one injury is exchanged for the

other, the gravity could be gauged by the fact

that there was linear tear on right lower pole

in the area where peritoneal haematoma was

noticed which indicates injury to lung. There

was jejunal perforation and tear of right lobe

of liver. PW-9 Dr. Arole categorically stated

that the injury was such that death could have

resulted. In view of this, it cannot be said

that appellant Abhay was not the author of any

life threatening injury.

25. The learned APP also rightly submitted

that there was no question of offence

punishable under only Section 324 of the IPC

being made out since the victim was in hospital

for upwards of 20 days. In any case,

considering the nature of the injury inflicted,

it cannot be said that the intention

attributable to the appellant was only to cause

a simple or grievous hurt.

26. The learned counsel for the appellants

next submitted ig that even so, intention or

knowledge attributable could not be that of

causing death and therefore offence could at

worst be one punishable under Section 308 of

the IPC and not under Section 307 of the IPC.

This is indeed an ingenuous argument and as

observed by the Hon ble Supreme Court in Khaili

and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh (supra),

illustrative of the fact that however diligent

a Judge might be, or however careful and

anxious to protect the interest of appellant,

his effort cannot take the place of argument by

an Advocate.

27. Section 308 of the IPC corresponds in

cases where victim survives to Section 304 of

the IPC which punishes homicide. In order to

comprehend the arguments advanced by the

learned counsel, it may be useful to reproduce

here Sections 299, 300, 307 and 308 of the IPC

as under:

299. Culpable homicide.- Whoever

causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death,

or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death,

commits the offence of culpable homicide.

300. Murder.- Except in the cases

hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or-

Secondly.- If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or-

Thirdly.- If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to

any person and the bodily injury

intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of

nature to cause death, or-

Fourthly.- If the person committing the act knows that it is

so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the

risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.

307. Attempt to murder.- Whoever does any act with such intention or

knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with

imprisonment of either description for a term which may extent to ten

years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to

[imprisonment for life], or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.

Attempts by life convicts.-

[When any person offending under this section is under sentence of [imprisonment for life], he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.]

308. Attempt to commit culpable homicide.- Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances that, if he by

that act caused death, he would be

guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, shall be

punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both; and, if hurt is caused

to any person by such act, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.

28.

Culpable homicide is murder if the act

is done with the intention of causing death or

intention or knowledge of causing such bodily

injury which is sufficient in ordinary course

of nature to cause death. Clauses Secondly and

Fourthly in Section 300 may not be relevant for

the present case. Thus culpable homicide is not

murder if the requisite intention to cause

death or knowledge that injury intended would

in ordinary course of nature cause death is

missing. It then amounts to culpable homicide.

Additionally, culpable homicide is not murder

if the case falls under one of the exceptions

under Section 300 and it is not the appellant s

case that his case falls under any exception.

29. Considering the area of the body over

which the injuries were inflicted and the

weapon which was used, as also the result

produced as noticed by PW-9 Dr. Arole, it would

not be possible to attribute to the appellant

any intention other than that of causing death.

Therefore, the learned trial Judge must be held

to have rightly convicted the appellant of the

offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC

which attracts punishment of imprisonment for

life. Therefore, benefit of provisions of the

Probation of Offenders Act cannot at all be

extended to the appellant, though the Probation

Officer has so recommended.

30. The learned counsel for the appellants

next submitted that the appellant was just a

22-year boy without any previous criminal

history and therefore benefit of the provision

of Section 360 of Code of Criminal Procedure be

extended to the appellant. As rightly pointed

out since the Probation of Offenders Act

applies to the State of Maharashtra, there is

no question of invoking the provision of

Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

in view of Section 19 of the Probation of

Offenders Act. In any case, if the offence is

one punishable with imprisonment for life,

there could be no question of invoking

provision of Section 360 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure. In none of the cases, on

which the learned counsel for the appellants

relied, has benefit of probation been given to

a person convicted for offence punishable with

imprisonment for life.

31. The learned counsel for the appellants

next submitted that considering the fact that

the appellant was just 22 years and had no

previous criminal history when the offence was

committed in May, 1993, that is 18 years ago,

and has been living in the shadow of conviction

for the last 14 years and has been in jail for

about three months in all, he may not be sent

back to the jail now and the substantive

sentence could be reduced by increasing the

fine. The learned APP relied on a Judgment of a

Division Bench of this Court in Arun Balkrishna

Nirmal & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, reported

in 2006 All MR (Cri.) 516, coincidentally

authored by me, where for a similar offence

sentence of RI for five years was held proper

when the offenders were 22 and 24 years old.

The observations in paras 11 and 12 of the

Judgment may be usefully reproduced as under:

11. This takes us to the question of sentence, which has been agitated by all the parties in the three proceedings. True it is, that the victim had suffered a brutal attack with as many as 34 injuries being inflicted upon him from which only providence seems to have saved him. It does not, however, follow that the accused must be sentenced to

suffer the maximum sentence

prescribed under Section 307 of the Penal Code, as urged by Shri Mohta,

the learned counsel for the revision- petitioner, and supported by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State. The learned Additional

Sessions Judge had observed at page 231 of his judgment that at the relevant time the convicts were just 18 to 20 years in age, when the record shows that they were 22, 23

and 24 years old respectively at the relevant time. Though the learned

Additional Sessions Judge may thus be seen to have erred on the side of leniency, because of incorrect

comprehension of age of the convicts at the time of commission of offence, it does not follow that the learned Trial Judge was too far off the mark.

     If not 18 to 20 years       old, the
     accused were 22 to 24 years       old
   



     youngsters    without   any  criminal
     antecedents.

     12.     The     contention     of    the

learned counsel for the convicts that the victim himself was a convict in a murder case is irrelevant and cannot be a mitigating circumstance. Considering the principle of

proportionality, we find that the learned Trial Judge had rightly exercised his discretion in the matter of sentence by inflicting sentence of rigorous imprisonment for five years on each of the convicts after considering the magnitude of attack, antecedents of the accused, etc. We are also conscious of the fact that the convicts have been

living under the shadow of

imprisonment, since the incident took place 19 years ago. In view of this

we do not see any reason to interfere in the discretion properly exercised by the learned Trial Judge.

32. I had carefully considered the

possibility of a reduced sentence even while

dismissing the appeal on 15-11-2010. Since a

reduced sentence would not obviate the need for

the appellant to revisit the jail and since

short term sentences, in such serious crime,

are unlikely to have appropriate correctional

effect on the criminal and would send wrong

signals to the society at large, it would be