Ambika Shikshan Sanstha vs Hon'Ble Presiding Officer
2009 Latest Caselaw 158 Bom

                                                           1


                 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY :
                            NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.




                                                                                                      
                               WRIT PETITION NO.2682 OF 2005.




                                                                            
    Ambika Shikshan Sanstha, Bhandara,
    through its Secretary, S.M. Mankar, 
    Plot No.64, Shastri Nagar, Bhandara, 




                                                                           
    Tahsil & District : Bhandara. 
                                                                                     ....      PETITIONER
                                                                                                          . 

                                                 // VERSUS //




                                                           
    1.   Hon'ble Presiding Officer,   
         College and University Tribunal, 
         Nagpur. 
                                     
    2.   Devidas Gulabrao Harde,
         Aged 34 years, R/o. Sant Tukadoji Ward, 
         Behind LIC Office, Bhandara, 
         Tahsil & District : Bhandara. 
           

    3.   The Nagpur University, Nagpur,
         through its Registrar, Civil Lines, 
        



         Nagpur. 


    4.   The Regional Director, Rashtriya
         Adhyapak Shikshan Parishad, 





         the National Council of Teacher Education,
         Shamla Hills, 'Manas Bhavan", 
         BHOPAL (Madhya Pradesh).
                                                                                       .... RESPONDENTS.
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------





    Shri K.H. Deshpande, Senior Advocate with Adv. Lakhe for Petitioner.
    Shri N.R.Saboo, Advocate for Respondents No.2.
    Ms. Tajwar Khan, Advocate for Respondent No.3.  
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                    CORAM:  B.P.DHARMADHIKARI, J.

DATED : DECEMBER 19, 2009.

ORAL JUDGMENT :

1. Challenge in this writ petition filed under Articles 226 and 227

of the Constitution of India is to the judgment of the College Tribunal

dated 02.11.2004 in Appeal No.N-18/2003, whereby the College Tribunal

has allowed appeal filed by respondent No.2 employee and directed the

petitioner/ management to reinstate him with continuity and full back

wages. This Court has issued Rule in the matter on 07.12.2005 but

granted stay of payment of back wages only.

2. The facts show that present respondent No.2 approached

College Tribunal with grievance that his services were orally terminated

on 14th August, 2003. He pointed out that the petitioner college started in

1992 and it is affiliated to respondent No.3 Nagpur University. In

response to the advertisement he applied and was interviewed by

competent Selection Committee and joined on 16.01.1996. His

appointment was also approved on 18.02.1996. He pointed out that for

some time he was shown as in-charge Principal also after Shri H.R.

Chauhan, earlier Principal expired in November, 2002. He contended

that examination forms were again forwarded in December, 2002 but the

same were signed by son of Secretary of the Institution, who did not

possess requisite qualification of physical education. He also pointed out

that payment of salary to him was discontinued in April, 2003. On 16th

June, 2003, when he went to attend college, the attendance register was

not given to him for putting signature and after declaration of result of

B.P. Ed. he was not permitted to take part in the process of admission of

the students. He complained to Nagpur University on 11.08.2003 and its

copy was received by the petitioner on 13.08.2003. On 14.08.2003 son of

Secretary of the petitioner prevented him from coming into college

premises. Then he has pointed out some subsequent events. He then

filed an appeal, as mentioned above, under Section 59 of the Maharashtra

Universities Act, 1994. The said appeal was opposed by the management

on various grounds and they also contended that the appeal as filed was

time barred. The College Tribunal has thereafter granted relief to

respondent No.2 as mentioned above.

3. I have heard learned Senior Advocate Shri K.H. Deshpande

with Advocate Shri Lakhe for the petitioner management, learned

Advocate Shri N.R. Saboo for respondent No.2-employee and learned

Advocate Ms. Tajwar Khan for respondent No.3 University.

4. Advocate Shri Deshpande has contended that the College

Tribunal failed to note that there was delay in filing the appeal which was

not explained. He has invited attention to the facts stated in appeal

memo to show that there was otherwise termination and hence, the

appeal ought to have been filed within 30 days therefrom. He has further

stated that, actually, there was no termination at all and it was the case of

petitioners that respondent No.2 was himself keeping away from duties

and was absconding. According to him, no finding has been recorded in

this respect. He further pointed out that as per roster the post was

reserved and the petitioner did not belong to any reserved category and

hence, his appointment was purely temporary. He also pointed out that

the petitioner did not possess requisite NET/SET qualification and hence,

there could not have been permanent appointment. He invites attention

to approval given by Nagpur University in this respect to urge that the

said approval is on ad-hoc basis. Without prejudice to all these

contentions, he has invited attention to provisions of Statute 53,

particularly clause 4, to urge that a clear vacancy against which

permanent appointment can be made legally becomes available only after

four years and hence, at the time of initial recruitment of respondent No.2

as there was no such clear vacancy, his employment was purely

temporary and on adhoc basis. To substantiate his contention he has

invited attention to provisions of Section 82 to Section 88 of the

Maharashtra Universities Act to show that permanent affiliation to college

is contemplated only after six years standing as affiliated or recognized

institution. He states that the scheme of Statute 53 is consistent with the

requirements of these sections regulating affiliation to the college. He has

also invited attention to provisions of Section 5 of the Maharashtra

Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act in

this respect to draw parallel and has stated that the College Tribunal has

erred in granting reinstatement with back wages to the employee. He has

further pointed out that as respondent No.2 does not possess NET/ SET

qualification even today, he was not qualified at the time of his initial

recruitment and he has relied upon various judgments to show that such

qualification is essential at the time of recruitment. He has further

pointed out that relaxation of such qualification is not possible.

5. Mere continuation of respondent No.2 for number of years on

adhoc basis does not clothe him with any right of regularization and he

states that after permanent or clear vacancy became available, there has

to be fresh process of recruitment. As no such process is undertaken in

the present matter, respondent No.2 does not get any right to the post.

6. On interpretation of Statute 53 he has invited attention to a

Division Bench judgment of this Court in 2008 (2) Mh.L.J. 565 (D.S.P.S.,

Manora Vs. Rekha). He has also pointed out that the said judgment is

against the judgment delivered by me as single Judge. By referring to

various parts of said Division Bench judgment and also to rulings cited by

him he has attempted to show that distinction between a new institution

and established institution is real distinction and the Universities Act does

not prohibit treating a recruit for first four years as temporary and person

recruited after four years as on probation. He contends that Division

Bench has erred in observing that annual appointment during this period

is only a ritual and appointment cannot be presumed to be probation

reversible i.e. after four years. He pointed out that attention of Division

Bench was not invited to scheme for affiliation as contained in provisions

of Sections 82 to 88 of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994. He

further states that when college is not permanently affiliated, better

candidates are not available for recruitment and after four years when the

post is available as clear vacancy, better candidates willfully apply and

hence, institution gets best possible recruits. According to him, this being

the reality and as attention of Division Bench was not invited to all these

factors its interpretation of Statute 53 is misconceived. He fairly pointed

out that Special Leave Petition preferred against this Division Bench

judgment was dismissed in motion but then that does not mean that the

Hon'ble Apex Court has affirmed the view or interpretation by this Court.

7. Lastly, he states that as respondent No.2 was ad-hoc employee

in the above circumstances, there was no question of obtaining previous

approval of University as contemplated by Statute 53(5). He pointed out

that respondent No.2 had thereafter secured alternate employment and

though he filed contempt, did not choose to join duties and hence, he is

not entitled to relief of back wages in any case.

8. Advocate Shri Saboo for respondent No.2 states that, for the

first time before this Court, the issue of reservation has been raised. He

relies upon documents to show that there was no roster, no reserved post

and approval given to respondent No.2 was as probationer. He further

states that even his appointment was against the clear vacancy after

fulfilling necessary formalities. He pointed out that college started in

1992 and the services of respondent No.2 have been terminated on

14.08.2003 i.e. seven years after his recruitment. He contends that

period of four years from starting of college was over in 1996 and hence,

the contention that the period of four years needs to be counted from

1996 is incorrect. He has further stated that the approval order mentions

the appointment on adhoc basis because of Government Resolution dated

22.12.1995 then holding field. He says that in view of subsequent

resolutions, as respondent No.2 has entered service before 1999 he

cannot be terminated even if he is not having NET/SET qualification. He

states that respondent No.2 is placed at disadvantageous position because

of lack of that qualification and as per Government policy he draws his

salary in lower pay scale. He contends that after NET/SET qualification is

procured, fitment into appropriate pay scale is contemplated. He further

states that the Tribunal has correctly considered the entire story and has

found that the management has terminated services of respondent No.2

and there was no abandonment. He invites attention to proviso as

contained in clause (1) of Statute 53 to show that it contemplates deemed

confirmation and also deemed satisfactory completion of probation. He

invites attention to certificate given by Principal of petitioner's institution

to show that his service record was satisfactory. In support of his

contention he has invited attention to a judgment of the Apex Court

reported in (1987)4 SCC 482 (State of Gujrat V Akhilesh C. Bhargav).

9. He further points out that while filing reply to Civil Application

No.7103 of 2005 this respondent has pointed out that he was not allowed

to join duties and by affidavit placed on record on 14.12.2009 he has

pointed out to this Court that he has no source of income. In this

situation, according to him, by raising various roving pleas an effort is

being made to anyhow keep him away from employment and writ

petition needs to be dismissed.

10. Advocate Ms. Khan appearing for respondent No.3 University

has pointed out that the services of respondent No.2 were against clear

vacancy and accordingly approval was given by Nagpur University on

probation. She further states that as he joined services in January, 1996

itself i.e. prior to 1999, as per Government Resolution dated 18.10.2001,

his services could not have been terminated and had the management

forwarded proper proposal to Nagpur University, that proposal could have

been sent by Nagpur University to University Grants Commission. She

further states, upon instructions, that in various similar cases University

Grants Commission has granted exemption. She also wanted to produce

on record some such exemptions but then Advocate Shri Lakhe has

pointed that such documents cannot be accepted for the first time at the

time of hearing.

11. Document dated 20.06.1995, relied upon by the petitioner,

shows that Deputy Secretary of respondent No.3 University granted

approval to various posts like Principal, Lecturer, Librarian, Clerk, Peon

etc. by it. Letter also mentions whether post is in open category or then

in reserved category. It also specifies the category for which it is reserved.

In so far as lecturers are concerned, ten posts have been sanctioned. Out

of them, five are for different reserved categories (one each) while five

are in open category. The advertisement published by petitioners on

01.07.1995 mentions ten posts of lecturers in physical education and five

were advertised in open category. Resolution shows that the petitioner

has been selected as lecturer for 1995-96 session. This resolution is

undated but it refers to proceedings dated 14th January, 1996. Next

document relied upon by the petitioners is a communication sent by it to

respondent No.3 seeking approval to the appointment of three lecturers.

It mentions that competent selection committee has on 10th January, 1996

selected three candidates who appeared for interview before it. Letter

seeks approval for academic year 1995-96. The communication from

Assistant Registrar (College) of Nagpur University to petitioners is dated

16.01.1996 and it mentions that it has given approval to appointment of

the petitioner for session 1995-96 onwards. It is to be noted that name of

the petitioner is at Sr.No. 2 in the list. In the list person at Sr.No.1 Shri

H.R. Chauhan has been shown to have been appointed against Other

Backward Classes category while person at Sr.No.3 Shri Bopche is shown

to have been appointed in Open Category. In the last column, meant for

remarks, the University has stated that approval of all three is on adhoc

basis as per Government Resolution dated 22.12.1995. From Note (a)

below it, it is clear that the approval given is against clear vacancy and

the clear vacancy has been clarified to me, vacancy other than 'leave' or

'lien vacancy' and it has been further stated that the incumbent can be

directly appointed on probation. Perusal of appointment order dated

15.01.1996, issued to the petitioner, shows that as per recommendation

of duly constituted selection Committee he has been appointed as lecturer

on probation period of two years. It is, therefore, apparent that the stand

that the petitioner was appointed against reserved category post being

raised, for the first time, before this Hon'ble Court, is misconceived and

unsustainable.

12. The communication from University and appointment on

probation clearly show that the petitioner appointed respondent No.2

against clear vacancy on probation. The College Tribunal has in

paragraph 5 of its judgment found that earlier Principal of the College

had issued certificate about satisfactory work of respondent No.2. In this

situation the College Tribunal has found that having completed two years'

probation, respondent No.2 is deemed to be confirmed lecturer as per

Statute 53 and his services could not have been terminated without

seeking permission of Nagpur University.

13. Statute 53 Rule 4 states that subject to procedure of selection

and appointment a teacher shall be appointed in a clear vacancy in first

instance on probation for two years from the date of his appointment. It

further states that at the end of said period of two years (24 months) he is

to be confirmed by giving him notice thereof or then his services can be

dispensed with by giving him one month's notice. It further states that in

absence of such notice of confirmation or notice of termination

satisfactory completion of probation is presumed and such teacher is

deemed to be confirmed in service. Proviso thereto stipulates that if any

teacher already in service has completed two years service as temporary

or probation in clear vacancy, he is also deemed to be confirmed teacher.

Explanation to this Rule 4 states that 'clear vacancy' means a vacancy

which is not 'lien vacancy' or 'leave vacancy' and that vacancy / post is

vogue in the institution for not less than four years.

14. Emphasis of petitioner is on absence of clear vacancy, as

according to them the vacancy against which the petitioner came to be

appointed was not in vogue for four years. Controversy is already

considered by me and answered against the petitioners. Letters Patent

Appeal against the said judgment is dismissed by Division Bench vide

judgment reported in 2008(2) Mh.L.J. 565 (supra). It is, therefore, not

necessary to comment upon the scheme of Statute 53 Rule 4 again at

length in this matter.

15. The learned Senior Advocate has, however, tried to show that

the provisions relating to affiliation as contained in Sections 83 and 88

were not brought to notice of this Court. According to him, permanent

affiliation as contemplated in Section 88 only after college completes six

years of its standing. According to him, the initial period of four years for

which vacancy has to be in vogue to qualify to be a clear vacancy and the

subsequent period of probation of two years i.e. total period of six years

as contemplated in Statute 53(4) coincides with this period of six years

mentioned in Section 88. Therefore, the scheme of Section 88 of the

Maharashtra Universities Act and said Statute 53 are consistent with each

other. Because of this scheme, there is real distinction between nascent

post/ institution, new and established institution or vacancy. It is to be

noted that clear vacancy becomes available only after four years and

hence, as per law it can be available in a college which has only four years

standing i.e. which does not have permanent affiliation. Thus, Statute 53

and Section 88 cannot be read to mean that clear vacancy has got any

bearing with nature of affiliation contemplated in Scheme of Section 82

to Section 88 of the Universities Act. In any case, it is to be noted here

that college was in existence since 1992 and in 1996 it had already

completed four years. The sanction letter of the University shows that the

posts are sanctioned on 20.06.1995 and advertisement was then issued on

01.07.1995. The appointment order has been given on 15.01.1996. It is

thus, clear that the workload and students were, therefore, already

available in 1995-96 session itself in the college. In this situation, the

arguments of learned Senior Advocate in attempt to distinguish the

Division Bench judgment or his hard efforts to show that the Division

Bench has taken incorrect view on interpretation are not very relevant in

present facts.

16. Respondent No.2 was appointed on 15.01.1996 and his

termination is not within four years. Four years from his appointment

expired on 15.01.2000. Next period of two years expired on 15.01.2002.

His termination is on 14.08.2003 i.e. much more after expiry of six years.

This is also the reason why the arguments of learned Senior Advocate

need not be considered in more detail in this matter.

17. The stand of University before the College Tribunal and before

this Court is in favour of respondent No.2. It has mentioned that his

appointment was not against reserved vacancy, was on probation and

against the a clear vacancy. It has also been pointed out that as per

Government Resolution dated 18.10.2001, similarly situated persons who

joined service before 1999 have been extended protection. In fact,

Advocate Ms. Khan has placed before this Court some documents to show

that in similar circumstances, when other employers/ managements

forwarded proposals of teachers for exemption as contemplated by

Government Resolution dated 18.10.2001, those exemptions have been

granted by University Grants Commission. However, because of objection

raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, I have not looked into the

said proposals. The Government Resolution dated 18.10.2001 of State

Government contains policy decision about non NET/SET lecturers who

have joined services between 19.09.1991 to 11.12.1999. The said

Government Resolution contemplated securing NET/SET qualification by

such candidates by December, 2003. It also stated that if said qualification

was not secured, the concerned lecturer would not be eligible to benefits

like promotion, senior scale, selection grade scale etc. and till their

retirement they would continue in pay scale of 8000-13500 other

conditions therein are not relevant in present matter. In pursuance of this

decision, respondent No.3 University has sent a communication on 6th

November, 2004 which mentions interim orders of the High Court. The

decision taken by University Grants Commission on 16th July, 2004 is also

incorporated in that communication and University Grants Commission

decided that its office may consider granting exemption from NET/SET

after examining each case individually and the said procedure would be

observed while giving exemption to teachers appointed by various other

Universities. The University, therefore, had directed managements to

submit individual proposal for exemption to it by 25th November, 2004.

These communications, therefore, clearly show that not passing NET/SET

qualification is not a bar for present respondent No.2.

18. The College Tribunal has found that respondent No.2 was

initially not permitted to sign on attendance register from February, 2003

and thereafter on 14.08.2003 he was not permitted to enter the premises.

Respondent No.2 in his appeal memo has given various dates but has not

stated that his services were terminated on the said date. It is also not the

case of the petitioner that it had terminated respondent No.2 in February,

2003 when he was prohibited from signing the attendance register or

then in April, 2003 when his salary was stopped. Petitioner's case, even

before this Court is of no termination i.e. of abandonment. The

contention that there is delay in approaching the College Tribunal is on

account of the theory of "otherwise termination" which petitioner is

forcing upon respondent No.2. If that story is ignored his appeal is within

limitation and there is no delay in the matter.

19. Shri Saboo has relied upon an unreported judgment of this

Court, dated 13th February, 2006 in Writ Petition No.173 of 1998. There

provisions of Section 43 of the Nagpur University Act and Clause 38 of

Ordinance No.34 (College Code) are looked into and the learned single

Judge of this Court found that letter of appointment of temporary teacher

has to specify the period of notice of termination and that period of notice

cannot be less than one month. However, in view of the consideration

above, I do not find it necessary to consider the said judgment in present

facts.

20. The judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2006) 2 SCC

31 (Mohd. Sartaj Vs. State of U.P.), relied upon by the petitioner, shows

that, there, candidate was found not possessing requisite training

qualification on the date of appointment. Requirement of possessing said

qualification on the date of appointment cannot be in dispute. Here, it

has been already found that in view of policy decision taken on

18.10.2001 not possessing NET/SET qualification is not a bar to continue

in employment. (2008) 7 SCC 153 (Pramod Kumar Vs. U.P. Secondary

Education Services Commission) is a judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

which again takes similar view. It shows that training qualification

obtained by employee there, was not from a recognized university. 1998

(3) SCC 146 (Union of India Vs. Ravi Shankar) is the judgment of the

Hon'ble Apex Court where again same aspect has been emphasized.

2004(1) Mh.L.J. 97 (Shobha M. Bhave Vs. State of Mah.) is a Division

Bench judgment of this Court which considers rights of adhoc appointees.

It has been held that granting regularization to such persons would be

illegal, unjust and unfair. 2009(4) Mh.L.J. 198 (Mah. Seva Sangh Vs.

Shaikh Jamalchand) is a judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court

which again considers the importance of qualification and in paragraph

13 it has been observed that a person appointed by relaxing the

qualification is not entitled to seek permanency merely because he was

assured by the institution that he would be continued till he acquires the

prescribed qualifications. The facts before this Court are entirely different

and therefore, this ruling has no relevance.

21. 1992(5) SLR 24 (I.K. Chopra Vs. Pradeshik Coop. Dairy Fed.

Ltd.) is a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court which considers

appointment against regular vacancies by placing a candidate on

probation for a period of one year. Explanation to Rule 17, considered

therein, stipulated that the posts cannot be deemed as regular unless it

has been in existence continuously for last five years. However, the

question which has been looked into by Division Bench of this Court in

2008(2) Mh.L.J. 565 was not required to be looked into by the Hon'ble

Apex Court there. Paragraph 15 of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex

Court shows that the employee was terminated even before the period of

three years had expired and hence, it has been observed that the post

could not be deemed to be the regular post. In this background, it has

been observed that as the post was not regular, Regulation 17 would not

be applicable. It is to be noted that in paragraph 16 the Hon'ble Apex

Court, therefore, found services of the appellant before it were as

temporary employee. This Court has already found that here, respondent

No.2 had worked in that post not only for four years but for more than

seven years.

22. (1972)1 SCC 227 (Director of Panchayat Raj Vs. Babu Singh

Gaur) is a judgment in which the Hon'ble Apex Court states that by mere

continuation in service status of permanency is not reached. The

respondents before the Hon'ble Apex Court (employees) were appointed

temporarily and the Hon'ble Apex Court has considered provisions of

fundamental Rule 26(d). As per the said rule and order of Governor the

Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph 10 found that it has got no bearing on

nature of appointment. It has been held that merely because for certain

specified purposes those temporary appointments were to be considered

as made in substantive capacity that did not mean that appointees were

holding posts in question in substantive capacity for all purposes. From

paragraph 11 it is apparent that there was also order converting those

temporary posts into permanent posts, which expressly envisaged a

separate order regarding confirmation of individual. It is obvious that

these judgments, therefore, has got no bearing in the present matter.

1976 (4) SCC 823 (State of U.P. Vs. Nand Kishore Tandon) holds that

person appointed in a substantive capacity to a temporary post does not

become permanent when the post is declared permanent. 1991 Supp (2)

SCC 207 (Mohinder Singh Vs. State of Haryana) lays down that a

temporary post can continue for indefinite period but then that does not

entitle the person working on it to have his services automatically

extended. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that termination of service of

such incumbent after notice to him is not improper. (2009)3 SCC 250

(State of W.B. Vs. Banibrata Ghosh) considers the issue of regularization

and holds that continuation on adhoc basis does not entitle adhoc

appointee to be regularised. It also shows that adhoc employees were

continued for ten years and the Hon'ble Apex Court found that no

misplaced sympathy could be shown to him by ordering his

regularization. The facts in paragraphs 5 and 6 show that it was a leave

vacancy initially for six months which was extended but then for some

inexplicable reasons the adhoc appointee was continued from 02.01.1992

to 31.03.1992 his extension was not approved by the District Inspector of

Schools and consequently, an advertisement was therefore, published. In

response to that advertisement same employee was again selected.

Thereafter the original incumbent holding post who had gone on leave

resigned and substantive vacancy arose in permanent sanctioned post.

Issue was considered in this background. It is to be noted that the

Hon'ble Apex Court also found that procedure for appointment against

leave vacancy was different from procedure for filling up regular vacancy.

23. (1997)5 SCC 152 (Hindustan Education Society Vs. Sk.Kaleem

Sk. Gulam Nabi), 2008(4) All MR 272 (Mustaq Shah S/o.Maheboob Shah

Vs.Haidariya Urdu Education Society) and 2003(1) Mh.L.J. 563 (B.G.P.

Sanstha Vs. Vijay Kumar) are the judgments which deal with provisions of

Section 5 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of

Service) Regulation Act. In view of the various judgments, considered

above, and clear facts in present matter, I do not find it necessary to refer

to those judgments here. The petitioners have not come up with defence

that some other procedure for selection was followed when respondent

No.2 was initially appointed. They have also not come up with the case

that after expiry of period of four years when clear vacancy became

available, they had contemplated some other procedure for recruitment to

be followed.

24.

I find that the College Tribunal has considered the relevant

arguments and its findings are neither erroneous nor perverse.

Respondent No.2 was appointed against clear vacancy on probation by

the petitioner by express order in writing and they have not withdrawn

that order of appointment and have not even urged that they have

committed any error by issuing such order. Respondent No.3 University

has also granted approval and sanction to that appointment. I, therefore

find that no case is made out warranting any interference in so far as

relief of grant of reinstatement is concerned.

25. In so far as grant of back wages is concerned, it is clear that

this Court granted stay of back wages only while admitting the matter.

Respondent No.2 thereafter attempted to join duties and as he was not

allowed to join duties he filed contempt proceedings. After initiation of

contempt proceedings, though he was allowed to join again it appears

that there was some dispute and he could not performed his duties. In

that situation, he got some temporary job on contract basis and he

accepted that job. Before College Tribunal there was no material

produced by him to show that he was without any source of income or

employment after his termination.

26.

Taking overall view of the matter, I find that the interest of

justice can be met with by granting him 50% back wages. Accordingly,

the judgment of the College Tribunal is modified only to that extent. The

petitioner-management is directed to reinstate respondent No.2 in service

forthwith with continuity of service and with 50% back wages.

27. Writ Petition is, thus, partly allowed with costs of Rs.Five

Thousand, to be paid by the petitioner-management to respondent No.2.

JUDGE RR..