Bajaj Auto Limited And Ors. vs Sundeep Polymers Pvt. Ltd.
2004 Latest Caselaw 791 Bom

JUDGMENT

B.R. Gavai, J.

1. Admit. Shri R. P. Joshi, learned Counsel waives notice on behalf of the respondent. Heard finally by consent of the parties.

2. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nagpur in Special Civil Suit No. 881 of 1999 dated 6th September, 2001, thereby rejecting the application of the applicants under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the applicants approach this Court by way of present Civil Revision Application.

3. The factual background giving rise to the filing of the present Civil Revision Application is as under :--

That, the respondent No. 1 herein filed a Special Civil Suit No. 881 of 1991 for recovery of Rs. 79,63,99,736/- as damages for breach of contract. It is the contention of the plaintiff in the plaint that it is the manufacturer of moulds and high precision plastic component for the industrial application specially for use by automobile industry. It is contended by the plaintiff that it has its manufacturing operations at Nagpur and that the defendants have entered into an agreement with it for lifetime supply of its products. It is contended by the plaintiff that it has made huge investments at Nagpur amounting to rupees thirty crores and that it has a most sophisticated factory at Nagpur. It is further contended that the plaintiff/respondent is supplying its products to the applicant No. 1 for almost two decades. It is submitted by the plaintiff that the applicant No. 1 herein vide registered letter dated 3-11-1999, which was received by the plaintiff at its Nagpur office on 11-11-1999, has terminated its agreement with the plaintiff. It is the contention of the plaintiff that due to the said termination, the machineries which were installed by the plaintiff specifically for manufacturing moulds for the present applicant No. 1/defendant No. 1 would remain idle and that there will be no use of its unit installed at Nagpur. The plaintiff, therefore, contended that the plaintiff is entitled to compensation of damages inasmuch, as the defendant No. 1's action of refusing to honour its promise and assurance was illegal and arbitrary.

4. The present applicants who are defendant Nos. 1, 3 and 4 filed an application under Section 9A read with Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred as the CPC in short), submitting therein that the suit was clearly abuse of process of law and was not maintainable. It is the contention of the present applicants that the registered office of the applicant Nos. 1 and 2 was at Pune and that the defendant Nos. 3 and 4 are the residents of Pune, whereas the defendant No. 5 has its registered office at Tokyo (Japan). It is further contended that the lease agreements between defendant No. 1 and the plaintiff have been executed at Pune, that the supplies were made by the plaintiff to defendant No. 1 at Pune/Aurangabad i.e. outside the territorial jurisdiction of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nagpur and, therefore, it had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the suit deserves to be dismissed summarily. It was denied by the present applicants that the plaintiff has set up its factory at Nagpur at the instance of defendant No. 1. It was further contended that the plaintiff has deliberately suppressed that it has its registered office at Mumbai and neither of the parties to the suit resided at Nagpur. The applicants have further averred in the said application that the parties by consent have restricted the jurisdiction to Pune Court only. It is averred that the said term pertaining to jurisdiction is contained in all the purchase orders placed by the defendant No. 1 with the plaintiff. It was submitted by the applicants that the plaintiff had deliberately filed a part of the purchase order and suppressed that part of the purchase order from the Court which contained the clause regarding jurisdiction.

5. The non-applicant/plaintiff filed its reply to the said application reiterating the averments made in the plaint. It reiterates that it had made huge investments at Nagpur on the assurance made by the defendant No. 1. The plaintiff, further, submitted in its reply that the cause of action for suit has arisen substantially, if not wholly, within the territorial jurisdiction of the learned Court at Nagpur. It is contended on behalf of the plaintiff that the goods were supplied from Nagpur and the cost thereof is received at Nagpur and that the goods have also been delivered at Nagpur. The plaintiff contended that the substantial part of the claim in the plaint was on account of damages etc. for breach of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and the breach of assurances given by the defendant No. 1. The plaintiff, therefore, submitted that if the substantial cause of action arises out of damages on other counts and if the small part of the claim arises out of purchase order, the claim cannot be separated and, therefore, it was in the interest of justice that this Court should entertain the present suit.

6. The learned trial Court, after considering the rival contentions raised on behalf of the parties, found that the suit was outcome of the damages caused to the Unit of the plaintiff because of the breach of the contract. The learned Judge further observed that the letter of termination was received by the plaintiff at Nagpur. It is further observed in the order that the term about jurisdiction pointed out on behalf of the defendants was relating to the breach of contract under order of purchase and not relating to the damage caused to the plaintiff by termination of the entire contract which was admittedly for the lifetime. The learned trial Court, therefore, held that the cause of action to file present suit arises at Nagpur and, therefore, directed the suit to proceed according to law. Being aggrieved by the said order, the applicants approach this Court by way of present Civil Revision Application.

7. Heard Shri S. V. Manohar, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicants and Shri R. P. Joshi, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent.

8. According to Shri Manohar, a substantial part of the claim arises out of the four purchase orders which came to be placed by the defendant No. I with the plaintiff. He submits that all these purchase orders ousted the jurisdiction of the Court except the Court at Pune. He further submits that except these purchase orders, there is no written contract. Shri Manohar, therefore, submits that when the suit is mainly based on the cause of action arising out of the said purchase orders which ousted the jurisdiction of the Courts except the Court situated at Pune, though there may be ancillary causes of action, the ouster clause in the purchase order will govern the proceedings between the parties. To substantiate the submissions, Shri Manohar submitted that admittedly the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 are the residents of Pune, the respondent No. 5 is the resident of Tokyo (Japan), the respondent No. 6 is the resident of Bombay. He further submitted that the registered office of plaintiff is at Bombay and only its unit is situated at Nagpur. He, therefore, submitted that in view of the clear and unambiguous ouster clause, the jurisdiction of the Court at Nagpur was totally taken away and the suit was maintainable only in the Courts having territorial jurisdiction at Pune. Shri Manohar took me through various averments made in the application under Order 7 Rule 11, the reply filed thereto by the plaintiff and the averments made in the plaint, to substantiate his submissions that a substantial part of cause of action has arisen out of the purchase orders which ousts the jurisdiction of the Courts except the Court situated at Pune. Shri Manohar submitted that the MoU dated 6th December, 1996 between the plaintiff, the defendant No. 1 and M/s Takahashi Seiki Company Limited and the Technical Assistance Agreement dated 11-2-1997 between the plaintiff and the said M/s Takahashi Seiki Company Limited also form the part of the said purchase order and, therefore, the cause of action based on the breach of the said MoU or the Technical Assistance Agreement would also be governed by the Ouster Clause in the purchase order.

9. Shri Manohar, learned Counsel for the applicants relied on the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of Hakam Singh v. M/s Gammon (India) Ltd. ; Hanil Era Textiles Ltd. v. Puromatic Filters (P) Ltd., and New Moga Transport Company v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., and Ors., .

10. Shri R. P. Joshi, learned Counsel for the respondent submits that the plaintiff was manufacturing moulds as well as the component parts out of the said moulds for defendant No. 1. He submitted that the plaintiff had installed Injection Moulding Machine and since 1980 is manufacturing components, parts so also moulds. Shri Joshi submitted that the claim of the petitioners was based on various causes of action. The defendant No. 1 had assured the plaintiff for life time supply. However, vide letter dated 3rd November, 1999, which was received by the plaintiff on 11th November, 1999 at Nagpur, the defendants had terminated all the contracts with the plaintiff. He submitted that the purchase orders are only insofar as 'Alpha-4' model is concerned. He submits that the perusal of the said termination letter would show that the termination is related to moulds for Super Chetak, Legend, Spirit, Classic-I, Classic-II, Stride and Sunny Models in addition to Alpha-4 model. He submitted that only a small amount remained to be unpaid by the defendant No. 1 on account of supply out of purchase orders. He, therefore, submitted that though the part of claim is based on said purchase orders, the said part being insignificant would not govern the present suit. He submitted that the present suit was basically based for compensation for wrong done to the plaintiff and that since the said wrong was done within the local limits of jurisdiction of Courts at Nagpur, the plaintiff had an option either to file a suit at Nagpur or at a place where the defendants reside.

11. Shri Joshi took me through the MoU dated 6th November, 1996 and submitted that the MoU related to the technical terms between the parties. As per the said terms, the plaintiff was entitled to receive seven moulds but he was given only four moulds. He said that there is no Ouster Clause in the said MoU and, therefore, the suit for breach of terms of the said MoU would not be governed by the Ouster Clause in the purchase order. Shri Joshi took me through various documents addressed on behalf of the defendant No. 1 i.e. letters dated 9-10-1993, 25-5-1996, 30-11-1996 and letter dated 23rd September, 1997 to substantiate his submissions that the assurance was given by the defendant No. 1 to the plaintiff that the plaintiff would be its lifetime supplier. Relying on the letter dated 9-10-1993, Shri Joshi submits that according to the said letter, everything including inspection of machines, rectification of machines as per the lacuna found in the injection moulding machines and the manufacturing of the components was to be done at Nagpur and, therefore, it is only the Court situated at Nagpur which had the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Relying on the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, Shri Joshi submitted that the suit is required to include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff was entitled to make in respect of the cause of action. He submitted that, therefore, it was necessary for him to join all causes of action and since only insignificant part of cause of action was governed by the purchase orders, the suit filed at Nagpur will not be governed by the Ouster Clause. He submitted that since the substantial part of cause of action arises out of the claim not emanating from the purchase orders, the suit was entitled to be filed at Nagpur. Shri Joshi submits that the said purchase order relates only to the price and payment part of components and, therefore, the Ouster Clause will not govern the rest of the matter.

12. Shri Joshi submitted that initially the original claim of the plaintiff was Rs. 79,63,99,736/-, by amendment which was permitted by an order dated 31st January, 2004, an additional claim of rupees thirty crores has been added thereby taking the total claim of the plaintiff to Rs. 109,63,99,736/-. He submitted that assuming without admitting that a claim to the tune of Rs. 15,56,39,736/- was referable to the purchase orders, it was a small, part of the claim of Rs. 110 crores. He, therefore, submitted that since the substantial claim arises out of cause of action which is not referable to purchase orders, the Court at Nagpur had the jurisdiction to entertain the said suit where substantial part of cause of action arises. Shri Joshi relied on the judgment of Apex Court in the case of A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. A. P. Agencies, Salem, , to substantiate his claim that for the Ouster Clause to operate the parties have to be ad idem and unless the parties are shown to be ad idem, it cannot be said that the Ouster Clause is applicable to the transactions of the parties. He also relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Patel Roadways Limited, Bombay v. Prasad Trading Company, in support of his contention that the defendant No. 1 is having an office at Nagpur and, therefore, the Court at Nagpur will have the jurisdiction. He mainly relies on the following observations of the Apex Court in the said case :--

"It would be a great hardship if, in spite of the corporation having a subordinate office at the place where the cause of action arises (with which in all probability the plaintiff has had dealings), such plaintiff is to be compelled to travel to the place where the corporation has its principal place. That place should be convenient to the plaintiff; and since the corporation has an office at such place, it will also be under no disadvantage. Thus the Explanation provides an alternative locus for the corporation's place of business, not an additional one."

13. Shri Joshi also relies on the judgment of this Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Sarvodaya Industries, to substantiate his submissions, that in view of the provisions of Section 19 of the Civil Procedure Code, a suit for compensation for wrong done can be filed at a place where the wrongful act was done and so also at the place where the resultant damage is caused. He submits that since the damage was caused at Nagpur, the Court at Nagpur had jurisdiction.

14. For appreciating the rival contentions, it will be necessary to refer to some of the clauses of the purchase orders. The relevant portion of the purchase order, which are identical, reads thus:--

"NOTES :

1. THE MOULDS WILL BE DESIGNED AND AS PER THE FOLLOWING :

(1) THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU) DATED-6TH NOVEMBER 1996, EXECUTED BETWEEN M/S BAI, M/S MARUBENT CORPORATION, M/S TAKAHASHI SEIKI CO., LTD., M/S TOKYO R AND D CO. LTD. AND M/S SUNDEEP POLYMERS PVT LTD AND AMENDMENT THERETO AS MAY BE AGREED TO BETWEEN THE PARTIES FROM TIME TO TIME AS PER THE PROJECT NEEDS.

(2) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT DATED 11-2-997 BETWEEN TAKAHASHI SEIKI CO. LTD. AND SUNDEEP POLYMERS LTD.

TERMS AND CONDITIONS :

1. PRICE

PRICES ARE FIRM AND FOR FREE DELIVERY AT OUR WORKS.

6. PAYMENT

60% ADVANCE ALONG WITH THE ORDER

20% AFTER SUBMISSION OF TI SAMPLE

20% AFTER FINAL APPROVAL OF SAMPLE AND MOULD.

12. GUARANTEE

MOULD SHOULD BE GUARANTEED FOR QUALITY, PRECISION, RELIABILITY AND ALSO FOR WORKMANSHIP AND PERFORMANCE, USE OF MATERIAL AND DESIGN, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO GET MINIMUM 300,000 PIECES WITH NORMAL MAINTENANCE.

CONDITIONS :

15. The prices and terms and conditions in this order will be taken as firm and cannot be changed till the order is fully executed."

20. This contract shall be deemed to have been entered into at Pune and only Pune Courts will have jurisdiction in all matters arising out of this Order.

15. It is also necessary to refer to the relevant pleadings made by the plaintiff in the plaint. The relevant portion of para 29 reads thus :--

"In the year 1995 or near about, the 1st defendant finalize the new model scooter in the Japan, Code name Alpha-4 in co-operation with the defendant No. 5. Since this was to be a modern design vehicle, having entire plastic body, it was important to select a top quality supplier in India for the development of supplier of plastic parts for Alpha-4 vehicle and such similar models in the future.

(a) The 1st defendant placed an order for a supply of a part of the moulds for the Alpha-4 from the defendant No. 5 and raised a purchase order No. 529911 dated 6-11-1996 on the 5th defendant for an approximate amount of Rs. JPY 175 Million. The plaintiff craves leave to refer to and rely upon the aforesaid Purchase Order of the 1st defendant when produced.

(b) A Memo of Understanding (MoU) has entered into by various parties involved in the development of Alpha-4, viz. The plaintiff, defendant Nos. 1 and 3 Takahashi Seiki and another Japanese Company Tokyo R and D Co. Ltd. This MoU spelt out the role and obligation of each party in the development of the plastic parts of the Alpha-4. The 1st defendant also spelt out its commitment in buying the plastic parts from the moulds supplied by the 5th defendant and for which the plaintiff was to set up additional investments. Hereto enclosed and annexed as document No. XXIV is a copy of the aforesaid MoU."

16. The relevant portion of para 31 reads thus :--

"Relying on the personal promises and assurances of the 1st and 4th defendants and the aforesaid MoU being document No. XXIV to the plaint and also the 1st defendant's aforesaid letter dated 30-11-1996 being document No. XXV to the plaint, the plaintiff agreed manufacturer the 10 moulds on a deferred payment basis as already explained in the aforesaid para 30. Thus the 1st defendant and the plaintiff finalized the orders for the moulds of the Helmet Box and the Floor Panel with an initial payment of Rs. 49.50 lacs and Rs. 55.75 lacs respectively, i.e. at approx, 28% of the landed cost of the Japanese Moulds."

17. The relevant portion of para 33 of the plaint reads thus :--

"In line with the aforesaid understanding between the plaintiff and the 1st, 4th and 5th defendants and also relying upon the MoU and the 1st defendant's letter dated 30-11-1996, the plaintiff agreed to accept the 4 sets of Purchase Orders for the manufacture of 10 Alpha-4 moulds, raised by the 1st defendant, at an initial payment of Rs. 296.7 lacs. These Purchase Orders are :

a) No. 541024 dated 12-2-1997 for Rs. 148.5 lacs.

b) No. 541023 dated 12-2-1997 for Rs. 111.5 lacs.

c) No. 2121209 dated 22-2-1998 for Rs. 35 lacs.

d) No. 20122154 dated 16-3-1998 for Rs. 1.7 lacs. The aforesaid Purchase Orders were in the line with the MoU and the Technical Assistance Agreement, as already spelt out, and the same was also mentioned on the Orders."

(b) The plaintiff would set up the necessary facilities for the manufacture and supply of all the plastic parts of Alpha-4 from the aforesaid moulds at it's existing factory at Nagpur and the 1st defendant would place it's purchase order for supply of parts and also handover all the 17 moulds to the plaintiff including those imported from the defendant No. 5, so as to produce the parts from these moulds. Thus the plaintiff would be able to recover its balance mould costs of Rs. 890 lacs and also be able to make a proper utilisation of it's existing investments and further multi-crore investments as envisaged under the MoU."

18. The relevant portion of para 34 reads thus :--

"After signing of the MoU and the receipt of the aforesaid Purchase Orders and relying upon the 1st defendant's promises and assurances of a huge business for Alpha-4 vehicle, the plaintiff immediately went ahead in implementing its obligations, which were as under ;--

(a) The plaintiff deputed its engineers for a long term training in the factory of Takahashi Seiki in Japan, with the training period exceeding a period of over one year. The plaintiff thus incurred an expenses amounting to Rs. 105 lacs, on this account alone.

(b) ......Thus in case of breach of the MoU and further promises, commitments and assurances given by the 1st and 4th defendants in the plaintiff from time to time, the 1st defendant does not supply to the plaintiff the aforesaid 7 moulds, supplied by the 5th defendant to the 1st defendant, the plaintiff states that he is entitled to claim from the 1st defendant the amount of Rs. 136.40 lacs, more particularly described in Document No. XXIX to the plaint, towards the aforesaid 7 moulds.

(c).........Due to delays in the implementation of the Alpha-4 project for which the 1st defendant alone is responsible the plaintiff has incurred till date an expense of Rs. 120 lacs towards the aforesaid equipment as per details annexed and marked as document No. XXX to the plaint and the plaintiff states then he is entitled to claim from the 1st defendant the aforesaid amount of Rs. 1,20,00,000/-."

19. The relevant portion of para 42 reads thus :--

"The plaintiff states that the total basis cost of the 10 Nos. of moulds for Alpha-4, as per the details given under Para (30) above is Rs. 11,87,00,000/-. After adding the current excise duty of 16% and the Sales Tax of 15.3$ other total cost of the 10 Alpha-4 moulds comes to Rs. 15,87,58,878/-. Out of the above due amount of Rs. 15,87,58,876/-, the plaintiff has received till date an amount of Rs. 3,06,19,140/-. The plaintiff state the further payments of Rs. 12,81,39,7367- are due to the plaintiff in the event of the production and supplies of components from the aforesaid 10 moulds are not to be made by the plaintiff to the defendant. Hereto annexed and marked as Document No. XXXVII are the details, of the calculations of the total mould costs, amounts received by the plaintiff from the 1st defendant from time to time and the balance amount due to the plaintiff from the 1st defendant."

20. The relevant portion of para 57 reads thus :--

"In the backdrop of the event narrated supra, by its letter dated 22-10-1999, the 1st defendant took a curious and shocking stand that its commitment of obtaining the entire supply of plastic components from the plaintiff was relatable only to the guarantee clause incorporated in the MoU dated 6-11-1996, implying thereby that should the 1st defendant not be interested in invoking the guarantee clause, its suffered from no obligation to source the plastic components from the plaintiff. The interpretation put by the 1st defendant on the MoU is to put it modestly destructive of the letter and spirit of the MoU viewed as a whole."

21. Though Shri Manohar has also placed reliance on the averments made in the affidavit-in-reply by the plaintiff to the applicants' application under Exh. 20, it will not be necessary to refer to them as the question of jurisdiction will have to be decided on the basis of the averments made in the plaint. Shri Joshi also relied on some of the averments made in the written statement. However, the Apex Court in various cases has held that for the purpose of deciding an application under Order 7, Rule 11 (a) to (d), the averments in the plaint are only germane and that the plea as taken in the written statement is wholly irrelevant at that stage. A reference can be made in this respect to one of the readily available recent judgments of the Apex Court in the case of Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and Ors. v. Assistant Chanty Commissioner and Ors., .

22. From the perusal of the averments reproduced hereinabove, it can be seen that the aforesaid claims are referable to the said purchase orders. The averments in para 29 show that they are directly referable to the MoU dated 6th November, 1996. From the perusal of the purchase order, it is clear that the said MoU is also part of the said purchase order. The said purchase order clearly recites that the moulds are to be designed by the manufacturer as per the MoU as may be agreed between the parties from time to time. Perusal of paras 31 and 32 would also show that they are referable to the MoU which is a part of the purchase order and the Technical Assistance Agreement dated 11-2-1997 which is also a part of the purchase order. Para 33 would reveal that the said claim is also based upon the damages arising out of the MoU which is part of the purchase order. Para 34 would show that the said claim is also on account of damages which the plaintiff claims due to breach of the terms in the MoU and the purchase order. Para 42 would also reveal that the claim of the plaintiff is related to Alpha model.

23. It can thus be clearly see that a part of cause of action is related to the purchase order as well as the MoU and the Technical Assistance Agreement which are a part of the purchase order. As can be seen from Clause 20 of the purchase order, it clearly provides that the contract shall be deemed to have been entered into at Pune and only Pune Courts will have jurisdiction in all matters arising out of the said order. In that view of the matter, I am unable to accept the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff that the purchase order was restricted to payment part alone and, therefore, the Ouster Clause would apply only to the payment part of the purchase order and not to the other matters covered under the said purchase order.

24. The Apex Court in the case of Hakam Singh v. Gammon (India) Ltd. (cited supra) has observed thus:--

"But where two courts or more have under the Code of Civil Procedure jurisdiction to try a suit or proceeding an agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in one of such Courts is not contrary to public policy. Such an agreement does not contravene Section 28 of the Contract Act."

25. The Apex Court in the case of New Moga Transport Co. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. (cited supra) has reiterated the legal position as under:--

"By a long series of decisions it has been held that where two courts or more have jurisdiction under Civil Procedure Code to try a suit or proceeding, an agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in any one of such courts is not contrary to public policy and in no way contravenes Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Therefore, if on the facts of a given case more than one court has jurisdiction, parties by their consent may limit the jurisdiction to one of the two courts. But by an agreement parties cannot confer jurisdiction on a court which otherwise does not have jurisdiction to deal with a matter."

26. The Apex Court has clearly held that once the parties bind themselves, it is not open for them to chose different jurisdiction. In the case of Hanil Era Textiles Ltd. v. Puromatic Filters (P) Ltd. (cited supra), the Apex Court has further held that even if the words "alone", "only", "exclusive" are not used, even then the Courts from the intention of the parties can arrive at a conclusion that it was intended to exclude the jurisdiction of other Courts except the Courts specified in the agreement.

27. The reliance placed by Shri Joshi to the case of A. B. C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. A. P. Agencies, Salem (cited supra) in my respectful opinion is not of much assistance to the case of the plaintiff. Since the Clause in question is clear and unambiguous, the question as to whether the parties were ad idem or not, in my view would not arise. So also the reliance placed by Shri Joshi on the case of Patel Roadways Limited, Bombay v. Prasad Trading Company (cited supra) is also of not much assistance. In the said case cited by Shri Joshi, there was no clause ousting the jurisdiction of other Courts except the one agreed by parties. The Apex Court in the aforesaid case was dealing with the provisions of Sub-section (c) of Section 20.

28. Insofar as the reliance placed by Shri Joshi on the case of State of Maharashtra v. Sarvodaya Industries (cited supra) is concerned, there can be no quarrel that the suit for compensation for wrongful act can be filed at a place where wrongful act was done or at a place where the resultant damage is caused. However, the question would be different when the parties have bound themselves to submit to the jurisdiction of the particular Court.

29. It can be seen that the claim made by the petitioner on the basis of certain causes of action is directly referable, to the purchase orders. Condition No. 20 of the purchase orders clearly provides that only the Pune Courts will have jurisdiction in all the matters arising out of the purchase order. It is thus clear that no Court except the Court at Pune had jurisdiction to entertain the matters arising out of the said purchase order. It is also clear that the MoU dated 6th November, 1996 and the Technical Assistance Agreement dated 11-2-1997 also form the part of said purchase orders. Therefore, the Court at Pune only had the jurisdiction to entertain the dispute arising out of the purchase orders including the aforesaid MoU and Technical Assistance Agreement. As already pointed out hereinabove, various claims made by the petitioner are arising out of causes of action related to the said purchase order. In my view, it is not necessary to find out as to how much of the claim is referable to the causes of action arising out of the said purchase order. Inasmuch as, the claim of the plaintiff on the basis of causes of action arising out of the said purchase order was wholly beyond the jurisdiction of the Court situated at Nagpur. The reliance placed by Shri Joshi on the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 is also misplaced. Order 2 Rule 2 provides that every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action. In the present suit, it can be seen that the plaintiff has joined several causes of action. It is not as if that the plaintiff has included all the claims arising out of single cause of action. Since the suit is based on several causes of action, it was open for the plaintiff to file a suit for causes of action not related to purchase order at Nagpur and to file another suit arising out of the causes of action related to the said purchase order at Pune. Since the plaintiff has himself chosen to join several causes of action in the present suit and also join the causes of action which are beyond the jurisdiction of the Court at Nagpur, the plaintiff himself has taken the risk. Therefore, the impugned order below Exh. 20 in Special Civil Suit No. 881/1999 dated 6th September, 2001 is liable to be quashed and set aside. The Civil Revision Application is, therefore, allowed. The plaint of the plaintiff is rejected, since the Court at jurisdiction to entertain the part of the claim made in the suit. No order as to costs.

30. The plaint of the plaintiff is directed to be returned to the plaintiff since the Court at Nagpur has no jurisdiction to entertain the part of the claims made in the suit. The plaintiff is at liberty to represent the plaint in the Courts having jurisdiction at Pune. Learned trial Court is directed to follow the procedure prescribed under Rule 10-A of Order 7 for returning the plaint to the plaintiff. Certified Copy expedited.

31. At this stage, Shri R. P. Joshi, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent sole seeks stay of the order passed by this Court for a period of four weeks so as to approach the Apex Court.

32. Shri S. V. Manohar, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicants strongly opposes the said prayer. However, taking into consideration the facts and circumstances, I am inclined to stay the effect and operation of the order passed by me for a period of four weeks.