Magna Graphics Ltd. vs Prakash Sabde
2004 Latest Caselaw 199 Bom

ORDER

Khandeparkar R.M.S, J.

1. Heard the learned Advocates for the parties. Perused the records.

2. The grievance of the petitioner relates to the wilful disobedience of the order of this Court dated 1st November, 2001 in Writ Petition No. 2592 of 2001 by the respondent No. 1, inasmuch as, that while disposing of the appeal Under Section 247 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966, on 25th February, 2002 in Appeal/Desk/LNA/131/2001, the respondent No. 1 decided the matter contrary to the judicial pronouncement in the said writ petition to the effect that the change of name of the petitioner-company was not an voluntary act but purely by virtue of operation of law under the provisions of Section 43A(1A) of the Companies Act, 1956.

3. The facts relevant for the decision in the matter are that, on 7th June, 1972, the Collector of Mumbai Suburban District granted a lease of land bearing Plot No. 101, C & D admeasuring about 923 sq. metres in area in favour of one Acme Rayon Doubling Mills Pvt. Ltd. The constitution and the name of Acme Rayon Doubling Mills Pvt. Ltd. were change to Lana Printer Pvt. Ltd. on 19th November, 1982, and since the change of name and structure of the Acme Rayon Doubling Mills Pvt. Ltd. was an voluntary act on the part of the company, M/s. Lana Printer Pvt. Ltd. had to pay 75% of the unearned profit to the Collector on 10th September, 1987. On 12th April, 1994, M/s. Lana Printers Pvt. Ltd. changed its name to Magna Graphics Pvt. Ltd. and accordingly intimated the same to the Collector for the purpose of carrying out required changes in their records in relation to the said company. By letter dated 25th May, 1995, while consenting for the change and without making any demand for 75% for the unearned profit subjected to the company to the certain terms and conditions to be followed by Magna Graphics (India) Pvt. Ltd. By letter dated 14th November, 1998, since the average annual turnover of the petitioner company during the financial years 1995-96,1996-97 and 1997-98 had exceeded a sum of Rs. 10 crores, bearing in mind the provisions of Section 43A(1A) of the Companies Act, 1956, the petitioner-company intimated to the Registrar of Companies and requested for deletion of word "Private" from the name of company M/s. Magna Graphics (India) Pvt. Ltd. Since 1st July, 1998, the petitioner deleted the word "Private" from its name and commenced referring to itself as Magna Graphics India Limited. The petitioner informed the same to the Collector under its letter dated 23rd February, 1999 and further requested to carry out the necessary changes in its records in relation to the petitioner-company. After verifying the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the petitioner company, the Collector by its letter dated 17th March, 2001 informed the petitioner company that there was a change in the constitution of the petitioner, and therefore, the petitioner was liable to pay 50% of unearned profit amounting to Rs. 19,30,988.50/-. By letters dated 28th March, 2001 as well as 17th August, 2001, the petitioner clarified to the Collector and further requested him to carry out changes in the records in terms of the change in the name of the petitioner-company without demanding 50% of the unearned profit on the ground that the change was on account of operation of law, and therefore, the petitioner was not liable to pay any percentage of unearned profit. The respondent, however, through Tahsildar of Borivali issued a notice dated 20th September, 2001 demanding the said amount from the petitioner while threatening to take coercive action in case of failure to pay the same. The petitioner, therefore, preferred an Appeal bearing No. LNA/131 of 2001 on 3rd October, 2001 against the order dated 17th March, 2001 as well as the notice dated 20th September, 2001 before the respondent No. 1. Pending the hearing and final disposal of the said appeal, the petitioner also filed stay application on 9th October, 2001, and being aggrieved by the order of rejection of the stay application, the petitioner preferred the Writ Petition No. 2592 of 2001 before this Court on 22nd October, 2001. The said writ petition came up for hearing on 25th October, 2001, and at the request of the respondents, the matter was adjourned to 1st November, 2001, and after hearing the parties, the learned Single Judge of this Court disposed of the said petition by his order dated 1st November, 2001, while holding that:

"In my considered view, the change in name of the petitioner was not by any voluntary act on behalf of the petitioner but was purely by virtue of operation of law under the provisions of Section 43A(1A) of Companies Act. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner has not committed any breach of conditions or ground because change of name was not at his instance but merely due to operation of law."

Thereafter, the appeal before the respondent No. 1 came up for final disposal and the copy of the order in the said writ petition passed on 1st November, 2001 was placed before the respondent No. 1 in the course of hearing on 8th January, 2002. By the order dated 25th February, 2002 respondent No. 1 rejected the appeal on the ground that the petitioner did not take prior permission from the Collector before the change in its name as per the conditions mentioned in the original lease which was still binding upon the petitioner company, and therefore, held that the demand of unearned profit by the Collector was perfectly justified. While challenging the said decision of the respondent No. 1, in the said appeal, the petitioner has filed the present contempt petition.

4. Being prima jade satisfied about the grievance made by the petitioner, a show-cause notice came to be issued to the respondents on 30th September, 2002, and consequent to the service thereof, the respondent No. 1 filed affidavit in reply on 16th October, 2002. According to the said respondent No. 1, he has not committed any Contempt of Court nor has wilfully disobeyed the order dated 1st November, 2001 passed in Writ Petition No. 2592 of 2001. It is his case that there was no specific order to do or to act or to refrain from or not to act which has been wilfully and intentionally disobeyed or not complied with by him. He has further submitted that he has considered the facts of the case in accordance with the law and has passed the said order in accordance with the interpretation of the terms and conditions of the original lease deed dated 7th June, 1972. According to him, the Clause X of the Lease Deed prohibits any transfer of right or interest in the lease by the original lessee in favour of anybody without the previous consent in writing of the Collector and it would be open to the Collector while granting such consent to impose a condition requiring the lessee to pay to the Government half the unearned increment in the event of any assignment under-letting or transfer. According to him, the objectives of the said Clause X are to avoid direct sale/transfer of lease without prior consent in writing. It is his further case that at the time of change in the name from M/s. Acme Rayon Doubling Mills Pvt. Ltd. to M/s. Lana Printers Pvt. Ltd., the later was asked to pay 75% of the unearned profit and accordingly, M/s. Lana Printers Pvt. Ltd. had deposited the sum of Rs. 30,074/- on 10th September, 1987 with the undertaking to pay amount to be fixed by the Government along with 8% interest thereon and the same was clarified by the Collector to the company M/s. Lana Printers Pvt. Ltd. by its letter dated 10th August, 1993. However, the said company M/s. Lana Printers Pvt. Ltd. now required to pay 75% of the unearned income to the Government. There was no restrain imposed upon the respondent No. 1 in the matter of adjudication of the issue in appeal while disposing the writ petition by this Court, and therefore, he has not committed any contempt of Court as such by passing the said order.

5. The matter being related to the accusation of violation of the order, it will be primarily necessary to ascertain what was the order of this Court which is said to be violated by the respondent No. 1. As already observed above, the order spoken of is dated 1st November, 2001 in Writ Petition No. 2592 of 2001. Undoubtedly, the matter has come before this Court on the basis of the claim put forth by the petitioner for the change in name from Magna Graphics (India) Pvt. Ltd. to Magna Graphic (India) Ltd. was on account of operation of law in terms of Section 43A(1A) of the Companies Act, 1956, and that therefore, the petitioner was not liable to pay any percentage out of the unearned profit to the respondents. In fact, the grievance of the petitioner in the said petition as transcribed in the order dated 1st November, 2001 reads thus :-

"The petitioner informed the respondent No. 1 about their becoming deemed public limited company as per Section 43A(1A) of the Companies Act and requested the respondent No. 1 to change the name of the petitioner in the records of the respondent No. 1. Thereupon the respondent No. 1 called upon the petitioners to furnish a copy of the Memorandum of Articles of Association which was furnished to the respondent No. 1. Thereupon the respondent No. 1. vide letter bearing No. C/off/7-B/62 informed the petitioner that the respondent No. 1 had come to the conclusion that there was change in the Constitution of the petitioner company and, therefore, the petitioners were liable to pay 50% of "Unearned Profit" of Rs. 19,30,988.50 to the respondent No. 1. The respondent No. 1 also called upon the petitioner to pay the aforesaid sum within 15 days from the date of the letter.

Thereupon the petitioner tried to clarify the position that there was no change in the constitution to the petitioner and, therefore, demand of 50% of the "Unearned Profit" was uncalled for, however, the request was rejected and the demand was renewed."

Taking note of the appeal filed by the petitioner against the order demanding the money and the refusal of stay granted to such demand, it was noted by the learned Single Judge, thus :-

"At the outset, it may be noted that the appeal filed by the petitioner before the respondent No. 2 is pending and it is submitted at the bar that it is due for hearing. The limited scope of this writ petition, therefore, is the impugned order dated 9-10-2001. The said order reads thus:-

Heard learned Advocate for appellants regarding stay matter, Exhibit 'G' at page 30. Additional Registrar of Companies issued Fresh Certificate of incorporation consequent on change of name. Appellant company changed their name without prior permission from Collector (ASD). Hence stay rejected. Next date of hearing is 1st November, 2001.

Therefore, it is clear that the order is passed by the respondent No. 2 presupposing that prior permission of the respondent No. 1, i.e., Collector is required for change of name of the said company, and on that basis that stay is rejected."

After considering the arguments of the parties, the learned Single Judge held that:-

"In my considered view, that change of name of the petitioner was not by any voluntary act on behalf of the petitioner but was purely by virtue of operation of law under the provisions of Section 43A(1A) of the Companies Act. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner has not committed any breach of condition or ground because change of name was not at his instance but merely due to operation of law."

Referring to the point regarding refusal of stay, taking note of the decisions of the Apex Court in the matter of Asstt. CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd. , it was held thus:-

"However, in the present case, this principle clearly is not applicable. Here is the case wherein the petitioner has not committed any default but the change has occurred only due to operation of law and, therefore, respondent No. 2 - The Divisional Commissioner should have stayed the recovery and expedited the hearing of the appeal under the circumstances involved in this case."

With the above ruling, the petition was disposed of in terms of prayer Clause (a) in the petition, which reads thus:-

"(a) that this Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of writ of certiorari calling for the records relating to the present case and after examining the legality, validity and propriety thereof, this Hon'ble Court be pleased to quash and set aside the impugned order dated 9th October, 2001 being Exhibit "A" hereto, passed by 2nd respondent herein and grant stay application till the hearing and final disposal of the appeal in terms of prayer Clause (d)."

6. Plain reading of the order dated 1st November, 2001 in the said writ petition, therefore, reveals that the petition, undoubtedly, related to the order dated 9th October, 2001 under which the stay to the demand of 50% of the unearned profit was rejected by the Appellate Authority, ie., the respondent No. 1 herein, who was the respondent No. 2 in the said writ petition, while setting aside the said rejection order of stay, this Court had granted the stay till disposal of the appeal before the respondent No. 2. At the same time, it discloses that the said order of rejection of stay was interfered with and the stay during the pendency of the appeal was granted on the basis of certain findings given in the order and the said findings included the finding that the rejection of stay was on presupposition that prior permission of the Collector was required for the purpose of change in the name of the company. While considering the provisions of Section 43A(1A) of the Companies Act, 1956, the change of name on the part of the petitioner company was held as purely by virtue of operation of law under the said provision. While arriving at the said finding, the learned Single Judge has also taken note of an undisputed fact in the matter that the annual turn over of the petitioner company had exceeded Rs. 10 crores entitling the company to be a deemed public limited with in the following observation:-

"Now, it is not in dispute that the provision of Section 43A of the Companies Act stipulates that the Private Limited Company whose annual turnover exceeds Rs. 10 crores would automatically assume the entity as a deemed Public Limited Company, which was happened in the case of the petitioner and, therefore, the petitioner approached the Collector after obtaining necessary certificate from the Registrar of Companies."

Apparently, therefore, the decision to grant stay to the demand in relation to 50% of the unearned profit passed by this Court on 1st November, 2001 in Writ Petition No. 2592 of 2001 was on the basis that the change in the name of the petitioner was not by any voluntary act on behalf of the petitioner company but was purely by virtue of operation of law under the provisions of Section 431(1A) of the Companies Act, 1956. Therefore, it cannot be disputed that this Court, in no uncertain terms, had made it clear, by the order dated 1st November, 2001, that the change in the name of the company was merely by operation of law and not on account of voluntary acts on the part of the company.

7. No doubt that the rule was made absolute under the said order, however, the said order nowhere comments or requires the respondent No. 1 to do any particular act as such or to refrain him from doing any act as such, as sought to be submitted on behalf of the said respondent. Nevertheless, the order in clear terms declares the change in the name from Magna Graphic (India) Pvt. Ltd. to Magna Graphic (India) Ltd. and that the same had not been on account of any voluntary act on behalf of the petitioner company but was purely by virtue of operation of law in terms of the provisions contained in Section 43A(1A) of the Companies Act, 1956. Undoubtedly, it is a declaratory order in that regard. It is undisputed fact that such declaration was never challenged by the respondents, and it had attained finality for all purposes. In other words, even though there was no specific direction either to the respondent No. 1 or for that matter to any other officer dealing with any judicial or quasi-judicial matters on behalf of the respondent No. 1 to do a specific act or to refrain from doing any specific act, there was clear declaration by this Court regarding the change in the name of the petitioner and that the said change was on account of operation of law and it was not on account of any voluntary act on behalf of the petitioner and such declaration had attained finality and was binding upon both the parties.

8. The fact that the Divisional Commissioner, Konkan Division, Commissioner, Konkan Division, Mumbai, as well as State of Maharashtra, through the Collector of Mumbai, were the parties to the Writ Petition No. 2592 of 2001 is not in dispute, apart from the fact that the said order was placed before the respondent No. 1 at the time of hearing of the appeal. There is categorical statement on oath by the petitioner in the petition that "during the course of argument the Advocate appearing for the petitioners handed over a certified copy of the order dated 1st November, 2001 to the respondents for assistance." The affidavit filed by the respondent No. 1 also clearly discloses thorough knowledge of the said order to the said respondent before disposal of the appeal. It is, therefore, evident that the order of the High Court clearly declared the change in the name of the petitioner to be by virtue of operation of law in terms of the provisions of Section 43A(1A) of the Companies Act, 1956. It is also clear from the records that the said order was known to the respondent No. 1 before the disposal of the appeal before him.

9. The relevant portion of the order passed by the respondent No. 1 on 25-2-2002, which is said to be in violation of the said order of this Court, reads thus:-

"Now Magna Graphics (India) Ltd. vide their letter of 23rd February, 1999 communicate to the Collector, BSD that with effect from 1st July, 1998, the company has become a deemed public limited company Under Section 43A of the Companies Act, 1956 hence the word "Private" in the name of company therefore, has been deleted and the name of the company will be "Magna Graphics (India) Limited". This was only informed by the company to the Collector. Advocate for the appellant argued repeatedly along with citing case law that pursuant to the provisions Under Section 43A of the Companies Act, 1956, various private companies were to be treated as deemed public company on fulfilment of certain criteria. Appellant company here have turnover above 10 crores Rs. for the years 1995-96, 1996-97 and 1997-98 and by virtues fulfilling one of the criteria, the said company automatically become a public limited company. From Ex. F, it is clear that company applied to Registrar of Companies on 14th Nov. 1998 to delete the word "Private" but company did not take any care to get it first changed from Collector, MSD as it done in earlier occasion, and after deleting the word "Private" informs the Collector, MSD" that the word "Private" is deleted. The appellant company should have taken previous permission from Collector, MSD first before any change as per the conditions mentioned in original lease, which are still binding on the appellant company. Appellant Company has changed from Private Limited Company to Public Limited Company and Constitution of a Public Limited company and private limited company cannot remain same, hence Collector, MSD has rightly asked appellant company to pay unearned income."

10. Though there is no specific reference to any clause from the lease deed, which is said to be binding upon the parties, the same is sought to be referred to in the affidavit in reply filed by the respondent No. 1 and the Clause X of the said Lease Deed dated 7th June, 1972 between the Collector and the Original Lessee viz., Acme Rayon Doubling Pvt. Ltd. reads thus:-

"X. The Lessee shall not at any time, assign under-let the said plot or any part thereof of otherwise transfer his rights or interest under this lease to anybody without the previous consent in writing of the Collector and it shall be open to the Collector while granting such consent to impose a condition requiring the lessee to pay to the Government half the unearned increment in the event of any assignment under-letting or transfer as above whether outright or as a result of an unredeemed mortgage, and every such assignee, under-lessee or transferee shall use the said plot only for the purpose for which it has been let out under the terms hereof."

11. As already seen above, the learned Single Judge of this Court in the Writ Petition No. 2592 of 2001, while disposing the said writ petition and while declaring that the change in the name was on account of operation of law in terms of the provisions of Section 43A(1A) of the Companies Act, 1956 and not on account of the voluntary act on behalf of the petitioner company, had also observed that the annual turnover of the petitioner company had exceeded the required limit to qualify to be public limited company in terms of Section 43A of the Companies Act during the required period, and on that count, due to the operation of law, there was change in the name of the company. In other words, there was a clear finding given by this Court that the change in name was on account of increment in the annual turnover of the petitioner-company for the required period, and consequently, there was a change in the name. There was no finding regarding any transfer or assignment or under-letting of the property which was subject-matter of the lease in favour of the lessee under the Lease Deed dated 7th June, 1972, and which came into the possession of the petitioner company as a Private Limited Company. Similarly, in the order dated 25th February, 2002, the respondent No. 1 has also not arrived at any finding that there has been any assignment or under-letting or otherwise transfer of property or interest in the leased property by the petitioner company in favour of any other company on account of change in the name from Magna Graphics (India) Private Limited to Magna Graphics (India) Limited. The only finding which has been arrived at in the order dated 25th February, 2002 by the respondent No. 1 is in relation to the deletion of the word 'Private' and that, therefore, it has been concluded that there has been change in the constitution of the company, and hence, the Collector, MSD was justified in asking the petitioner to pay percentage of the unearned profit. In other words, on one hand, the respondent No. 1 clearly took note of the order of this Court holding that the deletion of the word 'Private' from the name of the petitioner was on account of operation of law, and on the other hand, instead of the said order of this Court, the respondent No. 1 held that the petitioner was required to take consent of the Collector prior to such change. Whether on merits, the said finding is sound one or not, it is for the appellate authorities to deal with the same in the appeal filed by the petitioner against the said order. However, the fact remains that in spite of the order of this Court, the deletion of the word 'Private' was on account of operation of law, the respondent No. 1 proceeded to hold that the petitioner ought to have taken permission of the Collector prior to the change in the name. The ruling in that regard has been given clearly in contravention of the declaration by this Court in its order dated 1st November, 2001. Hence, it is apparent that the order dated 25th February, 2002 passed by the respondent No. 1 is in contravention of the specific ruling given by this Court in its order dated 1st November, 2001.

12. The point that arises for consideration is whether the decision in that regard by the respondent No. 1 amounts to Contempt of Court. Undoubtedly, it is necessary to ascertain whether the confirmation of the demand for 50% of the unearned profit, in the facts and circumstances of the case, amounts to wilful disobedience of the said order or not, so as to hold the respondent No. 1 being guilty of contempt of Court.

13. In terms of Section 16(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, a Judge, Magistrate or other person acting judicially shall also be liable for contempt of his own Court or of any other Court in the same manner as any other individual is liable and the provisions of the said Act are to be applied accordingly. Obviously, therefore, any authority exercising judicial or quasi judicial function can be held liable for contempt of his Court when, in exercise of discharge of the duties, the authority acts in violation of the order of this Court. It cannot be disputed that the respondent No. 1 while disposing of the appeal under reference was exercising his quasi judicial power. It also cannot be disputed that the respondent No. 1 was bound by the declaration given by this Court under order dated 1st November, 2001 in the said writ petition in relation to the change of name of the petitioner-company to be on account of operation of law and not on account of voluntary act on behalf of the petitioner. There is no finding arrived at by the respondent No. 1 that there has been any act on the part of the petitioner company by which the leasehold rights in the land in question were either assigned or under-let or transferred in favour of any other company so as to warrant application of the Clause X of the said lease Deed and empower the Collector to make demand in terms of the said provisions contained in the Lease Deed dated 7th June, 1972. A judicial or quasi judicial authority having brought to his or her notice any order of this Court, refuses to act in compliance with the order of this Court, it would per se amount to wilful disobedience of the order of this Court. No judicial or quasi judicial authority can be heard to contend that it lacked malafide while not complying with the order of this Court or that there was no deliberate attempt on the part of such authority in not complying with the order of this Court. When an act of non-compliance of the order of the this Court by any judicial or quasi judicial authority is brought to the notice of such authority and explanation in that regard is sought for, it is primarily for such lower authority to justify and explain as to how and in what basis, it could be said to have acted bona fide in not complying with the order of the this Court, and in the absence thereof, for all purposes, such non-compliance will have to be treated as wilful disobedience of the order of this Court.

14. As already observed above, the explanation given by the respondent No. 1 on the point of service of the show-cause notice is that (i) there was no specific direction to do any particular act or to refrain from doing any particular act or not to act under the order dated 1st November, 2001; and (ii) the Clause X of the Lease Deed dated 7th June, 1972 empowered the Collector to demand the said monies consequent to the assignment, under-letting or otherwise transfer of right or leasehold interest in the property which was leased by the Lease Deed dated 7th June, 1972.

15. It is well-settled that any law laid down by the High Court is binding upon all the parties and authorities within the territory of the State in which the High Court is situated. In East India Commercial Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, , it was clearly held that the law laid down by the High Court is binding upon all the subordinate courts within the State. The finding as regards the change in the name of the petitioner being by operation of law and not by any voluntary act having pronounced by this Court under its order dated 1st November, 2001 and having attained finality, is binding upon the parties including the respondent No. 1. The said finding rules out the voluntary act on the part of the petitioner company in the process of change in the name. Simultaneously, it cannot be disputed that, for invoking the powers under Clause X of the Lease Deed dated 7th June, 1972, there necessarily to be a voluntary act on the part of the petitioner company in the form of assignment or under letting or transfer of its right in favour of another company. There is no reference to any material on record by the respondent No. 1 in his order dated 25th February, 2002 in that regard, leave aside any finding in that regard. Being so, taking into consideration all these facts merely because there was no specific direction to do any particular act or to refrain from doing any particular act, the respondent No. 1 who was exercising quasi-judicial powers under the Land Revenue Code at the time of disposing the appeal, was not empowered to ignore the declaration given by this Court in the order dated 1st November, 2001 and contrary to the said declaration he could not have held that the petitioner was required to take prior permission of the Collector for the change in the name of the petitioner-company. The order of this Court was amply clear that the deletion of the word 'Private' from the company's name was on account of operation of law, and, therefore, there was neither any action nor any necessity for the petitioner to obtain any prior permission from the Collector for deletion of the word "Private" from the name of the petitioner company. Obviously, the order dated 25th February, 2002 is, therefore, as rightly submitted by the learned Advocate for the petitioner company, in contravention of the order dated 1st November, 2001 passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 2592 of 2001, and it apparently discloses a wilful disobedience of the order of this Court by the respondent No. 1.

16. The respondent No. 1,therefore, is guilty of Contempt of Court in relation to the said order dated 1st November, 2001.

17. After pronouncement of the above order, the respondent No. 1 was personally heard on the point of punishment in the matter, and was asked him whether he wanted to submit his say on the point of punishment as he was found guilty of contempt of Court for the reasons stated above. He submitted that he may be pardoned in the matter. He has further stated that he is M.Sc. LL.B and his family consists of his wife, two daughters and son and he has completed 50 years of age. He had been the Additional Commissioner for 2 and 1/2 years and now posted as Collector since 11th June, 2003 at Jalgaon. The respondent No. 1 also craved leave to place on record unconditional written apology. For that purpose, the matter is kept in the 2nd session.

18. At this stage, the respondent No. 1 has tendered unconditional apology in writing. The same is taken on record. Though it is well-settled that the apology, if any, has to be tendered right in the beginning of the proceedings and belated apology cannot help the contemner to avoid the punishment, taking into consideration the fact of unblamish service rendered by the respondent No. 1 till this date and the statement made by him personally in the course of hearing that henceforth he will ensure that the orders of this Court are not violated in any manner, I accept the unconditional apology tendered by him. In the course of personal hearing, the respondent No. 1 has also disclosed repentance for the manner in which the order was passed by him on 25th February, 2002.

19. In the result, while holding the act on the part of the respondent No. 1 in passing the order dated 25th February, 2002 to be in contravention of the order of this Court dated 1st November, 2001 passed in Writ Petition No. 2592 of 2001, unconditional apology tendered by the respondent No. 1 is hereby accepted. It is needless to say that the Appellate Authority dealing with the appeal on merits against the order passed on 25th February, 2002 will have to bear in mind the judgment delivered by this Court on 1st November, 2001 in Writ Petition No. 2592 of 2001 till the disposal of the appeal. The demand by the Collector under order dated 17th March, 2001 shall remain suspended. However, in view of the fact that the unconditional apology has come at late stage, though revealed repentance on the part of the respondent No. 1, it is necessary to dispose of the proceedings by awarding costs in favour of the petitioner-company payable by the said respondent. The respondent No. 1 to pay the costs of Rs. 1,000/- to the petitioner-company. The proceedings are hereby closed. Notice stands discharged. The contempt petition accordingly stands disposed of.