Bhagwati Co-Operative Housing ... vs The State Of Maharashtra And Ors.
2003 Latest Caselaw 1113 Bom

JUDGMENT

R.M.S. Khandeparkar, J.

1. Heard the learned Advocates for the parties. Rule, By consent, the rule is made returnable forthwith.

2. The petitioners challenge the order dated 16-12-1992, passed by the Deputy Secretary, Revenue and Forests Department as well as the order dated 11-2-1993 by the Collector for Mumbai Suburban District and seek consequential reliefs consequent to quashing of the said orders.

3. The dispute between the parties relate to a plot bearing No. 35A, situate at Santacruz, Mumbai, hereinafter called as "the said plot". The undisputed facts in the matter are that the petitioner-society had applied for grant of plots for the construction of residential buildings to accommodate their members and accordingly the Additional Collector of Bombay Suburban District had, by his order dated 1-2-1967, granted six plots bearing Nos. 34A, 34B, 34-C, 35A, 35B and 35C of the layout approved by the Town Planning Department from TPS VI, Santacruz P28 Nos. 18 and 19 of Andheri Taluka, Bombay Suburban District, on payment of the occupancy price, on certain terms and conditions disclosed in the Schedule appended to the said order. On payment of the occupancy price of Rs. 4,4-07.72, the petitioner-society was given possession of five plots, excluding the said plot. As regards the said plot, the possession thereof could not be given as the same was already encroached upon and therefore under the letter dated 29-11-1969, issued by the Additional Collector of Bombay Suburban District, it was informed to the petitioners that "the possession of the plot No. 35A will be handed over to the society after the encroachments are removed". The society, after taking possession of five plots out of the six plots allotted to them, constructed three buildings on the said five plots during the period from 1967 to 1972, comprising of 56 flats for the members of the petitioner-society. The name of the petitioner-society was mutated in the land records as well as in the office of the City Survey in relation to all the six plots, including the said plot. Sometimes in the year 1999, an association by name the Relief Road Housing Societies Association, of which the petitioner-society is a member, filed Writ Petition bearing No. 98 of 1999 against the State Government and others for a writ of mandamus for direction to the respondents therein to remove the encroachments by the unauthorised hutments, structures etc., in the Government land specified in the said petition as no steps were being taken to remove those encroachments by the concerned authorities, inspite of the fact that those area including the plots were reserved for school, market, garden, recreational ground, playground, roads and open spaces in terms of the Town Planning Scheme. The said petition was disposed of with direction to the Government and the other authorities to remove all the encroachments from the D.P. Road and the footpaths in the Daulat Nagar area with specific direction that any plot under reservation having an area of less than 1000 sq.mtr. should be cleared of the encroachments, without exception and in respect of plots under reservation having area of 1001 sq.mtr. or more, all encroachments should be removed, if the encroachment over the plot was to be over an area less than 25% of the total area of the plot, while leaving it open to the association, who had filed the petition, to challenge the validity of the Development Control Regulation 33(10) and the General Slum Rehabilitation Scheme formulated by the respondent No. 9 therein by way of an appropriate proceeding. The Government was also directed to ensure that the area once cleared of the encroachment should not be allowed to be encroached upon again, The said judgment was delivered on 12-10-2001, and the same was . On 4-10-2002 an advertisement came to be published in the issue of the daily newspaper by name "Mid-day" indicating that the respondent No. 5 herein had undertaken to construct a building in the said plot. On the very day, the petitioner-society addressed a letter to the respondent No. 5, objecting to the proposed construction in the said plot claiming that the said plot belonged to the petitioner-society. It was also suggested that the controversy should be resolved by mutual discussion with the petitioner-society. On or about 9-5-2003 the members of the petitioner-society noticed that 14 slums which were existing in the said plot, were removed and the same was cleared of the encroachment. The petitioners thereupon filed the present petition on 1-7-2003 challenging the acts on the part of the respondents as also seeking direction to the respondents to hand over the possession of the said plot to the petitioners in terms of the grant made under the letter dated 1-2-1967. Pursuant to the notice issued, the respondents filed their affidavit in reply on 11-7-2003 disclosing that the report dated 14-9-1967 by the District Inspector of Land Records disclosed refusal on the part of the petitioners to take possession of the said plot along with the encroachments and the grant of the said plot was therefore cancelled by the order dated 11-2-1993 pursuant to the sanction granted in that regard by the Government under the letter dated 16-12-1992. Further, contending that the said fact was communicated to the petitioners under the letter dated 11-2-1993 and that the said fact was reiterated by them in the letter dated 19-6-2003, in reply to the letter of 9-5-2003 of the petitioner-society. Further, by affidavit dated 18-7-2003 on behalf of the Slum Rehabilitation Authority, it was also stated that cancellation of the grant and the proposed development of the plot and further that the said plot was forming part of the slum rehabilitation scheme was known to the petitioners as long back as in the year 1999 in view of the fact that the association, of which the petitioner-society was the member, had filed Writ Petition and that there is no explanation for the laches on the part of the petitioner in approaching the Court. It was also disclosed that nearly about 665 permanent alternate accommodation have already been constructed and the eligible hutment dwellers were already shifted to the permanent accommodation and that the developer had constructed nearly 720 transit accommodation, and the construction of five buildings consisting of 418 tenements was in progress. Thereupon the petitioners amended the petition seeking to challenge the orders passed on 16-12-1992 and 11-2-1993 as having been passed without hearing the petitioners, and that they were never communicated to the petitioners, and that the petitioners came to know about the same only after receipt of the letter dated 19-6-2003, during the pendency of this petition.

4. The undisputed facts, therefore, disclose that the said plot along with five other plots, was granted to the petitioner-society under the order dated 1-2-1967 under certain conditions. However, the possession of the said plot was not delivered to the petitioners as the same was already encroached upon and the petitioners were therefore informed that the possession thereof would be handed over after the encroachments were removed. It is also a matter of record that till May, 2003 the encroachments were not removed. Meanwhile, in 1992, the grant of the said plot in favour of the petitioners was cancelled and subsequently the said plot formed part of the slum rehabilitation scheme and in the process of implementation of the said scheme, the encroachers of the said plot were sought to be rehabilitated in the buildings which were sought to be constructed in the course of execution of the said rehabilitation scheme.

5. A preliminary point is sought to be raised on behalf of the respondents regarding jurisdiction of the single Judge of this Court to deal with the matter. The contention of the respondents is that since the challenge is to the slum rehabilitation scheme, the matter is required to be dealt with by the Division Bench as in terms of the Rule 636 of the Bombay High Court (Original Side) Rules, 1980, the jurisdiction of the single Judge of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is confined to matters wherein disputes arise out of orders passed or omitted to be passed, by any judicial forum or by any authority empowered to adjudicate under any statute and the challenge to the slum rehabilitation scheme in the petition in hand is not covered by the said provision of law and therefore the same falls outside the jurisdiction of a single Judge and the matter will have to be dealt with by a Division Bench. Perusal of the petition, however, discloses that the grievance of the petitioners essentially relate to the order under the Section 30 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 and the orders which have been passed by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 on 16-12-1992 and 11-2-1993 and all other prayers are in the nature of consequential reliefs. Certainly, the petitioners seeking relief in relation to any order which is passed or omitted to be passed under the provisions of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code is to be dealt with by the single Judge in view of the Rule 636(1), Chapter XIV of the said Rules, Merely because a consequential relief, which may in a given case may happen to be the main relief to be granted, and therefore may require to be dealt with by the Division Bench, it cannot non-suit the petitioners before a single Judge when the cause of action arise from the order which can be dealt with by a single Judge in terms of the said Rule. What relief ultimately the petitioners would be entitled to, will have to be decided by the Court. Hence, the preliminary objection sought to be raised is rejected.

6. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it would be necessary to scan through the provisions of law applicable to the matter in issue. The grant of land for the purpose of construction activities can be in terms of the Section 31 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966, hereinafter called as "the Code". The Section 31 of the Code speaks of the unoccupied land which can be granted for the purpose of utilisation thereof on conditions and it provides that it shall be lawful for the Collector subject to such rules as may from time to time be made by the State Government in that behalf, to require the payment of a price for unalienated land or to sell the same by auction, and to annex such conditions to the grant as may be prescribed by such rules before land is entered upon under the Section 30. The Section 30 thereof speaks of occupation of unalienated land granted under the provisions of the Code. It provides that where any unoccupied land which has not been alienated, is granted to any person under any of the provisions of the Code, it shall be the duty of the Tahsildar without any delay to call such person to occupy such land in accordance with the terms of the grant. The provisions of the Sections 30 and 31 therefore reveal that the grant of land thereunder shall always be subject to the conditions which are to be specified in the grant and that the possession of a land can be given only in cases where the land is unoccupied.

7. The Section 29 of the said Code speaks of different type of classes of persons holding land from the State, and it classifies such persons in three categories, firstly, the occupants of Class-I, secondly, the occupants of Class-II and thirdly, the Government lessees. The occupants of the Class-I are those who hold unalienated land in perpetuity and without any restrictions on the right to transfer. The occupants of the Class-II are those who hold unalienated land in perpetuity subject to restrictions on the right to transfer. The Government lessees are those who are granted on lease the Government land in terms of the Section 38 of the Code. Those becoming the occupants subsequent to the enforcement of the Code are obviously those who get the land pursuant to the grant under the Section 31 of the Code. The term "Government lessee" has been defined in the Section 2(11) of the Code to mean a person holding land from Government under a lease as provided by the Section 38. The term "alienated" has been defined in the Section 2(2) of the Code to mean transferred in so far as the rights of the State Government to payment of rent or land revenue are concerned, wholly or partially, to the ownership of any person. The term "to hold land" or "to be a landholder or holder of land" is defined under the Section 2(12) to mean to be lawfully in possession of the land, whether such possession is actual or not. The term "occupancy" is defined under the Section 2(22) to mean a portion of land held by an occupant, and the term "occupant" is defined in the Section 2(23) to mean a holder in actual possession of unalienated land, other than a tenant or a Government lessee, provided that, where a holder in actual possession is a tenant, the landholder or the superior landlord, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be the occupant. The term "occupation" according to the Section 2(24) means possession and the term "to occupy land" is defined in the Section 2(25) to mean to possess or to take possession of land. The term "unoccupied land" is defined in the Section 2(41) to mean the land in a village other than the land held by an occupant, a tenant or a Government lessee.

8. The definitions in the Section 2 of the Code therefore reveals that a land can be said to be unoccupied land when it is not in occupation either of the occupant or a tenant or a Government lessee. It may even include the land under encroachment. Obviously, therefore, a land inspite of having been encroached upon, may be an unoccupied land for the purpose of the grant or allotment under the Code. This is evident from the provisions of law contained in the Sections 30 and 31 r/w the Sections 50 and 53 of the Code. In other words, the power of the Government under the Section 31 to grant a land is restricted only in case of unalienated land but there is no prohibition for grant of a land which has been encroached upon. Needless to say that the question of delivery of possession of land under the Section 30 of the Code, however, would arise only after removal of any such encroachment, otherwise the very purpose of the grant would be defeated, Nobody can be expected to take possession of the land which is already encumbered by way of encroachment and therefore before issuing the notice under the Section 30 for taking possession of the land granted under the Section 31, the authorities will have to ensure that the land is cleared of the encroachment. Being so, the expression "unoccupied land" used in the Section 30 cannot be strictly understood in the manner it is defined under the Section 2(41) for the purpose of taking possession of the land granted under the Section 31 of the Code. Undoubtedly, therefore, after the grant of land under the Section 31, before issuing notice for taking possession of the land, the authorities will have to ensure that the encroachment, if any, on such land, is removed, and if necessary, even by taking resort to the powers under the Section 50 of the Code.

9. The Section 37 of the Code provides that an occupant is entitled for use and occupation of his land in perpetuity subject to payment of the amount due on account of the land revenue for the same, according to the provisions of the Code, or of any rules made under the Code or of any other law for the time being in force, and on the fulfilment of any other terms or conditions lawfully annexed to his tenure. The Section 72(3) provides that if within three years of the date on which the Collector takes possession of the occupancy or alienated holding under the Sub-section (2) of the Section 72, the former occupant or superior holder thereof may apply for restoration of the occupancy or alienated holding and thereupon the Collector may restore the occupancy or alienated holding to the occupant or, as the case may be, to the superior holder on the occupant or superior holder paying arrears due from him as land revenue and a penalty equal to three times the assessment. However, if the occupant or the superior holder fails to get the occupancy or alienated holding restored to him within the period of three years, the occupancy or alienated holding or part thereof shall be disposed of by the Collector in the manner provided in the Sub-section (1) of the Section 72. The Section 148 of the Code refers to record of rights and it provides that a record of rights shall be maintained in every village and such record shall include various particulars which shall include the names of all persons other than tenants who are holders, occupants, owners or mortgages of the land or assignees of the rent or revenue thereof, amongst other particulars.

10. It is to be noted that the case of the petitioner rests upon the grant dated 1-2-1967 r/w the letter dated 29-11-1969. It cannot be disputed that the petitioners were granted six plots, including the said plot under the said grant, albeit on certain conditions and two of such conditions read thus:-

"3. That the Society shall not enroll any additional members or substitute any member in place of those approved by Government, except with previous written approval of Government.

6. That the Society shall not utilise any part of the land directly or indirectly for the commercial, business or professional purpose except as provided for in layout approved by the Additional Collector, Bombay Suburban District, and Greater Bombay Municipal Corporation or with the prior written approval of Government."

It is not in dispute that the petitioner-society, pursuant to the grant of the plots and delivery of possession of five plots, excluding the said plot, constructed three buildings consisting of 56 flats for the members of the society. In other words, pursuant to the grant 'in accordance with the terms and conditions specified in the Schedule appended to the grant letter dated 1-2-1967, the members of the petitioner-society accommodated themselves in 56 flats in three buildings constructed by the petitioner-society. It is also not in dispute that the plot was essentially obtained for construction of the buildings for the purpose of occupation by the members of the society. It is not the case of the petitioners that in the process of construction of the three buildings, consisting of 56 flats, there was any arrangement made in or to the buildings which are already constructed to extend the same pursuant to acquisition of possession of the said plot. It is also not the case of the petitioners that on account of construction of 56 flats, any member of the society had to forego his/her claim for a flat or the accommodation in the buildings constructed by the petitioner-society. It is not the case of the petitioners that any of the member of the society remained to be accommodated in the said buildings and the possession of the said plot is necessary in order to have a building for accommodating such remaining member or members. These facts assume relevancy more particularly in view of the Clause 6 of the conditions quoted above, The Clause 6 clearly provides that the society cannot utilise any part of the land directly or indirectly for commercial, business or professional purposes. As already pointed out above, the Section 37 of the Code clearly provides that the occupant who has obtained grant of the Government land on conditions under the Section 31 can utilise the same subject to fulfilment of the terms and conditions of the grant. Undisputedly, the grant of plots to the petitioner-society was only for the purpose of construction of buildings for occupation by its members. It is pertinent to note that the petition nowhere discloses the purpose for which the said plot will be put to use by the petitioners in case the possession thereof is delivered.

11. The letter dated 29-11-1969, which was repeatedly referred to in the course of the arguments on behalf of the petitioners, undoubtedly, discloses a statement by the Additional Collector, Bombay Suburban District to the effect that "possession of the plot 35A will be handed over to the society after the encroachments are removed". It is to be noted that pursuant to an order of grant of the land under the Section 31 of the Code, a grantee would certainly be entitled for possession of the land so allotted, in terms of the Section 30 of the Code. In other words, it is the duty of the Tahsildar to ensure implementation of the order of allotment passed by the authority under the Section 31 within reasonable time from the issuance of such order of allotment. Undoubtedly, the Section 30 by itself does not provide for any period of limitation for compliance of the order of allotment, which is based under the Section 31 of the Code. It is wall-settled law that when no period is prescribed for compliance of any obligation by an authority, the authority is expected to comply with such obligation within a reasonable period. In the absence of the provision for specific period of limitation to comply with the obligation under the Section 30, it is therefore to be held that the same has to be within a reasonable period. Certainly therefore, an allottee under the Section 31, if notices reluctance on the part of the authorities to comply with their obligation under the Section 30 in relation to the land allotted to the allottee, then the latter would certainly be entitled to approach the Court to seek enforcement of such obligation of the authority.

12. For enforcement of any right in favour of any person, certainly there is a period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963. The Article 54 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act prescribes the period for limitation for enforcing any agreement between the parties. The Article 65 provides limitation of twelve years for possession of any immovable property or any interest therein based on the title. The suits for which no specific period is prescribed under the Limitation Act, the Article 113 thereof provides the period of three years from the date of accrual of right to sue. Any decree, except for mandatory injunction, of a civil Court can be executed within a period of twelve years in terms of the Article 36 of the said Act. Any application for which no period of limitation is prescribed elsewhere in the said Act, it can be filed within a period of three years from the date of accrual of right to apply and Article 137 of the Limitation Act is clear in that regard. However, it cannot be disputed that for entertaining a Writ petition, the provisions of the Limitation Act are not applicable. At the same time, it is well-settled law that a the party seeking relief by way of a Writ Petition has to approach the Court at the earliest opportunity and in case of delay the petitioner has to disclose sufficient cause, for the same.

13. The grant of the plot was in February, 1967. In November, 1969 the petitioners were informed that the possession of the said plot would be given only after removal of the encroachments. It is a mutter of record that since 1969 till June last, the petitioners had not approached the authorities demanding possession of the plot or seeking removal of the encroachments and asking possession of the land after removal thereof. There is no explanation on record as to what prevented the petitioners from approaching the authorities in that regard for all those years. There is no explanation on record as to why the petitioners did not approach the Court seeking the relief for possession of the land after direction for removal of the encroachments during all this period. At the same time, as already observed above, the records disclose that there is no grievance of the petitioners that any member of the petitioner-society was denied a flat in the said buildings constructed by the petitioners pursuant to the delivery of possession of five plots. These facts reveal that the petitioner had no grievance althroughout regarding non-delivery of possession of the said plot to the petitioner-society. It is only when the hutments were removed from the said plot in May last, that the petitioners thought of claiming right to the said plot referring to grant in the year 1967 and the letter dated 29-11-1969. Failure on the part of the petitioner to approach the Court as well as to the authorities for delivery of possession of the said plot by ordering specific performance of the grant; dated 1-2-1-967 for a period of more than thirty years from the letter dated 29-11-1969 apparently discloses that the petitioners were not interested in getting the possession of the said plot till June last, At this stage, one has to also bear in mind the limitation prescribed under the Code for seeking restoration of occupancy when such occupancy is terminated by the authorities for failure to pay the land revenue or non-compliance of the conditions in terms of the Section 72(3) and the period thereunder is only of three years.

14. Since the terms and conditions under the Clause 6 thereof clearly debar the petitioners from utilising any part of the allotted land for the purpose of commercial or business or professional purposes and restricts the use thereof for residential purpose and that too for the members of the society only and in the absence of grievance of the petitioners that some of the members of the society were left out from being provided accommodation for their residence in the buildings already constructed, it cannot be said that any prejudice was caused to the petitioners on account of non-delivery of possession of the said plot. It is not the case of the petitioners that the petitioners had at any time approached the authority for change of the condition or deletion of the condition regarding utilisation of the plot allotted to them for residential accommodation of their members only. Being so, as the records stand, the question of delivery of possession to the petitioners even under the grant dated 1-2-1967 does not arise.

15. Referring to the pleadings in the petition and the Exhibit-F to the petition, it was also sought to be contended that the fact that there is a waiting list and on delivery of possession of the said plot, the persons whose name figure in the waiting list would be accommodated in such buildings to be constructed therein was brought to the notice of the authority under the said letter. Undoubtedly, the pleadings in the petition disclose that the petitioner-society had pointed out to the authority in the letter dated 15/17-1-2001 that the plot No. 35A would be utilised for the occupation of the members on the waiting list of the petitioner-society. However, perusal of the said letter, the copy of which is annexed as Exhibit-F, nowhere, discloses any such intimation or representation being made by the petitioners to the concerned authority. The pleadings do not find any support from the materials on record. Therefore, the contention in that regard is devoid of substance.

16. As rightly submitted by the learned Advocates for the respondents, the petitioners were also aware of the fact that the said plot was forming part of the slum rehabilitation scheme and this was know to them when Writ Petition was filed by the Relief Road Housing Societies Association, of which the petitioners are members. In the affidavit filed on behalf of the slum rehabilitation authority, the fact that the slum rehabilitation scheme included the plot No. 35A has been clearly stated and the said fact has not been disputed or denied by the petitioner-society. Undisputedly, the proceedings in the Writ Petition filed by the Relief Road Housing Societies Association disclose detail reference to the said scheme, as also requirement of action to be taken by the authorities to remove the encroachments from the D.P. Road and footpaths in Daulat Nagar area. It was sought to be contended that the order refers merely to the footpaths in Daulat Nagar area and not to the said plot in the petition. Irrespective of the fact that directions issued in the said order in the Writ Petition relate to removal of encroachments on the footpaths in the D.P. Road area, at the same time, the judgment refer to the slum rehabilitation scheme and the said scheme covers the plot No. 35A, Therefore, it was within the knowledge of the petitioners as long back as in 1999 that the said plot had been subjected to be the part of the slum rehabilitation scheme. In other words, refusal to comply with the obligation, if any, under the order of grant dated 1-2-1967 was clearly known to the petitioners also in the year 1999. Even if one presumes that till that time the petitioner-society was not aware of the same or that the petitioner-society was still interested in obtaining possession of the said plot, there is no explanation on record as to what prevented the petitioners from approaching the Court immediately thereafter. It is apparent that the petitioners have allowed to create third party right in the said plot without being objected to the same in time.

17. It was also sought to be argued that there was no obligation on the part of the petitioners to approach the authorities to seek delivery of possession of the plot which was granted under the letter dated 1-2-1967 or to see to it that the encroachment is removed by the authorities and the possession is delivered to the petitioner-society. As already observed above, the Section 30 of the Code clearly provides that pursuant to the grant under the Section 31, it is the duty of the Tahsildar, without any delay, to call upon the allottee to enter upon the occupation of the land allotted to him. In other words, the obligation upon the Collector creates a right in favour of the allottee to obtain possession of the land immediately after issuance of the order of grant under the Section 31. Once such right is accrued, it cannot be said that there is no obligation on the part of the petitioners to ensure that possession is obtained within reasonable time from the date of the grant of the land. A beneficiary in relation to any land of the Government pursuant to the order of grant cannot sleep over his/her right indefinitely and thereafter make a grievance about non-compliance of the obligation by the authorities. The failure on the part of the allottee to enforce the right accrued to him, for an indefinite period and certainly more than a period of thirty years, cannot be made a ground for action against the authority after expiry of the said period without disclosing any justification for the delay in approaching the Court. It is well-settled law that the law assists the vigilant and not to those who sleep over their right.

18. In the background of the above facts, therefore, in the absence of any explanation for the delay in approaching the Court and merely referring to the incident of May, 2003, consequent to removal of the huts to enforce the right which the petitioners had acquired in 1967 and further in 1969, cannot be a justification for interference by this Court in writ jurisdiction in the year 2003.

19. The petitioners, however, are right in contending that an order of revocation of grant of plot cannot be passed without hearing the allottee, The authorities are also not entitled to neglect or refuse to communicate such order to the allottee, The contention of the respondents that the order of cancellation of the grant was communicated to the petitioners under the letter dated 11-2-1993 cannot be accepted. Any such order will have to be communicated either by way of registered post or at least under the certificate of posting. The records apparently disclose that the letter dated 11-2-1993 was neither sent by registered post nor under the certificate of posting and therefore the presumption which is otherwise available under the Section 27 of the General Clauses Act is not available to the respondents in relation to the service of the said letter upon the petitioners, However, the said lapse on the part of the respondents, in the case in hand, in the facts and circumstances thereof, would not entitle the petitioners to challenge the said order in the present petition since the petitioners had not bothered to seek enforcement of the grant for more than twelve years since the year 1969. The order was passed in the year 1992, much after the expiry of the period of twelve years. In fact, considering the provision of the Section 72(3), of the Code, r/w the Section 30 and the fact that the said plot continued to have encroachment over it in the year 1992 as well as the conduct of the petitioners, it is doubtful whether there was any subsisting right in favour of the petitioners in the year 1992 over the said plot. In fact, the records reveal that the order was passed merely to keep the records straight and to enable the allottee of the land to whom it can be allotted subsequent to the failure on the part of the petitioners to obtain the possession thereof, without any encumbrance relating to the said plot. Viewed from this angle, therefore, the impugned order cannot be said to be causing any prejudice to the petitioners. For the reasons stated above, and in the facts and circumstances of the case, failure on the part of the respondents to issue notice to the petitioner-society before passing the order in the year 1992 and non-communication of the same to the petitioners cannot be a ground for entertaining the petition in the year 2003.

20. Much was sought to be argued, based on the entry in Form I in favour of the petitioner-society in relation to the said plot. Undoubtedly, the entry therein discloses the name of the petitioner-society to be the owner of the plot No. 35A. However, these entries are not the documents of title. They are revenue entries for the purpose of revenue records and the presumption arising under the Section 157 of the Code regarding such entries is always rebuttable. The records apparently disclose that possession of the said plot was never handed over to the petitioners and on the contrary, the possession remained with the encroachors till May last. Apparently, the presumption arising pursuant to the entry in Form I in favour of the petitioners stands rebutted. Therefore, merely on the basis of such entry, it cannot be presumed that the right in favour of the petitioners, which had accrued pursuant to the grant in 1967, continued to exist even in the year 1992, or further in the year 2003 in relation to the said plot.

21. For the reasons stated above, there is no justification for interference in the impugned orders and therefore the petition fails. The same is dismissed and the rule is discharged with costs.

22. All concerned to act on the ordinary copy of this order duly authenticated by the Associate/P.S. of this Court as a true copy.