Singareddy Nagamani, vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh
2024 Latest Caselaw 6809 AP

Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati

Singareddy Nagamani, vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 7 August, 2024

APHC010297182024

                   IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
                                 AT AMARAVATI             [3330]
                          (Special Original Jurisdiction)

            WEDNESDAY, THE SEVENTH DAY OF AUGUST
               TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR

                      PRESENT
 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE TARLADA RAJASEKHAR RAO

                     WRIT PETITION No: 14849/2024
Between:
Singareddy Nagamani,                                ...PETITIONER
                               AND
The State Of Andhra Pradesh and Others         ...RESPONDENT(S)

Counsel for the Petitioner:
  1. C SUMON

Counsel for the Respondent(S):
  1. GP FOR AGRICULTURE
  2. B PRAKASAM (Sr SC FOR A M C )


                     WRIT PETITION No: 14851/2024
Between:
Kambala Krishna Veni                                ...PETITIONER
                               AND
The State Of Andhra Pradesh and Others         ...RESPONDENT(S)

Counsel for the Petitioner:
  1. ASHOK RAM V

Counsel for the Respondent(S):
  1. GP FOR AGRICULTURE
  2. B PRAKASAM (Sr SC FOR A M C )
                                  2




                  WRIT PETITION No: 15125/2024
Between:
Chintaguntla Salaman                             ...PETITIONER
                               AND
The State Of Andhra Pradesh and Others       ...RESPONDENT(S)

Counsel for the Petitioner:
  1. KASA JAGANMOHAN REDDY

Counsel for the Respondent(S):
  1. GP FOR AGRICULTURE
  2. B PRAKASAM (Sr SC FOR A M C )

                  WRIT PETITION No: 15139/2024
Between:
Manepalli Naga Brahamam                          ...PETITIONER
                              AND
The State Of Ap and Others                   ...RESPONDENT(S)

Counsel for the Petitioner:
  1. G V S KISHORE KUMAR

Counsel for the Respondent(S):
  1. GP FOR AGRICULTURE

                  WRIT PETITION No: 16370/2024
Between:
Kambala Krishna Veni                              ...PETITIONER
                              AND
The State Of Ap and Others                   ...RESPONDENT(S)

Counsel for the Petitioner:
  1. ASHOK RAM V

Counsel for the Respondent(S):
  1. GP FOR AGRICULTURE
                                  3




                  WRIT PETITION No: 16372/2024
Between:
Singareddy Nagamani                              ...PETITIONER
                               AND
The State Of Andhra Pradesh and Others      ...RESPONDENT(S)

Counsel for the Petitioner:
  1. C SUMON

Counsel for the Respondent(S):
  1. GP FOR AGRICULTURE

                  WRIT PETITION No: 16545/2024
Between:
Manepalli Naga Brahamam                          ...PETITIONER
                               AND
The State Of Andhra Pradesh and Others      ...RESPONDENT(S)

Counsel for the Petitioner:
  1. G V S KISHORE KUMAR

Counsel for the Respondent(S):
  1. GP FOR AGRICULTURE


The Court made the following:
                                    4




COMMON ORDER:

Writ petitioners through their respective counsels filed the

following Writ Petitions: W.P.No.14849 of 2024, W.P.No.14851 of 2024,

W.P.No.15125 of 2024, W.P.No.15139 of 2024, for issuance of

mandamus, to declare the G.O.Rt.No.410 dated 28.06.2024 issued by

the Principal Secretary, Agriculture and Cooperation Department, who is

arrayed as 1st respondent in the above said Writ Petitions questioning

the consequential proceedings bearing No.AGC05-11021/20/2024-1

dated 28.06.2024 issued by the Director of Agricultural Marketing, who

is arrayed as 2nd respondent herein, in unilaterally removing the

petitioners herein as Chairman of Agricultural Market Committee and

appointing person-in-charge, without following the principles of natural

justice and contrary to the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh

(Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets Act, 1966 (hereinafter

called, „the Act, 1996‟), as violative of the Fundamental Rights

guaranteed to the petitioners under the Constitution of India, on the

ground that the said impugned G.O. discloses that the provision of law

which was given one time application with reference to the commencing

date of Amendment Act No.28 of 2019 and the G.O. clearly portrays a

complete lack of application of mind and perverse and it is abuse of

power by the respondents.

2. Subsequent to filing and pendency of the above Writ Petitions,

the respondents have issued G.O.Rt.No.458 dated 22.07.2024 and the

notification which reads thus:

NOTIFICATION In exercise of the powers conferred by the first proviso under sub-section (30 of Section 5 of the Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce & Livestock) Markets Act, 1966 (Act 16 of 1966), and in partial modification to the orders issued in the G.O.Rt.No.410, Agriculture & Cooperation (MKTG-I) Department, the Government of Andhra Pradesh hereby cease to hold the officers of all the members including Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the 21 existing Market Committees specified in the said G.O. on and from the 28th June, 2024.

Which was assailed in W.P.No.16370 of 2024, filed by learned counsel

Sri Ashok Ram V and W.P.No.16372 of 2024 filed by learned counsel

Sri C.Sumon and W.P.No.16545 of 2024 filed by learned counsel

Sri G.V.S.Kishore Kumar.

3. The said G.O.Rt.No.458 dated 22.07.2024 was assailed in the

Writ Petition No.16370 of 2024, W.P.No.16372 of 2024 and in

W.P.No.16545 of 2024, on the ground that the invocation of the proviso

to sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Act, 1966, is illegal and in

contravention of the several judgments of the Hon‟ble Apex Court and

this Court. Under sub-section (5) of Section 5 of the Act, 1966, the

respondents have to call for an explanation from the petitioners and

they have to issue a notification containing a statement of reasons of

the Government for the action taken and the G.O.Rt.No.458, the

"pleasure doctrine" by the Government cannot be exercised without

following the principle of law and the "Doctrine of Pleasure" has certain

limitations and that the principles of natural justice are bound to be

followed even if the respondents seek to invoke the said doctrine.

4. The power to remove the Chairman or any member has been

provided for in the same Section 5 of the Act, 1966 and sub-section (5)

of Section5 of the Act, 1966 clearly elaborates the procedure to be

followed for the purpose of removal of the Chairman of an Agricultural

Market Committee, which includes several essential ingredients such as

"formation of opinion" by the Government that there was

"insubordination" or "abuse of power" by the Chairman, "opportunity of

explanation" to the said Chairman, before taking any action and

"statement of reasons" for such removal.

5. It is also agitated that the respondents cannot remove the

petitioners retrospectively from the date 28.06.2024 and the

respondents have to read all the provisions together and without issuing

any show cause notice or calling for an explanation, they cannot remove

the petitioners. Hence, prayed to allow the Writ Petitions and to set

aside the impugned G.O.Rt.No.458 dated 22.07.2024.

6. Sri S.Sriram, Ex-Advocate General and the learned designated

Senior Counsel has taken the lead and argued the matter at length on

behalf of the learned counsel for the writ petitioners referred supra.

7. The anchor sheet of the argument of the learned Designated

Senior Counsel and Ex-Advocate General for the petitioners is

the judgment of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of B.P.Singhal v.

Union of India1, wherein it is held that the decision of the Government

by invoking the doctrine of pleasure must be tor good and compelling

reasons and it cannot be at the sweet will, whim and fancy of the State

Government, but it can only be for valid reasons and the power

referable to doctrine of pleasure can be used reasonably and only for

public good.

(2010) 6 SCC 331

8. Basing on the judgment of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in

B.P.Singhal's case (1 supra), learned Senior Counsel would agitate that

in the present case, the respondents have acted to their whims and

fancies and they have not issued any notice and exercising the power of

„pleasure‟ is against to the constitutional mandate and also argued that

the "doctrine of pleasure" in its absolute unrestricted application does

not exist in India and also referred Articles 310 and 311 of the

Constitution of India, which reads thus:

"310. Tenure of office of persons serving the Union or a State

-- (1) Except as expressly provided by this Constitution, every person who is a member of a defence service or of a civil service of the Union or of an all-India service or holds any post connected with defence or any civil post under the Union holds office during the pleasure of the President, and every person who is a member of a civil service of a State or holds any civil post under a State holds office during the pleasure of the Governor of the State.

311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State (1)

(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given

a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges."

9. And also voiced that a "pleasure doctrine" as contemplated under

proviso to sub-section 3 of Section 5 in the Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural

Produce Livestock) Markets Act, 1966 is in parimateria provisions of

the Act in the Andhra Pradesh Public Libraries Act, 1960, sub-section

(2) of Section 7 and sub-sections (1) & (3) of Section 11, where a

learned Single Judge of this Court held that said doctrine is not a

licence to act arbitrarily, whimsically or capriciously in Dasari Raja

Master v. State of Andhra Pradesh, rep. by its Principal Secretary and

another2, relying on the judgment of Hon‟ble Apex Court in

B.P.Singhal's case (1 supra) and relied on another judgment of this

Court in Dadi Devi v.State of Andhra Pradesh3 and His Lordship held

that premature termination would cast stigma on the character of the

person removed without reasons.

10. Learned Senior Counsel has stated that against the order in

Dasari Raja Master's case (2 supra), a Writ Appeal was filed by the

State and the said order was suspended by a Division Bench of this

Court and mere suspension of the order that does not means that the

2021 SCC Online AP 1049 = (2021) 4 ALD 196

2021 SCC Online AP 2674

ratio of the decision has been wiped off and relied on the following

judgments:

(i) Palaniswamy and another v. The State of A.P. Revenue (Land

Acquisition) Department, Secretariat, Hyderabad, rep., by its Principal

Secretary and two others4,

(ii) Government of A.P. and others v. N.Rami Reddy and others5 and

(iii) Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd., v. Church of South India Trust

Association CSI Cinod Secretariat, Madras6, wherein the Hon‟ble Apex

Court held that the stay of operation of an order does not, however, lead

to such a result, and it only means that the order which has been stayed

would not be operative from the date of the passing of the stay order

and it does not mean that the said order has been wiped out from

existence.

11. At the outset, it is the contention of the learned Senior Counsel

that the doctrine of pleasure is not absolute and subject to restrictions

and referred sub-section (5) of Section 5 of the Act, 1966, which

extracted thus:

"The Government may, by notification, remove the chairman or vice-chairman, who in their opinion wilfully omits or

2018 SCC Online Hyd. 16 = (2018) 3 ALD 181 (DB)

2000 SCC Online AP 721 = AIR 2001 AP 226

(1992) 3 SCC 1

refuses to carry out or disobeys the provisions of this Act or any rules or bye-laws or lawful orders issued hereunder or abuses his position or the powers vested in him, after giving him an opportunity for explanation, and the said notification shall contain a statement of the reasons of the Government for the action taken."

12. Learned Senior Counsel also relied on the sub-rule (3) of Rule 25

of the Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets

Rules, 1969, which reads thus:

"(3) (i) The Government shall, before taking action under sub-rule (2) issue a notice calling upon the member of the market committee concerned to show cause within such time as may be specified therein, not being less than seven days from the service thereof, why he should not be removed as a member of the market committee and consider his reply thereto, if any, received from the member before the expiry of the time specified in the notice."

13. Therefore, in view of sub-section (5) of Section 5 of the Act, 1966,

a notice has to be given calling for explanation and in the present case,

no notice was given before removal.

14. According to the learned Senior Counsel, removing the

petitioners, who have already been appointed for a specific period,

constitutes retrospective removal, which is against the law and relied on

orders in W.P.No.24877 of 2014 and batch delivered on 07.11.2014.

Answered at paragraph No.31. Therefore, it is agitated that the

impugned order is liable to be set aside.

15. And also contended that the State is under an obligation to act

fairly without ill will or malice in fact or in law and where malice is

attributed to the State, it can never be a case of personal ill-will or spite

on the part of the State and "Legal malice" or "malice in law" means

something done without lawful excuse and it is a deliberate act in

disregard to the rights of others and it is an act which is taken with an

oblique or indirect object and it is an act done wrongfully and willfully

without reasonable or probable cause, and not necessarily an act done

from ill feeling and spite and conscious violation of the law to the

prejudice of another, a depraved inclination on the part of the authority

to disregard the rights of others, where intent is manifested by its

injurious acts and passing an order for unauthorized purpose constitutes

malice in law, relying on the judgment of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Ravi

Yashwant Bhoir v. District Collector, Raigad and others7. Hence,

prayed to allow all the Writ Petitions.

(2012) 4 SCC 407

16. Learned Advocate General appearing for the respondents-State

argued that the authority is vested with the doctrine pleasure under

proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Act, 1966, where "pleasure

doctrine" is exercised no reasons need be required and the learned

Advocate General also relied on the same judgment of the Hon‟ble

Apex Court in B.P.Singhal's case (1 supra) and relied on the paragraph

Nos.70, 71, 80 and 83(iv) of the said judgment, which read thus:

"70. We have however already rejected the contention that the Governor should be in sync with the ideologies of the Union Government. Therefore, a Governor cannot be removed on the ground that he is not sync or refuses to act as an agent of the party in power at the Centre. Though the Governors, Ministers and Attorney General, all hold office during the pleasure of the President, there is an intrinsic difference between the office of a Governor and the offices of Ministers and Attorney General. Governor is the Constitutional Head of the State. He is not an employee or an agent of the Union Government nor a part of any political team. On the other hand, a Minister is hand-picked member of the Prime Minister's team. The relationship between the Prime Minister and a Minister is purely political. Though the Attorney General holds a public office, there is an element of lawyer-client relationship between the Union Government and the Attorney General. Loss of confidence will therefore be very relevant criterion for withdrawal of pleasure, in the case of a

Minister or the Attorney General, but not a relevant ground in the case of a Governor.

(v) Judicial review of withdrawal of President's pleasure

71. When a Governor holds office during the pleasure of the Government and the power to remove at the pleasure of the President is not circumscribed by any conditions or restrictions, it follows that the power is exercisable at any time, without assigning any cause. However, there is a distinction between the need for a cause for the removal, and the need to disclose the cause for removal. While the President need not disclose or inform the cause for his removal to the Governor, it is imperative that a cause must exist. If we do not proceed on that premise, it would mean that the President on the advice of the Council of Ministers, may make any order which may be manifestly arbitrary or whimsical or mala fide. Therefore, while no cause or reason be disclosed or assigned for removal by exercise of such prerogative power, some valid cause should exist for the removal. Therefore, while we do not accept the contention that an order under Article 156 is not justiciable, we accept the contention that no reason need be assigned and no cause need be shown and no notice need be issued to the Governor before removing a Governor.

80. The extent and depth of judicial review will depend upon and vary with reference to the matter under review. As observed by Lord Steyn in Ex parte Daly [2001 (3) All ER 433], in law, context is everything, and intensity of review will depend on the subject- matter of review. For example, judicial review is permissible in regard to administrative action, legislations and constitutional

amendments. But the extent or scope of judicial review for one will be different from the scope of judicial review for other. Mala fides may be a ground for judicial review of administrative action but is not a ground for judicial review of legislations or constitutional amendments. For withdrawal of pleasure in the case of a Minister or an Attorney General, loss of confidence may be a relevant ground. The ideology of the Minister or Attorney General being out of sync with the policies or ideologies of the Government may also be a ground. On the other hand, for withdrawal of pleasure in the case of a Governor, loss of confidence or the Governor's views being out of sync with that the Union Government will not be grounds for withdrawal of the pleasure. The reasons for withdrawal are wider in the case of Ministers and Attorney-General, when compared to Governors. As a result, the judicial review of withdrawal of pleasure, is limited in the case of a Governor whereas virtually nil in the case of a Minister or an Attorney General.

83 (iv) As there is no need to assign reasons, any removal as a consequence of withdrawal of the pleasure will be assumed to be valid and will be open to only a limited judicial review. If the aggrieved person is able to demonstrate prima facie that his removal was either arbitrary, malafide, capricious or whimsical, the court will call upon the Union Government to disclose to the court, the material upon which the President had taken the decision to withdraw the pleasure. If the Union Government does not disclose any reason, or if the reasons disclosed are found to be irrelevant, arbitrary, whimsical, or malafide, the court will interfere. However, the court will not interfere merely on the ground that a different view is possible or that the material or reasons are insufficient."

17. Learned Advocate General also relied on the judgment of the

Hon‟ble Apex Court in Cheviti Venkanna Yadav v. State of Telangana

and others8, wherein it was held at paragraph Nos.32, 33 and 34 as

follows:

"32. Having so stated, it is to be scrutinized whether the base of earlier judgment has been removed. The High Court in its earlier judgment had struck down the amended provision on the foundation that there was discrimination between the existing appointees and future appointees to the office of members, Vice- Chairmen and Chairmen. The High Court had opined that the classification between the two categories was not reasonable and it caused discomfort to Article 14 of the (2004) 1 SCC 712 Constitution. It had given emphasis on the statutory safeguards meant for removal. The legislature after the decision of the High Court has amended the provision. By such amendment, it has removed the distinction between the existing members and the members who are to come in future. It has substituted the word "appointed" by "nominated". It is worth noting that as per the earlier provision members were to be appointed by the Government in consultation with the Director of Marketing from among certain categories of growers of agricultural produce, owners of livestock and products of livestock in the notified area. The Chairmen and the Vice-Chairmen were appointed from amongst its members by the Government in consultation with the Director of Marketing. As has been stated earlier, the word

(2017) 1 SCC 283

"appointed" has been substituted as "nominated". Submission of Mr. Rao, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants is that by such an amendment the vested right of the appellants has been affected. It is noticeable that under the scheme of the Act, the word "appointed" as was used in the earlier provision was really not an appointment which can be equated to a post under the service jurisprudence. The members were meant to be members for the purpose of composition of market committee.

What is urged is that the members, the Chairmen and the Vice- Chairmen had a fixed term, who could be removed after inquiry or under certain conditions. Our attention has been drawn to sub- section (5) of Section 6 but after the amendment the members had ceased to become members prior to expiry of their tenure, that is, three years. We may make it clear that the competent authority of the State Government still can remove member or Vice-Chairman or Chairman taking recourse to other provisions prior to expiry of the period. The grievance of the appellants is that the period is curtailed and the vested right is affected. The argument is that it could not have been done by retrospective amendment of the provision.

33. The aforesaid argument suffers from a fallacy. The members were not elected. They were not appointed by any kind of selection. They were chosen by the State Government from certain categories. The status of the members have been changed by amending the word "appointed" by substituting it with the word "nominated". Thus, the legislature has retrospectively changed the meaning. In our considered opinion, by virtue of the amendment, the term which has been reduced for a nominated member stands on a different footing. In Om Narain Agarwal and others v. Nagar

Palika, Shahjahanpur and others11 it has been held that if an appointment has been made initially by nomination, there can be no violation of any provision of the Constitution in case the legislature authorised the State Government to terminate such appointment at its pleasure and to nominate new members in their place. It is because the nominated members do not have the will or authority of any residents of the Municipal Board behind them as may be present in the case of an elected member. The Court further observed that such provision neither offends any Article of the Constitution nor the same is against any public policy or democratic norms enshrined in the Constitution.

34. The word "appointment" has been substituted by "nomination". It is an appointment by nomination. It is from certain categories for the purpose of representation. It is not (1993) 2 SCC 242 appointment as the word ordinarily connotes. The legislature, in its wisdom, has substituted the word "appointment" and made it "nomination with retrospective effect". To enable it to curtail or reduce the term, the procedure for removal remains intact. A nominee can go from office by efflux of time when the period is over. That is different than when he is removed. A nominated member, in praesenti, can also be removed by adopting the procedure during the period. Otherwise, he shall continue till his term is over; and the term is one year. The plea of vested right is like building a castle in Spain. It has no legs to stand upon and, therefore, we unhesitatingly repel the said submission."

18. Learned Advocate General also relied on the judgment of the

High Court for the State of Telangana in W.P.No.1598 of 2024 dated

03.05.2024 and also relied on the judgment of this Court delivered by

me in W.P.No.14987 of 2024 dated 24.07.2024, holding that once the

doctrine of pleasure is applicable neither the principles of natural justice

would step in nor any question of giving an opportunity before removal

would arise and the said proposition was relied by me basing on the

judgments of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Cheviti Venkanna Yadav's case

(8 supra), in Krishna S/o. Bulaji Borate v. State Of Maharashtra And

Ors9 and in Om Narain Agarwal And Ors. Etc v. Nagar Palika

Shahjahanpur And Ors10.

19. And also contends that the reading of the two provisions, i.e.,

sub-section (3) of Section 5 and sub-section (5) of Section 5 of the Act,

1966, are two independent provisions and each of them has to be

decided in the language thereof and the provisions does defer

qualitatively and two sections are intended to ask two different objects

and there is nothing to indicate connection in between two provisions

and therefore agitate that both the provisions cannot be read together

and it is not a complete Code as voiced by the learned Senior Counsel

Sri S.Sriram, Ex-Advocate General and the two independent provisions

and each of them has to be decided on the language thereof and

(2001) 2 SCC 441

(1993) 2 SCC 242

therefore proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 5 cannot be read along

with sub-section (5) of Section 5 of the Act, 1966 and the doctrine of

pleasure can be exercised by the respondents, and supported the order

of this Court in W.P.No.14987 of 2024 dated 24.07.2024 and hence,

prayed to dismiss the Writ Petition.

20. After giving anxious considerations and the contentions raised by

both the learned designated Senior Counsels, the contention of the writ

petitioners is that since the Chairman holds office for the statutory

period of one year, that they could not be removed earlier, particularly,

when there was nothing against his conduct, and they cannot be

removed by invoking doctrine of pleasure by the authorities to their

whims and fancies and the doctrine of pleasure has to be exercised with

circumspection.

21. The said contention, according to my view, is not a valid

contention, as the petitioners do not hold the civil post, as contemplated

under Article 310 of the Constitution of India.

22. The distinction, however, must be borne in mind between the two

expression, namely 'public office' and 'civil post'. For the purpose of

invoking of Article 311 of the Constitution of India, it is imperative that

the person must be holding a civil post either under the Union of India or

under the State. In the instant case, the petitioners cannot be said to be

holding a civil post as contemplated under Art 310 of the Constitution of

India and, therefore, those Articles as contemplated under chapter XIV

cannot be attracted in this case. The power to appoint also includes the

power to remove those appointees, which is entirely up to the discretion

of the person appointing. In the event that the petitioner's term has been

reduced or is determined in accordance with the Proviso to Section 3 of

Section 5 of the Market Committees Act petitioners cannot file a petition

for the purpose of continuance or reinstatement to the said post till the

said order is over. No petition for the said relief is maintainable since it

is within the absolute discretion of the Government to determine the

term of the Chairman by exercising the above statutory power which

has been conferred on it by the competent Legislature.

23. Such nominations did not amount to employment, and in any

case did not amount to employment under the State and such nominees

could not claim no rights apart from those conferred under the Articles

of Association.

24. And as held by this Court in W.P.No.14987 of 2024 dated

24.07.2024, Section 16 of the General Clauses Act applies where the

power to appoint to include power to suspend or dismiss. Even in

B.P.Singhal's case (1 supra), in paragraph Nos.16 to 35 thereof, held

that though the doctrine of pleasure was discussed, but the same was

only in the wake of removal of the Governor (who hold a constitutional

post), whereas in the present case, the petitioner was removed by

invoking doctrine of pleasure and the principles of natural justice have

no application.

25. The principle that no person shall be removed until that person

has been given an opportunity of being heard in the matter, which was

explained by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in P.U.Myllaiahlychho v. State

of Mizoram11. Wherein the Supreme Court held that when the

appointment is at the pleasure of the Government, the petitioners were

not required to be heard prior to their removal and there is no violation

of principles of natural justice. In exercise of the doctrine of pleasure,

the principles of natural justice have no application. The ratio of the

above decision will apply with greater force in the present case, where

the appointment/nomination has no statutory basis whatsoever.

26. In Ghanshyam Singh v. Union of India12, the Delhi High Court,

while considering the validity of the provisions contained in the Multi-

State Co-operative Societies Act, has held that nomination of an officer

(2005) 2 SCC 92

AIR 1991 Delhi 59

or non-official by Central/State Government on Board of Directors of

Multi-State Co-operative Society can be revoked before expiry of full

term fixed for elected members and "nomination" cannot be equated

with "employment".

27. In the present case, since the nominations of the petitioners were

not based upon any rules or regulations prescribing qualifications, age,

etc., and since the same was based on subjective satisfaction of the

respondents. Therefore, the High Court was inclined to read the

doctrine of pleasure into the provisions of statute and bye-laws not

merely for the purpose of nomination, but for the purpose of removal

also.

28. A similar issue that the doctrine of pleasure, the State

Government could remove the petitioners without complying with the

requirements of principles of natural justice and without following the

procedure for removal has come up for consideration in D.C.Saxena v.

The State of Haryana and others13, wherein the appellant had been

removed by the State Government from the office of Chairman of the

Board even before he completed his tenure of two years for which he

had been appointed. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held that since

(1987) 3 SCC 251

the action was not punitive and the action was pursuant to a general

policy decision of the Government, the provisions of the Act therein

were not attracted. Therefore, it is permissible for the State

Government to remove the petitioners in exercise of the right which the

State Government to under the doctrine of pleasure.

29. Hon‟ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. and others v. U.P.State

Law Officers Association and others14, has held that those who come by

the back door have to go by the same door and those who come to be

appointed by such arbitrary procedure can hardly complain if the

termination of their appointment is equally arbitrary.

30. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in B.P.Singhal v. Union of India (1

supra), more particularly in paras 16 to 35 thereof. In the said judgment

though the doctrine of pleasure was discussed, but the same was only

in the context of office of Governor(s) and who hold a constitutional

post, whereas it was leaving no doubt held by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court that in exercise of power of doctrine of pleasure, principles of

natural justice has no application. In the case on hand the writ

petitioners were not appointed under any procedure and their

appointment cannot be equated with employment under Article 310 of

(1994) 2 SCC 204

the Constitution of India and the petitioners were appointed under the

A.P. (Agricultural Produce and Live Stocks) Markets Act, 1966, the said

Act provides for removal under proviso to sub-section 3 of Section 5.

The B.P.Singhal's case (1 supra) does not apply to the petitioners for

the discussion made in paragraph No.22 in the order, and the removal

of the petitioners by the respondents does not cause any stigma based

on exercising the 'doctrine pleasure', as per the judgment of the Apex

Court in Om Narain Agarwal and others v. Nagar Palika, Shahjahanpur

and others case (10 supra) wherein it was held that when a person is

appointed by the State in exercise of its power of 'doctrine of pleasure',

it is not necessary that such an appointee should continue for the entire

period and he can be removed at any time while exercising power of

'doctrine of pleasure'.

31. The order in the batch of Writ Petition No.24877 of 2014 that an

ordinance was promulgated amending the Section 5 of Telangana

(Agricultural Produce and Live Stocks) Markets Act, 1966, decreasing

the members and tenure of the members nominated by the government

respectively, after elaborate discussion of law the Division Bench held

that "enactment cannot be a precedent unlike judicial pronouncement of

superior courts to accept the constitutional validity". The petitioners

were removed from their position of exercising the authority granted by

the section, not because of retrospective amendments. Hence the order

is not applicable to the facts in the case on hand. "When the petitioners

are disqualified by virtue of "doctrine pleasure" for being member, that

will entail automatic retrospective termination or shall be deemed to

have been terminated retrospectively".

32. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the Writ Petitions fail and,

they are, accordingly, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

As a sequel, interlocutory applications pending, if any, in these

Writ Petitions shall stand closed.

__________________________________ JUSTICE TARLADA RAJASEKHAR RAO

Date:07.08.2024

siva

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE TARLADA RAJASEKHAR RAO

WRIT PETITION Nos.14849, 14851, 15125, 15139, 16370, 16372 AND 16545 OF 2024

Date: 07.08.2024

siva