Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati

Doddapuneni Raja Raja Naidu vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 1 April, 2024

Author: K. Sreenivasa Reddy

Bench: K Sreenivasa Reddy

APHC010578192022
                     IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA
                                 PRADESH
                                                              [3327]
                              AT AMARAVATI
                       (Special Original Jurisdiction)

            MONDAY ,THE FIRST DAY OF APRIL
           TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR
                       PRESENT
 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K SREENIVASA REDDY
            CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 8482/2022
Between:
Doddapuneni Raja@ Raja Naidu ...PETITIONER/ACCUSED(S)
and Others

                                  AND
The State Of Andhra           ...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT(S)
Pradesh and Others

Counsel for the Petitioner/accused(S):
  1. GINJUPALLI SUBBA RAO

Counsel for the Respondent/complainant(S):
  1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (AP)

   2. MALIREDDY GOWTHAM

The Court made the following:


          HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K. SREENIVASA REDDY

                        IA Nos.1 and 2 of 2023
                                 in/and
                   Criminal Petition No.8482 of 2022

Common Order:

This Criminal Petition, under Section 482 Cr.P.C., has been

filed by the petitioners/A-1 to A-5, seeking to quash the proceedings

in Crime No.537 of 2022 of Vedayapalem Police Station, Nellore, SPSR

Nellore District, for the offences under Sections 341, 324 and 307

read with 34 IPC and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled

Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

2. It is represented that both the parties have settled the dispute

amicably out of the Court at the intervention of their elders and well

wishers. In view of the settlement arrived between both the parties,

they filed IA Nos.1 and 2 of 2023 seeking to permit them to

compound the offences and to record the compromise.

3. Today, when the matter is taken up, petitioners and 2nd

respondent herein are present before this Court. They produced their

respective Aadhar cards in proof of their identity. Learned counsel for

the petitioners and the learned counsel for 2nd respondent identified

both the parties in the open Court. This Court has questioned the de

facto complainant with regard to compromise and he has

categorically stated to that extent that he has voluntarily entered into

compromise with the accused.

4. In Gian Singh v. State of Punjab & another,1 the Hon'ble

Apex court held thus: (para 57)

"The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different

2012 (9) Scale 257

from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences Under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil favour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and

compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."

5. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor has relied on a decision

reported in Ramawatar v. State of Madhya Pradesh2, in support

of his contention that, the Hon'ble Apex Court or the High Court, as

the case may be, after having given due regard to the nature of the

offence and the fact that the victim/complainant has willingly entered

into a settlement/compromise, can quash proceedings in exercise of

their respective constitutional/inherent powers.

6. In a decision in Kapil Gupta v. State of NCT of Delhi &

another3, the Hon'ble Apex Court held thus:

"12. No doubt that the learned ASG is right in relying on various judgments of this Court which reiterate the legal position that in heinous and serious offences like murder or rape, the Court should not quash the proceedings. It will be relevant to refer to paragraph 29.5 to 29.7 of the judgment of this Court in the case of Narender Singh v. State of Punjab1, which read thus:

"29.5 While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.

2021 SCC OnLine SC 966

(2022) 8 Supreme 341

29.6 Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone.

However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

29.7 While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage,

the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime."

13. It can thus be seen that this Court has clearly held that though the Court should be slow in quashing the proceedings wherein heinous and serious offences are involved, the High Court is not foreclosed from examining as to whether there exists material for incorporation of such an offence or as to whether there is sufficient evidence which if proved would lead to proving the charge for the offence charged with. The Court has also to take into consideration as to whether the settlement between the parties is going to result into harmony between them which may improve their mutual relationship.

14. The Court has further held that it is also relevant to consider as to what is stage of the proceedings. It has been observed that if an application is made at a belated stage wherein the evidence has been led and the matter is at the stage of arguments or judgment, the Court should be slow to exercise the power to quash the proceedings. However, if such an application is made at an initial stage

before commencement of trial, the said factor will weigh with the court in exercising its power.

15. The facts and circumstances as stated hereinabove are peculiar in the present case. Respondent No. 2 is a young lady of 23 years. She feels that going through trial in one case, where she is a complainant and in the other case, wherein she is the accused would rob the prime of her youth. She feels that if she is made to face the trial rather than getting any relief, she would be faced with agony of undergoing the trial.

16. In both the cases, though the charge sheets have been filed, the charges are yet to be framed and as such, the trial has not yet commenced. It is further to be noted that since the respondent No. 2 herself is not supporting the prosecution case, even if the criminal trial is permitted to go ahead, it will end in nothing else than an acquittal. If the request of the parties is denied, it will be amounting to only adding one more criminal case to the already overburdened criminal courts.

17. In that view of the matter, we find that though in a heinous or serious crime like rape, the Court should not normally exercise the powers of quashing the proceedings, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case and in order to give succour to Respondent No. 2 so that she is saved from further agony of facing two criminal trials, one as a victim and one as an accused, we find that this is a fit case wherein the extraordinary powers of this Court be exercised to quash the criminal proceedings."

7. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Mandar Deepak Pawar v. State

of Maharashtra & another4, held thus:

"The appellant and respondent No.2 were undisputedly in a consensual relationship from 2009 to 2011 (or 2013 as stated by the respondent No.2). It is the say of the respondent No.2 that the consensual physical relationship was on an assurance of marriage by the appellant. The

2022 LiveLaw (SC) 649

complaint has been filed only in 2016 after three years, pursuant whereto FIR dated 16.12.2016 was registered under Section 376 and 420, IPC. On hearing learned counsel for parties, we find ex facie the registration of FIR in the present case is abuse of the criminal process. The parties chose to have physical relationship without marriage for a considerable period of time. For some reason, the parties fell apart. It can happen both before or after marriage. Thereafter also three years passed when respondent No.2 decided to register a FIR. The facts are so glaring as set out aforesaid by us that we have no hesitation in quashing the FIR dated 16.12.2016 and bringing the proceedings to a close. Permitting further proceedings under the FIR would amount to harassment to the appellant through the criminal process itself. We are fortified to adopt this course of action by the judicial view in (2019) 9 SCC 608 titled Pramod Suryabhan Pawar Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. wherein the factual scenario where complainant was aware that there existed obstacles in marrying the accused and still continued to engage in sexual relations, the Supreme Court quashed the FIR. A distinction was made between a false promise to marriage which is given on understanding by the maker that it will be broken and a breach of promise which is made in good faith but subsequently not fulfilled. This was in the context of Section 375 Explanation 2 and Section 90 of the IPC, 1860. The Criminal appeal is accordingly allowed. Impugned judgment is set aside and the proceedings in pursuance to FIR dated 16.12.2016 stand quashed, leaving parties to bear their own costs."

8. This Court is satisfied with the identification of the parties and

voluntariness in arriving at the compromise. As the parties have

entered into a compromise and compounded the offences, the chance

of conviction is bleak and remote. Therefore, in view of the

compromise between the parties and in view of the aforesaid

decisions, continuation of the impugned proceedings is nothing but

abuse of process of Court.

9. Accordingly, IA Nos.1 and 2 of 2023 and the Criminal Petition

are allowed and the proceedings in Crime No.537 of 2022 of

Vedayapalem Police Station, Nellore, SPSR Nellore District against the

petitioners herein/A-1 to A-5 are hereby quashed.

As a sequel thereto, the miscellaneous applications, if any,