Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 4645 AP
Judgement Date : 4 October, 2023
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY
AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE TARLADA RAJASEKHAR RAO
WRIT PETITION No.19145 of 2023
ORDER:- (Per Hon'ble Sri Justice Cheekati Manavendranath Roy)
This writ petition is filed for Habeas Corpus to declare the
order of preventive detention dated 30.06.2023 passed by the
detaining authority which was approved as per G.O.Rt.No.1322,
dated 10.07.2023 and which was confirmed by the State Government
of Andhra Pradesh as per G.O.Rt.No.1783, dated 05.09.2023 against
the detenu, as illegal, unconstitutional and violative of Articles
14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and the provisions of the
Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers,
Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and
Land-Grabbers Act, 1986 (for short "the Act") and the Rules made
thereunder and consequently prayed to set aside the impugned
order of preventive detention and the consequential orders passed
under the aforesaid G.Os. confirming the said order of preventive
detention and to set the detenu at liberty forthwith.
2. The petitioner is the wife of the detenu by name Kancheti
Sai Babu @ Sai @ Sai Kumar @ Nalla Sai. Four crimes were
registered against him in various police stations as detailed infra:
2
i) Cr.No.36/2023, U/sec.120(B), 143, 379, 307, 109 r/w. 149
I.P.C. of Amaravathi Police Station, dated 20.04.2023.
ii) Cr.No.23/2023, U/sec.34(A) AP Excise Act of Krosuru Police
Station, dated 16.04.2023.
iii) Cr.No.33/2023, U/sec.188, 287, 354(c), 336 r/w. 34 I.P.C. of
Atchampet Police Station, dated 14.04.2023.
iv) Cr.No.35/2023, U/sec.420, 506 I.P.C of Bellamkonda Police
Station, dated 03.06.2023.
3. Prior to registration of the aforesaid four crimes, about ten
crimes were earlier registered against him, which are also
detailed below:
i) Cr.No.2/1993, U/sec.147, 148, 448, 427, 506 r/w 149 I.P.C.
of Krosuru Police Station.
ii) Cr.No.32/2004, U/sec.147, 148, 307, 353 r/w. 149 I.P.C. of
Krosuru Police Station.
iii) Cr.No.33/2004, U/sec.147, 148, 324, 427 r/w. 149 I.P.C. and
Sec.136(f) of RP Act and Sec.3(x) of SC's/ST's (PoA) Act, 1989
and Sec.3 of PDPP Act of Krosuru Police Station.
iv) Cr.No.20/2013, U/sec.323, 324, 506 r/w. 34 I.P.C. of Krosuru
Police Station.
v) Cr.No.43/2014, U/sec.324 r/w. 34 I.P.C. of Krosuru Police
Station.
vi) Cr.No.106/2021, U/sec.323, 506, 431 r/w. 34 I.P.C. of
Atchampet Police Station.
vii) Cr.No.17/2005, U/sec.143, 427 r/w. 34 I.P.C. of Arundelpet
Police Station.
viii) Cr.No.252/2010, U/sec.147, 148, 427, 452, 307 r/w. 149
I.P.C. of Chilakaluripet Town Police Station.
3
ix) Cr.No.253/2010, U/sec.353 r/w. 34 I.P.C. of Chikalaluripet
Town Police Station.
x) Cr.No.5/2019, U/sec.307, 326, 341, 506, 143, 147, 148 r/w.
149 I.P.C. of Pattabhipuram Police Station.
4. In view of the fact that the aforesaid four crimes are pending
against him and as ten crimes were earlier registered against him
as detailed supra, the sponsoring authority has recommended the
detaining authority to pass an order of preventive detention
against the detenu on the ground that he comes within the
definition of Goonda as defined under Section 2(g) of the Act as he
has a habitual offender and his activities are prejudicial to the
maintenance of law and order. It is stated that his activities are
also dangerous to the maintenance of public order and as he is
a habitual offender, to prevent him from committing the similar
nature of offences and from indulging in similar illegal activities,
that it is essential to pass an order of preventive detention against
him.
5. On the basis of the said recommendation made by the
recommending authority, the detaining authority has passed the
impugned order by preventive detention against the detenu.
The said order was subsequently confirmed by the Government by
way of issuing the aforesaid G.O.
4
6. Aggrieved thereby, the wife of the detenu has filed this writ
petition challenging the legal validity of the impugned order of
preventive detention and sought to set aside the same and to set
the detenu at liberty forthwith.
7. Counter has been filed by the 3rd respondent-District
Collector, who is the detaining authority, stating that about four
crimes are now registered against the detenu at present and on
account of registration of the said crimes, he clearly falls within
the definition of Goonda as defined under Section 2(g) of the Act
and earlier also, about ten crimes were registered against him and
the registration of the aforesaid crimes against him clearly show
that the detenu is habituated in committing various offences and
that he has been indulging in unlawful activities and it amounts
to disturbing the public order and as such, it is essential to pass
an order of preventive detention against him to prevent him from
committing the similar nature of offences in future.
8. Sri Posani Venkateswarlu, learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner, would vehemently contend that out of the four crimes
that are now pending against the detenu, one crime in Cr.No.23 of
2023 was registered under Section 34(A) of the A.P. Excise Act in
Krosuru Police Station and it does not fall within the definition of
Goonda as defined under Section 2(g) of the Act. He contends
that even though on account of registration of the three crimes,
the detenu may come within the definition of Goonda under
Section 2(g) of the Act, that even if one irrelevant ground is taken
as basis for passing an order of preventive detention that by itself
is sufficient to set aside the order of preventive detention as per
the settled law in this regard. He would submit that the offence
under Section 34(A) of the A.P. Excise Act, falls within the
definition of Bootlegger under the Act and not under the definition
of Goonda. In support of his contention, he relied on the
judgment of the Division Bench of this High Court rendered in the
case of Annam Venkatakrishnaraju v. State of Andhra
Pradesh and others1. He would then contend that in all the
other ten crimes that were earlier registered against him, the
detenu was acquitted in all the said cases and the said crimes
cannot be taken as basis for passing an order of preventive
detention and it would also amount to taking an irrelevant ground
as a basis for passing the impugned order of preventive detention
and it would vitiate the impugned order. In support of his
contention, he relied on the Judgment of the Apex Court rendered
2021 SCC OnLine AP 355
in the case of Khaja Bilala Ahmed v. State of Telangana and
others2.
9. He would also contend that in Cr.No.36/2023, which was
registered for the offences punishable under Sections 120(B), 143,
379, 307, 109 r/w. 149 of I.P.C. of Amaravathi Police Station, the
detenu was initially not shown as accused in the said crime and
he was shown as accused during the course of investigation and
he was arrested and produced before the concerned Magistrate to
remand in judicial custody, that the learned Magistrate did not
accept his remand and refused to remand him to Judicial custody.
So, he would contend that it is clear that he has been falsely
implicated in the said crime and it cannot be made as a basis for
passing the impugned order of preventive detention. He then
vehemently contends that even though the remand of the detenu
was not accepted by the Magistrate, still the detaining authority
has shown in the impugned order that he was arrested and
thereafter released on bail which clearly shows the non-
application of mind of the detaining authority to the facts of the
case, which also renders the impugned order as an illegal order
and it also vitiates the impugned order. Therefore, on the
(2020) 13 SCC 632
aforesaid grounds, he would pray to set aside the impugned order
and to set the detenu at liberty.
10. Learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondents,
would contend that the earlier ten crimes, in which the detenu
was acquitted, was in fact not made basis for passing the
impugned order of preventive detention and he would contend
that it is only to show his past history relating to his involvement
in unlawful activities, that they are incidentally shown and
mentioned in the impugned order and the same was not made
basis for passing the impugned order of preventive detention.
He would submit that the same is clearly explained in the counter
filed by the 3rd respondent. He then contends that even though
the detenu was acquitted in the said ten crimes earlier, as per the
law laid down by the Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court
rendered in the case of Haradhan Saha and another v.
The State of West Bengal and others3, it is clearly held by the
Apex Court that even though the detenu was acquitted earlier in
the cases registered against him, that the same can be made basis
for passing the impugned order of preventive detention, when it is
found that, he is a habitual offender participating in unlawful
activities.
AIR 1974 SC 2154
11. Learned Government Pleader would vehemently contend
that the very fact that the detenu is involved in four crimes at
present and that he was involved in ten crimes earlier, clearly
show that he is a habitual offender indulging in the acts which are
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and as such,
in order to prevent him from committing any such offences in
future, that in the interest of the general public, the impugned
order of preventive detention is passed and it is perfectly valid
under law and thereby prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.
12. We have meticulously considered the aforesaid rival
submissions made by both learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner and the learned Government Pleader.
13. The impugned order of preventive detention was passed
mainly on the ground that the detenu has been involving in the
acts, which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and
the very fact that four crimes are now pending against him, show
that he falls within the definition of Goonda as defined under
Section 2(g) of the Act. Goonda is defined in Section 2(g) of the
Act and reads thus:
""goonda" means a person, who either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang, habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences
punishable under Chapter XVII or Chapter XXII of the Indian Penal Code".
14. A reading of the definition of Goonda extracted above,
clearly shows that it is only when a person habitually commits or
attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences
punishable under Chapter XVII or Chapter XXII of the Indian
Penal Code, then only he can be termed as Goonda under the Act.
Three crimes i.e. Crime No.36 of 2023, Crime No.33 of 2023 and
Crime No.35 of 2023, no doubt pertains to the offences
punishable under Chapter XVII and Chapter XXII. So, it attracts
the definition of Goonda under the Act. But the other crime i.e.
Crime No.23 of 2023 is registered only under Section 34(A) of the
A.P. Excise Act. It has nothing to do with the offences under the
Indian Penal Code much less the offences under Chapter XVII and
XXII of I.P.C. It is only an offence under special enactment under
the A.P. Excise Act. So, it does not attract the definition of
Goonda under Section 2(g) of the Act. At best, the said crime
attracts the definition of Bootlegger as defined under Section 2(b)
of the Act. Yet, this Crime No.23 of 2023 is also made basis to
pass the impugned order of preventive detention terming the
detenu as a Goonda. So, it clearly amounts to taking
an irrelevant factor as a ground to pass the impugned order of
preventive detention. When an irrelevant factor or ground is
taken as basis for passing the order of preventive detention,
as rightly contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner, as per settled law, it would vitiate the order of
preventive detention and the same is liable to be set aside on the
sole ground. The legal position in this regard is no more res nova
and the same has been well settled.
15. The Co-ordinate Division Bench of this High Court has dealt
with the issue elaborately with reference to the earlier
decided case law on the said legal position. In Annam
Venkatakrishnaraju case (1 supra), the Division Bench of this
High Court clearly held that taking an irrelevant ground as the
basis for passing the order of detention would vitiate the said
order of detention and the same is liable to be set aside on that
ground. As per the facts of the case in the said reported
Judgment, about 11 crimes were registered against the detenu
therein, 10 crimes pertain to the offences which satisfies the
definition of Goonda under Section 2(g) of the Act. One crime out
of the said 11 crimes, did not fall within the definition of Goonda
under Section 2(g) of the Act and it attracts only the definition of
the Bootlegger. Therefore, the Court found that taking the said
crime which does not satisfy the definition of Goonda as the basis
for passing the impugned order of preventive detention, vitiated
the impugned order of preventive detention and thereby has set
aside the same. In the said Judgment, the Division Bench has
relied on the earlier judgment rendered by the Division Bench in
the case of S.Prasad Reddy v. Collector and District
Magistrate, Anantapur4 and also the other judgment rendered in
the case of Thallapuneni Venkateswarlu v. Collector and
District Magistrate, Cuddapah5, wherein it is held that the
crime which do not satisfy the definition of Goonda, cannot be
made basis for passing the order of preventive detention on the
ground that the detenu is a Goonda under the Act.
16. The ratio laid down in the aforesaid judgments squarely
applies to the present facts of the case. In the instant case also,
one crime which do not attract the definition of Goonda as
detailed supra, was made basis for the purpose of passing the
impugned order of preventive detention terming the detenu as
a Goonda. Undoubtedly, an irrelevant ground is made as basis for
passing the impugned order of preventive detention. So, as per
the law laid down in the aforesaid judgments, that by itself vitiates
(2005) 3 ALT 487
(2004) 5 ALT 250
the impugned order of preventive detention and the same is liable
to be set aside on the sole ground.
17. Further, apart from the aforesaid four crimes which are now
pending against the detenu, ten other crimes which were earlier
registered long back against the detenu and that too the cases in
which he was acquitted in all the said crimes, were also made
basis for passing the impugned order of preventive detention.
When the detenu was acquitted in all the said ten crimes,
according to the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, the
same cannot be based upon for passing the impugned order of
preventive detention. As noticed supra, he draws support in this
regard from the Judgment of the Apex Court rendered in Khaja
Bilala Ahmed case (2 supra), it was held at para No.23 of the
said judgment as follows:
".......The order of detention does, as a matter of fact, refer to the criminal cases which were instituted between 2007 and 2016. In order to overcome the objection that these cases are stale and do not provide a live link with the order of detention, it was contended that they were not relied on but were referred to only to indicate the antecedent background of the detenu. If the pending cases were not considered for passing the order of detention, it defies logic as to why they were referred to in the first place in the order of detention. The purpose of the Telangana Offenders Act 1986 is to prevent any person from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. For this purpose, Section 3 prescribes that the detaining authority must be satisfied that the person to be detained is likely to indulge in illegal activities in the future and act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The satisfaction to be arrived at by the detaining authority must not be based on irrelevant or invalid grounds. It must be arrived at on the basis of relevant material; material which is not stale
and has a live link with the satisfaction of the detaining authority. The order of detention may refer to the previous criminal antecedents only if they have a direct nexus or link with the immediate need to detain an individual."
Further held as follows:
"However, in the absence of a clear indication of a causal connection, a mere reference to the pending criminal cases cannot account for the requirements of Section 3. It is not open to the detaining authority to simply refer to stale incidents and hold them as the basis of an order of detention."
18. Therefore, these past ten crimes registered long back from
the year 1993 onwards in which the detenu was acquitted in all
the said crimes do not provide a live link with the present crimes
for making the same as basis for passing the impugned order of
preventive detention. They are undoubtedly stale incidents and
do not provide a live link for passing the impugned order of
preventive detention.
19. Although, as per the judgment relied on by the learned
Government Pleader that even after the accused was acquitted in
the crimes, that the same can be considered, still it must be
shown that it provides a live link with the present crimes for the
purpose of making it as basis for passing the order of preventive
detention. The same is miserably missing in this case. Although,
learned Government Pleader has contended that the said ten
crimes in which he was acquitted, are not in fact made as basis
for passing the impugned order of preventive detention, the said
contention cannot be countenanced. A careful perusal of the
order of preventive detention clearly shows that the detaining
authority has in fact made the said ten crimes also as basis to
hold him as a habitual offender and to pass the order of
preventive detention. Mere explaining in the counter that it was
only incidentally mentioned to show his past history by itself will
not make the order of preventive detention a valid one, when it
clearly shows that the detaining authority has in fact made the
same as basis for passing the impugned order of preventive
detention. Therefore, on the said ground also, the impugned order
is vitiated and it is liable to be set aside.
20. Apart from it, in Crime No.36 of 2023, as noticed supra, the
detenu was not initially an accused in the said crime when it was
registered and he was subsequently shown as an accused during
the course of investigation. After his arrest, when he was
produced before the concerned Magistrate for remand, the learned
Magistrate did not accept his remand. Yet, the detaining
authority has stated in the impugned order that he was arrested
in the said crime also and was released on bail. The said finding
runs contrary to the record. It clearly shows the non-application
of mind of the detaining authority in recording his subjective
satisfaction for passing the impugned order.
21. Therefore, for the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order is
badly vitiated and it is liable to be set aside.
22. Resultantly, the Writ Petition is allowed setting aside the
impugned order of preventive detention, dated 30.06.2023, passed
against the detenu, who is the husband of the petitioner by name
Kancheti Sai Babu @ Sai @ Sai Kumar @ Nalla Sai and the
consequential G.O.Rt.No.1322, dated 10.07.2023 and
G.O.Rt.No.1783, dated 05.09.2023 that were issued for approval
and confirmation of the said order. The detenu by name Kancheti
Sai Babu @ Sai @ Sai Kumar @ Nalla Sai shall be set at liberty
forthwith, if not required in any other case. There shall be no
order as to costs.
Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, in the Writ Petition,
shall stand closed.
______________________________________________ JUSTICE CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY
______________________________________ JUSTICE TARLADA RAJASEKHAR RAO Date: 04.10.2023 ARR/KSJ
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY
AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE TARLADA RAJASEKHAR RAO
WRIT PETITION No.19145 of 2023
Date: 04.10.2023
ARR/KSJ
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