Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 1690 AP
Judgement Date : 27 March, 2023
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE Dr. V.R.K.KRUPA SAGAR
CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.1187 of 2009
ORDER:
A convict for the offence under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, 'the N.I.Act')
preferred this criminal revision under Sections 397 and 401
Cr.P.C. seeking for his acquittal. Respondent No.1 is the
complainant before the learned trial Court. On his complaint,
this revision petitioner was prosecuted in C.C.No.64 of 2005
and learned III Metropolitan Magistrate, Vijayawada after due
trial and hearing, by its judgment dated 11.10.2006 found the
revision petitioner guilty for the offence under Section 138 of the
N.I.Act and convicted him and sentenced him to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for one year and pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-
with a default sentence of simple imprisonment for two months.
2. The convict carried the matter in appeal in Criminal
Appeal No.234 of 2006. Learned VIII Additional District and
Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Vijayawada after due
hearing on both sides by its judgment dated 09.07.2009 found
the trial Court's judgment right on facts and in law and found
no merit in the appeal and dismissed the same.
Dr. VRKS, J Crl.R.C.No.1187 of 2009
3. It is in challenge to these above referred judgments, the
present revision is filed urging the following grounds:
1. The Courts failed to consider that this revision petitioner handed over the disputed cheque to the complainant towards payment of premium for Life Insurance Policy.
2. That the signature on the subject matter cheque does not belong to this revision petitioner and it was forged.
3. It was the duty of the trial Court to forward the subject matter cheque for opinion of the handwriting expert and it failed to do so.
4. The evidence of PW.1 had no corroboration but Courts below accepted his evidence.
5. The subject matter cheque was not given towards debt covered by the decree in O.S.No.381 of 2003 and that decree pertains to a different debt. In ignorance of these facts this revision petitioner was convicted and therefore the judgments of the Courts below shall be set aside.
6. That the cheque was issued in the capacity of Managing Director of Siri Auto Sales Enterprises but not in the personal capacity of this revision petitioner for the purpose of discharge of any personal debt.
Dr. VRKS, J Crl.R.C.No.1187 of 2009
4. Respondent No.1/complainant did not submit any
arguments.
5. State is shown as respondent No.2 and the learned
Special Assistant Public Prosecutor submits that the case be
disposed of as required under law.
6. Learned counsel for revision petitioner submitted
arguments.
7. The point that falls for consideration is:
"Whether the judgments of the Courts below were
illegal, irregular or suffer from impropriety requiring
interference?"
8. Point:
Before the learned Magistrate when the accusation of
cheque dishonor for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I.Act
was read over and explained, the accused merely denied the
truth of the allegations and pleaded not guilty and did not raise
any specific line of defence.
Dr. VRKS, J Crl.R.C.No.1187 of 2009
9. In the trial that ensued, complainant testified as PW.1.
The averments in his complaint and his evidence as PW.1 were
that for the purpose of meeting financial needs in the business,
the accused in his personal capacity borrowed Rs.75,000/- on
03.05.2000 from the complainant and executed the original of
Ex.P.1 promissory note. During trial he also deposed that on
this very promissory note he filed the suit for recovery of money
in O.S.No.381 of 2003. The copy of the plaint pertaining to that
suit is Ex.P.11. At the trial, accused testified as DW.1. During
his cross-examination he did not dispute the factual correctness
and legal validity of Ex.P.1-promissory note and he also
admitted that based on that promissory note, the complainant
filed the suit and that was decreed against him and he did not
prefer any appeal. It is on this evidence, the learned trial Court
recorded that the promissory note and the decree in the suit
pertain to same transaction and existence of debt owed by the
accused to complainant remained undisputed. The learned
appellate Court also examined this aspect and approved the
correctness of that finding.
10. The averments in the complaint and the evidence of PW.1
was that towards the above referred promissory note, the debt
Dr. VRKS, J Crl.R.C.No.1187 of 2009
was outstanding and during that time when he demanded the
accused to repay, the accused towards part payment of the
above referred debt issued a cheque for Rs.70,000/- as per
Ex.P.2. He further said that when he presented this cheque for
collection this was returned unpaid and the banker endorsed
"account closed". On considering the evidence on both sides,
learned trial Court recorded a finding that the reason for which
the cheque was dishonoured remained undisputed and return
of a cheque on the ground that account was closed is equivalent
to dishonor of a cheque for insufficiency of funds and dishonor
of the cheque is evidenced by Exs.P.3 and P.4-cheque return
memos and on all those aspects no controversy was raised
before it by the defence. On assessment of evidence including
the evidence of DW.1 it observed that the subject matter cheque
in Ex.P.2 was handed over by the accused to the complainant.
These aspects were verified and were found to be correct by the
appellate Court also. On these aspects no controversy is raised
in this revision also.
11. A few more aspects regarding Ex.P.2-cheque are required
to be noticed here. In this criminal revision case filed by the
convict, the revision petitioner in his cause title described
Dr. VRKS, J Crl.R.C.No.1187 of 2009
himself as Proprietor of Siri Auto Sales Enterprises. However,
when the case was at the trial Court he contended that Siri Auto
Sales Enterprises is a partnership firm and he produced Ex.D.1
which is a partnership deed and he also filed Exs.D.2 and D.3,
which are income tax returns filed by the said partnership firm.
According to revision petitioner, he is Managing Partner of that
partnership firm. If that be the case, it is not known as to how
and why he described himself as a proprietor of it in the cause
title of this revision petition. Be that as it may. About that
partnership there is some relevancy for Ex.P.2-cheque. When it
comes to Ex.P.2-cheque, the first defence taken by the revision
petitioner before both the Courts below as well as here is that it
was an empty blank unsigned cheque that he had given to
complainant. The purpose of giving such a cheque was to
enable the complainant to remit premium for the L.I.C. Policy,
which is due from the accused. Referring to this defence, the
learned trial Court mentioned what was admitted by accused as
DW.1 in his cross-examination and also the evidence of brother
of the accused, who deposed as DW.2. Both the witnesses
during their cross-examination admitted that accused never
obtained any insurance policy. It was on that admission the
Dr. VRKS, J Crl.R.C.No.1187 of 2009
Courts below concluded that when there was no insurance
policy at all, the question of payment of a premium for a non-
existing insurance policy did not arise. It was for that reason
the purpose for which the cheque was allegedly given by
accused to complainant as sought by the complainant was
accepted and the contention of the accused in that regard was
negatived.
12. Though the first line of defence was that it was a total
blank unsigned cheque that was given, at the trial the cheque
was exhibited in evidence and it was fully filled up in its
columns, which include the signature of the accused. Therefore
the accused contended before the Courts below that he never
signed this cheque and the complainant got his signature
forged. Referring to this aspect of the mater, the trial Court
observed that the signature as available on Ex.P.2-cheque was
compared by it in terms of Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act
as against the admitted signatures of this very accused available
on Exs.D.1 to D.3 and it found that they are absolutely similar
without any variations. Therefore, it found that the signature
on Ex.P.2-cheque was the very signature of the accused.
Learned trial Court went a little further and made a comparison
Dr. VRKS, J Crl.R.C.No.1187 of 2009
of signature of the accused as available on the cheque as
against the signature subscribed by this accused on his
deposition form and on his Section 251 Cr.P.C. examination
form and Section 313 Cr.P.C. examination form. On all those
papers the signature of accused came to be subscribed when
the criminal case came before the Court. Learned trial Court
observed that those signatures are totally at variance against
the signatures of this very accused available on Exs.D.1 to D.3
which were earlier to the commencement of litigation. This
observation of the trial Court discloses the kind of attitude the
accused has towards legal process in changing his signatures.
13. Before the appellate Court, this accused raised a
contention that it was the duty of the trial Court to forward
Ex.P.2-cheque to the handwriting expert for comparison and it
failed to do so and instead, it took for itself the task of
comparison in terms of Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act
and that is incorrect. The learned appellate Court nagatived
that contention and recorded an observation that it was upto
the accused to seek for an expert's opinion and not for the
Courts. Having lost that contention there, the same is repeated
here by the revision petitioner. In an adversarial trial it is for
Dr. VRKS, J Crl.R.C.No.1187 of 2009
the parties to adduce evidence as they choose. On the evidence
that is made available, as a neutral arbiter, the trial Court
decides the facts and concludes the case. If any of the parties
believe that an opinion of an expert is beneficial in sustaining
one's own contention, it could request the help of the Court to
have the document referred to an expert. Court would consider
the request and depending on the need of the case it would take
a decision. Court by itself may entertain an opinion that the
evidence made available to it does not completely enable it to
take a decision, in which case it by itself also could seek the
opinion of an expert. In the case at hand, the trial Court by
itself did not entertain any belief that the case before it and the
evidence available for it was not sufficient to arrive at a
conclusion and unless it had the assistance of opinion of an
expert it could not make up its decision. Court holding such an
opinion is within the total discretion of that Court and none
could comment it. There is absolutely no law that is brought to
the notice of this Court by the revision petitioner that in every
case when an accused denies his signatures, it is always the
duty of the Court to forward the disputed document to a
handwriting expert and elicit his opinion and summon him on
Dr. VRKS, J Crl.R.C.No.1187 of 2009
its own and examine the witness on its own. Thus, a very
frivolous contention is raised by the revision petitioner. That
contention is negatived. Banker did not return the cheque on
the ground that signature did not tally. The finding of the
Courts below that Ex.P.2 bears the signature of the accused is
to be held as correct on facts.
14. On Ex.P.2-cheque, below the signature of accused, there
is a rubber stamp impression concerning his business entity.
Before the trial Court accused contended that, that was a fake
rubber stamp. He never produced the original rubber stamp of
his business entity for perusal of the Court to enable it to
appreciate his version. Thus best evidence available with him
was suppressed by the accused to his own detriment.
15. Harping on the rubber stamp impression of the
partnership firm below the signature of the accused on Ex.P.2-
cheque, the accused raised a contention before the trial Court
that since the partnership firm is not prosecuted for dishonour
of that cheque his prosecution was invalid. Learned trial Court
as well as appellate Court, at full length discussed this aspect of
the matter and they held that facts presented by both sides
Dr. VRKS, J Crl.R.C.No.1187 of 2009
during the evidence never disclosed any transaction of debt
between the partnership firm of the accused and the
complainant, the pronote and the decree do not pertain to any
transactions between complainant and the partnership firm.
Therefore, they held that participation of partnership firm in the
criminal trial is totally irrelevant. Then they held that mere
existence of rubber stamp of the partnership firm does not
relieve this accused from his liability. It is that aspect of the
matter that is challenged here. Having examined the material
on record, this Court finds no merit in the challenge raised by
the revision petitioner. The evidence of PW.1 and cheque return
memos in Exs.P.3 and P.4 indicate that the cheque is drawn by
the accused on an account maintained by him with the bank. It
was never the case of accused that Ex.P.2-cheque was not on an
account maintained by him. In ICDS Ltd. vs. Beena Shabeer1,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India made the following
observations:
"the words "any cheque" and "other liability" occurring in Section 138 are the two key expressions which stand as
(2002) 6 SCC 426
Dr. VRKS, J Crl.R.C.No.1187 of 2009
clarifying the legislative intent so as to bring the factual context within the ambit of the provisions of the statute. These expressions leave no manner of doubt that for whatever reason it may be, the liability under Section 138 cannot be avoided in the event the cheque stands returned by the banker unpaid. Any contra interpretation would defeat the intent of the legislature.
16. In the light of that legal principle and in the context of the
fact that the revision petitioner has not shown any principle of
law that is different from this, this Court has to hold that the
approach of the Courts below is right on facts and in law. The
contention of the revision petitioner that the cheque does not
pertain to the pronote and the decree and the cheque does not
contain his signature and that the partnership firm is not made
a party are all without any merit and without any legal basis.
All these contentions were properly considered by the Courts
below and they reached to accurate conclusions. In this
revision, the convict failed to point out any procedural errors or
jurisdictional errors or any legal errors in the approach of the
Courts below. Therefore, point is answered against the revision
petitioner.
Dr. VRKS, J Crl.R.C.No.1187 of 2009
17. In the result, the Criminal Revision Case is dismissed
confirming the conviction and sentence recorded against the
revision petitioner/accused in the judgment dated 09.07.2009
of learned VIII Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast
Track Court), Vijayawada in Criminal Appeal No.234 of 2006
and the judgment dated 11.10.2006 of learned III Metropolitan
Magistrate, Vijayawada in C.C.No.64 of 2005. Revision
petitioner/Konagala Ramanjaneyulu shall submit himself on or
before 03.04.2023 before the learned trial Court, failing which
the learned III Metropolitan Magistrate, Vijayawada shall secure
his presence and enforce the punishment.
18. Registry is directed to dispatch a copy of this order along
with the lower Court record, if any, to the Court below on or
before 29.03.2023. A copy of this order be placed before the
Registrar (Judicial), forthwith, for giving necessary instructions
to the concerned Officers in the Registry.
As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any,
shall stand closed.
_____________________________ Dr. V.R.K.KRUPA SAGAR, J Date: 27.03.2023 Ivd
Dr. VRKS, J Crl.R.C.No.1187 of 2009
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE Dr. V.R.K.KRUPA SAGAR
CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.1187 of 2009
Date: 27.03.2023
Ivd
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