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Marneedi Durga Prasad Prasad vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh
2023 Latest Caselaw 955 AP

Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 955 AP
Judgement Date : 20 February, 2023

Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Marneedi Durga Prasad Prasad vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 20 February, 2023
Bench: K Sreenivasa Reddy
          HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K. SREENIVASA REDDY

                       IA Nos.2, 3 and 4 of 2023
                                 in/and
                   Criminal Petition No.1300 of 2023

Common Order:

       This Criminal Petition, under Section 482 Cr.P.C., has been filed

by the petitioners/A-1 to A-3, seeking to quash the proceedings in

Crime No.22 of 2023 of Tadepalligudem Town Police Station, West

Godavari district, registered for the offences punishable under Sections

417, 376(2) (n), 313, 323, 506 read with 34 IPC and Sections 3(1)(r),

3(1)(s), 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled

Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.


2.     It is represented that both the parties have settled the dispute

amicably out of the Court at the intervention of their elders and well

wishers. In view of the settlement arrived between both the parties,

they filed I.A. Nos.2, 3 and 4 of 2023 seeking to permit them to

compound     the    offences   and   to   record   the   compromise   and

consequently to release the petitioner No.1/A-1 from jail.
                                          2




3.        Learned counsel for petitioners relied on a decision in Kapil

Gupta v. State of NCT of Delhi & another1, wherein the Hon'ble Apex

Court held thus:


         "12. No doubt that the learned ASG is right in relying on
         various judgments of this Court which reiterate the legal
         position that in heinous and serious offences like murder or
         rape, the Court should not quash the proceedings. It will be
         relevant to refer to paragraph 29.5 to 29.7 of the judgment of
         this Court in the case of Narender Singh v. State of Punjab1,
         which read thus:

            "29.5 While exercising its powers, the High Court is to
            examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote
            and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the
            accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme
            injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the
            criminal cases.

            29.6 Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the
            category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are
            to be generally treated as crime against the society and not
            against the individual alone. However, the High Court would
            not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of
            Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under
            this provision. It would be open to the High Court to
            examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is
            there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected
            sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving
            the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would
            be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury
            sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the
            vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used
            etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the
            victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of
            this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to
            whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the
            chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former
            case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the
            criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be
            permissible for the High Court to accept the plea

1
    (2022) 8 Supreme 341
                                 3




  compounding the offence based on complete settlement
  between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be
  swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties
  is going to result in harmony between them which may
  improve their future relationship.

      29.7 While deciding whether to exercise its power under
  Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a
  crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at
  immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the
  matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be
  liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal
  proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that
  at this stage the investigation is still on and even the
  charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases
  where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start
  or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can
  show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but
  after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material
  mentioned above. On the other hand, where the
  prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the
  conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of
  argument, normally the High Court should refrain from
  exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in
  such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide
  the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to
  whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or
  not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already
  recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate
  stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the
  parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting
  in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted
  by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307
  IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime
  and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict
  found guilty of such a crime."

13. It can thus be seen that this Court has clearly held that
though the Court should be slow in quashing the proceedings
wherein heinous and serious offences are involved, the High
Court is not foreclosed from examining as to whether there
exists material for incorporation of such an offence or as to
whether there is sufficient evidence which if proved would lead
to proving the charge for the offence charged with. The Court
has also to take into consideration as to whether the
                                 4




settlement between the parties is going to result into harmony
between them which may improve their mutual relationship.

14. The Court has further held that it is also relevant to
consider as to what is stage of the proceedings. It has been
observed that if an application is made at a belated stage
wherein the evidence has been led and the matter is at the
stage of arguments or judgment, the Court should be slow to
exercise the power to quash the proceedings. However, if such
an application is made at an initial stage before
commencement of trial, the said factor will weigh with the
court in exercising its power.

15. The facts and circumstances as stated hereinabove are
peculiar in the present case. Respondent No. 2 is a young lady

of 23 years. She feels that going through trial in one case, where she is a complainant and in the other case, wherein she is the accused would rob the prime of her youth. She feels that if she is made to face the trial rather than getting any relief, she would be faced with agony of undergoing the trial.

16. In both the cases, though the charge sheets have been filed, the charges are yet to be framed and as such, the trial has not yet commenced. It is further to be noted that since the respondent No. 2 herself is not supporting the prosecution case, even if the criminal trial is permitted to go ahead, it will end in nothing else than an acquittal. If the request of the parties is denied, it will be amounting to only adding one more criminal case to the already overburdened criminal courts.

17. In that view of the matter, we find that though in a heinous or serious crime like rape, the Court should not normally exercise the powers of quashing the proceedings, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case and in order to give succour to Respondent No. 2 so that she is saved from further agony of facing two criminal trials, one as a victim and one as an accused, we find that this is a fit case wherein the extraordinary powers of this Court be exercised to quash the criminal proceedings."

He also relied on a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Mandar

Deepak Pawar v. State of Maharashtra & another2, wherein it was held

thus:

"The appellant and respondent No.2 were undisputedly in a consensual relationship from 2009 to 2011 (or 2013 as stated by the respondent No.2). It is the say of the respondent No.2 that the consensual physical relationship was on an assurance of marriage by the appellant. The complaint has been filed only in 2016 after three years, pursuant whereto FIR dated 16.12.2016 was registered under Section 376 and 420, IPC. On hearing learned counsel for parties, we find ex facie the registration of FIR in the present case is abuse of the criminal process. The parties chose to have physical relationship without marriage for a considerable period of time. For some reason, the parties fell apart. It can happen both before or after marriage. Thereafter also three years passed when respondent No.2 decided to register a FIR. The facts are so glaring as set out aforesaid by us that we have no hesitation in quashing the FIR dated 16.12.2016 and bringing the proceedings to a close. Permitting further proceedings under the FIR would amount to harassment to the appellant through the criminal process itself. We are fortified to adopt this course of action by the judicial view in (2019) 9 SCC 608 titled Pramod Suryabhan Pawar Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. wherein the factual scenario where complainant was aware that there existed obstacles in marrying the accused and still continued to engage in sexual relations, the Supreme Court quashed the FIR. A distinction was made between a false promise to marriage which is given on understanding by the maker that it will be broken and a breach of promise which is made in good faith but subsequently not fulfilled. This was in the context of Section 375 Explanation 2 and Section 90 of the IPC, 1860. The Criminal appeal is accordingly allowed. Impugned judgment is set aside and the proceedings in pursuance to FIR dated 16.12.2016 stand quashed, leaving parties to bear their own costs."

2022 LiveLaw (SC) 649

4. It is stated by 2nd respondent-defacto complainant in the

affidavit filed in support of I.A.No.4 of 2023 that she realized that her

love was one side for which she bore grudge against petitioner

No.1/A.1 and lodged the report. She further stated that elders

advised her to settle the issue peacefully and that she wishes to marry

in furture and the present complaint may cause hurdle to such

marriage. She further stated in the affidavit that there is no coercion,

force or misrepresentation from anybody in giving the said affidavit or

in compounding the present case and out of her free will and wish, she

was giving the affidavit.

5. Today, when the case is called, both the parties are present

before this Court. They produced their Aadhar cards in proof of their

identity. Learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned counsel

for the 2nd respondent identified both the parties in the open Court.

This Court questioned the de facto complainant with regard to

compromise and she has categorically stated to that extent that she

has voluntarily entered into compromise with the petitioners herein/A1

to A3.

6. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid decisions of the Hon'ble Apex

Court and as the parties have entered into a compromise and

compounded the offences, this Criminal Petition is allowed and the

proceedings in Crime No.22 of 2023 of Tadepalligudem Town Police

Station, West Godavari district, against the petitioners herein/A-1 to

A-3 are hereby quashed. Consequently, petitioner No.1 herein/A-1

shall be set at liberty forthwith, if he is not required in any other case

or crime.

7. Accordingly, IA Nos.2, 3 and 4 of 2023 and Criminal Petition

No.1300 of 2023 are allowed.

7. As a sequel thereto, the miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending

in this Criminal Petition shall stand closed.

______________________ K. SREENIVASA REDDY, J

Dated: 20.02.2023

Note:

Issue CC today (B/o) Nsr

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K. SREENIVASA REDDY

IA Nos.2, 3 and 4 of 2023 in/and Criminal Petition No.1300 of 2023

Dated: 20.02.2023 Nsr

 
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