Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati

Prof.Pradeep K.Sharma, Chennai vs Dasari Seetha Naidu, Krishna ... on 16 September, 2022

     HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH: AMARAVATI

  HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, CHIEF
                       JUSTICE
                                     &

          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D.V.S.S. SOMAYAJULU

                              C.A.No.1 of 2018

Prof. Pradeep K.Sharma,
Registrar, Post Graduate & Research Institute,
Dakshina Bharatha Hindu Prachara Sabha,
Tyuagarajanagar, Chennai 600017.
                                                              ..

Appellant Versus

Dasari Seetha Nadu, W/o D.Suresh babu, Aged 59 Yrs., occ: Retired Principal, R/0 H.No.31-8-12, G1, Aiswarya Flat, Maruthi Nagar, Andhra Bank Street, Vijayawada, Krishna District.

.. Respondent

Counsel for the appellant : Sri Prabhakar Sripada

Counsel for the respondents : Sri N.Ravi Prasad

ORAL JUDGMENT

Date: 16.09.2022 (per D.V.S.S.Somayajulu, J)

This Contempt Appeal has been filed questioning the

order dated 22.12.2017 in C.C.No.786 of 2017 by which the

appellant was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/-, in

default, he was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment

for three (3) days.

This Court has heard Sri Prabhakar Sripada, learned

counsel for the appellant and Sri N.Ravi Prasad for the

respondent.

The matter was argued at length by Sri Prabhakar

Sripada. By relying on his grounds of appeal, he submits that

there is improper appreciation of law and the explanation

offered by the appellant is not considered at all by the single

Judge. It is his contention that the judgments cited by the

appellant were not actually considered and applied in their

proper perspective. He also points out that in the facts and

circumstances of the case, the Andhra Pradesh Revised

Pension Rules are not applicable at all to the case and that

therefore the order is incapable of being executed. Learned

counsel laid stress on the fact that there is no willful

disobedience as the last drawn pay etc., were not determined.

The calculation of pension is not actually possible as per him.

Therefore, he submits that since it is not practicable or

feasible, the order could not be complied with and that

consequently there is no willful disobedience of the Court

order. It is also submitted that when a vacate stay

application has been filed, it should be considered first before

the contempt application is taken up and this aspect is

overlooked by the learned Judge. He also points out that

there is no direction to give last drawn pay to the petitioner.

Lastly, he also submits that this Court while hearing a

contempt appeal cannot enhance the punishment and that

this Court can either confirm the punishment or reduce the

same. He relies upon the case law which is submitted by him

including Niaz Mohammad and others v. State of Haryana

and others1 and other cases to argue that the distinction

between willful disobedience and order being not capable of

implementation should be kept in mind.

In reply to this, Sri N.Ravi Prasad argues and submits

that sequence of events which are filed and described clearly

show that the interim order was passed long after the writ

was admitted. As the present appellant did not appear in

Court on two occasions, after hearing the counsel for the writ

petitioner, the order was passed. Therefore, he submits that

it is not an ex parte order that has been passed.

1 (1994) 6 SCC 332

In the alternative, he also submits that the vacate stay

petition has been filed after the notice in the contempt

application was the taken up. He submits that this is again a

ruse to avoid the compliance of the Court order. He also

submits that even the vacate stay petition has been dismissed

on merits on 19.08.2021 and the writ petition alone is

pending for disposal even till date and the interim order has

not been complied with according to the counsel. Lastly, he

also submits that the issues raised about the non

practicability or difficulty in implementation etc., are not

clearly pleaded, let alone proved. It is his contention that the

current argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is

not borne out by his appeal grounds.

Lastly, relying upon the case of Prithawi Nath Ram v.

State of Jharkhand and others2, learned counsel argues

that if the party is of the opinion that the implementation is

neither practicable nor feasible, it should always approach

the Court that passed the order or invoke the jurisdiction of

the Appellate Court. But on the alleged ground that it is not

practicable, they cannot delay the implementation. He points

(2004) 7 SCC 261

out that the conduct of the appellant is clearly contumacious

and that the punishment that is imposed is correct. A retired

employee has still not succeeded in getting any relief till date

because of the conduct of the appellant. He, therefore,

submits that there are no merits in the contempt appeal.

COURT:

The law on the subject is very clear. The first and

foremost duty of the respondents in cases like this is to

implement the order passed by the Court. The rightness or

wrongness of the order cannot be urged in contempt

proceedings. Right or wrong, the order has to be obeyed.

Flouting an order of the Court would render the party liable

for contempt (para 8 of Prithawi Nath Ram's case).

With regard to the submission that the vacate stay

petition should first be taken up, this Court is of the opinion

that the learned single Judge did not commit any error in this

matter. The sequence of events shows that the interim order

was only passed after the petitioner failed to appear in the

Court on 18.01.2017 and 20.01.2017. In para 18 of the

impugned order, the sequence of dates are clearly noted. On

06.04.2016, writ petition was admitted, thereafter in January,

2017, the matter was called and as there was no

representation for the respondents, the interim order was

passed. Therefore, it is not an ex parte order passed at the

very inception of the proceedings without hearing the

respondents. It is an order passed in the situation mentioned

above. The learned single Judge also noticed while passing

the impugned order that after the notice in the contempt case

was issued, the vacate stay application was filed. In addition,

the application to vacate the interim order was also dismissed

on merits on 19.08.2021. This is also a factor which can be

taken into consideration since this is inter se the parties and

is not in dispute. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that

the single Judge did not commit any error in not disposing

the vacate stay petition before ordering the Contempt.

Even otherwise, the alleged difficulty in implementation

theory that is now advanced does not appear to be very

correct. It is also not borne out by the record. The grounds

of appeal in the present case deal essentially with improper

appreciation of law; that the explanation that was offered is

not considered and that the Revised Pension Rules are not

applicable. Even, if there was a difficulty in the

implementation of the order, the case law relied upon by the

learned single Judge in Prithawi Nath Ram's case (1 supra)

is clearly applicable. In para 8, the Hon'ble Supreme Court

clearly said as follows:

8. If any party concerned is aggrieved by the order which in its opinion is wrong or against rules or its implementation is neither practicable nor feasible, it should always either approach the court that passed the order or invoke jurisdiction of the appellate court.

The appellant in this case has not approached the Court

that passed the order by bringing out the alleged difficulties,

nor did it approach the Appellate Court citing the above

mentioned difficulties. Only in the contempt appeal verbal

submissions are made about the alleged difficulties. This

Court is satisfied that the grounds urged or the alleged

difficulty or impracticability is not borne out by record. As an

interim measure, in order to avoid contempt, the appellant

could have complied with the order with a reservation or rider

that it would be subject to the final decision. They did not

choose to do so and on the other hand are arguing that it is

not practicable. The fact remains that an order passed in