Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati

A. Punnaiah vs Union Of India, on 12 October, 2022

       HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI

     CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO.4 OF 2022

JUDGMENT:

The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal under Section 23 of the

Railway Tribunal Act, is filed against the order, dated

28.10.2021 passed in DDR No.297 of 2020 in M.A.No.17 of

2021 on the file of Railway Claims Tribunal, Amaravathi

Bench, whereby the application filed by the appellant to

condone of delay of 1796 days in filing claim petition was

dismissed.

2. The brief facts of the case are that the

appellant/applicant met with untoward incident on

16.11.2014 while he was travelling through valid ticket, due

to which his left leg was crushed and ultimately it was

amputated below knee. Due to lack of knowledge about

railway compensation case and provisions of Section 124 of

Railways Act for compensation, he did not file application for

compensation. But, recently he came to know about the same

through one Vishnu Vardhan, who was awarded

compensation by RCT/Amaravathi Bench, Guntur towards

loss of left eye in train journey. Hence, he filed claim petition

along with delay petition to condone the delay of 1796 days.

3. Lower Tribunal dismissed the petition holding that the

explanation given by the petitioner is not sufficient to

condone such delay and the records pertaining to the said

period might have been destroyed and if the delay is

condoned, it would prejudice the rights of Railways to contest

the matter.

4. Aggrieved by the order of the Railways Claims Tribunal,

applicant filed the present appeal.

5. Respondent filed counter and contended that Lower

Tribunal considered the delay in a proper perspective and

dismissed the petition. No valid grounds were made out to

entertain the appeal and thus prayed to dismiss the appeal.

6. Heard Ms. Aparajita learned counsel representing Smt.

N.S. Geetha Madhuri, learned counsel for the appellant and

Sri Jupudi V. K. Yagna Dutt, learned counsel for the

respondent.

7. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that

the Tribunal failed to appreciate applicability of the

provisions of Section 124-A of the Railway Act and thus came

to a wrong conclusion regarding delay. The lower tribunal

ought to have condoned the delay of 1796 days since the

appellant is not aware of legal remedies. She also would

submit that the Tribunal without considering the case law

wrongly dismissed the delay application. Hence, prays to

allow the appeal.

8. Learned counsel for the respondent would submit that

as per Section 17(1)(b) of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act,

1987, the application has to be made within one year of

occurrence of the incident. He submits that except pleading

ignorance of law the appellant has not explained the delay

properly and ignorance of law cannot be an excuse

"ignorantia juris non-excusat". He further contended that

going by the averment that the appellant was bed-ridden for

two years i.e. till 2016, thereafter till filing of petition no valid

reason was explained. Lock down due to COVID-19 pandemic

situation was affected from 24.03.2020. He further submits

that as per Section 23(1) of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act,

1987, an appeal shall lie from every order, not being an

interlocutory order and the order impugned comes with the

purview of an interlocutory order, appeal is not maintainable.

Thus prays to dismiss the appeal.

9. Now the point for consideration is whether the

appellant has explained delay properly in filing OA? If so,

whether any interference is warranted?

10. While considering the application for condonation of

delay, the Court has to see whether the delay is inordinate or

delay is few days and that reasons assigned are valid and

cogent. Party seeking condonation of delay needs to explain

the delay properly, the grounds which are reasonable and

plausible.

11. In Balwant Singh (dead) v. Jagdish Singh and Ors. 1

after referring to earlier case law, the Hon'ble Apex Court held

at paragraphs 24 and 25 as under;

"We may state that even if the term "sufficient cause" has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally

(2010) 8 SCC 685

is to introduce the concept of "reasonableness" as it is understood in its general connotation.

The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly."

12. In Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of

Brihan Mumbai2, the two-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Apex

Court held as under:

"What needs to be emphasized is that even though a liberal and justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statues, the courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the costs.

What colour the expression "sufficient cause" would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is

(2012) 5 SCC 157

found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay."

Eventually, the Bench upon perusal of the application for condonation of delay and the affidavit on record came to hold that certain necessary facts were conspicuously silent and, accordingly, reversed the decision of the High Court which had condoned the delay of more than seven years."

13. In Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of

Raghunathpur Nafar Academy3, the Hon'ble Apex Court

broadly culled out the following principles:

i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice- oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

ii) The terms sufficient cause should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation.

iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant

(2013) 12 SCC 649

so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.

viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.

x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.

xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.

xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.

16. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:

a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard

manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.

b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective.

c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.

d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challan manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.

14. In Majji Sannemma alias Sanyasirao Vs. Reddy

Sridevi and others4, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed:-

"17. In the case of Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [(1962 2 SCR 762] (supra), it is observed and held as under:--

In construing sec. 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-

heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that

2021 SCC OnLine SC 1260

judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chattappan, (1890) J.L.R. 13 Mad. 269, "s. 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words 'sufficient cause' receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant."

18. In the case of P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala [(1997) 7 SCC 556] (supra), while refusing to condone the delay of 565 days, it is observed that in the absence of reasonable, satisfactory or even appropriate explanation for seeking condonation of delay, the same is not to be condoned lightly. It is further observed that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. It is further observed that while exercising discretion for condoning the delay, the court has to exercise discretion judiciously.

19. In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448] (supra), it is observed as under:--

"The laws of limitation are founded on public policy. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as "statutes of peace". An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. The principle is based on the maxim "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium", that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same time laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression. The object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy."

20. In the case of Basawaraj Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] (supra), it is observed and held by this Court that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case. It is further observed that the expression "sufficient cause" cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. It is further observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of a party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. It is further observed that in case a party has acted with negligence, lack of bona fides or there is inaction then there cannot be any justified ground for condoning the delay even by imposing conditions. It is observed that each application for condonation of delay has to be decided within the framework laid down by this Court. It is further observed that if courts start condoning delay where no sufficient cause is made out by imposing conditions then that would amount to violation of statutory principles and showing utter disregard to legislature."

15. A conspectus of judgments referred to supra, makes it

clear that length of delay is no matter, and acceptability of

the explanation is the only criterion. The primary function of

a Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and

to advance substantial justice. Rules of limitation are not

meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see

that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their

remedy promptly. Hon'ble Apex Court also cautioned that if

the delay is occasioned by party deliberately to gain time,

then the Court should lean against acceptance of the

explanation. Litigant should be vigilant. The explanation

should not be fanciful and concocted. The Courts while

dealing with an application to condone delay should keep in

mind the right accrued to other side and should deal with

such application with utmost care.

16. As per Section 17(1)(b) of the Railway Claims Tribunal

Act, 1987, an application must be made within one year from

the date of occurrence of accident. Section 17(1)(b) reads

thus:

"17. Limitation -

.....

(b) under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) (or, as the case may be, sub-section (1A)) of Section 13 unless the application is made within one year of occurrence of the accident.

...."

17. However, in the case on hand, appellant approached

the Tribunal by filing application with a delay of 1796 days.

One of the reasons assigned by the appellant is that due to

lack of knowledge, he could not file claim application within

time and that only recently, he came to know about the

Railway Claims Tribunal Act, through one Vishnu Vardhan.

It is settled principle of law that ignorance of law cannot be

an excuse and it cannot be taken as a valid ground to

condone delay. Apart from that, appellant did not specifically

state as to when he met Vishnu Vardhan and the said Vishnu

Vardhan, in turn, informed him about compensation under

the Railway Claims Tribunal Act. The affidavit is silent on

these aspects.

18. Further explanation offered by the petitioner for non

filing of claim application, within time, is that he was bed

ridden for two years and thereafter lockdown was imposed

due to COVID-19 pandemic situation. The alleged accident

took place in the year, 2014 and the period of two years

during which appellant was bed ridden was completed by

2016. In fact, the lockdown was imposed from March, 2020.

Thus, the reason assigned by the petitioner that due to

Covid-19 he could not file petition is not acceptable. As held

by Hon'ble Apex Court, the reason should not be fanciful.

19. If the appellant is vigilant, Court will definitely come to

rescue of the appellant. Vigilantibus non dormentibus jura

subveninet, means that court protects those who are vigilant

about their rights. The long dormant claims have more of

cruelty than justice in them.

20. In V. Subba Rao and others Vs Secretary to

Government Panchayat Raj and Rural Development,

Government of A.P. and others5 it was observed that:

Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So, a life-span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for legislatively fixed period of time.