Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Sri. P. Ashok Gajapathi Raju vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh, on 26 April, 2022
HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
MAIN CASE No. CRL.P.No.2965 of 2022
PROCEEDING SHEET
Sl. DATE ORDER OFFICE
No. NOTE
01. 26.04.2022 DR, J
CRL.P.No.2965 of 2022
Notice.
Learned counsel for the petitioner is permitted
to take out personal notice on the 2nd respondent
through RPAD and file proof of service.
Post on 21.06.2022.
________
DR, J
I.A.No.01 of 2022
Dispensed with for the present.
________
DR, J
I.A.No.02 of 2022
Based on the complaint, dated 23.07.2019
made by the 2nd respondent herein, the III Town
Police , Visakhapatnam city, has registered a case in
Crime No.300 of 2019 under Sections 192, 406, 417,
420, 465, 467 r/w 34 of IPC and the same was
numbered as C.C.No.93 of 2022 on the file of II
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,
Visakhapatnam City under sections 192, 193, 199,
200, 417, 420, 406 and 465 r/w 34 of IPC .
According to the complaint, after demise of
Maharaja Alakanarayana Gajapathi Raju disputes
arose between two sons, Sri P.Vijaya Gajapati Raju
(P.V.G Raju) and P.Visweswara Gajapathi Raju
among the properties, dispute in O.S.No.21 of 1963,
was filed and the said suit was resolved in a court by
way of a settlement dated 27.09.1963 as recorded in
suit O.S.No.21 of 1963 on the file of the Subordinate
Judge's Court, Vijayanagaram. By virtue of the said
settlement the title of the property admeasuring
37,902 Sq.ft. of land comprised in TS No.4307/2,
Block No.95 situated at Karpagam Avenue, 4th street,
2
Sainagar, RA Puram in Mylapore Area,Chennai was
vested with P.Vijaya Gajapathi Raju i.e., subject
property in the present dispute.
Subsequently, the legal heirs of Visweswara
Gajapathi Raju claimed share in the said property by
filing a suit in C.S.No.335 of 1998 before the High
Court of Madras against Sri P.Vijayram Gajapathi
Raju (P.V.G Raju), who died during the pendency of
the said suit. A1 to A6 and eldest son of late Sri
P.Vijayram Gajapathi Raju and P.Ananda Gajapathi
Raju were impleaded as parties to the said suit and
the same was renumbered in O.S.No.2664 of 1997 on
the file of VIII Assistant City Civil Court, Chennai.
The matter went up to High Court in the Second
S.A.No.458 of 2019 and during pendency of the
second appeal, Ananda Gajapathi Raju the 1st son of
Sri P.Vijayram Gajapathi Raju (P.V.G Raju) died and
the accused No.7 and No.8 were impleaded as legal
heir of said Anandand Gajapathi Raju in the
proceedings.
The defacto complainant/the 2nd respondent
herein, who is the daughter of Sri P.Ananda
Gajapathi Raju through his 1st wife, was also
impleaded in the said appeal for her rights in the
property and finally O.S.No.2664 of 1997 was
dismissed by the High Court of Madras in
S.A.No.458 of 2009 dated 23.02.2017.
Pursuant to the said judgments, the accused
No.1 to 8 incorporated their names in the permanent
land Register maintained by the Government of
Tamil Nadu to claim their title in the subject
property, later they have executed a Deed of Partition
on 01.06.2018 among themselves and registered the
same, in the Mylapore Sub-Registrar Office.
The very allegation in the complaint of the 2nd
respondent is that in the Second Appeal, the defacto
complainant was also impleaded as a party and
subsequently the same was dismissed by the High
Court. While considering the matter by the High
Court of Madras, the defacto complainant was also a
party to the said suit. Hence, leaving he defacto
complainant, by colluding, the accused No.1 to 8
prepared and executed a partition deed between them
on 01.06.2018.
Based on the said complaint, the investigation
Officer/1st respondent has investigated the crime,
examined 10 witnesses; based on the statements of
LWs.1 to 10 and also the letter received from the Sub
Registrar, Mylapore dated 23.12.2019, the
Investigation Officer has given finding that the
partition deed discloses that the ancestral property
was partitioned among themselves i.e. A1 to A8
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leaving other legal heirs i.e., defacto complainant.
Accordingly, Police filed charge sheet that accused/
A1 to A8 are liable for punishment under Sections
192, 193, 199, 200, 417, 420, 406, 465 r/w 34 of IPC.
Petitioner has filed the present petition under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C. mainly on three grounds.
Firstly, as per Section 177, 178 of Cr.P.C. the 1st
respondent has no jurisdiction to entertain the present
complaint. Even according to the contents of the
complaint, accused 1 to 8 have executed the Partition
Deed and registered the same with Mylapore Sub
Registrar Office.
According to the said complaint, the cause of
action arose only at Chennai. Apart from that the
entire dispute is with regard to the properties situated
admeasuring 37,902 Sq.ft. in TS No.4307/2, Block
No.95, at Karpagam Avenue, 4th street, Sainagar, RA
Puram, Mylapore Area, Chennai. Thus, the incident
occurred and the property situated, are at Chennai. As
per Section 177 of Cr.P.C., the 1st respondent has no
jurisdiction to entertain the said complaint and they
are not entitled to investigate the crime.
To support his contention, learned counsel for
the petitioner has relied on the judgment of the
Supreme Court, in Y.Abraham Ajith and Ors Vs.
Inspector of Police, Chennai and Another1
"The crucial question is whether any part of the
cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the
concerned Court. In terms of Section 177 of the
Code it is the place where the offence was
committed. In essence it is the cause of action for
initiation of the proceedings against the accused.
While in civil cases, normally the expression
"cause of action" is used, in criminal cases as
stated in Section 177 of the Code, reference is to
the local jurisdiction where the offence is
committed. These variations in etymological
expression do not really make the position
different. The expression "cause of action" is
therefore not a stranger to criminal cases.
It is settled law that cause of action consists of
bundle of facts, which give cause to enforce the
legal inquiry for redress in a court of law. In other
words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the
law applicable to them, gives the allegedly
affected party a right to claim relief against the
opponent. It must include some act done by the
latter since in the absence of such an act no cause
of action would possibly accrue or would arise.
The expression "cause of action" has acquired a
1
(2004) 8 Supreme Court Cases 100
4
judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense
cause of action means the circumstances forming
the infraction of the right or the immediate
occasion for the action. In the wider sense, it
means the necessary conditions for the
maintenance of the proceeding including not only
the alleged infraction, but also the infraction
coupled with the right itself. Compendiously the
expression means every fact, which it would be
necessary for the complainant to prove, if
traversed, in order to support his right or
grievance to the judgment of the Court. Every
fact, which is necessary to be proved, as
distinguished from every piece of evidence, which
is necessary to prove such fact, comprises in
"cause of action".
The expression "cause of action" has sometimes
been employed to convey the restricted idea of
facts or circumstances which constitute either the
infringement or the basis of a right and no more.
In a wider and more comprehensive sense, it has
been used to denote the whole bundle of material
facts.
The expression "cause of action" is generally
understood to mean a situation or state of facts
that entitles a party to maintain an action in a
court or a tribunal; a group of operative facts
giving rise to one or more bases for sitting; a
factual situation that entitles one person to obtain
a remedy in court from another person. (Black's
Law Dictionary a "cause of action" is stated to be
the entire set of facts that gives rise to an
enforceable claim; the phrase comprises every
fact, which, if traversed, the plaintiff must prove
in order to obtain judgment. In "Words and
Phrases" (4th Edn.) the meaning attributed to the
phrase "cause of action" in common legal
parlance is existence of those facts, which give a
party a right to judicial interference on his
behalf".
In Halsbury Laws of England (Fourth Edition) it has
been stated as follows:
"Cause of action" has been defined as meaning
simply a factual situation the existence of which
entitles one person to obtain from the Court a
remedy against another person. The phrase has
been held from earliest time to include every fact
which is material to be proved to entitle the
plaintiff to succeed, and every fact which a
defendant would have a right to traverse. "Cause
of action" has also been taken to mean that
particular act on the part of the defendant which
gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint, or the
subject matter of grievance founding the action,
not merely the technical cause of action".
When the aforesaid legal principles are applied, to
5
the factual scenario disclosed by the complainant
in the complaint petition, the inevitable
conclusion is that no part of cause of action arose
in Chennai and, therefore, the concerned
magistrate had no jurisdiction to deal with the
matter. The proceedings are quashed. The
complaint be returned to respondent No.2 who, if
she so chooses, may file the same in the
appropriate Court to be dealt with in accordance
with law. The appeal is accordingly allowed."
Consistently the same was held in Rhea
Chakraborty Vs. State of Bihar2 as follows -
The interpretation of Sections 177 and 178 of the
CrPC would be relevant on the issue. In Satvinder
Kaur Vs. State (Govt of NCT of Delhi) (1999) 8 SCC
728 for the Division Bench, Justice M B Shah wrote
as under:-
"12. A reading of the aforesaid sections would
make it clear that Section 177 provides for
"ordinary" place of enquiry or trial. Section 178,
inter alia, provides for place of enquiry or trial
when it is uncertain in which of several local areas
an offence was committed or where the offence
was committed partly in one local area and partly
in another and where it consisted of several acts
done in different local areas, it could be enquired
into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over
any of such local areas. Hence, at the stage of
investigation, it cannot be held that the SHO does
not have territorial jurisdiction to investigate the
crime."
25. Likewise, Justice Arijit Pasayat, in Y Abraham
Ajith vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai & Anr. (2004)
8 SCC 100, writing for the Division Bench
pronounced as follows:-
"12. The crucial question is whether any part of
the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of
the court concerned. In terms of Section 177 of
the Code, it is the place where the offence was
committed. In essence it is the cause of action for
initiation of the proceedings against the accused.
......
29. Moreover, the allegation relating to criminal
breach of trust and misappropriation of money
which were to be eventually accounted for in
Patna (where the Complainant resides), could
prima facie indicate the lawful jurisdiction of the
Patna police. This aspect was dealt succinctly by
Justice J S Khehar, as a member of the Division
Bench in Lee Kun Hee, President, Samsung
Corporation, South Korea and Others Vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh and Ors. (2012) 3 SCC 132 and it
was held as under:-
2020 SCC Online SC 654
"38 ******
181. Place of trial in case of certain offences.--(1)-
(3)* * * (4) Any offence of criminal
misappropriation or of criminal breach of trust
may be inquired into or tried by a court within
whose local jurisdiction the offence was
committed or any part of the property which is
the subject of the offence was received or
retained, or was required to be returned or
accounted for, by the accused person." A perusal
of the aforesaid provision leaves no room for any
doubt, that in offences of the nature as are
subject-matter of consideration in the present
controversy, the court within whose local
jurisdiction, the whole or a part of the
consideration "... were required to be returned or
accounted for...." would have jurisdiction in the
matter."
Learned counsel for the petitioner by
following the said judgments, contended that in the
instant case, no cause of action would arise in the
jurisdictional limit of the 1st respondent as the
Registration of the documents was made at Sub-
Registrar Office, Mylapore and also the subject
property is situated at Chennai. Therefore, as per
Section 177 of Cr.P.C. the 1st respondent has no
jurisdiction to entertain the crime and investigate the
same, on this ground charge sheet has to be quashed.
Second ground, raised by the petitioner is that
the issue involved in the present complaint, is purely
civil in nature; only with a malafied intention to
defame the petitioner politically, present complaint
has been lodged. After changing the political
scenario, in fact, the 2nd respondent was appointed as
chairman of Managing Trustee of Manasas Trust
replacing the petitioner herein. Said proceedings
were assaulted before this Court by the petitioner
herein in W.P.Nos.6692, 6694, 6857 and 9895 of
2020, which were disposed of vide common order
dated 14.06.2021 with the following directions:
154. In the result,
(I) W.P.No.6692, 6694 and 9895 of 2020 are
allowed. Consequently,
(1) G.O.Ms.No.71 to 74 Revenue (Endts.II)
Department, Dated 03.03.2020 are set aside.
(2) Recognition of the respondents 4 to 6 (Kum.
Sanchaitha
Gajapathi Raju, Smt. Urmila Gajapathi Raju and
Smt. R.V.Sunitha Prasad) as members of family of
founder in relation to MANSAS Trust,
Vizianagaram and Sri Varaha Lakshmi Narasimha
Swamy Vari Devasthanam, Simhachalam,
Visakhapatnam District, is set aside.
(3) Appointment of the respondent No.4
(Kum.Sanchaitha
Gajapathi Raju) as the hereditary
Trustee/Chairman of Sri Varaha
Lakshmi Narasimha Swamy Vari Devasthanam,
Simhachalam,
Visakhapatnam District, is set aside.
(4) Appointment of the Respondent No.4
(Kum.Sanchaitha
Gajapathi Raju) as the Chairman of Maharajah
Alak Narayan
Society of Arts & Science (MANSAS) Trust is set
aside.
(5) Appointment of the petitioner as Hereditary
Trustee/Chairman
of Sri Varaha Lakshmi Narasimha Swamy Vari
Devasthanam, Simhachalam, Visakhapatnam
District, is revived and restored,
upholding G.O.Ms.No.123, Revenue (Endts.II)
Department, dated
31.03.2016, with immediate effect.
(6) Appointment of the petitioner Sri P.Ashok
Gajapathi Raju, as
the Chairman of Maharajah Alak Narayan Society
of Arts & Science
(MANSAS) Trust, Vizianagaram, is revived and
restored in terms of
G.O.Ms.No.138 Revenue (Endts.II) Department,
dated 07.04.2016,
with immediate effect.
II. W.P.No.6857 of 2020 is dismissed. "
While passing the said writ petitions, the High Court
observed that -
"143. Nonetheless, the whole exercise in
bringing out all the four G.Os., gives raise to
any amount of suspicion in relation to the
factors that motivated and propelled, in
making this attempt. It is manifest from the
nature of these G.Os. and reasons assigned
there in that it is only to accommodate the 4th
respondent, they are so brought out. The
respondents 5 and 6 apparently became the
pawns in the hands of the Government and the
authorities under this Act, whose attempts
were made use of to give a colour of propriety,
to favour the 4th respondent in issuing
G.O.Ms.No.71 Revenue (Endts.II)
Department, dated 03.03.2020 and
G.O.Ms.No.73 Revenue (Endts.II)
Department, dated 03.03.2020."
On perusal of the said observation, it clearly
discloses the interference of the Government in the
petitioner's family. It is an admitted fact that initially
the properties were settled by the competent civil
court in O.S.No.21 of 1963 between P.Vijaya
Gajapathi Raju (P.V.G. Raju) and P.Visweswara
Gajapathi Raju. For the reasons best known, the heirs
of Visweswara Gajapathi Raju filed suit with regard
to the properties situated in T.S.No.4307/2, in Block
No.95 situated at Karpagam Avenue, 4th street,
Sainagar, RA Puram in Mylapore Area,Chennai and
the same was dismissed by the High Court of Madras
in S.A.No.458 of 2009 and it is also not in dispute
that subsequently, the defacto complainant has also
approached the civil court for declaring that she is
also legal heir of deceased/Ananda Gapathi Raju, 1st
son of P.V.G. Raju and to declare her share in the
property situated at Mylapore Area, Chennai.
Learned counsel for the petitioner further
submitted that on perusal of the complaint as well as
the contents of the charge sheet and the averments
made in the suit, it is purely civil dispute between the
legal heirs of 1st and 2nd son of P.Vijaya Gajapathi
Raju. In view of the same, when it is purely civil
dispute, the 1st respondent is not entitled to entertain
the complaint made by the 2nd respondent and they
should not have investigated the same. It is also
reiterated by the Hob'ble Apex Court in catena of
decisions that the police should not entertain the
complaints in civil disputes.
To support his contention, learned counsel for
the petitioner further relied in Hridaya ranjan
Prasad Verma and Ors. Vs. State of Bihar and
Another3, wherein it is observed that -
"Cheating is defined in Section 415 of the Code
as, "Whoever, by deceiving any person,
fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person
so deceived to deliver any property to any
(2000) 4 SCC 168
person, or to consent that any person shall
retain any property, or intentionally induces the
person so deceived to do or omit to do
anything which he would not do or omit if he
were not so deceived, and which act or
omission causes or is likely to cause damage or
harm to that person in body, mind, reputation
or property, is said to "cheat".
Explanation - A dishonest concealment of facts
is a deception within the meaning of this
section.
The section requires - (1) Deception of any
person.
(2) (a) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that
person (i) to deliver any property to any
person; or (ii) to consent that any person shall
retain any property; or
(b) intentionally inducing that person to do or
omit to do anything which he would not do or
omit if he were not so deceived, and which act
or omission causes or is likely to cause damage
or harm to that person in body mind,
reputation or property.
On a reading of the section it is manifest that in
the definition there are set forth two separate
classes of acts which the person deceived may
be induced to do. in the first place he may be
induced fraudulently or dishonestly to deliver
any property to any person. The second class of
acts set forth in the section is the doing or
omitting to do anything which the person
deceived would not do or omit to do if he were
not so deceived. In the first class of cases the
inducing must be fraudulent or dishonest. In
the second class of acts, the inducing must be
intentional but not fraudulent or dishonest."
Also in G.Sagar Suri V. State of U.P.4, the
Hon'ble Apex Court held as follows:-
"It is to be seen if a matter, which is essentially of
civil nature, has been given a cloak of criminal
offence. Criminal proceedings are not a short cut
of other remedies available in law. Before issuing
process a criminal court has to exercise a great
deal of caution. For the accused it is a serious
matter. This Court has laid certain principles on
the basis of which High Court is to exercise its
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code,
Jurisdiction- under this Section has to be
exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice."
(2000) 2 SCC 636
In view of the above observations, learned
counsel contended that the High Court is entitled to
entertain the petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
Finally, learned counsel for the petitioner has
submitted that the ingredients of section 191 to 195 of
IPC would not attract in this case. In support his
contention, learned counsel for the petitioner, relied
on the judgment in Bhima Raju Prasad Vs. State,
represented by Deputy Superintendent of Police,
CBI/SPE/ACU-II5, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court
held as follows:-
"It is well settled that Section 195(1)(b) creates a
bar against taking cognizance of offences against
the administration of justice for the purpose of
guarding against baseless or vindictive
prosecutions by private parties. The provisions of
this Section imply that the Court is the only
appropriate authority which is entitled to raise
grievance in relation to perjury, forgery of
documents produced before the Court, and other
offences which interfere with the effective
dispensation of justice by the Court. Hence, it for
the Court to exercise its discretion and consider
the suitability of making a complaint for such
offences. However, there is a pertinent difference
in the wording of Section 195(1)(b) (i) and Section
195(1)(b)(ii) inasmuch as Section 195(1)(b)(ii) is
restricted to offences which are committed in
respect of a document which is "produced or
given in evidence in a proceeding in any court".
Whereas Section 195(1)(b)(i) applies to offences
against public justice which are committed not
only in any proceeding in any court, but also "in
relation to" such proceeding. Whether such
semantical difference bars the analogous
application of precedents relating to Section
195(1)(b)(ii) for interpreting Section 195(1)(b)(i)
will be discussed by us later."
Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted
that by interfering Sections 191 to 195 of Cr.P.C. the
Hon'ble High Court clearly stated that the said
provisions would apply for the proceedings before the
Court. In the instant case, taking the facts, the
2021 SCC OnLine SC 210
alleged offence under section 192, 193 I.P.C. would
not apply.
Sri Sravan Kumar, learned Assistant Public
Prosecutor appearing for the 1st respondent has
vehemently opposed the arguments and submitted
that in the instant case, though having knowledge that
the defacto complaint is one of the legal heir and she
was impleaded as a party to the proceedings before
the Hon'ble High Court of Madaras, knowingfully,
after disposal of the said proceedings, A1 to A8 with
a malafide intention to cheat her registered a deed on
01.06.2018 without mentioning the name of the
defacto complainant/2nd respondent herein, as legal
heir. Hence, it is nothing but criminal breach of trust,
which attracts the ingredients of Section 405 of IPC.
Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor further
contended that as per the investigation, it clearly
discloses that the Deed of partition, which was
registered before Sub Registrar at Mylapore was
prepared and notarized at Viajayanagaram, A.P.,
hence, as per Section 177 of Cr.P.C., the 1st
respondent has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint;
even according to the provision, it clearly says that it
can ordinarily be enquired into tried by the court,
even whose local jurisdiction the offence was
committed. Hence, as part of the offence was
committed at A.P., 1st respondent has jurisdiction to
entertain and investigate the crime.
Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor further
contended that the accused 1 to 8 have knowingly
having knowledge about the fact that the defacto
complainant is also one of the legal heirs of Sri
Ananda Gajapati Raju, by concealing said fact, they
have made false statements before the Sub-Registrar
Mylapore, which would attract the offence under
Section 191 of IPC.
Considering the rival submissions and also on
perusal of the common order passed by this Court in
W.P.Nos.6692 and batch, dated 14.06.2001 as well as
the allegations made in the complaint and in view of
the provisions of Section 177 of Cr.P.C and Sections
405, 420, 192 and 193 of IPC, this court has no
hesitation to say that the matter has purely in civil
nature, since admittedly there are civil disputes
pending between the competent Civil Court.
Nevertheless on perusal of the complaint and taking
observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in
Y.Abraham Ajith and Ors's case and Rhea
Chakraborty's case cited supra, this court has doubt
about the jurisdiction of the 1st respondent to entertain
the complaint and to investigate the same.
In view of the above, there shall be stay of all
further proceedings, as prayed for.
________
DR, J
Pnr
