Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Sri Nannapaneni Seetharama Raju, vs State Of Andhra Pradesh on 2 September, 2021
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH R0Y
Writ Petition Nos.16468 and 20077 of 2020
and
Crl. Petition Nos.4422, 4423, 4424, 4425, 4426 and 4427 of 2021
COMMON ORDER:
The two Writ Petitions and the six Criminal Petitions are
filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. respectively seeking quash of the common
F.I.R. in Crime No.08/RCO-ACB-GNT/2020 of A.C.B. Police
Station, Guntur, registered against the petitioners for the
offences punishable under Sections 13(1)(d)(ii) r/w.13(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, the "P.C. Act")
and under Sections 409, 420 r/w.120-B of IPC.
2) The petitioner in W.P.No.16468 of 2020 is accused No.1
and the petitioner in W.P.No.20077 of 2020 is accused No.13
and the petitioners in Crl.P.Nos.4423, 4424, 4422, 4427, 4426
and 4425 of 2021 are accused Nos.2 to 7 respectively in the
above F.I.R. Therefore, these Writ Petitions and Criminal
Petitions are being disposed of by this common order.
3) Factual matrix of the prosecution case germane to dispose
of these Writ Petitions and Criminal Petitions may briefly be
stated as follows:
(a) One Komatla Srinivasa Swamy Reddy is the de facto
complainant, who lodged report with the police. He claims to be
an advocate from Ongole. He has lodged a report with the D.G.,
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ACB, A.P., Vijayawada on 07.09.2020 stating that A-1
Sri Dammalapati Srinivas was the former Additional Advocate-
General and also Advocate-General of the State of Andhra
Pradesh. He and some public servants in high positions took
advantage of their involvement in the decision making process
relating to exact location of the core capital area and purchased
lands either in their names or in the name of their binamis or
their family members, associates/acquaintances, after sharing
the privileged information about location of core capital area as
they are privy to the said information and thereby enriched
themselves.
(b) It is stated that till the draft of capital region area was
approved by the Council of Ministers of the State of Andhra
Pradesh, the details of the draft were kept secret. It is only in
the month of December, 2014, the Capital Region Authority Bill,
2014 was presented and the names of the villages that would be
included in the new capital region became known to the public.
(c) However, the father-in-law of A-1, who is A-3, his
brother-in-law-A-4 and his close relatives-A-5 and A-6 and his
wife-A-2 and other accused purchased large extent of land in
Amaravati capital region and in the villages which are adjacent
to the said capital region and the iconic bridge proposed to be
built across the Krishna river even before notification was
issued in the month of December, 2014 by the State
Government notifying the capital region area and the villages
included in the said capital region. It is stated that A-3, A-4,
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A-5 and A-6, who are the father-in-law, brother-in-law and
relatives of A-1, purchased about Ac.40.25 cents of land and
out of the said land, Ac.11.18 cents is in the core capital area
and remaining Ac.29.07 cents is adjacent to the core capital
region. The aforesaid lands are purchased by them between the
period from June, 2014 to December, 2014 even before
issuance of notification notifying the capital region.
(d) It is stated that A-1, who worked in a key position as
Additional Advocate-General, was privy to the information
relating to the location of the capital area and he has divulged
the said information to his family members, relatives and close
associates and based on the said information furnished by him
that aforesaid persons purchased the said lands in and around
the capital region. Similarly, the other accused, who got
information from the higher officials working in the Government
relating to exact location of the capital area prior to its
notification issued in the month of December, 2014, have also
purchased lands in and around the proposed capital region.
Therefore, all the accused have indulged in insider trading.
(e) On receipt of the said report lodged by the de facto
complainant, the DG, ACB, AP, Vijayawada, by his order in
C.No.82/RE-VGT/2020-S17, dated 08.09.2020, instructed
Sri T.V.V. Pratap Kumar, Dy.S.P., ACB, Guntur, to conduct a
regular enquiry and submit report on the said allegations made
against A-1 former Additional Advocate-General and Advocate-
General, and others.
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(f) Accordingly, the Dy.S.P, ACB, Guntur, conducted a
preliminary enquiry and he has submitted his report, dated
14.09.2020, to the D.G, ACB, AP., Vijayawada, stating that
during the course of preliminary enquiry that he has collected
relevant documents pertaining to the sale of lands from internet
and the web-site belonging to the Stamps and Registration
Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh, and it surfaced
during the course of his enquiry that the said sale transactions
took place during the months of June to December, 2014. In
the Assembly sessions that took place in January, 2020, the
Government disclosed in the Assembly that people in high
position took advantage of being involved in decision making
process about location of capital of Andhra Pradesh and thereby
purchased lands between June and December, 2014 for
themselves either through their binamis or through their family
members by sharing the said information about the location of
capital area and thereby allowed their kith and kin also to get
themselves enriched.
(g) It is stated in the preliminary enquiry report that the
de facto complainant stated in his statement recorded during
the course of enquiry that in the advocate circles, it was openly
proclaimed that A-1, with his close intimacy with the then Chief
Minister and his associates in the Telugu Desam Party, was
initially appointed as Additional Advocate-General on
19.06.2014 and was later appointed as Advocate-General on
28.05.2016, and he and other top leaders in the Telugu Desam
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Party and businessmen, who supported Telugu Desam Party,
bought lands in and around the capital region with prior
knowledge of exact location of the capital and cheated the
farmers who sold the lands to them. It is stated in the report
that between June, 2014 and December, 2014, there were only
some rumours and leaks about the location of the capital at
Amaravati, but its limits were known to very few people in the
Government and the list of villages included in the capital area
was published only in the month of December, 2014 and till
then the information relating to the villages coming within the
purview of capital region is not known to the public. Therefore,
even before official notification was issued on 30.12.2014 that
the accused herein, who secured information relating to exact
location of capital region in an illegal manner had by indulging
in insider trading purchased the said lands from the farmers. It
is stated in the report that the beneficiaries of such sale
transactions, as indicated in the Annexure enclosed to the said
report are:
1) Dammalapati Srinivas;
2) Dammalapati Nagarani;
3) Nannapaneni Krishnamurthy;
4) Nannapaneni Sita Rama Raju;
5) Nannapaneni Lakshmi Narayana;
6) Madala Vishnuvardhana Rao;
7) Mukkapati Pattabhi Rama Rao;
8) Yarlagadda Ritesh;
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9) Yarlagadda Lakshmi;
10) Nuthalapati Sritanuja;
11) Nuthalapati Sribhuvana;
12) Katragadda Srinivasa Rao; and
13) Vellanki Renuka Devi.
The innocent farmers, who have no prior knowledge of location
of capital in their area, have sold away their property at a low
price and thus, the farmers were cheated by the accused. A-1
got the lands which were purchased in the name of his relatives
and close associates, subsequently transferred in his name and
in the name of his wife, which clearly indicates that the said
sale transactions that earlier took place are binami
transactions. Even there is no difference in the sale price from
the earlier sales and the sales that took place in the name of
A-1 and his wife and his relatives and it also indicates that they
are binami sale transactions. Therefore, it is stated in the
preliminary enquiry report that A-1 has grossly misused his
official position as an Additional Advocate-General and he being
privy to the information relating to the exact location of the
capital area divulged the said information to his relatives and
associates which is a secret information and thereby purchased
the lands in the capital area and adjacent to it for paltry sale
consideration from the farmers, who have no knowledge about
the exact location of the capital area and thereby enriched
themselves. Therefore, all of them indulged in insider trading
and A-1 committed an offence of criminal misconduct in
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obtaining pecuniary advantage to him and his family members
and associates by abusing his official position. Therefore, he is
liable for prosecution under Sections 13(1)(d)(ii) r/w.13(2) of the
P.C. Act and also under Sections 409, 420 r/w.120-B of IPC
and other accused are liable for prosecution under Sections 420
r/w.120-B of IPC.
(h) On the basis of the aforesaid preliminary enquiry
report, wherein it is stated that the above accused and others
have committed a cognizable criminal offence and that it is
necessary to register a case against A-1 and others and conduct
a thorough investigation, a case in Crime No.08/RCO-ACB-
GNT/2020 of A.C.B. Police Station, Guntur, was registered on
15.09.2020, as per the order dated 14.09.2020 issued by the
DG, ACB, AP., Vijayawada, instructing Sri T.V.V.Pratap Kumar,
Dy.S.P, ACB, Guntur, to register a case against the accused.
4) Even before the F.I.R. was registered on the basis of the
preliminary enquiry report on 15.09.2020, A-1 has filed
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 to call for records pertaining to any
inquiry/investigation being conducted by any of the State
agencies and to quash the letter dated 23.03.2020 issued by the
Principal Secretary, Home Department to Secretary,
Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievance
and Pensions bearing No.1130466/SC.A/A1/2019-I and
seeking other reliefs.
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5) When the Writ Petition came up before one of the learned
Judges of this Court on 15.09.2020, the learned Judge recused
from hearing the case on the ground that he has earlier
appeared along with A-1 during his tenure as an Advocate-
General. Therefore, when A-1 moved house motion in view of
the urgency, the matter came up before the then Chief Justice
of this Court after according permission to move house motion.
6) This Court, by its order, dated 15.09.2020, ordered for
stay of investigation and directed not to take any coercive steps
while ordering notice to respondents 1 to 4 and 6. The Court
was not inclined to issue notice calling for the response of
respondent No.5 Sri Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy, the present Chief
Minister of the State of Andhra Pradesh, who was added as a
respondent in person.
7) The State has preferred petition for Special Leave to
Appeal (Crl.) No.4979 of 2020 to the Hon'ble Supreme Court
assailing the said interim order passed by this Court dated
15.09.2020, granting stay of investigation.
8) Thereafter, learned counsel for the petitioner in the said
S.L.P. sought permission of the Supreme Court to withdraw the
said S.L.P. Accordingly, the petitioner was permitted to
withdraw the S.L.P. and the S.L.P. was dismissed as withdrawn
as per order dated 22.07.2021. While dismissing the said S.L.P.
as withdrawn, the Hon'ble Supreme Court directed that the
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counter-affidavit if any to the amended Writ Petition that is filed
by A-1 before the High Court be filed within one week and
rejoinder affidavit if any be filed within one week thereafter and
further directed the High Court to decide the pending Writ
Petition as expeditiously as possible and preferably within four
weeks.
9) The said order is placed before this Court on 29.07.2021
when the matter came up for hearing before this Court on that
day. When the aforesaid direction of the Apex Court was
brought to the notice of this Court, this Court has allowed
I.A.No.1 of 2021 impleading the de facto complainant as 7th
respondent in W.P.No.16468 of 2020 and ordered notice to him
and directed the State to file its counter-affidavit if any to the
amended Writ Petition seeking amendment of the prayer in the
Writ Petition to quash the F.I.R. and posted the matter to
12.08.2021. On 12.08.2021 the State reported no counter-
affidavit and stated that the amendment application may be
allowed. Accordingly, A-1 was permitted to amend the prayer
in the Writ Petition as sought for. Therefore, the petitioner-A1
in the said Writ Petition now seeks quash of the F.I.R. registered
against him.
10) A-1 who is the petitioner in W.P.No.16468 of 2020 sought
quash of the F.I.R. on various grounds. Myriad and manifold
allegations have been made against the State and particularly
against Sri Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy, the present Chief Minister
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of the State of Andhra Pradesh, attributing motive in registering
the aforesaid F.I.R. against him and his family members. It is
stated that he has earlier appeared in many cases in pursuance
of his profession as an Advocate against Sri Y.S. Jagan Mohan
Reddy, which ultimately, resulted into registering some criminal
cases against Sri Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy, which are now
pending trial in C.B.I. Court. Therefore, to wreak vengeance
against him and out of malice against him that the present
criminal case has been foisted against him and his family
members by grossly abusing his present position as Chief
Minister of the State, to harass and humiliate him by falsely
implicating him and his family members in a concocted criminal
case. He also sought for quash of F.I.R. on the ground that the
facts of the case do not constitute any offences, for which the
F.I.R. was registered and that launching of criminal prosecution
against him in the facts and circumstances of the case amounts
to abuse of process of court.
11) As this Court, at the time of granting interim order of stay
of investigation and ordering notice to respondents 1 to 4 and 6,
was not inclined to issue notice to Sri Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy,
who was added in person as 5th respondent and as this Court
was also of the view that irrespective of the manifold allegations
made against the 5th respondent attributing motive for
launching criminal prosecution against A-1 that it would be
appropriate to decide the Writ Petition by ascertaining whether
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facts of the case and the allegations set out in the F.I.R. prima
facie constitute any such offences registered against A-1 and
while confining itself strictly to the said core issue to ascertain
whether it amounts to abuse of process of court or not, was also
not inclined to order notice to the 5th respondent. Therefore,
this Court, as per order dated 12.08.2021, held that the 5 th
respondent, who was added in person by ;name, is not a
necessary party to the Writ Petition, therefore, no notice is
required to be issued to the 5th respondent and thereby deleted
the 5th respondent from the array of parties.
12) Therefore, as several allegations are made against the 5 th
respondent in person attributing motive to falsely implicate A-1
and his family members in the present case, as the 5 th
respondent is now deleted from the array of parties, this Court
is not delving into the correctness of said allegations to consider
the plea of motive taken by A-1. This Court is strictly confining
itself to ascertain whether the allegations set out in the F.I.R.
prima facie constitute any offences under Sections 13(1)(d)(ii)
r/w.13(2) of the P.C. Act and under Sections 409, 420 r/w.
120-B of IPC or not and whether launching of criminal
prosecution against all the accused in the case amounts to
abuse of process of court or not.
13) The State has filed counter-affidavit of Sri T.V.V. Pratap
Kumar, Dy.S.P., ACB, Guntur denying material averments of
the writ petitions filed by A-1 and A-13 and also the averments
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of the Criminal Petitions filed by A-2 to A-7. It is pleaded that
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that on any
information furnished regarding commission of a cognizable
offence, a Station House Officer is obliged to register an F.I.R.
and in the instant case, on the information furnished before the
Station House Officer and after conducting preliminary enquiry,
the F.I.R. was registered against the persons named therein. It
is stated that the F.I.R. was registered on the basis of the bona
fide information that was furnished and on the basis of the law
laid down in the case of Lalitha Kumari v. State of Uttar
Pradesh1 by the Apex Court. Therefore, the registration of
F.I.R. is completely legitimate and is unexceptionable. It is
stated that the information disclosed in the F.I.R. clearly
constitutes a cognizable offence and as mandated by the
Supreme Court in various judgments, the present F.I.R. was
registered. It is further stated that, as further investigation was
stayed by this Court on the very day of registration of F.I.R. i.e.
on 15.09.2020, no further investigation could be made. It is
pleaded that the Apex Court repeatedly held that the
investigation cannot be scuttled at a nascent and early stage
and the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and Article 226 of the
Constitution of India cannot be sought to be exercised for
thwarting an investigation of a cognizable offence and the said
law has been reiterated in the case of Neeharika Infrastructure
1 (2014) 2 SCC 1
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Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra2. It is pleaded that as the
Writ Petitioners seek to raise several factual issues of
complexity and defence that the same cannot be considered in
the Writ jurisdiction. While making parawise denial of all the
averments made in the Writ Petition, it is prayed to dismiss the
Writ Petition in the counter-affidavit filed by the State.
14) The 7th respondent de facto complainant has adopted the
said counter-affidavit filed by the State.
15) The 6th respondent Deputy Inspector General of Police,
Intelligence Department, has filed a separate counter-affidavit
stating that he was impleaded only as eo-nomine and that the
allegations made in the affidavit filed in support of the Writ
Petition against him are not correct. It is pleaded that the
Intelligence Department in the State has a "Counter Intelligence
Cell" Police Station and it has jurisdiction over the entire State
of Andhra Pradesh as per G.O.Ms.No.287, Home (P.S. & C.A.D.)
Department, dated 03.11.2010, and he is the Supervisory
Officer of the said Police Station. Therefore, in discharge of his
functions as Supervisory Officer that he has signed the letters,
including the letter dated 29.01.2020, and the said letter was
issued to secure information under Section 138(1)(b) of the
Income Tax Act as it is his duty as a Police Officer under
Section 23 of the Police Act, 1961, to aid and assist any enquiry
and investigation into any crime in order to ensure public peace
2 (2020) 10 SCC 118 = (2021) SCC Online SC 315
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and to apprehend those who are guilty of any offence as alleged
against them. It is further pleaded that it is also the duty of the
Intelligence Department of the State to collect material in
accordance with law and communicate the same to the
concerned Investigating Agency. Therefore, he prayed for
dismissal of the Writ Petition against him.
16) When the matter came up for hearing before this Court,
heard arguments of learned Senior Counsel Sri Siddarth
Luthra, appearing for A-1 in W.P.No.16468 of 2020; learned
counsel for other accused i.e. A-2 to A7 and A-13 in other Writ
Petition and Criminal Petitions have adopted the arguments of
learned Senior Counsel Sri Siddarth Luthra; and heard learned
Advocate General for the State; Sri O. Kailashnath Reddy,
learned counsel for the de facto complainant, adopted the
arguments of the learned Advocate-General; and heard learned
Senior Counsel Sri M.S. Prasad for 6th respondent.
17) Learned Senior Counsel Sri Siddarth Luthra vehemently
contended that the facts of the case as alleged in the F.I.R. and
in the preliminary enquiry report absolutely do not constitute
or make out any offences punishable under Sections 13(1)(d)(ii)
r/w.13(2) of the P.C. Act and under Sections 409, 420 r/w.
120-B of IPC. He would submit that, in fact, these are covered
matters in view of earlier common order of this Court passed in
a batch of Criminal Petitions in Crl.P.Nos.4819 of 2020 decided
on 19.01.2021, which was confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme
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Court in Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.2636 of
2021 and batch, as per order dated 19.07.2021. He would
submit that all the issues which are now raised in these Writ
Petitions and the Criminal Petitions were already considered by
this Court in the aforesaid earlier common order of this Court
and held that the facts of the case do not constitute any
offences punishable under Sections 420, 406, 409 and 120-B of
IPC. He would submit that this Court has elaborately discussed
regarding the legal position relating to the said offences under
Sections 406, 409, 420 and 120-B of IPC and gave a categorical
finding that the facts of the case do not constitute any such
offences. So, he would submit that as the present F.I.R. was
also registered against the petitioners herein based on similar
allegations and identical facts that all the petitioners herein,
who are similarly placed, are also entitled for quash of the F.I.R.
18) He would submit that even this Court has elaborately
dealt with the concept of offence of insider trading in the
aforesaid earlier common order and held that the said offence of
insider trading is alien to our criminal law under I.P.C. and it
was only an offence punishable under the Securities and
Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 (herein after called as "SEBI
Act") relating to unlawful disclosure of information pertaining to
sale of securities in stock market. Therefore, he would submit
that in view of the above common order of this Court, which
was also confirmed by the Apex Court in Petition for Special
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Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.2636 of 2021 and batch, as per order
dated 19.07.2021, that the present prosecution against the
petitioners for the offences punishable under Sections 409, 420
r/w.120-B of IPC is also not maintainable under law and
thereby prayed to quash the F.I.R. registered against the
petitioners in the present case.
19) As regards the offence under Section 13(1)(d)(ii) of P.C. Act
is concerned, learned senior counsel Sri Siddarth Luthra would
submit that the said allegation is only against A-1 and even
though he being an Additional Advocate General at the relevant
time is undoubtedly a public servant that the allegations
ascribed against him do not constitute any offence of criminal
misconduct as contemplated under Section 13(1)(d)(ii) of the
P.C. Act. He would submit that it was also contended before the
Apex Court during the course of arguments in Petition for
Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.2636 of 2021 and batch, that
there is a possibility of public officials being arraigned under
Section 13 of the P.C. Act after investigation in this case, and
the Apex Court rejected the said contention in the above
judgment and held that as all the transactions in question are
between private individuals involving private lands and as found
by the High Court that the information about the likely location
of the capital city was very much in public domain at the time of
the transactions in question that the said part of submissions
made relating to possibility of public officials being arraigned
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under Section 13 of the P.C. Act does not make out a case for
interference. So, he would submit that the said contention that
A-1 being a public servant is liable for prosecution under
Section 13(1)(d)(ii) of the P.C. Act is unsustainable in view of the
aforesaid observation of the Apex Court made in Petition for
Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.2636 of 2021 and batch and as
such, it is no more open to the prosecution to contend that A-1
is liable for prosecution under Section 13(1)(d)(ii) of the P.C. Act.
20) Even otherwise, he would submit that mere buying lands
by A-1 or his family members in exercise of their constitutional
right and legal right to acquire property based on the
information which is in public domain relating to location of
capital does not attract any offence of criminal misconduct as
contemplated under Section 13(1)(d)(ii) of the P.C. Act as he did
not have any pecuniary advantage or gain illegally on account of
buying lands for valid consideration. He would submit that it is
a genuine sale transaction relating to private lands as A-1 and
other accused have purchased the lands for valid sale
consideration which are willingly sold by the owners of the said
lands after receiving valid sale consideration under valid
registered sale deeds. So, he would submit that absolutely no
offence whatsoever much less the offence under Section
13(1)(d)(ii) of the P.C. Act and the offences punishable under
Sections 409, 420 r/w.120-B of IPC are made out from the facts
of the case and the launching of criminal prosecution against
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A-1 and other accused is sheer abuse of process of Court and
thereby prayed for quash of the said F.I.R. registered against
the petitioners.
21) Per contra, learned Advocate-General appearing for the
State would contend that the term insider trading has been
contextually used. He would contend that as A-1 was
admittedly an Additional Advocate-General during the relevant
period when the lands were purchased by him and his family
members that in his fiduciary capacity or position as an
Additional Advocate-General, there was primarily a breach of
trust as he is not expected to divulge the information which is
confidential in nature before its official notification to any
person including his family members and close associates. He
would contend that as A-1 has acted upon such information
unauthorisedly and indulged in purchasing lands either in his
name or in the name of his family members and close associates
that it partakes the character of breach of trust punishable
under Section 409 of IPC. He would also submit that the said
acts committed by A-1 in his official capacity as Additional
Advocate-General tantamount to an act of criminal misconduct
as contemplated under Section 13(1)(d)(ii) of the P.C. Act. He
submits that as there has been a conspiracy between him and
other accused in this case relating to purchase of said lands
during the relevant period of time that other accused are also
liable for the offence punishable under Section 120-B of IPC for
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criminal conspiracy. He would also submit that as the
information relating to location of capital in the area where the
sellers owned lands was not disclosed to them and the same
was deliberately concealed by all the accused at the time of
purchasing the lands that it amounts to deception and cheating
as per the explanation appended to Section 415 of IPC and all
the accused are liable for offence of cheating punishable under
Section 420 r/w.120-B of IPC. Therefore, he would pray for
dismissal of the Writ Petitions and the Criminal Petitions.
22) I have given my anxious and thoughtful consideration
to all the aforesaid submissions made by the learned Senior
Counsel Sri Siddarth Luthra appearing on behalf of the
petitioners and the learned Advocate-General appearing on
behalf of the State.
23) The dispute primarily relates to purchase of lands by the
petitioners from its lawful owners under various registered sale
deeds for a valid consideration. Therefore, it is a peculiar case
where the prosecution seeks to criminalize private sale
transactions entered into between the petitioners as buyers of
the lands and the owners of the said lands as sellers, long back
about six years ago by invoking the concept of the offence of
insider trading applying the same to the facts of the present
case and also on the ground that the petitioners as buyers of
the lands did not disclose to the owners of the lands that the
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capital city is going to be located in the said area and thereby
concealed the material fact and cheated the owners of the lands.
CONCEPT OF OFFENCE OF INSIDER TRADING AND ITS
APPLICATION TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE:-
24) As regards the concept of offence of insider trading is
concerned, when a case of similar nature based on similar
allegations and identical facts has come up for consideration
before this Court in Crl.P.No.4819 of 2020 and batch, this
Court while disposing of the said Criminal Petitions as per its
common order dated 19.01.2021, after tracing the origin and
history of the offence of insider trading, categorically held that
the said offence of insider trading basically relates to a trading
of public company's stocks or other securities (such as bonds or
stock options) based on material, nonpublic information about
the company. The Court also found that the laws in various
countries relating to the offence of insider trading were brought
mainly to curb the insider trading in the field of stock market as
it is apparent from the object and reasons of the said enactment
that the offence of insider trading is essentially an offence
relating to trading of public company stocks or other securities
such as bonds or stock options based on material, nonpublic
information about the company. It is also clearly held that the
said offence of insider trading has absolutely nothing to do with
the sale and purchase of land which is an immovable property
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
which are private sale transactions wholly unrelated to the
affairs of stock market business.
25) Also held that on par with the other countries, India also
brought into force the SEBI Act to curb the offence of insider
trading in the field of stock market in India and that the insider
trading in India is only an offence according to Sections 12-A
and 15-G of the SEBI Act. It is also held that as per the
provisions of the said Act, the offence of insider trading is said
to be committed only when a person with access to nonpublic,
price sensitive information about the securities of the company
subscribes, buys, sells, or deals, or agrees to do so or counsels
another to do so as principal or agent. Therefore, held that
insider trading is only made an offence in India under the SEBI
Act and it essentially deals with the sale and purchase of
securities in stock market based on nonpublic material
information and it is a special enactment which specifically and
exclusively deals with the offences relating to sale of securities
in stock market. It is pertinent to note that this Court clearly
held that the said provisions of Sections 12-A and 15-G of the
SEBI Act cannot be read into or imported into the provisions of
the IPC much less into Section 420 of IPC and it is not at all the
intention of the Parliament to attribute any criminal liability to
such private sale transactions of immovable property either
under Section 420 of IPC or under any provisions in the scheme
of I.P.C. It is finally held by this Court in the earlier common
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
order that it is legally impermissible to prosecute the petitioners
for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 406, 409 and
120-B f IPC by applying the said concept of insider trading or in
the guise of the said concept of insider trading.
26) The said findings recorded by this Court relating to the
offence of insider trading are confirmed by the Apex Court in the
appeal preferred by the State in S.L.P.No.2636 of 2021 and
batch. Therefore, it is no more open to the prosecution to
contend that the said concept of insider trading applies either
relatively or even contextually to the present facts of the case.
The prosecution cannot invoke the said concept of offence of
insider trading which is essentially an offence under the SEBI
Act to prosecute the petitioners herein for the offences under
Sections 409, 420 r/w.120-B of IPC. Therefore, the said
contention of the prosecution is hereby rejected.
27) Before dealing with the vital aspect as to whether the facts
of the case constitute any offence under Sections 409, 420
r/w.120-B of IPC, this Court would first like to deal with the
offence of criminal misconduct as contemplated under Section
13(1)(d)(ii) of the P.C. Act attributed against A-1.
WHETHER ANY CASE OF CRIMINAL MISCONDUCT AS
CONTEMPLATED UNDER SECTION 13(1)(d)(ii) OF P.C. ACT
IS MADE OUT AGAINST A-1 AND WHETHER THE FACTS OF
THE CASE CONSTITUTE ANY SUCH OFFENCE AGAINST
A-1:-
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
28) It is the version of the prosecution that A-1 was an
Additional Advocate-General from 30.06.2014 and was an
Advocate-General from 30.05.2016 and during his tenure as an
Additional Advocate-General that he was privy to the
information which is confidential in nature relating to exact
location of capital region and instead of maintaining the
confidentiality of the said information that he has shared and
disclosed the said information to his family members, relatives
and close associates and initially got the lands purchased by his
family members and thereafter, got some of the lands
transferred to him and to his wife, who is A-2, and thereby
committed an act of criminal misconduct as he had pecuniary
advantage for himself and his family members unlawfully by
abusing his position as Additional Advocate General and the
same is punishable under Section 13(1)(d)(ii) of the P.C. Act.
This is the substratum of the prosecution case against A-1 as
regards the offence under Section 13(1)(d)(ii) of the P.C. Act.
29) Admittedly, A-1 was an Additional Advocate-General for
the State of Andhra Pradesh from 30.06.2014 till 28.05.2016.
He was an Advocate-General from 30.06.2016 onwards for the
State of Andhra Pradesh. The said period during which he
worked as Advocate-General is not germane in the context to
consider. Since the process relating to location of capital city
took place during June, 2014 to December, 2014 when official
notification to that effect was issued on 30.12.2014 and as the
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
sale transactions in question took place between June, 2014
and December, 2014 and in the month of July, 2015 during
which period A-1 was an Additional Advocate-General, his
tenure as an Additional Advocate-General from 30.06.2014 till
28.05.2016 alone is relevant in the context to consider. It is
stated that as he was privy to the information which is
confidential in nature relating to the location of capital city
which took place during the period from June, 2014 to
December, 2014 and that he has disclosed the said information
to his relatives and associates. As the entire case of the
prosecution rests and predicates on the said ground to
prosecute A-1 and also the other accused in the case, it is
essential to ascertain whether as an Additional Advocate-
General during the said period of time, by the very nature of his
duties as an Additional Advocate-General, he has any
constitutional function or statutory duty to involve or be part of
any decision making process in respect of location of capital city
which is the main function of the Legislature and Executive of
the State Government.
30) In this context, it is very much relevant to note at the very
outset that appointment of Additional Advocate-General for the
State is not contemplated under Article 165 of the Constitution
of India or in the scheme of the Constitution of India. Article
165 deals with appointment of Advocate-General for the State.
It reads thus:
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
"165. Advocate-General for the State.-- (1) The Governor of
each State shall appoint a person who is qualified to be appointed a
Judge of a High Court to be Advocate-General for the State.
(2) It shall be the duty of the Advocate-General to give advice
to the Government of the State upon such legal matters, and to
perform such other duties of a legal character, as may from time to
time be referred or assigned to him by the Governor, and to
discharge the functions conferred on him by or under this
Constitution or any other law for the time being in force.
(3) The Advocate-General shall hold office during the
pleasure of the Governor, and shall receive such remuneration as
the Governor may determine."
31) Therefore, a plain reading of the aforesaid Article makes it
manifest that appointment of only an Advocate-General for the
State is contemplated and it does not contemplate any
appointment of Additional Advocate-General.
32) As per the settled law, even though appointment of an
Additional Advocate-General is not contemplated under Article
165 of the Constitution of India, the State can appoint any
lawyer on its behalf to conduct any case or to defend it and the
State can designate any such lawyer with whatever designation
the State may propose including by conferring designation on
him as an Additional Advocate-General.
33) Whether such Advocate, who is appointed by the State
and designated as an Additional Advocate-General, is competent
to discharge any constitutional duties and statutory functions
on behalf of the State or whether his role is confined only to
appear on behalf of the State to conduct cases or to defend the
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W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
State in the cases before the Court or not, will be adverted to in
the succeeding paragraphs.
34) As admittedly A-1 was appointed as an Additional
Advocate-General on 30.06.2014, indisputably the office of the
Additional Advocate-General falls within the definition of a
public servant for the purpose of P.C. Act, 1988. Section 2(c)
defines "public servant". All the persons holding offices, which
are enumerated in clause (i) to (xii) of Section 2(c), fall within
the definition of public servant for the purpose of the P.C. Act.
Section 2(c)(i) of the P.C. Act, which is relevant in the context, is
extracted hereunder and it reads thus:
"Section 2 (c) "public servant" means, ---
(i) any person in the service or pay of the Government or
remunerated by the Government by fees or
commission for the performance of any public duty;"
35) Therefore, a plain reading of the aforesaid definition
makes it clear that a person who is remunerated by the
Government by fees or commission for the performance of any
public duty is also to be construed as a public servant. Since,
A-1, who is an Advocate by profession, was appointed by the
State Government to appear on its behalf and to conduct and
defend the cases in the Court, and he is remunerated by the
Government for performance of the said duty, undoubtedly, he
would come within the definition of "public servant" as defined
under Section 2(c)(i) of the P.C. Act.
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
36) Even though while holding an office of an Additional
Advocate General, A-1 can be termed as a public servant in view
of the definition of public servant as defined under Section 2(c)
of the P.C. Act, the crucial question that arises for consideration
is whether A-1 during his tenure as Additional Advocate
General from the period from 30-06-2014 to 28-05-2016, was
actually involved in any decision making process relating to
location and establishment of the capital city and in the process
of preparing draft bill for bringing the enactment i.e. the Andhra
Pradesh Capital Region Development Authority Act, 2014 (for
short, the "A.P. C.R.D.A. Act") into force or not.
37) Admittedly, accused No.1 was not the Advocate-General
during the period when decision as to where capital city is to be
located was taken between June to December, 2014 by the
Government of the State and when A.P. C.R.D.A. Act was
passed by the State Legislature and was notified on 30.12.2014.
He was only an Additional Advocate-General during the said
period of time. So, he has no authority under law as Additional
Advocate General to perform any constitutional or statutory
duties or functions attached to the office of the Advocate
General. It is only the Advocate General who holds a
constitutional office under Article 165 of the Constitution of
India and he alone performs the duties and functions which are
constitutional and statutory for the State which are attached to
his office.
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
38) The legal position whether an Additional Advocate General
holds any constitutional office and whether he is competent to
perform any constitutional and statutory duties and functions
has been succinctly explained and dealt with by the Apex Court
in the case of M.T. Khan v. Govt. of A.P3.
39) Considering the true import of Article 165 of the
Constitution of India which deals with the appointment of an
Advocate General and the functions to be performed by him, the
Apex Court while interpreting Article 165 of the Constitution of
India held that the constitutional scheme is that it envisages
appointment of only one Advocate General and the appointment
of an Additional Advocate General is not contemplated under
Article 165 of the Constitution of India.
40) However, it is held by the Apex Court that even though in
the scheme of the Constitution it is not provided for
appointment of an Additional Advocate General that the State in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 162 is competent to
appoint a lawyer of its choice and designate him in such
manner as it may deem fit and proper and once it is held that
any such person is designated as Additional Advocate General
that he is not authorized to perform any constitutional and
statutory functions, but he can discharge other functions as an
Advocate appointed by the State while appearing on behalf of
3 (2004) 2 SCC 267
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
the State in the Court to conduct cases on behalf State or to
defend the State in other cases.
41) Therefore, the legal position is now manifest from the
exposition of law made by the Apex Court in the above judgment
that even though the Government of a State as a litigant can
appoint as many lawyers as it likes on its behalf and for the
said purpose, the State is not prohibited from conferring such
designation on such legal practitioners as it may deem fit and
proper and it can designate any lawyer as Additional Advocate
General, the said Additional Advocate General cannot discharge
any constitutional and statutory functions.
42) Even Clause (2) of Article 165 of the Constitution makes
the said position very clear. It enjoins that it shall be the duty
of only Advocate General to give advice to the Government of the
State upon such legal matters and to perform such other duties
of a legal character, as may from time to time be referred or
assigned to him by the Governor, and to discharge the functions
conferred on him by or under the Constitution or any other law
for the time being in force. For better appreciation, Clause (2) of
Article 165 of the Constitution of India is reproduced hereunder
and it reads thus:
"165. Advocate-General for the State.--
(1) .........................................................
(2) It shall be the duty of the Advocate-General to give advice to
the Government of the State upon such legal matters, and to
perform such other duties of a legal character, as may from
time to time be referred or assigned to him by the Governor,
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
and to discharge the functions conferred on him by or under
this Constitution or any other law for the time being in force.
43) Therefore, when Article 165 and the aforesaid legal
position enunciated by the Apex Court while interpreting Article
165, makes it explicitly clear that an Advocate who is appointed
by the Government of a State is designated as Additional
Advocate General, he has no right or power to discharge any
constitutional or statutory duties and functions on behalf of the
State and his right is confined only to conduct or defend the
cases on behalf of the State in the Court. The said power to
perform constitutional and statutory duties is exclusively
conferred only on the Advocate General and it is his exclusive
duty to give advice to the Government of the State upon legal
matters and to perform other duties of legal character which are
assigned to him by the Governor and to discharge the functions
conferred on him by or under the Constitution or any other law
for the time being in force.
44) When that be the clear legal position, A-1 who was only an
Additional Advocate General during the relevant period from
30-06-2014 to 28-05-2016 had absolutely no opportunity to
involve himself in any statutory or constitutional functions/
affairs to be performed by the State or by the office of the
Advocate General so as to hold that he had an opportunity to
know the information relating to exact location of the capital
city, which according to the prosecution is a confidential
information and that he is privy to the said information. He has
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
absolutely no role to play in the decision making process
relating to location of capital city or in bringing A.P. C.R.D.A.
Act into force.
45) There is absolutely nothing to indicate either in the F.I.R
or in the preliminary enquiry report as to how A-1 was privy to
the said confidential information. Therefore, having regard to
the very nature of duties and functions of an Additional
Advocate General who has to only conduct or defend cases on
behalf of the State, he has absolutely no opportunity to be privy
to any such information, which is within the exclusive
knowledge of the officials of the State Government and other
authorities at the helm of the affairs of the State Government.
The version of the prosecution that it is in the common
knowledge in the advocate circles that A-1 has close
acquaintance with the then Chief Minister Sri N.Chandrababu
Naidu and his group in Telugu Desam Party and as such, he is
privy to the said information cannot be countenanced. It is a
vague allegation and too hypothetical in nature. No criminal
liability can be fastened in this regard against A-1 on surmises
and conjectures. Political leaders would be in public life and
many people and advocates would have some acquaintance with
them. It cannot be inferred or presumed or held that on
account of such acquaintance that A-1 as an Additional
Advocate-General was privy to the said information. As noted
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
supra, it is a vague allegation which was hypothetically made.
Therefore, it cannot be countenanced.
46) The said version as per contents of the F.I.R. and the
preliminary enquiry report shows that the de facto complainant
has overheard from the advocate circles that accused No.1 had
close acquaintance with the then Chief Minister N.Chandrababu
Naidu and his group in Telugu Desam Party and on the basis of
the said information which was overheard by him that it is
alleged that accused No.1 is privy to the information relating to
location of capital city. Criminal prosecution cannot be
launched on the basis of any such information which was
overheard by the de facto complainant and on the basis of mere
conjecture and surmise and on the basis of vague allegations.
The Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka v. Arun
Kumar Agarwal4 at para 15 of the judgment held as follows:
".....The acts of persons will not be subject to criminal
investigation unless a crime is reported and have been
committed or reasonable suspicion thereto arises.
On mere conjecture or surmise as a flight of fancy that
some crime might have been committed, somewhere, by
somebody but the crime is not known, the persons involved
in it or the place of crime unknown, cannot be termed to be a
reasonable basis at all for starting criminal investigation."
4 (2000) 1 SCC 210
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
47) Therefore, there is absolutely no material whatsoever to
prima facie establish that accused No.1 was privy to any such
information relating to location of capital city. It purely appears
to be a figment of imagination of the de facto complainant.
48) Now, the crucial question that arises for consideration is
whether purchasing the lands on the basis of the information
that is in public domain relating to location of capital at a
particular area would amount to committing an act of criminal
misconduct as contemplated under Section 13(1)(d)(ii) of the
P.C. Act or not. For better appreciation of the same, it is
apposite to extract Section 13(1)(d)(ii) of the P.C. Act to the
extent it is relevant in the present context and it reads as
follows:
"13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant.--(1) A public
servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct,--
(a) ...................
(b) ..................
(c) .................; or
(d) if he,--
(i) ........
(ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for
himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary
advantage; or
(iii) .....; or
(e) ......
(2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be
not less than one year but which may extend to seven years and
shall also be liable to fine."
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
49) Therefore, a careful reading of the aforesaid Section makes
it manifest that a public servant is said to commit an offence of
criminal misconduct only when he obtains for himself or for any
other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage by
abusing his position as public servant. So, the necessary
ingredients of this Section to attract the offence are: (i) that the
accused must be a public servant; (ii) he must abuse his
position as a public servant; (iii) and thereby obtain for himself
or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary
advantage.
50) As regards the first ingredient is concerned, it is already
noticed that A-1 was a public servant at the relevant time.
However, as regards the other two ingredients relating to
abusing his position as a public servant and thereby obtaining
for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or
pecuniary advantage is concerned, the entire case of the
prosecution rests on the allegation that he was privy to the
information relating to the exact location of capital area and by
using the said confidential information which is in his
knowledge along with other public servants, and by sharing the
said information with his kith and kin that he initially got lands
purchased in their name and subsequently he purchased some
of the lands from some of his relatives in his name and in the
name of his wife, who is A-2, and thereby abused his position as
a public servant and obtained pecuniary advantage for himself.
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
51) In this regard, at the very outset, it is to be noticed, as
held supra, that A-1 in his official capacity as an Additional
Advocate-General is not directly connected with any affairs
relating to identifying the area where the capital city is to be
located. It is not made clear either from the contents of the
F.I.R. or from the contents of the preliminary enquiry report
that he was involved in the process of decision making or in
identifying the area where the new capital for the State of A.P. is
to be located. Obviously, he being an Additional Advocate-
General is not directly connected with the process of decision
making relating to the location of the area where the capital is
to be established. It is not at all part of his official duty. At that
point of time, there was an Advocate General for the State to
discharge any constitutional or statutory functions, if any,
entrusted to him. It is not the version of the prosecution as can
be seen from the F.I.R. or from the preliminary enquiry report
that A-1 was either directly or indirectly involved in the process
of identifying the area where the capital city is to be located.
Therefore, unless it is prima facie established either from the
allegations set-out in the F.I.R. which is a detailed report or
from the findings of the preliminary enquiry report that the A-1
had any direct role to play in decision making process relating
to establishment of capital and location of its area, it cannot be
said under any stretch of reasoning or imagination that he was
privy to the said information which is exclusively within the
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
knowledge of the concerned Government officials who are
dealing with the said issue. Therefore, when it is not shown
that he was privy to the said information, the question of
divulging the same or sharing the same with his associates or
family members does not arise at all. Consequently, the
question of abusing his position as a public servant by sharing
the said information or divulging the same and thereby
obtaining any pecuniary advantage for himself or for others also
does not arise.
52) Simply because A-1 and his relatives purchased lands at
the area where the capital is proposed to be located, it cannot
be held that he has purchased the lands on the basis of the
information that he received as a public servant in his capacity
as Additional Advocate-General. Therefore, A-1 cannot be
prosecuted for the offence of criminal misconduct under Section
13(1)(d)(ii) of the P.C. Act on mere surmises or conjectures and
on suspicion by taking hypothetical view. There must be atleast
a clear allegation either in the F.I.R. or in the preliminary
enquiry report that he was actually involved in decision making
process relating to location of capital city and that he got clear
and definite knowledge/information of exact location of capital
area and that by way of purchasing lands by using the said
information that he has some pecuniary advantage. The said
essential requirements, which are sine qua non to establish the
alleged act of criminal misconduct are conspicuously and
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
absolutely absent in the present case. Therefore, he cannot be
held liable for the offence of criminal misconduct as
contemplated under Section 13(1)(d)(ii) of the P.C. Act. The
necessary ingredients contemplated under the said Section as
discussed supra are not at all satisfied to hold that there is a
prima facie case to prosecute him for the said offence.
53) The acts complained must relate to official duty or
functions of A-1 as Additional Advocate-General and they must
form integral part of his official functions as Additional
Advocate-General. Only when it is shown that any part of his
integral functions as Additional Advocate-General are misused
or abused, to have pecuniary gain for himself or for anyone,
then only an offence of criminal misconduct would be
constituted. Prosecution has miserably failed to show that A-1
has misused any part of his official duty as Additional Advocate-
General at relevant point of time to have any pecuniary
advantage to him or his family members. Purchasing private
lands by him or his family members in exercise of their
constitutional right to acquire property which are voluntarily
sold by its owners with their free consent is not an offence and
it does not constitute any offence of criminal misconduct as
contemplated under Section 13(1)(d)(ii) of the P.C. Act.
54) So, the contents of the F.I.R. and the preliminary enquiry
report do not make out or constitute any offence of criminal
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
misconduct punishable under Sections 13(1)(d)(ii) r/w.13(2) of
the P.C. Act against A-1.
INFORMATION RELATING TO LOCATION OF CAPITAL CITY
IS NOT CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION AND IT IS VERY
MUCH IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN:-
55) Be that as it may, the material on record completely belies
the said version of the prosecution also. The information
relating to location of capital for the State of Andhra Pradesh
between Krishna District and Guntur District by the side of
river Krishna is not a secret or confidential information which is
exclusively within the knowledge of the concerned officials of the
Government. In fact, it is very much in the public domain. It is
significant to note that it is clearly stated in the F.I.R, also in
the preliminary enquiry report that the enquiry discloses that
between June, 2014 and December, 2014, the public were
speculating about the possible location of the capital region for
the State of Andhra Pradesh. Therefore, it is now evident that
even the preliminary enquiry made by the Dy.S.P., ACB,
Guntur, pursuant to the direction given by the DG, ACB, AP,
Vijayawada, after the report was lodged by the de facto
complainant clearly revealed that there was a speculation
among the public about the possible location of the capital
region for the State of Andhra Pradesh during the period from
June, 2014 to December, 2014.
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
56) Apart from it, the evidence that is produced by the
petitioners i.e. newspaper clippings of various Telugu and
English daily newspapers which are all of wide circulation bears
ample testimony of the fact that the news/information relating
to the decision of the Government to locate the capital city for
the State of Andhra Pradesh would be between Krishna District
and Guntur District by the side of River Krishna is very much in
public domain.
57) The appointed day for bifurcation of the combined State of
Andhra Pradesh into two States of Andhra Pradesh and
Telengana as per A.P. Reorganisation Act, 2014 is 02.06.2014.
The new Government for the State of Andhra Pradesh was
formed after General Elections on 09.06.2014. The Chief
Minister was sworn on 09.06.2014. These facts are
incontrovertible facts. Immediately after the swearing in
ceremony, the then Chief Minister declared publicly that the
capital city is coming between Krishna District and Guntur
District by the side of River Krishna. This news was widely
published in all the widely circulated Telugu and English
newspapers. On 10.06.2014 it was published in English
newspaper with the headlines "AP capital near Guntur, Naidu
says he wants capital between Guntur and Vijayawada". The
news reads as follows:
"It is official. The new capital of Andhra Pradesh will
come up between Vijayawada and Guntur. Andhra Pradesh
Chief Minister N. Chandrababu Naidu announced this on
Monday (i.e. on 09.06.2014).
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
Speaking to the media at his residence, Mr.Naidu said
that if the capital comes up between Vijayawada and
Guntur it will develop like Hyderabad city."
58) It was also published in Andhra Jyothi, Telugu daily
newspaper, on 10.06.2014. Similarly, again on 02.07.2014 it
was published in Eenadu, Telugu daily newspaper, which is
another widely circulated local news paper, that the Andhra
Pradesh Government is contemplating to establish the new
capital for the State by the side of Krishna river, making
Amaravati as main centre. The same news has been published
in Times of India, English newspaper, on 02.07.2014 with the
headline "AP capital in Amaravati? On 23.07.2014 also a news
was published in Sakshi, Telugu daily newspaper, which is
another widely circulated newspaper in the State, with the
caption "Capital will be in between Krishna and Guntur and it is
the suitable place for building capital city said by Chairman of
Advisory Committee Narayana. On 24.09.2014 again it is
published in Eenadu, Telugu daily newspaper, that the capital
city would be on ring road and it may be anywhere throughout
the length of 184 K.Ms as the farmers are now coming forward
and that 30,000 acres are necessary and the aerial photograph
of Putrajaya Nagara was also published in the newspaper.
59) It is important to note that on 30.10.2014, the Economic
Times published the news that the Andhra Pradesh will have a
"riverfront" capital on the south side of river Krishna as the
State Government ended months of suspense and speculation
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
today by announcing that 17 villages in the existing Guntur
District would be developed as new capital city. It is also stated
that it is for the first time that the Telugu Desam Party lead
government had come out with a clear location of the new
capital as it had so far been saying it would come within
Vijayawada region. Most importantly it is to be noted that the
names of the proposed villages that would form part of the new
capital area are published in the above news paper stating that
Neerukonda, Kurugallu and Nidamarru in Mangalagiri Mandal;
Borupalem, Tulluru, Nelapadu, Nekkallu, Sakhamuru,
Mandadam, Malkapuram, Velagapudi, Mudalingayapalem,
Uddandaraya-palem, Lingayapalem, Rayapudi, Apparajupalem
and Dondapadu in Tulluru Mandal would form part of capital
area.
60) In Deccan Chronicle, English daily newspaper, it was
published on 31.10.2014, stating that in tune with the dream of
Chief Minister N. Chandrababu Naidu of building a "riverfront
capital", the Cabinet sub-committee, on land pooling, met here
on Thursday, identified 17 villages - 14 in Tulluru Mandal and
three in Mangalagiri of Guntur District and most of the villages
that will be formed part of the A.P. capital on the banks of the
river Krishna.
61) The aforesaid news items publishing even the names of
the villages that would form part of capital region or that would
come within the purview of capital region belies the allegation in
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
F.I.R. and in preliminary enquiry report that names of villages
forming part of capital city are kept secret till notification was
issued in December, 2014.
62) As per the finding recorded by this Court in the earlier
common order rendered in batch of criminal petitions in Crl.P.
No.4819 of 2020 and batch, dated 19.01.2021, at para.106, this
Court noted that as per the submissions made by the learned
Advocate General, the Cabinet took decision regarding location
of capital on 01.09.2014 and it was announced in the
Legislative Assembly on 02.09.2014. Therefore, on account of
announcement of the said information relating to the area
where the capital would be located in the Legislative Assembly,
that the said news is again in public domain.
63) Thus, from June, 2014 till 30.12.2014, on which day
official notification relating to location of capital was issued, the
news has been widely published in various newspapers from
time to time regarding possible location of capital city between
Krishna District and Guntur District by the side of River
Krishna. The fact that the said information relating to location
of capital city is very much in public domain by way of
publication of the said news in various newspapers has been
adequately dealt with by this Court in the previous common
order, dated 19.01.2021. Therefore, it is needless to refer all
the publications made in various newspapers during the said
period. So, the fact that remains established beyond doubt is
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
that the news relating to location of capital city between Krishna
District and Guntur District by the side of River Krishna, is not
a secret and confidential information and the said news has
been in very much in public domain. Therefore, not only the
petitioners/accused and the sellers/owners of the land, but the
whole world is aware of the information relating to possible
location of the capital between Krishna District and Guntur
District by the side of River Krishna. In fact, the prosecution
also did not deny the said material fact of publication of
aforesaid news items in various newspapers from June, 2014
till December, 2014. Therefore, in view of the said clear
evidence available on record, it cannot be said under any
stretch of reasoning that the said information is confidential in
nature and A-1 being privy to the said information has shared
the said information with the other accused and that he had
illegally made use of the said information and purchased the
lands for himself and for his family members and thereby had
any pecuniary advantage.
64) In fact, probably with the information which is in public
domain, on account of the said wide publicity of news in various
newspapers regarding location of capital between Krishna
District and Guntur District by the side of River Krishna on
account of official announcement by no less than a person like
the Chief Minister of the State itself that the capital is likely to
come between Krishna District and Guntur District by the side
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
of River Krishna, A-1 and other accused might have purchased
the lands.
65) In fact, it was contended before the Supreme Court in
S.L.P.No.2636 of 2021 and batch arising out of the common
order passed by this Court in Crl.P.No.4819 of 2020 and batch,
dated 19.01.2021, that there is possibility of public officials
being arraigned under Section 13 of the P.C. Act after
investigation in the case is completed. The Apex Court did not
accept the said contention. The Apex Court has struck a
discordant note and held as follows:
"......suffice it to observe that all the transactions in question are
between private individuals involving private lands and, as found
by the High Court, the information about the likely location of the
capital city was very much in public domain at the time of the
transactions in question. Therefore, this part of submission does
not make out a case for interference."
66) So, it is now clear that the said contention that public
officials are liable under Section 13 of the P.C. Act which was
already raised before the Apex Court has been negatived on the
ground that as per the finding recorded by this Court that the
information about the likely location of the capital city is very
much in public domain at the time of transactions.
67) This fact that the said information is very much in the
public domain strikes at the bottom of the prosecution case and
cuts the case of the prosecution at it roots. This vital plea that
the said information is confidential in nature and A-1 and other
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
officials who are alone privy to the said information disclosed
the same to their relatives is bereft of any legal foundation.
68) Therefore, in the said facts and circumstances of the case,
it cannot be said that A-1 has committed any act of criminal
misconduct as contemplated under Section 13(1)(d)(ii) of the
P.C. Act.
RIGHT TO ACQUIRE PROPERTY IS A CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT AND A LEGAL RIGHT:-
69) Earlier Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31 of the Constitution of
India are part of Chapter III of the Constitution dealing with
fundamental rights of a citizen. Article 19(1)(f) guaranteed to
the Indian citizen a right to acquire, hold and dispose of
property. Article 31 provided that "no person shall be deprived
of his property save by authority of law". Therefore, in view of
Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31 of the Constitution, right to
property was part of fundamental rights of a citizen.
Subsequently, by 44th constitutional amendment both Article
19(1)(f) and Article 31 were repealed with effect from
20.06.1979. So, the right to property ceased to be a
fundamental right. However, the right to acquire property
continues to be a constitutional right, legal right and also a
human right. Provision akin to Article 31 has been
incorporated under Article 300-A in Chapter-IV of the
Constitution under the rubric "right to property".
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
70) The Supreme Court, in the case of D.B. Basnett v. The
Collector, East District, Gangtok, Sikkim5 held at para 14 of
the judgment as follows:
"We may note that even though rights in land are no
more a fundamental right, still it remains a constitutional
right under Article 300A of the Constitution of India."
71) In Tuka Ram Kana Joshi v. Maharashtra Industrial
Development Corporation6 the Supreme Court reiterated that
right to property is now considered to be, not only a
constitutional or a statutory right, but also a human right.
Though it is not a basic feature of the constitution or a
fundamental right, the right to property is considered very
much to be part of new dimensions where human rights are
considered to be in realm of individual's rights such as the right
to health, the right to livelihood, the right to shelter and
employment etc., and such rights are gaining an even greater
multifaceted dimension.
72) Therefore, when the petitioners herein have in exercise of
their constitutional right and legal right to acquire property
purchased the said lands under registered sale deeds for valid
consideration from the owners of the land which are willingly
sold by them, the prosecution is not justified in seeking to
criminalize the said private sale transactions entered into by
private individuals in respect of private lands. Therefore, the
5 Judgment in Civil Appeal No. 196 of 2011 dated 02.03.2020
6 (2013) 1 SCC 353
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
present prosecution under the aforesaid sections of law is not
maintainable on this ground also.
WHETHER OFFENCES UNDER SECTIONS 420 R/W.120-B
AND UNDER SECTION 409 OF IPC ARE MADE OUT FROM
THE FACTS OF THE CASE:
73) As regards the offence under Sections 420 r/w.120-B of
IPC against all the accused is concerned, it is relevant to note
that the sale transactions in question have taken place as per
the contract between the owners/sellers and the
petitioners/purchasers. The recitals in the sale deeds clearly
show that it is the owners who have offered to sell their lands to
the petitioners to meet their legal necessities and other needs.
The petitioners have accepted the said offer and purchased the
lands for a valid sale consideration under registered sale deeds.
The owners have also willingly with their free volition and
consent sold the said lands to the petitioners under registered
sale deeds and transferred the ownership of the lands in favour
of the petitioners. It is not as though the petitioners have
approached the owners and made any false representation and
induced them to sell the lands to them and deceived them. In
fact, there is absolutely no dispute regarding the fact that the
recitals of the sale deeds show that the owners have offered to
sell the lands to the petitioners with their own consent and
volition. Learned Advocate-General also on instructions from
the Investigating Officer, while answering the question posed by
the Court, fairly conceded that the recitals in the present sale
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
deeds of all the accused show that the owners have offered to
sell the lands to the petitioners. Therefore, the question of the
petitioners approaching the owners and inducing them to sell
the lands either by making any false representation or by
concealing any material fact of location of capital at their lands
does not arise at all.
74) While Section 420 of IPC deals with the punishment for
the offence of cheating, Section 415 of IPC defines the offence of
cheating. A reading of Section 415 of IPC makes it manifest
that whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or
dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any
property to any person is said to have committed an offence of
cheating. As already discussed supra, it is not at all the case of
the prosecution that the petitioners have approached the
owners of the lands and induced them fraudulently or
dishonestly to deliver any property to them. So, the question of
cheating them by deception does not arise at all.
75) However, it is contended that as per the explanation
appended to Section 415 of IPC, a dishonest concealment of fact
is a deception within the meaning of the said Section. Relying
on the said explanation, it is sought to be contended that as the
petitioners did not disclose to the owners of the lands that the
capital is going to be located in their area that it amounts to
concealment of material fact and as such, an offence of cheating
is made out. This Court in the earlier common order in
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
Crl.P.No.4819 of 2020 and batch, dated 19.01.2021, after
undertaking elaborate discussion in this regard has negatived
the said contention. The Court after considering Section
55(5)(a) of the Transfer of Property Act and other relevant
provisions of law relied on by the learned Advocate-General,
unequivocally held that buyers have no legal obligation to
inform the sellers regarding the latent advantages that the
buyers may derive on account of the said sale transactions, to
the sellers. Therefore, held that the non-disclosure of the fact
that the capital is going to be located in the area where the
lands are situate by the buyers to the sellers even if the same is
within the knowledge of the buyers at that time does not
amount to concealment of material fact and that it does not
attract any offence of cheating under Section 415 of IPC.
Relevant case law as decided by the English Courts sand Indian
Courts has been also elaborately dealt with in the said common
order. The said findings are also confirmed by the Apex Court
while dismissing the S.L.P.No.2636 of 2021 and batch preferred
against the same.
76) In this context, it is important to note that the sellers of
the said lands have absolutely no demur or grievance
whatsoever in respect of the sale of the lands by them to the
petitioners. They did not complain at any point of time that
they have no knowledge about location of capital near their
lands and that the petitioners also did not disclose the said fact
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
to them at the time of buying the lands and concealed or
suppressed the said fact or that the petitioners have made any
false representation and thereby induced them to sell the lands.
The sellers/owners did not institute any civil or criminal legal
action till now in this regard for all this length of time. It is not
at all their case that the petitioners have cheated them in
respect of sale of the said lands made by them to the
petitioners.
77) Surprisingly, it is the de facto complainant, who is totally
a stranger to the said sale transactions, lodged the report with
the police, alleging that the petitioners have cheated the
owners/sellers of the lands and that too five years after the date
of alleged sale transactions. When the sellers have absolutely
no grievance that they have been cheated by the petitioners in
respect of the lands that were sold to them, it is really
surprising to note as to how the de facto complainant who is
totally a stranger to the said sale transactions and who has
absolutely no interest in the said lands would come forward and
lodge a report with the police alleging that the petitioners have
cheated the owners of the lands. As can be seen from the
preliminary enquiry report also, there is nothing to indicate in it
that the owners who sold the said lands came forward to
complain that they were cheated by the petitioners by making
any false representation or by suppressing any material fact.
So, the preliminary enquiry report also does not disclose the
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
said fact. So, it is really beyond the comprehension of this
Court as to how the Dy.S.P., ACB, who conducted a preliminary
enquiry opined that a cognizable case is made out. So, it is a
cryptic report submitted by him.
78) So, in the said facts and circumstances of the case, the
contention of the petitioners that the de facto complainant who
is a stranger was set up to lodge the report to set the criminal
law in to motion with an ulterior motive to illegally prosecute
the petitioners and subject them to harassment cannot be
completely ruled out. It is clear that taking complete advantage
of the legal position that any person can set the criminal law
into motion and not necessarily by an aggrieved person, the
present report was lodged by the de facto complainant for the
obscure reasons best known to him to prosecute the petitioners
for the said offences at the behest of some vested interests
behind the curtain. There is absolutely no merit or substance
in the contents of the said report lodged by the de facto
complainant which makes out any offence for which the F.I.R.
was registered.
79) In Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.2636 of
2021 and batch, the Apex Court held at page 7 as follows:
"..... There was also no question of loss being caused to the
sellers or any cheating by the buyers because neither by law
nor by a legal contract, the buyers were obliged to disclose
the likelihood of the location of capital city, which facts were
already in public domain. Moreover, there was no such pre-
existing legal relationship between the buyers and the sellers
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
for which, the buyers were bound to protect the interest of
the sellers."
80) Therefore, the facts of the case and the allegations set out
in the F.I.R. absolutely do not constitute any offence punishable
under Section 420 of IPC.
81) As regards the offence under Section 409 of IPC is
concerned, it relates to criminal breach of trust by a public
servant, or by banker, merchant or agent. Except A-1, the
other accused are not public servants, bankers, merchants or
agents, to whom any property was entrusted. So, the question
of committing criminal breach of trust by them does not arise at
all. The predominant requirement which is essential to attract
the offence under Section 409 of IPC is that the accused must
be a public servant, banker, merchant or an agent and the
property is to be entrusted to him in any one of the above
capacities and while holding domain over the said property in
his capacity as a public servant, banker, merchant or an agent,
broker or attorney, if he commits any criminal breach of trust in
respect of the said property, then only an offence under Section
409 of IPC would be constituted. Therefore, no case is made
out against the other accused in this case under Section 409 of
IPC.
82) Even though A-1 was a public servant at that time, there
is no allegation that any property was entrusted to him in his
capacity as a public servant or that he got any domain over the
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
property and that he has committed breach of trust in respect
of the said property. So, no case is made out against A-1 also
for the offence under Section 409 of IPC.
83) Apropos the offence under Section 120-B of IPC is
concerned, which deals with criminal conspiracy, a reading of
Section 120-A of IPC, which defines the offence of criminal
conspiracy, makes it manifest that in order to constitute an
offence of criminal conspiracy that there must be an agreement
between two or more persons to do or cause to be done: (i) an
illegal act, or (ii) an act which is not illegal by illegal means.
There is nothing to indicate from the facts of the case that there
has been any agreement between the petitioners to do an illegal
act or to do an act which is not illegal by illegal means.
Further, as per the findings recorded supra, this Court found
that no offence of criminal misconduct was committed by A-1 in
sharing the information or divulging the information relating to
location of capital to the other accused. It is found from the
evidence on record that the said information is very much in
public domain known to the entire public at large. So, when it
is held that A-1 did not resort to any such illegal act of sharing
and divulging the information relating to location of capital, the
question of all the accused entering into a criminal conspiracy
as alleged by the prosecution does not arise at all. In fact, this
Court also dealt with the legal position relating to offence of
criminal conspiracy punishable under Section 120-B of IPC in
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
the earlier common order, dated 19.01.2021, based on similar
facts and held that the facts of the case do not constitute any
offence of criminal conspiracy. This Court also at para. 116 of
the said common order held that the facts of the case show that
the prosecution is making an attempt to pick up sporadic
instances here and there hypothetically and knit the same to
concoct a story of conspiracy to somehow bring the same within
the scope of Section 120-B of IPC. Also held that no offence
under Section 120-B of IPC is made out and constituted from
the facts of the case. The same finding holds good in the
present case also.
84) A careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of
the case clearly reveal that the owners of the land who sold the
said lands have absolutely no grievance whatsoever that they
have been cheated by the petitioners, who purchased the lands
from them under registered sale deeds for valid consideration.
Yet, the de facto complainant concocted a story very intelligently
and he being totally a stranger to the said sale transactions
lodged a report with the police based on conjectures and
surmises and on hypothetical views. He is not at all justified in
launching any such criminal prosecution against the
petitioners. It appears that completely taking undue advantage
of the fact that any person can set criminal law into motion and
not necessarily by the aggrieved person, he has lodged the
report setting the criminal law into motion. In the
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
circumstances, the version of the petitioners that there are
some persons of vested interest behind the curtain, who has set
up the de facto complainant and engineered manipulating the
report, which was lodged by the de facto complainant to harass
the petitioners and to humiliate them and to persecute them by
way of malicious prosecution cannot be completely ruled out.
85) The Apex Court in the judgment cited supra in the case of
State of Karnataka v. Arun Kumar Agarwal 4 at para.15 of the
judgment held that the acts of persons will not be subject to
criminal investigation unless a crime is reported and has been
committed or reasonable suspicion thereto arises. On mere
conjecture or surmise as a flight of fancy that some crime
might have been committed, somewhere, by somebody but
the crime is not known, the persons involved in it or the place
of crime unknown, cannot be termed to be a reasonable basis
at all for starting criminal investigation.
86) It is further held, "the attempt made in this case appears
to us to be in the nature of blind shot fired in the dark without
even knowing whether there is a prey at all. That may create
sound and fury but not result in hunting down the prey."
87) The Apex Court also time and gain has examined the
scope of jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482
Cr.P.C. and laid down several principles which govern the
exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
Cr.P.C. A three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in the case of
State of Karnataka v. L.Muniswamy7 held that the High Court
is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion
that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of
the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that
the proceeding ought to be quashed.
88) Similarly, another three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in
the case of State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa8 by
analyzing the scope of Section 482 Cr.P.C. held that the power
is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial
justice for the administration of which alone courts exist.
Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if
any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce
injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an
abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would
result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise
of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding
if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of
the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would
otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is
disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the
question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be
quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to
7 (1977) 2 SCC 699
8 (2002) 3 SCC 89
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any
offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in
toto.
89) Also held that judicial process should not be an
instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment.
90) Therefore, when no offence is constituted whatsoever
under Section 13(1)(d)(ii) r/w.13(2) of the P.C. Act and under
Sections 409, 420 r/w.120-B of IPC against any of the
petitioners, allowing the proceedings to be continued pursuant
to the registration of the said F.I.R. would certainly amounts to
abuse of process of Court. Therefore, ground Nos.1 to 3 and 5
enumerated in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal9
squarely apply to the present facts of the case.
91) Therefore, the F.I.R. that was registered against the
petitioners in Crime No.08/RCO-ACB-GNT/2020 of A.C.B.
Police Station, Guntur, for the offences punishable under
Sections 13(1)(d)(ii) r/w.13(2) of the P.C. Act and under Sections
409, 420 r/w.120-B of IPC, is liable to be quashed.
CONCLUSION:
92) The upshot of above discussion is that A-1 while holding
the office of an Additional Advocate-General has no authority to
discharge any constitutional or statutory duties and functions
9 1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335 = 1982 CriLJ 527
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
and he has no role to play in the decision making process in
locating the area where the capital is to be established and in
bringing into force the A.P. C.R.D.A. Act, 2014. He was not
privy to any information relating to exact location of capital city.
He had no role to play in the process of identifying the location
to establish capital city to know the information regarding exact
location of capital city. Therefore, the question of A-1 disclosing
the said information to the other accused and that all the
accused have purchased the lands from the owners on the basis
of the said information does not arise and there is no truth in
the said allegation. A-1 also did not commit any act of criminal
misconduct as contemplated under Section 13(1)(d)(ii) of the
P.C. Act and no case is made out against him for the said
offence from the facts of the case. The information relating to
location of capital is not a confidential information and it is very
much in the public domain from June, 2014 itself. Right to
acquire property is a constitutional right and legal right of the
petitioners as citizens of the country. As they purchased the
lands in exercise of their constitutional right and legal right and
acquired property from the owners/sellers of the lands, who
willingly and voluntarily sold them to the petitioners for valid
sale consideration under registered sale deeds, the said private
sale transactions cannot be criminalized and no criminal
liability can be attributed to the petitioners in the facts and
circumstances of the case to prosecute them for any such
offences under Sections 420 r/w.120-B of IPC or under Section
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
409 of IPC. The concept of offence of insider trading which is
essentially an offence in the field of stock market relating to
selling and buying the securities and bonds cannot be applied
to the offences under the Indian Penal Code and cannot be read
into Section 420 of IPC or into any provisions in the scheme of
Indian Penal Code. It is totally alien to I.P.C. and it is unknown
to our criminal jurisprudence under the Indian Penal Code.
There is no dishonest concealment of fact in respect of the sale
transaction in question as contemplated under Explanation
appended to Section 415 IPC. So, it does not amount to any
deception constituting an offence under Section 420 of IPC. The
sellers did not sustain any loss on account of the said sale
transactions. So, no element of criminal liability is involved in
the sale transactions. No offence of conspiracy to do any illegal
act or to commit an offence is made out from the facts of the
case against the petitioners. Therefore, in the said facts and
circumstances of the case, the prosecution of the petitioners for
the alleged offences for which the F.I.R. was registered is wholly
unjustified and clearly opposed to all cannons and basic tenets
of criminal law and it amounts to sheer abuse of process of
court warranting interference of this Court in exerciser of its
inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the same
in view of the law enunciated and the grounds enumerated by
the Apex Court in Bhajan Lal9's case and other judgments of
the Apex Court in State of Karnataka v. L.Muniswamy7 and
State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa8.
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
93) In fine, this batch of Writ Petitions and Criminal Petitions
are allowed. The common F.I.R. in Crime No.08/RCO-ACB-
GNT/2020 of A.C.B. Police Station, Guntur, registered against
the petitioners for the offences punishable under Sections
13(1)(d)(ii) r/w.13(2) of the P.C. Act and under Sections 409,
420 r/w.120-B of IPC, is hereby quashed.
94) A-1 claimed compensation in the Writ Petition for
intimidating him and harassing him by initiating the present
criminal proceedings against him. This Court deems it
appropriate, instead of granting any such compensation in this
Writ Petition, to leave it open to A-1 by granting liberty to him to
claim compensation or damages, as the case may be, against
the de facto complainant for launching frivolous criminal
proceedings against him.
As a sequel, miscellaneous applications, pending if any,
shall also stand closed.
________________________________________________
JUSTICE CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY
Date:02-09-2021.
Note:
L.R. copy to be marked.
B/O
cs
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH R0Y
Writ Petition Nos.16468 and 20077 of 2020
and
Crl. Petition Nos.4422, 4423, 4424, 4425, 4426 and 4427 of 2021
Dated:02-09-2021
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
*HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY
+ Writ Petition Nos.16468 and 20077 of 2020
and
Crl. Petition Nos.4422, 4423, 4424, 4425, 4426 and 4427 of 2021
% Dated 02-09-2021
W.P.No.16468 of 2020:
# Dammalapati Srinivas
..... Petitioner
Vs.
$ The State of Andhra Pradesh rep. by its Principal Secretary, Home
Department, A.P., Secretariat Complex Velagapudi, Amaravti, A.P., &
Ors.
..Respondents
! Counsel for the petitioners : Sri Siddarth Luthra,
Learned senior counsel, for
Sri Ginjupalli Subba Rao,
Sri Posani Venkateswarlu,
Sri M.Lakshmi Narayana,
Sri Vimala Varma Vasireddy, and
Smt.S.Pranathi, learned counsel.
^ Counsel for respondents : Learned Advocate-General
for Smt.A.Gayathri Reddy,
learned Standing Counsel
for ACB-cum-Special
Public Prosecutor
Learned Govt. Pleader for Home;
Sri O.Kailashnath Reddy,
and Sri Inakollu Venkateswarlu
<GIST:
> HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred:
1 (2014) 2 SCC 1
2 (2020) 10 SCC 118 = (2021) SCC Online SC 315
3 (2004) 2 SCC 267
4 (2000) 1 SCC 210
5 Judgment in Civil Appeal No. 196 of 2011 dated 02.03.2020
6 (2013) 1 SCC 353
7 (1977) 2 SCC 699
8 (2002) 3 SCC 89
9 1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335 = 1982 CriLJ 527
CMR,J.
W.P.No.16468 of 2020 & batch
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Writ Petition Nos.16468 and 20077 of 2020
and
Crl. Petition Nos.4422, 4423, 4424, 4425, 4426 and 4427 of 2021
W.P.No.16468 of 2020:
Dammalapati Srinivas
..... Petitioner
Vs.
The State of Andhra Pradesh rep. by its Principal Secretary, Home
Department, A.P., Secretariat Complex Velagapudi, Amaravti, A.P., &
Ors.
..Respondents
COMMON ORDER PRONOUNCED ON: 02-09-2021
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers --
may be allowed to see the Judgments?
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be -Yes-
marked to Law Reporters/Journals
3. Whether Their Ladyship/Lordship wish to see -Yes-
the fair copy of the Judgment?
JUSTICE CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY
