Kandhumarthi Ratnam vs Karriveerraju
2021 Latest Caselaw 4867 AP

               HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE M.VENKATA RAMANA

                  SECOND APPEAL No. 1053 of 2004

JUDGMENT :

The defendants are the appellants.

2. The respondents as the plaintiffs laid the suit for redemption

relating to an alleged usufructuary mortgage and to direct the original

defendant Sri Botta Nookayya to deliver vacant possession of the plaint

schedule land.

3. The plaint schedule describes the land in question being of Ac.1-

00 in S.No.89/2, patta No.227 in Rekhavanipalem, Tuni Mandal of East

Godavari District within the boundaries mentioned therein. It shall be

referred to hereinafter as, „the suit land‟ for convenience.

4. Sri Gavarayya and his wife Smt. Seethayamma are the parents of

the respondents. The suit land belonged to Sri Gavarayya. He died in the

year 1965. Upon his death, it devolved upon Smt. Seethayamma and both

the respondents. Smt.Seethayamma died in the year 1969 and therefore,

both the respondents became its absolute owners upon succession.

5. During her lifetime Smt.Seethayamma on her behalf and on

behalf of the 1st respondent, who was then a minor, borrowed Rs.1,000/-

from Sri Boddu Narasimha Murthy offering the suit land as the security

and executed a registered simple mortgage deed in his favour dated

30.04.1966 agreeing to repay the same with interest at 8% p.a. within

three years.

6. The deceased 1st defendant Sri Nookayya is cousin of

Smt.Seethayamma.

MVR,J S.A.No.1053 of 2004

7. The aforestated simple mortgage dated 30.04.1966 was

assigned in favour of Sri Nookayya under a registered deed dated

16.03.1967.

8. It is the contention of the respondents that the deceased

defendant Sri Nookayya was in possession and enjoyment of the suit land

under a usufructuary mortgage, enjoying the profit therefrom towards

interest on the principal amount of Rs.1,000/- and that when they

demanded him to deliver this land to them, Sri Nookayya refused claiming

that the respondent should pay certain amount under the promissory

notes.

9. There was exchange of notices in between the respondents and

Sri Nookayya prior to the institution of the suit.

10. The respondents further contended that Sri Nookayya insisted

that the suit land be sold to him offering meagre price, which they did not

agree and that he attempted to grab the suit land taking advantage of the

discharged promissory notes. In those circumstances denying the alleged

oral agreement for sale of the suit land in his favour by the respondents

for Rs.22,000/- and further denying the connected transactions alleged,

referring to their demand for delivery of possession of the suit land upon

receiving the amount due under the mortgage, the respondent laid the

suit.

11. Sri Nookayya as the sole defendant resisted the claim denying

the alleged usufructuary mortgage and relationship between himself and

respondents as mortgagee and mortgagors, contending that the suit land

was agreed to be sold to him under an oral agreement for sale dated MVR,J S.A.No.1053 of 2004

22.12.1986, whereby Rs.11,600/- was received by the respondents

towards part-payment of the sale consideration. Expressing his ready and

willingness to pay balance amount of Rs.10,400/-, denying that the 1st

respondent had discharged the amounts due to him under various

promissory notes, Sri Nookayya asserted possession of the suit land in

terms of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. He further

contended that the promissory notes executed by the 1st respondent in his

favour and in favour of his son Sri Botta Nageswara Rao though not

enforceable being barred by time, they reflect part sale consideration paid

under the above sale agreement. He also asserted that he had effected

improvements to this land spending huge money.

12. Upon death of Sri Nookayya during trial, his Legal

Representatives, who are the appellants in this second appeal, also

contended that on 22.12.1986 the 1st respondent offered to bring the 2nd

respondent to execute the sale deed in terms of oral agreement for sale,

referring to various amounts allegedly borrowed by him on different dates.

They further contended that they have been enjoying the suit land as

purchasers from 22.12.1986 and that they have been always ready and

willing to perform their part of the contract, paying balance sale

consideration. They further alleged that it is the respondents who

defaulted to abide by the terms of this contract. They also contended that

the suit claim is barred by time as per Article 61(b) of the Limitation Act.

13. On the pleadings, the trial Court settled the following issues:

"1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for redemption of mortgage?

2. To what relief?"

MVR,J S.A.No.1053 of 2004

14. At the trial, the 2nd respondent examined himself as P.W.1,

while relying on Ex.A1 to Ex.A12 in support of their contention. The

appellants examined the 3rd appellant as D.W.1 apart from D.W.2 to D.W.4

in support of their contention while relying on Ex.B1 to Ex.B6.

15. Upon consideration of the material and evidence, the trial Court

passed a preliminary decree in favour of the respondents directing the

appellants to receive Rs.1,000/- being the principal under the mortgage

deed dated 30.04.1966 and to deliver vacant possession of the suit land in

favour of the respondents fixing one month being the time for

redemption.

16. The appellants carried the matter in appeal where the decree

and judgment of the trial Court were confirmed.

17. In these circumstances, the present second appeal is preferred.

18. This second appeal was admitted on the following substantial

questions of law:

"1. Whether the claim of the plaintiff is barred by limitation as Article- 61(b) of the Limitation Act applies?

2. Whether Section-92 of the Evidence Act applies in this case to lead evidence with regard to the facts in pronote?"

19. Heard Sri E.V.V.S.Ravi Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants

and Smt. M.Bhaskara lakshmi, learned counsel for the respondents.

SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW No.1: LIMITATION:

20. In terms of Article-61 of the Limitation Act the period of

limitation for filing a suit by mortgagor for redemption of immovable MVR,J S.A.No.1053 of 2004

property shall be computed on three different counts. Article-61 reads as

follows:

61. By a mortgagor--

      (a) to redeem or recover Thirty years.    When the right to
      possession of immovable                   redeem or to recover
      property mortgaged;                       possession accrues.

      (b) to recover possession Twelve years.   When       the transfer
      of                                        becomes known to the
      immovable        property                 plaintiff.
      mortgaged             and
      afterwards transferred by
      the mortgagee for a
      valuable
      consideration;

      (c) to recover surplus Three years.       When the mortgagor re-
      collections received by                   enters     on       the
      the mortgagee after the                   mortgaged property.
      mortgage     has    been
      satisfied.

21. In case of redemption simplicitor, the period of limitation is 30

years when the right to redeem or to recover possession accrues for the

mortgagor and to enforce against a mortgagee. In case of transfer of

mortgaged property for valuable consideration, the right to recover

possession of immovable property mortgaged shall be enforced within 12

years when the transfer becomes known to the plaintiff i.e. the mortgagor.

Another contingency is with reference to recovery of surplus collection

received by the mortgagee after the mortgage has been satisfied and in

which case the mortgagor shall enforce the such claim within three years

from the date when he re-enters the mortgaged property.

22. For the present purpose, reference to Article-61(a) and (b) of

the Limitation Act is relevant.

MVR,J S.A.No.1053 of 2004

23. Section 58(d) of the Limitation Act explains usufructuary

mortgage as follows:

"58(d) Usufructuary mortgage.--Where the mortgagor delivers possession [or expressly or by implication binds himself to deliver possession] of the mortgaged property to the mortgagee, and authorises him to retain such possession until payment of the mortgage -money, and to receive the rents and profits accruing from the property [or any part of such rents and profits and to appropriate the same] in lieu of interest, or in payment of the mortgage -money, or partly in lieu of interest [or] partly in payment of the mortgage -money, the transaction is called an usufructuary mortgage and the mortgagee an usufructuary mortgagee."

24. Sri E.V.V.S.Ravi Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants ,

relied on Prabhakaran and others v. M.Azhagiri Pillai (dead) by

L.Rs. and others1 where nature of usufructuary mortgage is explained in

Para-12 of this ruling as under:

"12. An usufructuary mortgage is a transfer by the owner (mortgagor) of an interest in an immovable property for securing the amount advanced/to be advanced by the creditor (mortgagee), under which possession of the property is delivered to the mortgagee with authority to retain such possession and enjoy the rents and profits therefrom, until the debt is paid (vide Section 58(d) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, for short 'T.P.Act‟). The owner/mortgagor, who continues to hold the bundle of rights constituting ownership, minus the right to possession, has the right to recover possession of the mortgaged property by paying the mortgage debt. The said right to recover possession (along with the right to receive back the documents relating to the mortgaged property and the right to obtain a deed of reconveyance/retransfer of the mortgaged property) is known as the right of redemption of the mortgagor and is statutorily recognized in Section of T.P. Act. Such right of redemption can be extinguished during the subsistence of the mortgage only by the act of parties or by decree of a court. This Court in Jayasingh D. Mhoprekar vs. Krishna B. Patil [1985 (4) SCC 162] observed :

"It is well-settled that the right of redemption under a mortgage deed can come to an end only in a manner known to law. Such extinguishment of right can take place by a contract between the parties, by a merger or by a statutory provision which debars the mortgagor from redeeming the mortgage. A mortgagee who has entered into possession of the mortgaged property under a mortgage will have to give up possession of the property when the suit for redemption is filed unless he is able to show that the right of redemption has come to an end or that the suit is liable to be

. 2006(4) SCC 484 MVR,J S.A.No.1053 of 2004

dismissed on some other valid ground. This flows from the legal principle which is applicable to all mortgages, namely, "Once a mortgage, always a mortgage".

25. Para-13 of this ruling for the purpose of construing limitation in

case of redemption of this mortgage is relevant and it is extracted

hereunder:

"13. Article 148 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (referred to as 'old Act') provided a limitation of 60 years for a suit against a mortgagee, to redeem or to recover possession of immovable property mortgaged. The corresponding provision in the Limitation Act, 1963 ('new Act' or "Limitation Act‟ for short), is Article 61 (a) which provides that the period of limitation for a suit by a mortgagor to redeem or recover possession of the immovable property mortgaged is 30 years. The period of limitation begins to run when the right to redeem or to recover possession accrues. In the case of a usufructuary mortgage which does not fix any date for repayment of the mortgage money, but merely stipulates that the mortgagee is entitled to be in possession till redemption, the right to redeem would accrue immediately on execution of the mortgage deed and the mortgagor has to file a suit for redemption within 30 years from the date of the mortgage. Section 27 of the Limitation Act provides that "at the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished". This would mean that on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed under the Act, the mortgagor would lose his right to redeem and the mortgagee would become entitled to continue in possession as the full owner."

26. Mortgage was created by Smt.Seethayamma and on behalf of

the 1st respondent under the original of Ex.B5 on 30.04.1966 in favour of

Sri Boddu Narasimha Murthy. The simple mortgage was assigned as per

Ex.B6 on 16.03.1967 in favour of Sri Nookayya- deceased 1st defendant by

Sri Boddu Narasimha Murthy for consideration. During the lifetime of Smt.

Seethayamma, the nature of this mortgage remained as such and as a

simple mortgage. It was never a usufructuary mortgage nor possession of

the suit land was delivered in favour of Sri Nookayya during her lifetime.

27. The respondents did not furnish necessary details of this

usufructuary mortgage in the plaint except a bare reference. The

appellants have denied of existence of any such mortgage while asserting MVR,J S.A.No.1053 of 2004

that they are in possession of the suit land by virtue of an oral agreement

for sale entered into by Sri Nookayya on behalf of his son Sri Nageswara

Rao and the 1st respondent. The respondents have denied this alleged oral

agreement for sale. However they admitted the possession of the suit land

to rest with the appellants.

28. In the additional written statement, the 3rd appellant came up

with the contention that the suit claim is barred by time in terms of

Article-61(b) of the Limitation Act, basing on the statement of P.W.1,

namely the 1st respondent in cross-examination that he came to know

about the mortgage transaction covered by Ex.A4 in the year 1969 from

the husband of the 2nd respondent, after his mother passed away.

29. In the backdrop of the documentary evidence through Ex.B5

and Ex.B6, the appellants cannot deny the relationship between Sri

Nookayya and the respondents as a creditor and debtors, what all

transferred in terms of the deed of assignment covered by Ex.B6 was for

the purpose of recovery of the amount due, which was otherwise liable to

be paid to Sri Boddu Narasimha Murthy by Smt. Seethayamma under the

original of Ex.B5. Thus, the transaction covered by Ex.B6 was purely for

collection and apparently right to foreclose the mortgage was transferred.

It was not an instance where the original mortgagee Smt. Boddu

Narasimha Murthy transferred absolute right, title and interest in the suit

land to Sri Nookayya under the original of Ex.B6 nor is it the case of any

of the parties.

30. In those circumstances, basing on possession of the suit land

vis-a-vis the mortgage transaction covered by Ex.B5 and Ex.B6, the MVR,J S.A.No.1053 of 2004

inference to draw is that the relationship between Sri Nookayya and the

respondents stood in the nature of creditor and debtors or mortgagee or

mortgagors respectively.

31. In such circumstances, as contended by Smt. M.Bhaskara

Lakshmi, learned counsel for the respondents, if at all the provisions of

the Limitation Act need be looked into in this context it is only Article-

61(a) of the Limitation Act that applies. Thus, period of 30 years was

available for the respondents to institute the suit for redemption against

Sri Nookayya or the appellants.

32. Even if the contention of the appellants is considered for the

sake of arguments, the alleged transformation of simple mortgage into

usufrucutary mortgage, meeting such requirements as referred to above,

was upon delivery of suit land in favour of Sri Nookayya-the original

defendant. The plaint is silent when Sri Nookayya came in possession of

this property. Even in the written statement filed by Sri Nookayya-original

defendant, there is no reference when the suit land was delivered to him.

However, in para-2 of the additional written statement it is averred that

the appellants were enjoying the suit land as vendees from 22.12.1986. If

this date is considered for the purpose of computing limitation, either

under Article-61(a) of the Limitation Act the suit claim stood within the

period of limitation.

33. However, D.W.1, namely, the 3rd appellant, departed from such

version in the additional written statement and as rightly observed by the

learned trial Judge, gave a contradictory version.

MVR,J S.A.No.1053 of 2004

34. D.W.1 deposed that after execution of Ex.B1 promissory note

on 24.09.1977, P.W.1 delivered possession of the suit land in their favour

in lieu of interest payable thereunder and also to account for the debt

under Ex.B5 mortgage deed. It is an incidence of this simple mortgage,

transforming into a usufructuary mortgage. He further deposed that two

days later, P.W.1 came to him and agreed to sell the suit land in their

favour for Rs.22,000/- and had received Rs.1500/- upon executing Ex.B2.

This Ex.B2 promissory note is dated 22.12.1986.

35. Admitted version of the respondents is that the 1st respondent

was borrowing money from Sri Nookayya or from D.W.1 on certain

occasions. While P.W.1 claimed that he had repaid the amounts due, for

which purpose he produced Ex.A8 to Ex.A12-promissory notes claiming

that they were all discharged promissory notes, it is the version of the

appellants that P.W.1 borrowed different sums of money under Ex.B1 to

Ex.B4 promissory notes while also due the amount under the mortgage

deed dated 30.04.1966 (Ex.B5). But, this plea of discharge of the alleged

debts under Ex.A8 to Ex.A12 is not proved. There is only evidence of

P.W.1 in this respect nor Ex.A8 to Ex.A12 bear endorsement or indication

at the instance of the appellants that the amounts due thereunder were

repaid nor they admitted these promissory notes in Ex.A8 to Ex.A12.

36. As rightly observed by the Courts below and contended for the

respondents, the transaction covered by Ex.B2 was nine (09) years after

the transaction covered by Ex.B1 promissory note. When this fact situation

is considered in relation to the statements of D.W.1 referred to above, the

inference to draw is that the picture so presented is incorrect and is

fringing on falsity.

MVR,J S.A.No.1053 of 2004

37. For the purpose of construing period of limitation, Smt.

M.Bhaskara Lakshmi, learned counsel for the respondents, relied on Nani

bai VS. Gita bai Kom Rama Gunge2 and R. DhanaLakshmi Ammal

vs. Anthuraj3.

38. In para-6 of Nani bai, the observations of the Hon‟ble Supreme

Court are as under:

"6.It was next contended that even if Article 12 was not available to the defendants by way of a bar to the suit, the suit was certainly barred under Article 134 of the Limitation Act. Under Article 134, the plaintiff has to sue to recover possession of immovable property mortgaged and, afterwards, transferred by the mortgagee for a valuable consideration, within 12 years from the date the " transfer becomes known to the plaintiff ". On the other hand, it has been contended on behalf of the plaintiff that the usual rule of 60 years' limitation under, Article 148 of the Limitation Act, governs the present case. On this part of the case, the defendants suffer from the initial difficulty that the sale-deeds relied upon by them in aid of the plea of limitation under Article 134, have not been brought on the record of this case, and, therefore, the Court is not in a position to know the exact terms of the sale-deeds. This difficulty, the appellants sought to overcome by inviting our attention to the statements made in paragraph 8 of the plaint. But those are bald statements giving the reasons why the defendants other than the original mortgagee, were being impleaded as defendants. There is no clear averment in that paragraph of the plaint about the extent of the interest sold by those sale-deeds and other transfers referred to therein. The Court is, therefore, not in a position to find out the true position. Those sale-deeds themselves were the primary evidence of the interest sold. If those sale-deeds which are said to be registered documents, were not available for any reasons, certified copies thereof could be adduced as secondary evidence, but no foundation has been laid in the pleadings for the reception of other evidence which must always be of a very weak character in place of registered documents evidencing those transactions.

Article 134 of the Limitation Act contemplates a sale by the mortgagee in excess of his interest as such. The legislature, naturally, treats the possession of such transferees as wrongful, and therefore, adverse to the mortgagor if he is aware of the transaction. Hence, the longer period of 60 years for redemption of the mortgaged property in the hands of the mortgagee or his successor-in-interest, is cut down to the shorter period of 12 years' wrongful possession if the transfer by the mortgagee is in respect of a larger interest than that mortgaged to him. In order, therefore, to attract the operation of Art,. 134, the defendant has got affirmatively to prove that the mortgagee or his successor-in-interest has transferred a larger interest than justified by the mortgage. If there is no such proof, the shorter period under Article 134 is not available to the defendant in a suit

. AIR 1958 SC 706

. AIR 1972 Mad 185 MVR,J S.A.No.1053 of 2004

for possession after redemption. A good deal of argument was addressed on the question as to upon whom lay the burden to prove the date of the starting point of limitation under that article. It was argued on behalf of the defendants-appellants that as it is a matter within the special knowledge of the plaintiff, the plaint should disclose the date on which the plaintiff became aware of the transfer. On the other hand, it was contended on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent that it is for the defendants to plead and prove the facts including the date of the knowledge which would attract the bar of limitation under Article 134. As we are not satisfied, for the reasons given above, that Article 134 is attracted to the present case, it is not necessary to pronounce upon that controversy. It is, thus, clear that if Arts. 12 and 134 of the Limitation Act, do not stand in the way of the plaintiff's right to recover posses.-,ion, the only other Article which will apply to the suit, is Article 148. It is common ground that if that Article is applied, the suit is well within time."

39. In Dhanalakshmi Ammal, the High Court of Madras considered

the fact situation, when Article-61(b) of the Limitation Act is applicable as

under:

"2. ..........It seems to us that when a mortgagee purporting to be the absolute owner transfers the property covered by the mortgage, the mortgagor's remedy is to institute a suit for recovery of possession under Article 61(b) and the period of limitation is 12 years and the time from which the period begins to run is "when the transfer becomes known to the plaintiff". This proposition is settled by Sarvotuma Kamath v. Abdulla Beary, Nani Bai v. Gita Bai and Subbaiah Iyer v. Pichiah Pillai, held that though the suit was framed as one for redemption, no question of redemption would arise and the suit was really one for recovery of possession of the properties and if it was filed more than 12 years after the date the mortgagor came to know of the transfer by the mortgagee, it would be barred. It was also held in that case that the fact that the cause of action for redemption of the original mortgage had not yet arisen would be no ground for holding that the suit was within time, as there was no room for the argument, that a cause of action could not be held to be barred even before it had accrued."

40. Sri E.V.V.S.Ravi Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants,

strenuously contended that in the absence of certainty as to delivery of

possession, in favour of Sri Nookayya and when it occurred, in view of the

observations in Prabhakaran referred to above, the contention of the

respondents is difficult to accept. The learned counsel for the appellants

further contended that even otherwise the decisions relied on by the

learned counsel for the respondents are based on particular fact situation

and observations therein cannot be made applicable to this case on hand.

MVR,J S.A.No.1053 of 2004

41. Nature of pleadings and evidence let in by both the parties, in

this context is not definite and certain. The whole sequence seems to

have been presented as if it is for the Court to solve the riddle. The

manner of conducting this matter at the trial is leaving much to be

desired. When the foundation has to be laid at the trial stage in something

nicely cut and dried manner, the situation in this case by means of

pleadings and evidence is not adhering to such standards. Nonetheless,

law laid down in the rulings relied on for the learned counsel for the

respondents reinforced the inference drawn in this case and to hold that

the suit claim is not barred by time since Article 61(a) of the Limitation Act

is applicable that provides for 30 years period of limitation to sue the

mortgagee by the mortgagor for redemption and not article 61(b).

42. Sri E.V.V.S.Ravi Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants,

contended that on behalf of the respondents in this second appeal, the

transformation of simple mortgage into usufructuary mortgage is

projected for the first time. However, it is not so particularly in the context

of the testimony of D.W.1, who referred to the debt due under the original

of mortgage covered by Ex.B5 and also having regard to the admitted

possession of this property by the appellants.

43. Both the Courts below considered the question of limitation in

right perspective. There is no reason to interfere with the findings so

recorded now. Thus, this question of limitation is held in favour of the

respondents and against the appellants.

MVR,J S.A.No.1053 of 2004

SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW No.2:

44. The appellants have claimed the suit land under an oral sale

said to have been entered into by the 1st respondent and D.W.1 on

22.12.1986. Undisputedly, there is no documentary evidence in support of

this claim. The attempt of the appellants in this context is based on the

amounts allegedly borrowed by the 1st respondent and under Ex.B1 to

Ex.B4-promissory notes. Undisputedly, all these promissory notes stood

barred by time by the date of the suit.

45. The version of the appellants that the amounts borrowed under

these promissory notes were treated as part of sale consideration under

this oral agreement for sale where the 1st respondent had allegedly

agreed to sell the suit land for Rs.22,000/- is not in any manner

substantiated. The effort of the appellants in examining D.W.2, who is the

scribe of Ex.B2 and D.W.4-scribe of Ex.B1 and Ex.B7 is not in right

direction.

46. Both the Courts below held that the appellants cannot lead

such evidence against the contents of the promissory notes offending

Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act. When the recitals under these

promissory notes reflect simple money transactions between creditor and

debtors, they cannot be elevated to the status as desired by the

appellants to reflect a sale transaction and the amount borrowed

thereunder as per their terms being part of sale consideration. Evidence of

D.W.3 did not bear any relationship, who claimed that he is a

neighbouring land owner of the suit land and who, as per his version

came to know about this sale transaction from D.W.1.

MVR,J S.A.No.1053 of 2004

47. Therefore, as rightly observed by both the Courts below the

evidence let in by the appellants to establish this oral sale, gets excluded

in view of the prohibition under Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act,

which did not permit evidence to be let-in vis-a-vis the contents of the

documents.

48. There was exchange of notices between the parties prior to

institution of the suit. The nature of transaction in between these parties,

as a simple money claim based on a mortgage is also ruling out this

alleged claim of oral sale of the suit land set up by the appellants.

49. Close relationship among these parties cannot stand to

consideration and as a reason to hold that Sri Nookayya or the appellants

decided to obtain a document evidencing this alleged sale.

50. When there are consistent findings concurrently arrived at by

both the Courts below in the context of appreciation of material and

evidence, this Court sitting in second appeal cannot lightly interfere.

51. Therefore, this instance did not present being a substantial

question of law since application of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act

is in right perspective by both the Courts below. Thus, this question is also

held against the appellants and in favour of the respondents.

52. Thus, this Court is satisfied that there are no such questions

much less substantial questions of law in terms of Section 100 CPC to

consider and determine. Both the Courts below rightly came to the

conclusion to uphold the claim of the respondents, with which no

interference is warranted in this second appeal. Consequently, the second

appeal has to be dismissed.

MVR,J S.A.No.1053 of 2004

53. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed with costs

confirming the decrees and judgments of both the Courts below. The

appellants are directed to deliver peaceful and vacant possession of the

suit land to the respondents and accordingly the decree passed by the

trial Court is confirmed. Time for redemption is one month.

As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, stand closed.

Interim Orders, if any, stand vacated.

_______________________ JUSTICE M.VENKATA RAMANA

Dt: 29.11.2021 RR MVR,J S.A.No.1053 of 2004

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE M.VENKATA RAMANA

SECOND APPEAL No.1053 of 2004

Dt:29.11.2021

RR