Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Indian Council Of Agricultural ... vs Central Administrative ... on 22 January, 2021
Bench: C.Praveen Kumar, B Krishna Mohan
1
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C.PRAVEEN KUMAR
AND
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE B. KRISHNA MOHAN
Writ Petition No. 3930 of 2013
And
Writ Petition No. 8203 of 2013
COMMON ORDER: (per the Hon'ble Sri Justice C. Praveen Kumar)
These Writ Petitions are disposed of through BlueJeans
video conferencing App.
1) Since, both these Writ Petitions are filed challenging the
Order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal,
Hyderabad, dated 27.04.2012, in O.A. No. 673 of 2011, the
same are disposed of by this Common Order.
2) The facts, which lead to filing of these Writ Petitions, are
as under:-
(i) One G. Hemasundera Rao ['Applicant'] in O.A. was
working as a Tractor Driver in Central Tobacco
Research Institute ['CTRI'], Rajahmundry, during the
year 2003 to 2008. Initially, he was transferred from
Rajahmundry to Veda Sundur in Tamil Nadu in
February 2008 and in the month of July 2008 was
transferred back to Kandukuru in Prakasam District.
While he was working at Kandukuru, memos came to
be issued stating that his performance in handling
2
the tractor was not good and that he was driving the
tractor slowly, taking more time than required in
ploughing, thereby affecting the field operations.
(ii) While things stood thus, a complaint, dated
11.01.2008, was received by the CTRI, alleging that
the Applicant was repeatedly harassing one
Ms.T.Swetha, thereby causing hurt to her modesty. It
has been further stated that the Applicant was
stalking her; indecently proposed her and made an
attempt to lure her to come to his house. Basing on
these allegations, the Director of the Institute
conducted preliminary investigation.
(iii) After obtaining the written statement of Ms.T.Swetha,
dated 18.01.2008 and 22.01.2008, memorandums,
dated 11.09.2008, 16.10.2008 and 23.09.2009, were
issued to the Applicant calling for his explanation.
However, the Applicant submitted a reply to the
memorandums on 05.10.2009. The Applicant was
placed under suspicion in the month of October
2009. A charge memo, dated 09.03.2010, came to be
issued by the Disciplinary Authority, under Rule 14
containing three [03] Articles of Charge including the
charge of hurting the modesty of Ms. T. Swetha.
3
(iv) The Applicant submitted his written statement
denying the contents of the charge-memo and further
stated that the written statement of the complainant
Ms.T.Swetha is found to be forged.
(v) Not being satisfied with the explanation given, the
Director, CTRI, appointed one Dr. Smt. Suman
Kalyanai, as an Inquiry Officer to hold an inquiry in
respect of the Charges. After giving due opportunity
to the Applicant, the inquiry was conducted as per
Rules and all the three [03] Charges were held
proved, vide Report, dated 31.07.2010. Later on, the
Applicant submitted a detailed representation, dated
21.08.2010, to the Director, CTRI, in respect of the
aforesaid report, wherein, he sought for imposing
lesser penalty. Taking into consideration the finding
of the Inquiry Officer and after considering the
representation, the authorities imposed penalty of
removal from service.
(vi) Challenging the same, the Applicant filed an Appeal,
dated 28.09.2010, before the Appellate Authority,
who rejected the same vide Order, dated 19.04.2011,
confirming the penalty of removal from service.
4
(vii) Aggrieved by the same, the Applicant preferred O.A.
No. 673 of 2011 before the Central Administrative
Tribunal. Vide its Order, dated 27.04.2012, the
Tribunal while upholding the findings of the
Disciplinary Authority and also the Appellate
Authority, however, remitted the matter back to the
Disciplinary Authority for awarding lesser
punishment. The Tribunal further held that the
period between the date of removal and
reinstatement, after imposing lesser punishment,
shall be treated as dies-non. Challenging the same,
the Department filed W.P. No.3930 of 2013; while the
Applicant filed W.P. No.8203 of 2013.
3) Heard Smt. C. Vani Reddy, the learned Counsel for the
Writ Petitioners in W.P. No. 3930 of 2013 and Sri.Tuhin
Kumar, the learned Counsel for the Applicant, in W.P.
No.8203 of 2013.
4) Smt. C. Vani Reddy, the learned Counsel for the Writ
Petitioners would contend that, the Order of the Tribunal is
illegal, arbitrary and incorrect. Having regard to the nature of
allegations made against the Applicant, the order of the
Tribunal directing the authorities to impose lesser
punishment and to treat the period from the date of removal
and reinstatement, after imposing lesser punishment, as dies-
5
non is totally contrary to law. In other words, the learned
Counsel would contend that, while remanding the matter
back, the Tribunal virtually ordered reinstatement of the
Applicant, which could not have been done. She further
pleads that, no reasons are given as to why the punishment
imposed is disproportionate to the Charges proved against the
Applicant.
5) On the other hand, Sri. Tuhin Kumar, the learned
Counsel for the Applicant would contend that, the entire
proceedings before the Disciplinary Authority stands vitiated,
as the Complainant Ms. T. Swetha, at whose instance the
Charges came to be framed, was not examined, thereby
denying the Applicant to cross-examine the Complainant. He
further pleads that, when the punishment imposed being
grave i.e., removal from service, non-examination of the
Complainant and not giving an opportunity to cross-examine
the Complainant would be in violation of principles of natural
justice. In other words, he would contend that, the procedure
followed while holding the Applicant guilty of the Charges,
more particularly, the 1st Charge, is not fair and violative of
basic principles of law.
6) The point that arises for consideration is, whether the
Order of the Tribunal warrants interference?
6
7) In order to appreciate the same, it would be useful to
refer to the Articles of Charge framed against the Applicant,
which are as under:
'Article-I
Sri. G. Hemasundara Rao, Technician, T-2 (Driver) while
working at CTRI, Rajahmundry had repetitively hurt the
modesty of Ms. T. Swetha, B.Tech (Final Year) while she
was doing Project Work at CTRI, Rajahmundry during
the year 2008.
Sri. Hemasundara Rao was stalking the girl, proposed
her indecently and lured her to come to his house. Such
acts on the part of Shri Hemasundara Rao amounts to
harassment of a woman at work place which is
misconduct under Rule 3-C read with Rule 3(1)(i) and
with Rule 3(i)(iii) of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
Article-II
Sri. G. Hemasundara Rao, while working as Technician,
T-2 (Driver), while working at CTRI Research Station,
Kandukur, did not maintain absolute integrity and
devotion to duty. He acted in a manner unbecoming of a
government servant. He habitually neglected the duty
entrusted to him. His negligence caused serious
consequences to the research activities of the Station.
Such acts amount to misconduct under Rule 3(1)(i) read
with Rule 3(1)(ii), Rule 3(1)(iii), Rule 3(25)(g) and Rule
3(25)(10) of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
Article-III
Sri. G. Hemasundara Rao, while working as Technician,
T-2 (Driver), while working at CTRI Research Station,
Kandukur, made false accusations against his
superiors. He has attempted to induce his superior
7
officers to withdraw four Memoranda by attributing
caste-coloured remarks to the Head, CTRI Research
Station, Kandukur. He also threatened the Head, CTRI
Research Station, Kandukur that if the Memoranda are
not withdrawn, he would take-up the matter with other
authorities.
Such acts on the part of Shri Hemasundra Rao amounts
to misconduct under Rule3(1)(iii) read with Rule 3(25)(1),
Rule 3(25)(7) and Rule 3(25)8) of CCS (Conduct) Rules,
1964".
8) A reading of the above Articles of Charge would show
that, 1st Charge relates to repeated hurt caused to the
modesty of Ms.T. Swetha, B. Tech (Final Year) student, while
she was doing a project work at CTRI, Rajahmundry in 2008.
The Applicant was stalking the girl, proposed her indecently
and lured her to come to his house.
9) The 2nd Charge relates to maintaining integrity and
devotion to duty by the Applicant. It was alleged that, he
acted in a manner unbecoming of a government servant and
was negligent in his duty.
10) The 3rd Charge relates to the Applicant making false
allegations against his superiors. He is said to have attempted
to induce his superior officers to withdraw four
memorandums by attributing caste-coloured remarks to the
Head, CTRI Research Station, Kandukur.
8
11) It is to be noted here that the power of judicial review in
matters of this nature, is meant to ensure that the individual
receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion
reached by the authority is necessarily correct in the eye of
the court. Dealing with the same, the Apex Court in The
State Of Karnataka v. N.Gangaraj1, referred to the
following cases, which are as under:
"8. In State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v. S. Sree Rama
Rao2, a three Judge Bench of this Court has held that the
High Court is not a court of appeal over the decision of the
authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public
servant. It is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is
held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according
to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the
rules of natural justice are not violated. The Court held as
under:
"7. ...The High Court is not constituted in a
proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a
court of appeal over the decision of the authorities
holding a departmental enquiry against a public
servant: it is concerned to determine whether the
enquiry is held by an authority competent in that
behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in
that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice
are not violated. Where there is some evidence,
which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold
the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may
reasonably support the conclusion that the
delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the
function of the High Court in a petition for a writ
under Article 226 to review the evidence and to
arrive at an independent finding on the evidence...."
1
Civil Appeal No. 8071 of 2014, dt. 14.02.2020.
2
AIR 1963 SC 1723
9
9. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Ors.,3 again, a
three Judge Bench of this Court has held that power of
judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review
of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial
review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair
treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the
authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of the
court. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does
not act as an appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence
and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence.
It was held as under:
"12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a
decision but a review of the manner in which the
decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant
to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment
and not to ensure that the conclusion which the
authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of
the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges
of misconduct by a public servant, the
Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether
the inquiry was held by a competent officer or
whether rules of natural justice are complied with.
Whether the findings or conclusions are based on
some evidence, the authority entrusted with the
power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and
authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion.
But that finding must be based on some evidence.
Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of
proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to
disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts
that evidence and conclusion receives support
therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to
hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the
charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial
review does not act as appellate authority to
reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own
independent findings on the evidence. The
Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority
3
(1995) 6 SCC 749
10
held the proceedings against the delinquent officer
in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural
justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing
the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or
finding reached by the disciplinary authority is
based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be
such as no reasonable person would have ever
reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the
conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as
to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of
facts. Where appeal is presented. The appellate
authority has co- extensive power to reappreciate
the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a
disciplinary inquiry the strict proof of legal evidence
and findings on that evidence are not relevant.
Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence
cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the
Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel4,
this Court held at page 728 that if the conclusion,
upon consideration of the evidence, reached by the
disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from
patent error on the face of the record or based on no
evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued."
10. In High Court of Judicature at Bombay through
its Registrar v. Shashikant S. Patil & Anr.,5 this Court
held that interference with the decision of departmental
authorities is permitted if such authority had held proceedings
in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of
statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry
while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution. It was held as under:
"16. The Division Bench of the High Court seems to
have approached the case as though it was an
appeal against the order of the
administrative/disciplinary authority of the High
4
(1964) 4 SCR 781
5
(2000) 1 SCC 416
11
Court. Interference with the decision of
departmental authorities can be permitted, while
exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution if such authority had held proceedings
in violation of the principles of natural justice or in
violation of statutory regulations prescribing the
mode of such enquiry or if the decision of the
authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to
the evidence and merits of the case, or if the
conclusion made by the authority, on the very face
of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no
reasonable person could have arrived at such a
conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above.
But we cannot overlook that the departmental
authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of
the High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the
enquiry has been properly conducted. The settled
legal position is that if there is some legal evidence
on which the findings can be based, then adequacy
or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for
canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition
filed under Article 226 of the Constitution."
11. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand
Nalwaya6, this Court held that the courts will not act as an
appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic
enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is
possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been
fairly and properly held and the findings are based on
evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the
reliable nature of the evidence will not be ground for
interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. The
Court held as under:
"7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act
as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led
in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground
that another view is possible on the material on
record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly
6
(2011) 4 SCC 584
12
held and the findings are based on evidence, the
question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable
nature of the evidence will not be grounds for
interfering with the findings in departmental
enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with
findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries,
except where such findings are based on no
evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The
test to find out perversity is to see whether a
tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at
such conclusion or finding, on the material on
record. Courts will however interfere with the
findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of
natural justice or statutory regulations have been
violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary,
capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous
considerations. (vide B. C. Chaturvedi vs. Union
of India - 1995 (6) SCC 749, Union of India vs. G.
Gunayuthan - 1997 (7) SCC 463, and Bank of
India vs. Degala Suryanarayana - 1999 (5) SCC
762, High Court of Judicature at Bombay vs.
Shahsi Kant S Patil - 2001 (1) SCC416)."
12) In Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran7 the Apex Court
held that, 'High Court cannot act as an appellate authority in
disciplinary proceedings'. The Court further held as under, the
parameters as to when the High Court shall not interfere in the
disciplinary proceedings:-
"13. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the
High Court shall not:
i. re-appreciate the evidence;
ii. interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the
same has been conducted in accordance with law;
iii. go into the adequacy of the evidence;
iv. go into the reliability of the evidence;
7
(2015) 2 SCC 610
13
v. interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which
findings can be based.
vi. correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to
be;
vii. go into the proportionality of punishment unless it
shocks its conscience."
13) In Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan Tewari8 the
Apex Court held:-
"That if the disciplinary authority records a finding that is not
supported by any evidence whatsoever or a finding which is
unreasonably arrived at, the Writ Court could interfere with the
finding of the disciplinary proceedings. We do not find that
even on touchstone of that test, the Tribunal or the High Court
could interfere with the findings recorded by the disciplinary
authority. It is not the case of no evidence or that the findings
are perverse. The finding that the respondent is guilty of
misconduct has been interfered with only on the ground that
there are discrepancies in the evidence of the Department. The
discrepancies in the evidence will not make it a case of no
evidence. The Inquiry Officer has appreciated the evidence and
returned a finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct"
14) From a reading of the judgments referred to above, it is
very much clear that, the High Court cannot go into the
proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience;
secondly, if the disciplinary authority records a finding which
is not supported by any evidence whatsoever or a finding
which is unreasonably arrived at, the court could interfere
with the finding of the disciplinary proceedings. The Courts
have also held that, if the inquiry has been fairly and properly
held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of
2017 2 SCC 308
adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence
will not be a ground for interfering with the findings in
departmental enquiries.
15) As regards the contention that Ms. T. Swetha, was not
examined, the Tribunal held that, there was a preliminary
enquiry by the Committee in which her statement was
recorded and the representation of the Applicant, dated
13.09.2010, to the Disciplinary Authority, was only to reduce
the punishment/take a lenient view over the report of the
Inquiry Officer. Therefore, non-examination of the victim girl,
having regard to the totality of the circumstances, would not
vitiate the inquiry.
16) Insofar as the quantum of punishment is concerned, the
Tribunal while holding the Applicant guilty of the three
Charges, held as under:
"... After going through the material placed before us, we are of
the considered view that the punishment given by the
Disciplinary Authority as confirmed by the Appellate Authority
is shockingly disproportionate to the Charges held proved
against the Applicant. We feel that the Applicant, who is only
45 years old and has a family to maintain, deserves another
chance to correct himself and improve his performance."
17) From the findings arrived at by the Tribunal, it appears
that, Charge Nos. 2 and 3 were not serious enough to warrant
punishment of removal from services, but, however,
punishment of removal of service vis-à-vis Charge No. 1 was
shockingly disproportionate to the charge.
18) It also appears that the circumstances which weighed
with the Authority, were that the Applicant was 45 years old
and deserves another chance to correct himself and improve
his performance. Further, the Tribunal virtually ordered
reinstatement of the Applicant while directing the authorities
to award lesser punishment and treat the interregnum as
dies-non. We are afraid that the Tribunal ought not to have
gone to the extent of mentioning the terms of punishment,
namely, reinstatement and treatment of the said period as
dies-non, while remanding the matter for imposing lesser
punishment.
19) Be that as it may, the primary question that falls for
consideration is, whether the Disciplinary Authority was
right in holding that the Applicant admitted his guilt
and whether his removal from services without
examining the Complainant and not giving him an
opportunity to cross-examine the Complainant is
correct?
20) The fact that Charge No. 1 came to be framed mainly on
a report given by the Complainant Ms.T.Swetha, who was
doing project work at CTRI, Rajahmundry is not in dispute. It
is not doubt true that a written statement of the Complainant
was taken at the time of preliminary investigation but it is
also well established that preliminary investigation is being
conducted only to find-out as to whether the allegations made
are correct and whether it warrants further inquiry.
21) The Report of the Inquiry Officer, dated 31.07.2010,
wherein, it was held that, all the three [03] Charges are
proved, refers to examination of five [05] witnesses and
marking of about eight [08] documents, but, for reasons best
known, Ms. T. Swetha, was not examined. No explanation is
forthcoming as to why she was not examined, though, the
basis of the 1st Charge, was the complaint given by her.
22) The argument advanced before the Inquiry Officer was
that the victim girl, who appeared before the preliminary
Inquiry, identified the Applicant and also substantiated the
allegations made by her in the complaint is false. But,
however, the same was rejected on the ground that the
infirmities and contradictions in the statements of the
Applicant and his lies emerging during the inquiry does not
give scope for the inquiry officer to consider his innocence of
the charges and the facts and records of the prosecution
establish the truth. Similar such plea was taken before the
Appellate Authority, but the same was rejected. The Tribunal
also held that failure on the part of the prosecution to
examine the material witnesses does not vitiate proceedings,
when in his written statement, the Applicant admitted his
guilt.
23) But, it is to be noted that the Applicant nowhere
admitted his guilt but only sought for reduction in
punishment after submission of the inquiry report. It is to be
noted that the Tribunal came to such a conclusion basing on
a letter, dated 13.09.2010, addressed by the Applicant to the
Disciplinary Authority, which was long after the inquiry
report and before the decision of the Appellate Authority.
24) As seen from the record, when a copy of the Enquiry
Officer's report was supplied to the Applicant, vide letter,
dated 06.08.2010, the Applicant submitted a detailed
representation, dated 21.08.2010, requesting the authorities
to drop the Charges, but, however, a show-cause notice was
issued, on 20.08.2010, proposing to impose penalty of
removal from service, for which, the Applicant submitted a
representation, dated 13.09.2010, to Disciplinary Authority,
for taking a lenient view. Thereafter, the Disciplinary
Authority passed an Order on 18.09.2010, awarding
punishment of removal. The letter, dated 13.09.2010,
obviously, was in reply to the show-cause notice issued, after
finding him guilty and before the punishment is imposed.
After taking into consideration the letter, dated 13.09.2010,
the Order of removal from service came to be passed on
18.09.2010. Therefore, the contents of this letter, cannot be
treated to mean that he has admitted his guilt. Therefore, the
finding of the Tribunal that the Applicant has admitted his
guilt may not be correct.
Non-Examination of the Complainant.
25) The Apex Court in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab
National Bank and Others9 categorically held as under:
"14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi judicial
proceeding. The Enquiry Officer performs a quasi judicial
function. The charges leveled against the delinquent officer
must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a
duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the
materials brought on record by the parties. The purported
evidence collected during investigation by the Investigating
Officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to
be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was
examined to prove the said documents. The management
witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove
the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the
Enquiry Officer on the FIR which could not have been treated
as evidence."
26) Similarly, in Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat
and Another10, the Apex Court held as under:
"41. In the aforesaid backdrop, we have to consider the most
relevant issue involved in this case. Admittedly, the Enquiry
Officer, the High Court on Administrative side as well on
Judicial side, had placed very heavy reliance on the statement
made by Shri C.B. Gajjar, Advocate, Mr. G.G. Jani, complainant
and that of Shri P.K. Pancholi, Advocate, in the preliminary
(2009) 2 SCC 570
(2013) 4 SCC 301
inquiry before the Vigilance Officer. Therefore, the question
does arise as to whether it was permissible for either of them to
take into consideration their statements recorded in the
preliminary inquiry, which had been held behind the back of
the appellant, and for which she had no opportunity to cross-
examine either of them.
42. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Amlendu Ghosh v.
District Traffic Superintendent, North-Eastern Railway,
Katiyar11, held that the purpose of holding a preliminary
inquiry in respect of a particular alleged misconduct is only for
the purpose of finding a particular fact and prima facie, to
know as to whether the alleged misconduct has been
committed and on the basis of the findings recorded in
preliminary inquiry, no order of punishment can be passed. It
may be used only to take a view as to whether a regular
disciplinary proceeding against the delinquent is required to be
held.
45. In view of above, it is evident that the evidence recorded in
preliminary inquiry cannot be used in regular inquiry as the
delinquent is not associated with it, and opportunity to cross-
examine the persons examined in such inquiry is not given.
Using such evidence would be violative of the principles of
natural justice.
46. In Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of
Maharashtra & Ors.,12 this Court while placing reliance upon
a large number of earlier judgments held that cross-
examination is an integral part of the principles of natural
justice, and a statement recorded behind back of a person
wherein the delinquent had no opportunity to cross- examine
such persons, the same cannot be relied upon."
27) In view of the Judgments referred to above, it is very
clear that the statement recorded in the preliminary enquiry,
which are behind the back of the Applicant, and for which he
AIR 1960 SC 992
AIR 2013 SC 58
had no opportunity to cross-examine them, cannot be used in
regular inquiry, as the delinquent/applicant was not
associated with it and had no opportunity to cross-examine
the persons examined in such preliminary enquiry. The Court
went on to hold that using such evidence would be violative of
principles of natural justice; squarely falling within the
parameters laid down by the Apex Court, for interference by
this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
28) Admittedly, in the instant case, the complainant was
not examined during the enquiry and no opportunity was
given to the Applicant to cross-examine the complainant. The
statement of the complainant recorded during the preliminary
enquiry was made the basis for the first charge. Having
regard to the judgments referred to above, the Order
impugned in the Writ Petitions is set-aside and the matter is
remitted back to the Disciplinary Authority to start the
proceedings by examining the Complainant and give an
opportunity to the Applicant to cross-examine the
Complainant and thereafter, proceed in accordance with law.
29) It is made clear that any observations made in this
Order are only for deciding the issue involved and the same
shall not influence either the Disciplinary Authority or the
Appellate Authority while dealing with the mater on remand.
30) With the above directions, Writ Petition No. 3930 of
2013 and Writ Petition No. 8203 of 2013 are disposed off. No
order as to costs.
31) Consequently, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any,
shall stand closed.
______________________________
JUSTICE C.PRAVEEN KUMAR
________________________________
JUSTICE B. KRISHNA MOHAN
Date: 22.01.2021.
SM...
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C.PRAVEEN KUMAR
AND
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE B. KRISHNA MOHAN
Writ Petition No. 3930 of 2013
And
Writ Petition No. 8203 of 2013
(per the Hon'ble Sri Justice C. Praveen Kumar)
Date: 22.01.2021
SM..
