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Chekka Guru Murali Mohan vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh
2021 Latest Caselaw 164 AP

Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 164 AP
Judgement Date : 19 January, 2021

Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Chekka Guru Murali Mohan vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 19 January, 2021
Bench: Cheekati Manavendranath Roy
*HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY

      + Criminal Petition Nos.4819, 4843, 4844, 4867, 4938
                           and 5384 of 2020

% Dated 19-01-2021


Crl. Petition No.4819 of 2020:

# 1. Chekka Guru Murali Mohan & Anr.
                                                            ..... Petitioners
Vs.

$ The State of Andhra Pradesh through SHO, CID PS, AP,
Mangalagiri, Guntur District, Rep. by Public Prosecutor,
High Court of Andhra Pradesh & Anr.
                                                       ..Respondents

! Counsel for the petitioners       :     Sri Siddardha Luthra,
                                        Learned senior counsel,
                                        Sri      Posani    Venkateswarlu,
                                         learned senior counsel,
                                        Sri K.S. Murthy,
                                        Sri Ginjupalli Subba Rao,
                                        Ms.S.Pranathi,
                                        Sri A.K. Kishore Reddy and
                                        Sri M.V. Subba Reddy

^ Counsel for the 1st respondent-State        : Learned Advocate General
                                             and      learned     Public
                                             Prosecutor
 Counsel for the 2nd respondent
            -de facto complainant: Sri O.Kailashnath Reddy

<GIST:

> HEAD NOTE:

? Cases referred

   1. AIR1984SC718=(1984)2 SCC 500
   2. 1987 (1) BomCR 59 = 1986 MhLJ 1004;
   3. 1908 CLJ 342;
   4. Judgment in Civil Appeal No. 196 of 2011 dated 02.03.2020
   5. (2007) 8 SCC 705;
   6. (2013) 1 SCC 353;
   7. (1866) 35 Beav 27;
   8. (1788) 2 Bro. C.C. 400 = 29 E. R. 224;
   9. (1886) 11 App Cas 232, 235;
   10. 1817 SCC OnLine US SC 28=15 US 178 (1817) = 4 L.Ed.214 = 2 Wheat. 178
   11. 1915 SCC OnLine Sind JC 6 = AIR 1915 Sind 21;
   12. (1896) 20 Bom 522;
   13. (1905) ILR 27 All 561;
   14. (2009) 8 SCC 751;
   15. (2004)11 SCC 585;
   16. (1980) 2 SCC 665;
   17. 2010 (8) Supreme 389;
   18. 1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335 = 1992 CriLJ 527;
                                     2

                                                                           CMR,J.

Crl.P.No.4819 of 2020 & batch

19. (2015) 8 SCC 293;

20. (2000) 1 SCC 210;

21. (2013) 10 SCC 591;

22. (2007) 1 SCC 1;

23. AIR 1964 SC 72;

24. (2012) 2 SCC 688;

25. (1977) 4 SCC 451;

26. (2011) 10 SCC 632;

27. Judgment dated 26.11.2020 in Spl.L.P.(Cri) No.4931 of 2020;

28. (2004) 15 SCC 691; [

29. Crl.P.No.1719 of 2020, dated 21.10.2020.

CMR,J.

Crl.P.No.4819 of 2020 & batch

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

Criminal Petition Nos.4819, 4843, 4844, 4867, 4938 and 5384 of 2020

Crl. Petition No.4819 of 2020:

1. Chekka Guru Murali Mohan & Anr.

..... Petitioners Vs.

The State of Andhra Pradesh through SHO, CID PS, AP, Mangalagiri, Guntur District, Rep. by Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh & Anr.

..Respondents

ORDER PRONOUNCED ON: 19-01-2021

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY

1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers -- may be allowed to see the Judgments?

2. Whether the copies of judgment may be -Yes- marked to Law Reporters/Journals

3. Whether Their Ladyship/Lordship wish to see -Yes- the fair copy of the Judgment?

JUSTICE CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY

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Crl.P.No.4819 of 2020 & batch

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH R0Y

Criminal Petition Nos.4819, 4843, 4844, 4867, 4938 and 5384 of 2020

COMMON ORDER:

This batch of Criminal Petitions, under Section 482

Cr.P.C., are filed, seeking quash of the common F.I.R. in Crime

No.49 of 2020 of C.I.D.P.S., A.P., Amaravati of Mangalagiri,

registered against the petitioners for the offences punishable

under Sections 420, 409, 406 and 120-B of I.P.C.

2) A person by name Sri Salivendra Suresh of Velagapudi

village, who is totally a stranger to the sale transactions in

question, which are sought to be impeached on the ground of

playing fraud and cheating the sellers of the land by the

petitioners, who are purchasers of the lands, lodged a report

with Mangalagiri Police.

3) Synoptic outline of the contents of the report germane

to dispose of these Criminal Petitions may be stated as follows:

(a) It is alleged in the report that the de facto complainant

is a resident of Velagapudi village, which is situated within the

Capital Region Development Authority (hereinafter called as

"C.R.D.A."). He has been following the news being published

and the debates in the Legislative Assembly relating to the

irregularities that took place in respect of the lands situated

within the capital area. There has been no capital for the State

of Andhra Pradesh after the erstwhile common State of Andhra

Pradesh was bifurcated into two States i.e. the State of

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Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh. Therefore, as per

the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, Sivaramakrishna

Committee was constituted to decide as to where the capital for

the residuary State of Andhra Pradesh is to be located. The

then Chief Minister Sri Nara Chandra Babu Naidu brought the

Capital Region Development Authority Act in the month of

December, 2014 and declared that 25 villages which are

adjacent to the Krishna River will be the capital region.

(b) However, even prior to it several people who got

acquaintance with important people in the Government got

information as to where the capital would be located and they

purchased the lands within the said area and adjacent to the

C.R.D.A. region from the farmers of that locality deceptively.

(c) Whileso, after the month of July, 2019 it has been

widely published in the media that persons who got close

acquaintance with the important persons in the erstwhile

government purchased lands in their names and in the name of

their companies on the basis of the prior information got to

them regarding location of the capital city and that the farmers,

who have no information regarding location of capital in their

area, have sold the lands. He also came to know when the Bill

was introduced in the Assembly by the present Government to

abolish the C.R.D.A. enactment, during the debates took place

in the Assembly, that officials who worked in the Government in

high positions and the political leaders who are in power at that

time have purchased lands in their names and in binami names

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by using their black money within the C.R.D.A. region and

adjoining the said C.R.D.A. region for paltry sale consideration

and thereby had monetary gain for them. All this was done as

per the conspiracy hatched up between the officials and the

political leaders and the persons who purchased the said lands.

(d) Therefore, when he verified the sale transactions that

took place in the C.R.D.A. region in the website of the

Registration Department, it came to light that (1) Lalitha Super

Specialty Hospital; (2) Sri Thottempudi Venkateswara Rao,

Cherukuri Tejaswi of North West Holdings Private Limited which

belongs to them; (3) Sri C. D. Murali Mohan and Sri

B.V.R.Sarma to whom Vertex Homes Private Limited belongs; (4)

Gayathri Realtors Limited, Chennai; (5) Smt.Kilaru Srihasa

W/o.Kilaru Rajesh, who is close associate of Sri Nara Chandra

Babu Naidu and Sri Nara Lokesh and (6) Good Life Estates,

Vijayawada, (petitioners herein) have purchased vast extent of

lands in the said capital region area and near to it. It is stated

that as per the information collected by the de facto

complainant, even before officially declaring the area where the

capital is going to be located, the officials of the Government

and political leaders clandestinely divulged the information

relating to area where the capital is going to be located to their

kith and kin and to their men and companies and on the basis

of the said information furnished, the aforesaid persons and

companies have purchased the lands from the farmers of the

said area. Therefore, the farmers who sold the lands have been

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Crl.P.No.4819 of 2020 & batch

cheated and deceived. So, it is alleged by the de facto

complainant in the report that there has been a conspiracy

hatched up between the highly placed government officials and

the political leaders on one hand and the persons who

purchased the lands during the period from June, 2014 to

December, 2014 before officially declaring the location of the

capital area in as much as the official information has been

clandestinely leaked to the persons who purchased the lands

from the farmers. Therefore, he prayed in his report to enquire

into the matter and take necessary legal action in this regard.

4) The said report was lodged on 07.09.2020 at about

13.30 hours by the de facto complainant with the police.

Initially, an entry was made in the General Diary i.e. G.D. by

the police. As per record, as per the instructions of the

Additional Deputy General of Police, C.I.D. A.P., preliminary

enquiry was ordered on the allegations set out in the said

report. Accordingly, Sri R.S. Kishore Kumar, Inspector of Police,

CID, RO, Vijayawada, has conducted a preliminary enquiry

relating to the said allegations. He has submitted his

preliminary enquiry report to the Addl. Dy.G.P., CID,

Mangalagiri, on 16.09.2020 stating that he has enquired one

Marella Nagi Reddy S/o.Rami Reddy of Kaza village and he

stated that in the month of June, 2014 one Chilakapati Srinivas

of Bethampudi village approached him and asked him to sell his

land to Good Life Estates Private Limited and he refused.

Thereafter, he again came to him and pressurized him to sell

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the property for Rs.40.00 Lakhs and accordingly, he sold the

said land to Good Life Estates Private Limited represented by

K.Venkateswarlu and J.Srinivasa Rao, and that few months

thereafter the then Government announced location of capital at

Thulluru area and Bethempudi village is also located in the

capital region and consequently, the value of the land has

increased. It is also stated in the preliminary enquiry report

that the Inspector of Police also examined one Pandi

Hanumantha Rao S/o.Satyanarayana of Nehru Nagar, Guntur,

and he stated that he had land in Namburu village and in the

month of July, 2014 he sold his land to one V.V.R. Varma and

C.V. Murali Mohan, who are the representatives of Vertex

Homes Private Limited and later the capital area was

announced and Namburu village is just abetting the core capital

area and as such value of the said lands is also increased and

when the aforesaid persons who sold the lands questioned the

above purchasers in this regard over phone as to why they

purchased the lands without disclosing the proposal of location

of the capital at the said lands that the purchasers threatened

them with dire-consequences.

5) Based on the said preliminary enquiry report dated

16.09.2020 wherein it is stated that the preliminary enquiry

revealed that the contents of the report lodged by the de facto

complainant disclose commission of a cognizable offence, the

present F.I.R. was registered as per the instructions of the Addl.

Dy.G.P., CID, AP., Mangalagiri, in Crime No.49 of 2020 for the

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Crl.P.No.4819 of 2020 & batch

offences punishable under Sections 420, 409, 406 and 120-B of

IPC. The said case is now under investigation.

6) The petitioners in this batch of Criminal Petitions, who

are all shown as accused in the aforesaid F.I.R., sought quash

of the said common F.I.R. registered against them on the

ground that the facts of the case even if they are taken to be

true at its face value do not constitute any offence punishable

under Sections 420, 409, 406 and 120-B of IPC and allowing

the proceedings to be continued against them pursuant to the

registration of the aforesaid F.I.R. would amount to abuse of

process of law.

7) Learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State filed

counter-affidavit and additional counter-affidavit along with

material papers opposing the claim of the petitioners for quash

of the F.I.R. The 2nd respondent who is the de facto

complainant also filed his counter-affidavit opposing the claim

of the petitioners to quash the F.I.R. The counter-affidavit of

the 2nd respondent de facto complainant is nothing but verbatim

reproduction of the contents of the F.I.R. The pleas taken by

the learned Public Prosecutor in his counter-affidavit and

additional counter-affidavit would be dealt with while referring

to the elaborate arguments addressed by the learned Advocate

General on behalf of the State, to avoid repetition of the pleas.

It would be suffice to make a detailed reference of the

submissions made by the learned Advocate General on behalf of

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Crl.P.No.4819 of 2020 & batch

the State which covers the pleas taken in the counter-affidavit

and additional counter-affidavit filed by the prosecution.

8) When these Criminal Petitions came up for final hearing

before this Court, I have heard Sri Siddardha Luthra, learned

senior counsel, Sri Posani Venkateswarlu, learned senior

counsel, and other learned counsel for the petitioners Sri K.S.

Murthy, Sri Ginjupalli Subba Rao, Ms.S.Pranathi, Sri A.K.

Kishore Reddy and Sri M.V. Subba Reddy, in all these Criminal

Petitions and the learned Advocate General, assisted by the

learned Public Prosecutor for the State at length. Heard Sri

O.Kailashnath Reddy, learned counsel appearing for the de

facto complainant. Also considered the written submissions

filed by learned Public Prosecutor.

RIVAL CONTENTIONS:

9) Learned counsel for the petitioners and learned senior

counsel Sri Siddardha Luthra, vehemently contended that the

facts of the case do not constitute any offences punishable

under Sections 420, 409, 406 and 120-B of IPC for which F.I.R.

was registered against the petitioners. They would submit that

many of the petitioners who are in the field of business have

only purchased the lands in the process of developing their

business activity in the field of real estate and in the

construction field. Therefore, purchasing lands for a valid

consideration under registered sale deeds does not amount to

commission of any offence.

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Crl.P.No.4819 of 2020 & batch

10) It is contended that the news relating to location of

capital for the newly carved out State of Andhra Pradesh

between the Krishna District and the Guntur District adjacent

to Krishna river and the highway between the Krishna District

and the Guntur District is afloat and has been in speculation

from the time when the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act for

bifurcation of the common State of Andhra Pradesh was passed

in the Parliament in the month of March, 2014. They would

contend that even when the government was formed in the

month of June, 2014, that the then Chief Minister publicly

announced immediately after his swearing in ceremony on

09.06.2014 that the Government is contemplating to locate the

new capital for the State of Andhra Pradesh in between the

Krishna District and the Guntur District by the side of the

Krishna river and the same has been widely published in all

widely circulated newspapers. Even subsequently also the news

relating to the proposal of the Government to locate the capital

between the Krishna District and the Guntur District has been

continuously published in various widely circulated Telugu and

English newspapers. Therefore, the proposal of the Government

to locate the capital between the Krishna District and the

Guntur District adjacent to Krishna river is very much in the

public domain and it is not a non-public information either in

the Government circle or in the public circle. Therefore, they

would contend that if the petitioners who got information

through the news published in the newspapers regarding the

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proposal of the Government to locate the capital in the said area

purchase any lands in the said area which are willingly sold by

the owners of the said lands for a valid sale consideration that it

does not amount to any offence under law and no criminal

liability can be attributed to the petitioners in the given facts

and circumstances of the case.

11) Therefore, they would contend that launching criminal

prosecution against the petitioners on the alleged vague report

lodged by a stranger to the said sale transactions at the

instance of some vested interests who are behind him and on

the basis of the alleged statements said to have been given by

the sellers of the land subsequently after lapse of six long years

of selling away their lands, during the course of investigation

alleging that the fact that the capital is going to be located in

the said area where their lands are situated is not disclosed to

them before purchasing the lands and that there is hike in the

price of lands subsequent to declaration of the capital officially

by the Government, clearly amounts to abuse of process of law.

Therefore, learned counsel for the petitioners prayed to quash

the F.I.R. on the ground that criminal prosecution in the said

facts and circumstances of the case is not legally maintainable

against them.

12) It is finally contended by the learned Counsel for the

petitioners that the de facto complainant, who is a stranger to

the sale transactions and who did not sustain any loss on

account of the said sale transactions, has no locus standi to

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Crl.P.No.4819 of 2020 & batch

lodge the said report with the police and initiate criminal

prosecution against the petitioners.

13) Per contra, learned Advocate General with the able

assistance of Sri R.Srinivasa Reddy, learned Public Prosecutor

for the State of Andhra Pradesh, vehemently contended that the

contents of the F.I.R. reveal that the petitioners, who have

purchased the lands within and abetting the capital region got

prior information from the top officials working in the

Government and from the political leaders in the Government

with whom they got close acquaintance regarding exact location

of the capital area and the proposed villages which would come

within the purview of the capital area and based on the prior

information unauthorizedly furnished to them that they

purchased lands from the farmers without disclosing to them

that the capital city is going to be located at their villages and

the said concealment of material fact amounts to cheating the

sellers in as much as, as per the explanation appended to

Section 415 IPC makes it clear that a dishonest concealment of

fact is a deception within the meaning of the said Section.

Therefore, he would contend that there has been a conspiracy

between the petitioners who purchased the lands and the top

government officials who are working in the Government at that

time and the political leaders relating to unauthorized

disclosure of the information relating to location of capital and

as such these facts which are supported by the statements

given by some of the vendors of the lands during the course of

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investigation prima facie make out the offences punishable

under Section 420 of IPC and also under Section 120-B of IPC.

So, the learned Advocate General would vehemently contend

that the matter requires deep probe to unearth the said

conspiracy hatched up between the petitioners on one hand and

the top government officials working at that time and the

political leaders.

14) Repelling the contention relating to the locus standi of

the de facto complainant to lodge the report, learned Advocate

General would submit that the concept of locus standi is alien to

criminal law and any person who got information relating to

commission of offence is legally entitled to lodge report to set

the criminal law into motion except only in certain cases which

are carved out in Sections 195 to 199 of Cr.P.C. which require

locus standi and as the present offences are not within the

purview of Sections 195 to 199 Cr.P.C., the contention raised by

the petitioners regarding the locus standi of the de facto

complainant to lodge the report has no merit.

15) He would further contend that as per Section 55(5)(a)

of the Transfer of Property Act, the buyer is bound to disclose to

the seller any facts as to the nature or extent of seller's interest

in the property of which the buyer is aware, but of which he has

reason to believe that the seller is not aware, and which

materially increases the value of such interest. Therefore, the

petitioners being the buyers of the land are under the legal

obligation under Section 55(5)(a) of the T.P. Act to disclose to

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the seller that the capital is going to be located in the said area

and as they did not disclose the said fact before purchasing the

lands and concealed the said fact it would clearly come within

the purview of the explanation appended to Section 415 of IPC

of dishonest concealment of fact which is a deception within the

meaning of the said section. Therefore, he would submit, that a

clear case of Section 420 IPC is made out. So, he contends that

there is no merit in the contention of the petitioners that the

facts of the case do not constitute any offence punishable under

Section 420 IPC and in fact the facts of the case clearly

constitute the offences punishable under Sections 420 and

120-B of IPC.

16) The learned Advocate General then contended that the

employees working in the concerned section in the secretariat,

who are involved in preparing the G.Os. in determining the area

covered by C.R.D.A. gave statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C.

and under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the police and the learned

Magistrate respectively during the course of investigation that

some irregularities have taken place in preparing the draft

G.Os. without mentioning the names of the villages covered by

the said capital region which are kept under secret and as such

these statements prima facie establish that some illegalities and

irregularities took place in the matter of preparing the said

G.Os. which also establish conspiracy as alleged by the

prosecution.

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17) He would also submit that these facts relatively also

establish that there has been offence of insider trading on

account of the conspiracy hatched up between the higher

officials in the government, political leaders of the then

Government and the petitioners who purchased the aforesaid

lands which requires deep probe during the course of

investigation. Therefore, the learned Advocate General prayed

for dismissal of these Criminal Petitions.

18) In reply to the aforesaid contentions raised by the

learned Advocate General on behalf of the State, learned Senior

Counsel Sri Siddhardh Luthra, would submit that Section

55(5)(a) of the T.P. Act only imposes an obligation on the buyer

to disclose to the seller only a fact relating to the nature and

extent of the seller's interest in the property which may

materially increase the value of such interest and it does not

cover the information relating to the reason for purchase of the

said lands by the buyer or any future benefit that they may

derive in respect of the said lands. Therefore, learned Senior

Counsel would submit that the non disclosure of the fact that

the capital is going to come within the said region to the seller

even if true it does not amount to concealment of material fact

as required under Explanation appended to Section 415 IPC. He

would then contend that the mere fact that there is subsequent

increase in the value of the property on account of location of

capital in the said area cannot afford a ground to prosecute the

petitioners for the offence punishable under Section 420 IPC. It

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is contended that as per Section 55(vi)(a) of the T.P. Act, the

buyer is entitled to the benefit of any improvement in, or

increase in value of, the property, and to the rents and profits

thereof when the ownership of the property has passed to him.

Therefore, when the buyer is legally entitled to the benefit of

increase in the value of the property on account of the

ownership of the property that was passed to him, the sellers

cannot legitimately complain that they were cheated by the

buyers as there is subsequent increase in the value of the

property.

19) The learned Senior Counsel Sri Siddhardh Luthra

further contends that the offence of insider trading is not made

an offence under any of the provisions of the IPC and it relates

only to the fraud played pertaining to sale and purchase of

securities and bonds in the stock market and it is only made an

offence under The Securities and Exchange Board of India Act,

1992 (herein after called as "SEBI Act"). So, he would contend

that invoking the said theory of insider trading even relatively or

contextually to prosecute the petitioners in this case for the

offences punishable under the IPC is legally unsustainable. He

finally contends that the alleged irregularities and illegalities

spoken to by some of the official witnesses in their 164 Cr.P.C.

statements said to have been given before the learned

Magistrate, at best show that there is contravention of the

business rules, and even if it is true, they do not establish

anything incriminating against these petitioners who have

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nothing to do with the said preparation of G.Os. and as such

the said statements do not in any way support the case of the

prosecution against these petitioners.

20) Having regard to the magnitude of the vital issues and

contentions raised by the prosecution and also the petitioners,

as elaborately discussed supra, and particularly as the findings

that may be recorded in this judgment in the given facts and

circumstances of the case, would have far reaching

consequences on all the sale transactions that have already

taken place and that may take place in future, I have given my

earnest, anxious and thoughtful consideration to the

aforementioned rival contentions raised by both the parties.

21) Although arguments have been also addressed by

learned Counsel appearing for some of the petitioners in these

Criminal Petitions that the present Government in order to

wreak vengeance against the petitioners and against some of

the persons who have some acquaintance with the erstwhile

Government, the present prosecution has been illegally and

maliciously launched to harass and humiliate the petitioners by

distorting the facts to drag the petitioners into the alleged

conspiracy with the Government officials by concocting a false

story, this Court is of the considered view that without entering

into any controversy relating to the said motive attributed to the

present Government by the petitioners, that these Criminal

Petitions have to be decided dispassionately irrespective of the

motives that are attributed on either side, strictly adhering to

CMR,J.

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question of fact, question of law, and interpretation of the legal

provisions relevant in the context to determine the present

controversy involved in these Criminal Petitions. The Court is

primarily required to see in the given facts and circumstances of

the case, whether the facts of the case emanating from the

record even taken to be true at its face value, constitute any

offences punishable under Sections 420, 409, 406 and 120-B of

IPC for which the F.I.R. is registered. If the facts of the case

prima facie constitute all or any one of the offences for which

the F.I.R. is registered, the Court shall allow the investigation to

go on to find out the truth or otherwise of the said allegations. If

the facts of the case do not constitute any offences for which the

F.I.R. is registered and no offence is made out from the facts of

the case, then it amounts to abuse of process of law to allow the

criminal proceedings initiated pursuant to registration of F.I.R.

to be continued against the petitioners and the F.I.R. registered

against them is liable to be quashed. So, the main focus of the

Court should be on the vital issue of ascertaining whether the

facts of the case constitute any offence or offences for which the

F.I.R. is registered or not.

22) This is a very peculiar and very interesting case and in

fact a case of first of its kind where the prosecution seeks to

criminalize private sale transactions entered into between the

petitioners as buyers of the land and the sellers of the land long

back about six years ago by invoking the concept/theory of

offence of insider trading applying the same relatively to the

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facts of the case, primarily on the ground that the petitioners as

buyers of the land did not disclose to the owners of the land

that the capital city is going to be located in the said area and

thereby concealed the said material fact and cheated the owners

of the land and on the ground that as the location of the capital

was officially declared subsequently that there is a phenomenal

increase in the value of the land and the owners of the land

sustained loss on account of concealment of the said fact.

23) Therefore, when that be the substratum of the

prosecution case, the paramount questions that arise for

determination are whether it is legally permissible to criminalize

private sale transactions willingly entered into by the

owners/sellers of the land with the buyers for a valid sale

consideration, on the sole ground that the buyers did not inform

the sellers of the land that the capital area is going to be located

at their lands or not under Section 420 of IPC? Whether it

amounts to dishonest concealment of fact as per the

Explanation appended to Section 415 of IPC? Even if there is

subsequent increase in the value of the land on account of

official announcement of location of the capital subsequently at

that area, whether any offence under Section 420 of IPC is

constituted or not is also the question to be determined. Then

the other important question for determination is whether the

concept of offence of insider trading is applicable to the present

facts of the case. Finally, it is to be ascertained whether any

element of criminality is involved in the transaction or not.

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LOCUS STANDI OF THE DE FACTO COMPLAINANT TO LODGE REPORT WITH THE POLICE:-

24) Before adverting to the above vital questions, the

Court is first inclined to decide the cavil raised relating to the

locus standi of the de facto complainant to lodge the report with

the police setting the criminal law into motion. No doubt,

admittedly, the de facto complainant is absolutely a stranger to

the sales transactions that took place between the petitioners

and the vendors in respect of the sale of the lands in question.

The de facto complainant is not the person who sold the lands

to the petitioners or to anyone and he is not the person who

sustained any loss on account of the said sale transactions.

However, it is to be noted that as rightly contended by the

learned Advocate General that it is settled proposition of law

that the concept of locus standi to set criminal law into motion

is alien to criminal law. Any person who got information

regarding commission of a cognizable offence is entitled to bring

the same to the notice of the concerned police to investigate

regarding the truth or otherwise of the said version and set the

criminal law into motion. As per our criminal jurisprudence, the

basic principle is that, eventually, every offence is against the

society. Therefore, any person who got acquaintance with the

facts of the case relating to commission of any cognizable

offence can set the criminal law into motion by lodging a report

to that effect. Only in exceptional cases which are exempted

from this principle, which are set out in Sections 195 to 199

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Cr.P.C. in respect of certain offences, the criminal has to be set

into motion only by a person who is aggrieved. The present

offences for which the petitioners are sought to be prosecuted

do not fall within the purview of the exceptional cases under

Sections 195 to 199 Cr.P.C.

25) Legal position in this regard is not res nova and the

same has been authoritatively very well settled. The

Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of A.R.

Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak and Ors.1 had an occasion

to deal with this concept of locus standi of a person to set the

criminal law into motion. The Apex Court at para No.6 of the

Judgment held as follows:

"It is a well recognised principle of criminal jurisprudence that anyone can set or put the criminal law into motion except where the statute enacting or creating an offence indicates to the contrary. The scheme of the Cr.P.C. envisages two parallel and independent agencies for taking criminal offences to Court. Even for the most serious offence of murder, it was not disputed that a private complaint can, not only be filed but can be entertained and proceeded with according to law."

Further held as follows:

"Locus standi of the complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence save and except that where the statue creating an offence provides for the eligibility of the complainant, by necessary implication the general principle gets excluded by such statutory provision. .... While Section 190 Cr.P.C. permits anyone to approach the Magistrate with a complaint, it does not prescribe any

1 AIR1984SC718=(1984)2 SCC 500

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qualification the complainant is required to fulfil to be eligible to file a complaint. But where an eligibility criterion for a complainant is contemplated specific provisions have been made such as to be found in Sections 195 to 199 Cr.P.C. These specific provisions clearly indicate that in the absence of any such statutory provision, a locus standi of a complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence. In other words, the principle that anyone can set or put the criminal law in motion remains intact unless contra- indicated by a statutory provision.

26) Also held that the general principle of nearly universal

application is founded on a policy that an offence i. e. an act or

omission made punishable by any law for the time being in

force (See Section 2(n) Cr.P.C.) is not merely an offence

committed in relation to the person who suffers harm but is

also an offence against society. The society for its orderly and

peaceful development is interested in the punishment of the

offender. Therefore, prosecution for serious offences is

undertaken in the name of the State representing the people

which would exclude any element of private vendatta or

vengeance. Punishment of the offender in the interest of the

society being one of the objects behind penal statutes enacted

for larger good of the society, right to initiate proceedings

cannot be whittled down, circumscribed or fettered by putting it

into a straight jacket formula of locus standi unknown to

criminal jurisprudence, save and except specific statutory

exception.

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27) The Bombay High Court of Nagpur Bench in the case

of Shriram Krishnappa Asegaonkar v. State of Maharashtra2

held at para No.12 of the judgment as follows:

"There is, therefore, no doubt that the complaint of offence of cheating punishable under Section 420 IPC can be filed by any person to set the law in motion and that it is not necessary that such a complaint should be filed by only the person deceived."

28) In arriving at the said conclusion, the Bombay High

Court relied on the judgment of the Division Bench of the

Calcutta High Court in the case of Mahadeolal v. Emperor3

wherein the Calcutta High Court held that the prosecutor in

criminal case is really the Crown and the complainant merely

sets the machinery of the laws in motion, and, in a case of

cheating it has been held therein that it is not necessary that

complainant should have been the person deceived. In that case

a pleader was deceived by writing a letter of cancellation of

contract and the complaint was filed by servant of a firm, who

became aware of the deception. It was held that the prosecution

initiated by the servant of a firm is maintainable.

29) So, in view of the law enunciated in the aforesaid

judgments, the contention of the petitioners that the de facto

complainant has no locus standi to initiate criminal prosecution

by way of lodging a report with the police has no merit and it is

2 1987 (1) BomCR 59 = 1986 MhLJ 1004 3 1908 CLJ 342

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liable to be rejected. The cavil is answered accordingly in favour

of the prosecution.

30) However, though the plea relating to locus standi

raised by the petitioners is not legally sustainable, justification

on the part of the stranger to the alleged sale transactions in

question, who is the de facto complainant, in lodging a report

with the police initiating criminal prosecution against the

petitioners and that too after lapse of six years and its

genuineness is certainly a relevant factor which requires

consideration and the same will be adverted to at the

appropriate time while dealing with the same during the course

of discussion of this judgment.

CONCEPT OF INSIDER TRADING AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE:-

31) Ferreting out the origin and history of the offence of

insider trading reveal that basically the offence of insider

trading relates to trading of a public company's stock or other

securities (such as bonds or stock options) based on material,

nonpublic information about the company. In various

countries, some kinds of trading based on insider information is

illegal, because it is seen as unfair to other investors who do not

have access to the information, as the investor with insider

information could potentially make larger profits than a typical

investor could make. The study on the subject reveals that the

rules governing the offence of insider trading are complex and

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vary significantly from country to country. The extent of

enforcement also varies from one country to another. Trading

by specific insiders, such as employees, is commonly permitted

as long as it does not rely on material information not in the

public domain. Rules prohibiting or criminalizing insider

trading on material nonpublic information exist in most

jurisdictions around the world, but the details and the efforts to

enforce them vary considerably. In the United States, Sections

16(b) and 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 1934 directly

and indirectly address insider trading. The United States

Congress enacted this law after the stock market crashed in

1929.

32) In the European Union and the United Kingdom,

trading on nonpublic information is, under the rubric of market

abuse, subject at a minimum to civil penalties and to possible

criminal penalties as well. United Kingdom's Financial Conduct

Authority has the responsibility to investigate and prosecute

insider dealing, defined by the Criminal Justice Act, 1993.

Japan enacted its first law against insider trading in 1988. The

Australian legislation in this regard arose out of the report of

1989 parliamentary committee report which recommended

removal of the requirement that the trader be 'connected' with

the body corporate.

33) Thus, the history pertaining to the offence of insider

trading clearly reveals that the above laws are brought in this

regard mainly to curb the insider trading in the field of stock

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market. So, it is apparent that the said offence of insider

trading is essentially an offence relating to trading of public

company stocks or other securities such as bonds or stock

options based on material, nonpublic information about the

company. Absolutely, it has nothing to do with the sale and

purchase of land which is an immovable property which are

private sale transactions wholly unrelated to the affairs of stock

market business. As it is found that the insiders in the

company who are associated with the affairs of the company

have been furnishing nonpublic information unauthorisedly to

some investors relating to sale of shares, bonds and other

securities and as it is resulting into loss to other investors

which is found to be unfair, to curb these illegal acts of insider

trading, various countries across the world brought various

enactments.

34) Similarly, India also brought into force the Securities

and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, to curb the offence of

insider trading in the field of stock market in India.

35) As per the statement of objects and reasons of the said

enactment, originally SEBI was established in 1988 through a

government resolution to promote orderly and healthy growth of

the securities market and for investors' protection. This SEBI

has been monitoring the activities of stock exchanges, mutual

funds, merchant bankers, etc., to achieve these goals. As the

capital market has witnessed tremendous growth, characterised

particularly by the increasing participation of the public, it is

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felt that investors' confidence in the capital market can be

sustained largely by ensuring investors' protection. With this

end in view, Government decided to vest SEBI immediately with

statutory powers required to deal effectively with all matters

relating to capital market. So, the said Act 15 of 1992 was

introduced with the above objective and the SEBI Bill has been

passed by both the Houses of Parliament and received the

assent of the President on 4th April 1992 and it came on to the

Statute Book as the Securities and Exchange Board of India

Act, 1992 with effect from 30-01-1992.

36) Therefore, insider trading in India is an offence

according to Section 12-A and 15-G of the SEBI Act. As per the

provisions of the aforesaid Act, the offence of insider trading is

said to be committed when a person with access to nonpublic,

price sensitive information about the securities of the

company subscribes, buys, sells, or deals, or agrees to do so or

counsels another to do so as principal or agent. Price-sensitive

information is information that materially affects the value of

the securities. Section 12-A of the SEBI Act deals with the

acts which constitute insider trading relating to sale of any

securities listed or proposed to be listed on a recognized stock

exchange and Section 15-G deals with imposing penalty for

committing the said offence of insider trading.

37) Therefore, insider trading is only made an offence in

India under the SEBI Act, 1992 and it essentially deals with the

sale and purchase of securities in the field of stock market

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based on nonpublic material information. It is a special

enactment which specifically and exclusively deals with the

offences relating to sale of securities in stock market. Insider

trading is not made an offence specifically under the Indian

Penal Code. No provisions akin to Section 12-A and 15-G of the

SEBI Act is incorporated in IPC by the Parliament relating to

private sale transactions of purchase or sale of land which is an

immovable property by invoking the said concept/theory of

insider trading. Therefore, the offence of insider trading is

totally alien to our criminal law under IPC. It is a concept or

offence totally unknown to our criminal law under Indian Penal

Code.

38) When the said concept of offence of insider trading is

not made applicable to purchase of any immovable property like

lands of private individuals and when the same is only confined

to purchase of securities and bonds under the SEBI Act, the

same cannot be even contextually or relatively applied or

invoked to criminalize the private sale transactions relating to

purchase of a land which is an immovable property in the guise

of the offence of insider trading. The provisions of Sections 12-

A and 15-G of the SEBI Act or any of its provisions cannot be

read into and imported into the provisions of the IPC much less

into Section 420 of IPC. It is not at all the intention of the

Parliament to attribute any criminal liability to such private sale

transactions of immovable property either under Section 420

IPC or under any provisions in the scheme of I.P.C. Therefore,

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this Court has absolutely no hesitation to hold that the said

concept/theory of the offence of insider trading which is

essentially an offence dealing with illegal sale of securities and

bonds of the company cannot be applied to the private sale

transactions relating to sale and purchase of lands to

criminalize the said transactions under any of the provisions of

the IPC much less under Section 420 of IPC. It is legally

impermissible to prosecute the petitioners for the offences

under Sections 420, 406, 409 and 120-B of IPC by applying the

said concept of insider trading and in the guise of the said

concept of insider trading.

39) Learned Advocate General would contend that the said

concept of the offence of insider trading is to be relatively

applied to the present facts of the case as the present facts of

the case are somewhat akin to the said offence of insider trading

as envisaged under the SEBI Act. By the said argument,

obviously, the idea that is sought to be conveyed by the learned

Advocate General is that as the allegations in the F.I.R. show

that the petitioners obtained prior information from the higher

officials in the Government and political leaders regarding exact

location of the capital and thereby purchased the lands in the

said area based on the said information, that the facts of the

case constitute an offence akin to insider trading in purchasing

the said lands. This Court is unable accede the said contention.

It is elaborately discussed supra, while dealing with the concept

of offence of insider trading and found that the said offence of

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insider trading essentially deals with only sale and purchase of

securities and bonds based on non-public material information

under the special enactment with the object of protecting the

capital market and to instill investors' confidence in the capital

market. Therefore, when it is only confined to the sale and

purchase of securities and bonds in the field of capital market,

as already held supra, the same cannot be read into the

provisions of IPC much less into Section 420 IPC. Parliament

never intended to make private sale transactions relating to

landed property an offence by applying the concept of insider

trading or to bring the same within the purview of the said

concept of insider trading. Therefore, the said contention holds

no water.

RIGHT TO ACQUIRE PROPERTY IS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AND A LEGAL RIGHT:

40) Earlier Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31 of the

Constitution of India are part of Chapter III of the Constitution

dealing with fundamental rights of a citizen. Article 19(1)(f)

guaranteed to the Indian citizen a right to acquire, hold and

dispose of property. Article 31 provided that "no person shall be

deprived of his property save by authority of law". Therefore, in

view of Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31 of the Constitution, right to

property was part of fundamental right of a citizen.

Subsequently, by 44th constitutional amendment both Article

19(1)(f) and Article 31 were repealed with effect from

20.06.1979. So, the right to property ceased to be a

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fundamental right. However, the right to acquire property

continues to be a constitutional right, legal right and also a

human right. Provision akin to Article 31 has been

incorporated under Article 300-A in Chapter-IV of the

Constitution under the rubric "right to property".

41) The Supreme Court, in the case of D.B. Basnett v.

The Collector, East District, Gangtok, Sikkim4 held at para

14 of the judgment as follows:

"We may note that even though rights in land are no more a fundamental right, still it remains a constitutional right under Article 300A of the Constitution of India."

42) The Apex Court in the case of Chairman, Indore

Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals

Ltd.5 held in following terms:

"The right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional right but also a human right.

Under Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 dated 10-12-1948, adopted in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution, it is stated that: (i) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. (ii) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

Earlier human rights existed to the claim of individuals right to health, right to livelihood, right to shelter and employment etc, but now human rights have started gaining a multifaceted approach. Now property rights are also incorporated within the definition of human rights. Even claim of adverse possession has to be read in consonance with human rights.

4 Judgment in Civil Appeal No. 196 of 2011 dated 02.03.2020 5 (2007) 8 SCC 705

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Also held that, property, while ceasing to be a fundamental right would, however, be given express recognition as a legal right, provision being made that no person shall be deprived of his property save in accordance with law."

43) In Tuka Ram Kana Joshi v. Maharashtra Industrial

Development Corporation6 the Supreme Court reiterated that

right to property is now considered to be, not only a

constitutional or a statutory right, but also a human right.

Though it is not a basic feature of the constitution or a

fundamental right, the right to property is considered very

much to be part of new dimensions where human rights are

considered to be in realm of individual's rights such as the right

to health, the right to livelihood, the right to shelter and

employment etc., and such rights are gaining an even greater

multifaceted dimension.

44) From the aforesaid exposition of law, it is now

abundantly made clear that a citizen has a legal and

constitutional right to acquire and hold property. The said right

of an individual to hold a property apart from being a legal

right, has also been held to be a human right.

45) Since the prosecution seeks to criminalize the private

sale transactions validly entered into by the petitioners as

buyers with their sellers for a valid sale consideration under

valid registered sale deeds by which they acquired the landed

6 (2013) 1 SCC 353

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property in question, the aforesaid right of the petitioners as

citizens of the country to acquire property as part of their

constitutional right, legal right, and human right assumes

significance in this context. Therefore, for that limited purpose,

the aforesaid legal position has been dealt with in this case.

FACTUAL FINDINGS:-

46) In the background of the aforesaid legal position that

the right to property is a constitutional right and legal right of a

citizen of the country, it is to be now seen whether buying a

land without informing the seller the purpose of buying the said

land or latent advantage which he may derive pertaining to the

sale transaction which is within the knowledge of the buyer

would amount to an offence under Section 420 of IPC and also

under Sections 406 and 409 of IPC or not.

47) Before embarking upon an enquiry on this vital

aspect, to have a comprehensive understanding of the case of

the prosecution, few relevant facts needs a mention to have a

clarity regarding the substratum of the prosecution case.

48) The erstwhile combined State of Andhra Pradesh

which was originally constituted under the States

Reorganization Act, 1956 with effect from 01-01-1956 was

bifurcated into two States i.e., the State of Telangana and the

State of Andhra Pradesh in the year 2014 as per the Andhra

Pradesh Reorganization Act 2014. The said enactment was

passed by the Parliament on 03.03.2014. Both the States i.e.,

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the State of Telangana and the residuary State of the present

Andhra Pradesh were formed with effect from 02-06-2014 which

is the appointed day under the Andhra Pradesh Reorganization

Act. In the General Assembly Elections held in the month of

April, 2014 for the residuary State of Andhra Pradesh, the

Telugu Desam Party came into rule. The Hyderabad city which

was the capital city for the erstwhile combined state of Andhra

Pradesh was made the capital for the State of Telangana. There

is no capital city for the State of Andhra Pradesh. Therefore, as

there is no capital for the State of Andhra Pradesh, the State

Government had to take steps to establish a capital city for the

newly carved out State of Andhra Pradesh. So, the Government

has passed the Capital Region Development Authority

enactment (hereinafter called as "C.R.D.A. Act") to build a

capital city between the Krishna District and the Guntur

District by the side of the Krishna river consisting of 25 villages

in the said C.R.D.A. region. G.O.Ms.No.252 and G.O.Ms.No.254

were issued to that effect notifying the capital region on

30.12.2014. A concept of land pooling was introduced under

the aforesaid enactment to acquire the lands from the owners of

the lands in the said villages for the purpose of establishing the

capital city.

49) Whileso, after the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act

was passed on 03.03.2014 as there was speculation regarding

location of capital between the Krishna District and the Guntur

District, various people have purchased lands in between the

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said Krishna and Guntur Districts and the present petitioners

are also among the said persons who purchased the lands in

the said area. Some of the lands were purchased by them are

within the capital region and most of the lands are beyond the

capital region and also beyond the proposed inner ring road.

The location of these lands purchased by the petitioners is

identified as per the plans submitted by the prosecution along

with the C.D. file.

50) Now, the main case of the prosecution is that the

petitioners who purchased the said lands during the period

from June, 2014 to December, 2014 got prior information

regarding the exact location of the capital city unauthorisedly

from higher officials in the Government and the political leaders

and based on the said information they have purchased the said

lands from the owners of the said lands and at that time they

did not disclose to the owners that the capital city is going to

come within the said area and thereby cheated the sellers of the

land and they derived monetary benefit on account of increase

in the land value subsequently, after location of the capital in

that area is officially announced under the aforesaid G.Os. on

30.12.2014 and this has resulted into loss to the owners of the

land who sold the same oblivious of the fact that the capital city

is going to come in that area. Precisely this is the substratum

of the prosecution case.

51) Therefore, in the light of the aforesaid version of the

prosecution, the crucial question that arises for consideration is

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even if the said version of the prosecution is to be taken as true

at its face value, whether it constitute any offences punishable

under Sections 420, 409, 406 and 120-B of IPC or not.

SECTIONS 420 AND 415 OF I.P.C.

52) For better appreciation, Sections 420 and 415 of IPC

are reproduced hereunder for ready reference:

"S.420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.--Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."

53) While the above Section 420 of IPC deals with the

punishment for the offence of cheating, Section 415 IPC defines

what is cheating, and it reads thus:

"S.415. Cheating.--Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to "cheat".

Explanation.--A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section.

54) At the outset it is to be noticed that certain

illustrations are given below Section 415 IPC illustrating some

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instances of offence of cheating and the facts of the case are not

coming within the purview of any of the said illustrations.

55) A combined reading of the aforesaid two Sections 415

and 420 IPC makes it manifest that the necessary ingredients

which are to be essentially established to constitute an offence

of cheating under Section 420 of IPC are (i) There must be a

false representation said to have been made by the accused to

the person deceived knowing fully well that the said

representation made by the accused is false at the time of

making it; (ii) the accused must induce the deceived person

fraudulently or dishonestly to deliver any property to him or to

any person based on the said false representation made by the

accused; (iii) and consequently it must result into loss or

damage to the said person, in body, mind or property.

56) So, going by the ingredients contemplated under

Sections 415 and 420 of IPC, it is obvious that deception is the

quintessence of the offence of cheating. So, to hold a person to

be guilty of cheating another person, usually and generally,

there must be an allegation that a false representation was

made by the accused to the person deceived knowing fully well

that the said representation is false to his knowledge at the time

of making it and thereby he must induce the person deceived to

deliver any property to him or to any person and consequently

the person deceived must sustain damage or harm to him either

in body, mind, reputation or to any property. Admittedly, as per

the facts of the prosecution case, it is not their case that the

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petitioners made any false representation to the owners of the

lands at the time of sale of the said lands and induced them to

deliver the said property to them. So, the above basic

ingredients required to constitute an offence of cheating under

Section 420 IPC are conspicuously absent in the facts of the

case.

57) It is also to be noticed that the alleged deception must

be fraudulent and the alleged inducement must be dishonest in

order to attract the offence under Sections 420 r/w. 415 IPC, in

view of the express language employed in the definition of

cheating in Section 415 IPC. Thus, certain negative terms like

dishonest, fraudulent etc. are used to attribute criminal liability

to a person. So, no act can be construed as an offence under

the Section unless they are committed dishonestly and

fraudulently. Considering the cardinal principle of criminal law

that there can be no offence unless it is done with requisite

mens rea i.e. guilty intention, the above qualifying words like

dishonestly and fraudulently are used.

58) Section 24 IPC defines the term "dishonestly" and it

reads as follows:

"S.24. Whoever does anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another person, is said to do that thing, "dishonestly"."

59) Wrongful gain and wrongful loss are again defined in

Section 23 IPC and it reads as follows:

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"S.23. "Wrongful gain".- Wrongful gain is the gain by unlawful means of property to which the person gaining is not legally entitled.

"Wrongful loss".- Wrongful loss is the loss by unlawful means of property to which the person losing it is legally entitled."

"Gaining wrongfully, losing wrongfully" - A person is said to gain wrongfully when such person retains wrongfully, as well as when such person acquires wrongfully. A person is said to lose wrongfully when such person is wrongfully kept out of any property, as well as when such person is wrongfully deprived of property."

60) Thus, a comprehensive definition of wrongful gain and

wrongful loss, which are required to be established to prove a

dishonest act under Section 24 IPC is given. The word

"wrongful" means prejudicially affecting a party in some legal

right. For either wrongful loss or gain, the property must be

lost to the owner, or the owner must be wrongfully kept out of

it.

61) Similarly the term "fraudulently" is defined in Section

25 IPC and it reads as follows:

"S.25. Fraudulently.- A person is said to do a thing fraudulently if he does that thing with intent to defraud but not otherwise."

62) The literal meaning of the word "defraud" is almost

synonym to 'deception' and 'hoodwink' etc. When the

petitioners have acquired the property lawfully by paying valid

sale consideration to the sellers under registered sale deeds, it

cannot be said that any element of fraud or deception is

involved in the transaction.

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63) Therefore, when the facts of the case are viewed in the

light of the aforesaid definition of "dishonestly" under Section

24 IPC and the wrongful gain and wrongful loss under Section

23 IPC, this Court is at a loss to understand as to what is the

dishonest act that was committed by the petitioners relating to

the said sale transactions and what is the wrongful gain and

wrongful loss that is involved in the transaction and how the

petitioners gained property by unlawful means to which they

are not legally entitled and how the petitioners have deprived

the sellers of the property by unlawful means to cause wrongful

loss to them.

64) In the context, it is very much relevant to note that the

facts of the case show that as per the recitals in the sale deeds

that the sellers have voluntarily offered to sell their lands to the

petitioners to meet their family and legal necessities and the

petitioners have accepted the said offer and purchased the

lands by paying valid sale consideration under registered sale

deeds. Therefore, it is a lawful sale transaction and it cannot be

said that the petitioners had wrongful gain by unlawful means

of property to which they are not legally entitled. Similarly, as

the sellers have sold the lands under registered sale deeds after

receiving valid sale consideration to a tune of lakhs of rupees,

no wrongful loss is also caused to them by unlawful means by

the petitioners. The landed property was acquired lawfully i.e.

by lawful means by the petitioners. So, it cannot be said under

any stretch of reasoning that the petitioners have wrongfully

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acquired the property. Therefore, absolutely no act of

dishonesty is involved in the transaction.

65) However, learned Advocate General invoked the

Explanation appended to Section 415 IPC which says that "a

dishonest concealment of fact is a deception within the meaning

of this section" and thereby contended that the petitioners did

not inform the sellers of the land that the capital is going to

come in the said area where the said lands are located and

suppressing the said fact that they have purchased the lands

and if the petitioners informed the sellers that the capital is

going to come within that area that the sellers might not have

agreed to sell the said lands and consequently, as there is

subsequent increase in the value of the land after location of the

capital is notified by a G.O. on 30.12.2014 that the sellers are

put to monetary loss due to the acts of the petitioners in

concealing the said fact in buying the said land and as such

the facts of the case attract the definition of cheating under

Section 415 IPC and the facts of the case constitute an offence

under Section 420 of IPC. Thus, the learned Advocate General

as usual with the ability of adroit eloquence at his command

made his best effort to convince this Court that in the light of

the Explanation appended to Section 415 IPC, that a case under

Section 420 IPC is constituted in the facts and circumstances of

the case.

66) I am unable to persuade myself to countenance the

said contention raised by the learned Advocate General. In this

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context, in the first place it has to be seen that is it necessary

on the part of the buyer of the land to disclose the reason of

buying the land or the purpose of purchasing the land or any

latent advantage which he may have in purchasing the land

which is within the knowledge of the buyer to the seller at the

time of entering into the said sale transaction. Even if the

petitioners got any prior knowledge that there is a proposal to

locate the capital city in the said area whether they are legally

bound to disclose or inform the said fact to the seller of the land

and whether its nondisclosure amounts to dishonest

concealment of fact as required under Explanation appended to

Section 415 IPC or not. These are the paramount questions

required to be determined in view of the above vital contention

raised by the learned Advocate General.

67) Before adverting to the same, it is apposite to note that

illustration (i) among the illustrations given below Section 415

of IPC clearly explains as to what amounts to concealment of

fact. It reads thus:

" (i): A sells and conveys an estate to B. A, knowing that in conse- quence of such sale he has no right to the property, sells or mortgages the same to Z, without disclosing the fact of the previous sale and conveyance to B, and receives the purchase or mortgage money from Z. A cheats."

68) Therefore, it is only concealment of such information

or non-disclosure relating to right in the land that amounts to

dishonest concealment of material fact and not every

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extraneous information not relating to a right or interest of the

seller in the land.

69) Further, while answering the said question, it is

relevant to note that a transaction relating to sale of land

between two persons is essentially a contract between the buyer

and the seller. There would be an offer to sell the land and

acceptance of the said offer to purchase the land between the

said two persons. It involves payment of valid sale

consideration as per the terms and conditions adumbrated in

their contract to complete the said sale transaction of selling

and buying of the said land. Therefore, it is essentially a civil

transaction covered by the Indian Contract Act. There are

certain rights and liabilities imposed on both the buyer and the

seller under Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act.

70) Learned Advocate General invoking Section 55(5)(a) of

the T.P. Act and placing heavy reliance on it, would contend

that the petitioners being the buyers of the land are bound to

disclose the sellers that there is a proposal to locate the capital

city in that area and that there is likelihood of increase in the

value of the said land in future and as the same is not disclosed

to the seller that it amounts to dishonest concealment of

material fact as contemplated under the Explanation appended

to Section 415 IPC. In order to appreciate the said contention of

the learned Advocate General, it is expedient to extract Section

55(5)(a) of the T.P. Act, which reads thus:

"Section 55(5) the buyer is bound -

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(a) to disclose to the seller any fact as to the nature or extent of the seller's interest in the property of which the buyer is aware, but of which he has reason to believe that the seller is not aware, and which materially increases the value of such interest."

71) A bare reading of the aforesaid provision makes it

manifest that there is only a liability on the buyer to disclose to

the seller any fact regarding the nature or extent of the

seller's interest in the property of which buyer is aware and

which he has reason to believe that the seller is not aware

which may materially increases the value of such interest.

Therefore, the underlying words that are to be noticed in the

aforesaid provision are nature or extent of seller's interest in

the property. Therefore, the crucial question that needs to be

considered in this regard is whether the said expression "nature

or extent of the seller's interest in the property" comprehends

within it the information relating to proposed location of capital

in the said land or not and also information relating to latent

advantage that the buyer may derive in future upon happening

of an event which is certain or uncertain. It is also to be seen

whether the buyer got duty to disclose that there is a possibility

of increase in the value of the land in the future or not.

Certainly, that is not the intendment of the Parliament under

Section 55(5)(a) of the T.P.Act. In the considered view of this

Court it does not cover the disclosure of information relating to

latent advantage in respect of the land as per settled law in this

regard.

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72) The nature of the duty of the buyer to disclose the

facts within his knowledge relating to the interest of the seller in

the property, as contemplated under Section 55(5)(a) of T.P. Act

has been succinctly explained by famous jurist and author

Mulla in the commentaries on Transfer of Property Act in its

Ninth Edition at page No.534 as follows:

"The rule matters only title of the seller in respect of the property. Although the seller's title is ordinarily a matter exclusively within his knowledge yet there may be cases where the buyer has information which the seller lacks. In such a case, he must not make an unfair use of it. He must give the information to the seller. .... An English illustration in this regard is the case of Summers v. Griffiths7 where an old woman sold property at an undervalue believing that she could not make out a good title to it while the purchaser knew that she could. The purchaser was held to have committed a suppressio veri and the sale was set aside as fraudulent."

73) The same case is also cited as an illustration to

explain the nature of the duty of the buyer under Section

55(5)(a) of the Transfer of Property Act in the commentaries on

the Law of Transfer of Property Act authored by Sri G.C.V.

Subbarao, in its Fourth Edition at page No.1197.

74) Therefore, the legal position is now made abundantly

clear that the nature of the duty that is imposed on the buyer

under Section 55(5)(a) of the T.P. Act is only relating to the

interest of the seller in his property which the buyer is aware

7 (1866) 35 Beav 27.

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and the seller is not aware which is required to be disclosed by

the buyer.

75) This duty imposed on the buyer under Section

55(5)(a), the Act also does not embrace within itself any

information pertaining to the latent advantages in respect of the

land which the buyer is aware and the seller is not aware and it

does not cover such situation, in view of the law enunciated in

various cases discussed infra and as per the opinion expressed

by various jurists and authors based on the decided case law on

the point.

76) In the commentaries on the Law of Transfer of

Property Act authored by a renowned jurist Sri G.C.V.

Subbarao, in its Fourth Edition at page No.1197, under the

caption "Buyer's liabilities before completion of sale" while

dealing with the requirement of disclosure of facts materially

increasing the value under Section 55(5)(a) of the T.P. Act, it is

stated as under:

"Latent advantages need not be disclosed: A buyer is not bound to disclose latent advantages or communicate to his vendor facts which may influence his own judgment in purchasing the property. In Fox vs. Mackreth ((1788) 2 Bro. C.C. 400 = 29 E. R. 224), A knowing that there was a coal-mine in the estate of B of which he knew B was ignorant entered into a contract to purchase the estate of B for the price of the estate, without considering the mine. It was held that the contract could not be set aside on the ground of fraud since B, as the buyer, was not obliged from the nature of the contract, to apprise the seller of the existence of the mine."

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77) This judgment in Fox vs. Mackreth8 provides a

complete answer to the vital contention raised by the learned

Advocate General that the petitioners as buyers are bound to

disclose to the sellers that the capital city is going to come in

the said area while purchasing the said land and non-disclosure

of the same amounts to dishonest concealment of fact as

contemplated under Explanation appended to Section 415 IPC.

78) In the case of Fox vs. Mackreth8, the relevant

observations made in the said judgment are very apt to consider

to drive home the point involved in this case. It is observed as

follows:

"The doubt I have is, whether this case affords facts from which principles arise to set aside this transaction, which will not, by necessary application, draw other cases into hazard. And without insisting upon technical morality, I don't agree with those who say that where an advantage has been taken in a contract, which a man of delicacy would not have taken, it must be set aside; suppose for instance, that A, knowing there to be a mine in the estate of B, of which he knew B, was ignorant, should enter into a contract to purchase the estate of B, for the price of the estate, without considering the mine, could the court set it aside? Why not, since B, was not apprised of the mine, and A. was? Because B, as the buyer, was not obliged, from the nature of the contract, to make the discovery. It is therefore essentially necessary, in order to set aside the transaction, not only that a great advantage should be taken, but it must arise from some obligation in the party to make the discovery. The Court will not correct a contract, merely because a man of nice honour would not have entered into it; it must fall within some definition of

8 (1788) 2 Bro. C.C. 400 = 29 E. R. 224

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fraud; the rule must be drawn so as not to affect the general transactions of mankind."

79) As per the above illustration given in the judgment

that even if a buyer is aware of the fact that there is coal mine

in the land of the seller, and he buys the land without apprising

the seller of the said fact, for a valid price, it does not amount to

fraud as buyer has no legal obligation to inform the said fact to

the seller. When that be the clear legal position, the present

case absolutely stands on a better footing when compared to the

above illustration, where the petitioners also have no legal

obligation to inform the sellers that there is a proposal to locate

the capital city in their area.

80) Even in the commentaries on the Transfer of Property

Act authored by another eminent jurist Mulla in the Ninth

Edition at page No.534 while dealing with the buyer's duty of

disclosure under Section 55(5)(a) of the T.P.Act stated that there

is no doubt that the buyer is under no duty to disclose latent

advantages and this is also the law in England as stated in the

judgment of Lord Selborne in Coaks v. Boswell9.

81) In Coaks v. Boswell9 it is held as hereunder:

"Every such purchaser is bound to observe good faith in all that he says or does, with a view to the contract, and (of course) to abstain from all deceit, whether by suppression of truth or by suggestion of falsehood. But inasmuch as a purchaser is (generally speaking) under no antecedent obligation to communicate to his vendor

9 (1886) 11 App Cas 232, 235

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facts which may influence his own conduct or judgment when bargaining for his own interest, no deceit can be implied from his mere silence as to such facts, unless he undertakes or professes to communicate them. This, however, he may be held to do, if he makes some other communication which, without the addition of those facts, would be necessarily or naturally and probably misleading."

82) While expressing the above opinion, Jurist Mulla also

referred the judgment in Fox v. Mackrett8, which is already

cited supra, in which it is held that the buyer need not disclose

the existence of a coal mine of which the seller is unaware.

83) The Supreme Court of United States in the case of

Laidlaw et al. v. Organ10, speaking through the Hon'ble Chief

Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court on the

similar issue in the said case as follows:

"The question in this case is, whether the intelligence of extrinsic circumstances, which might influence the price of the commodity, and which was exclusively within the knowledge of the vendee, ought to have been communicated by him to the vendor? The court is of opinion that he was not bound to communicate it. It would be difficult to circumscribe the contrary doctrine within proper limits, where the means of intelligence are equally accessible to both parties."

84) Therefore, considering the analogy in the aforesaid

judgments of English cases and American case, the legal

position is manifestly clear that the information which is in the

knowledge of the petitioners relating to proposal of location of

10 1817 SCC OnLine US SC 28 = 15 US 178 (1817) = 4 L.Ed.214 = 2 Wheat. 178

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the capital in the area where the lands in question are

purchased, even if it is true, need not be informed to the sellers

and they have no legal obligation to disclose or inform the same

to the sellers of the land at the time of purchasing the said

lands. So, it does not amount to dishonest concealment of fact

as contemplated under Explanation appended to Section 415

IPC. In this context, as already noticed, it is also significant to

note that it is not a mere concealment of fact that is made an

act of deception under the said Explanation and it is only a

dishonest concealment of fact that is made an act of deception

under the said Explanation. When there is no legal obligation

to disclose the fact, as discussed supra, non-disclosure of the

same does not amount to dishonest concealment of the fact. In

the case of Karachi Municipality v. Bhojraj11 the Court of

Judicial Commissioner, Sind dealt with this Explanation to

Section 415 IPC. In the said case, the accused was charged for

heating the Karachi Municipality. He executed a sale deed in

favour of Karachi Municipality in respect of certain land, and

received the price. It was subsequently discovered that the land

was mortgaged by the accused and the other members of his

family were interested in it. Alleging that the fact that the land

was mortgaged was suppressed at the time of execution of sale

deed, he was sought to be prosecuted and in the said process

Explanation appended to Section 415 IPC as has been done in

11 1915 SCC OnLine Sind JC 6 = AIR 1915 Sind 21

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this case, was invoked. It was argued that the accused

dishonestly concealed the fact of mortgage and that there was a

member of the joint family. The Court rejecting the said

contention held as follows:

"No concealment of fact is dishonest unless there is a legal obligation to disclose. A defect in title has been held to be a material defect in the property under Section 55(1)(a) of the T.P. Act as per the ratio laid down in Haji Essa v. Dayabai12. There is no duty on the seller to disclose these unless the buyer could not with ordinary care discover them. The Municipality could easily have ascertained the existence of a prior mortgage and knew that the seller was a Hindu.

Further held as follows:

"The cheating must refer to some false representation which induced the Municipality to agree to buy the land."

Also held that the law on this point has been correctly stated in

the case of Emperor v. Bishen Das13.

85) In Emperor v. Bishen Das13, it is held while dealing

with Section 415 IPC that sale of immovable property without

mentioning encumbrances does not amount to cheating and the

accused cannot be convicted on the ground that he omits to

mention that there is an encumbrance on the property at the

time of its sale. It is held that unless it is shown that he was

asked by the vendee whether the property was encumbered and

he said that it was not, or that he sold the property on the

12 (1896) 20 Bom 522 13 (1905) ILR 27 All 561

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representation that it was unencumbered, he cannot be held

responsible for offence of cheating.

86) In this context, it is apt to refer relevant observations

made by the Court in the said judgment which will have direct

impact on the present case. It is held as follows:

"It is true that the explanation appended to Section 415 lays down that a dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of the section. If we turn to the definition of the word "dishonestly" to be found in Section 24 of the Code we find that a dishonest act is an act done with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another. Section 23 defines "wrongful gain" as a gain by unlawful means of property to which the person gaining is not legally entitled. Similarly, "wrongful loss" is defined as the loss by unlawful means of property to which the person losing it is legally entitled. The unlawfulness of the means used is a necessary element in criminal dishonesty. Now in the present instance I cannot find anything unlawful in the means used by the applicant. There was no obligation cast on him by law (vide Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act) to disclose to his vendee the existence of the mortgage, in as much as the mortgage had been effected by a registered instrument and the vendee could with ordinary care have ascertained its existence. He might also have ascertained its existence by questioning his vendor. Had he done so, and had the vendor falsely represented the property to be unencumbered, the case would have been very different, as there would have been an actual misrepresentation by the vendor sufficient to constitute the offence of cheating."

Further held as follows:

"I have no hesitation in holding that the dishonest concealment of facts referred to in the explanation to Section 415 is a dishonest concealment of facts which it is

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the duty of the person concealing them to disclose to the person with whom he is dealing."

Finally, it is held as follows:

"The same is the law in England. In the case of Horsfall v. Thomas (1862) 31 L.J., 322 Bramwell, B, says:- "The fraud must be committed by the affirmance of something not true within the knowledge of the affirmer or by the suppression of something which is true and which it was his duty to make known. Where there is a concealment of a fact I am of opinion that there is neither fraud nor dishonesty within the meaning of the Criminal Law unless there is a duty imposed by law as between the accused and the person with whom he is dealing to make that fact known. For the above reasons, I quash the conviction of the applicant Bishan Das under Section 417 of the Indian Penal Code."

87) Thus, from the conspectus of the law as expounded

and enunciated in all the above Indian cases and U.K. and U.S.

cases with reference to the Explanation appended to Section

415 IPC and the legal obligations and liabilities under Section

55 of the T.P. Act, the legal position is manifestly clear as

cloudless sky that when there is absolutely no legal obligation

on the part of the buyer to disclose the said fact to the seller at

the time of sale of the land that it does not amount to dishonest

concealment of fact as contemplated under Explanation

appended to Section 415 IPC.

88) The mere fact that there is a possibility of increase in

the value of the land subsequent to the sale also cannot afford a

ground to prosecute the buyer for the offence of cheating.

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89) In the context, the contention of the learned Senior

Counsel Sri Siddhardh Luthra, appearing for one of the

petitioners, merits consideration. He would contend that

Section 55(6) of the T.P. Act envisages that the buyer is entitled

to the benefit of any improvement in, or increase in value of, the

property, and to the rents and profits thereof, where the

ownership of the property was passed to him. Therefore, when

the petitioners lawfully became owners of the said lands, on

account of transfer of ownership of the said lands to them, the

petitioners as buyers are legally entitled to the subsequent

benefit of any improvement or increase in the value of the

property. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case,

the alleged omission to disclose the fact cannot said to be a

fraudulent one as stated in the last part of Section 55 of the T.P.

Act also which was invoked by the learned Advocate General.

90) Further, illustration (d) to Section 17 of the Indian

Contract Act which defines 'fraud' under the said Act can also

profitably be used to drive home the point involved in this case

and it reads thus:

"(d) A and B, being traders, enter upon a contract. A has private information of a change in prices which would affect B's willingness to proceed with the contract. A is not bound to inform B."

91) Now, the Explanation appended to Section 17 of the

Indian Contract Act is also relevant in the context to drive home

the point, and it reads thus:

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"Explanation.--Mere silence as to facts likely to affect the willingness of a person to enter into a contract is not fraud, unless the circumstance of the case are such that, regard being had to them, it is the duty of the person keeping silence to speak, or unless his silence, is, in itself, equivalent to speech."

92) Thus, in the light of the above legal position, viewed

from any angle, even if the petitioners really got any information

regarding location of the capital in the said area where the lands

are purchased, the mere non-disclosure of the said information

to the sellers at the time of purchasing the said lands cannot be

construed as a dishonest concealment of fact for the purpose of

fastening criminal liability to the petitioners for the offence

under Section 420 IPC.

93) Another significant fact needs to be noticed is that the

sale transactions relate to sale of land that took place long back

about six years ago in the year 2014. The owners of the land,

who sold their lands, had absolutely no demur whatsoever from

any quarter for all this length of time in respect of sale of the

said lands. They never expressed any grievance at any point of

time earlier that they have been cheated by the petitioners by

suppressing the fact that the capital city is going to be located

in their area at the time of selling the lands. They did never

raise their finger in this regard for all this length of time even

after notifying the location of the capital city. Now, abruptly

when some stranger lodged a report with the police who had

nothing to do with the sale transactions, the sellers allegedly

came up with the above said version before the police that they

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have been cheated by the petitioners by not informing them that

the capital is going to come in their area at the time of selling

their lands. So, in the said circumstances, the credibility and

authenticity of the said belated version now introduced is really

at stake. Therefore, the prosecution version now introduced by

way of the said statements of the sellers would certainly be

incredulous. If really they got grievance in this regard, they

would have initiated both civil and criminal action in this regard

long back when location of the capital city was notified on

30.12.2014 itself about six years back. They did not initiate

any civil action to declare the sale as void on the ground of

fraud or deception or on the ground of suppression of material

fact. They also did not launch any criminal prosecution based

on the above grounds. Therefore, the above belated version now

introduced by the prosecution by way of alleged statements of

sellers is far from truth. In view of the said reasons, it throws

any amount of doubt on the justification of the de facto

complainant who is a stranger to the said sale transactions in

lodging the present report. Therefore, in the said

circumstances, the contention of the petitioners that there are

vested interests behind the de facto complainant who

engineered the preparation of the said report lodged by him with

a concocted story to illegally prosecute the petitioners cannot be

completely ruled out.

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94) In this context, it is relevant to consider the judgment

of the Apex Court in Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar14

wherein it is held at para No.7 as follows:

"7. This Court has time and again drawn attention to the growing tendency of complainants attempting to give the cloak of a criminal offence to matters which are essentially and purely civil in nature, obviously either to apply pressure on the accused, or out of enmity towards the accused, or to subject the accused to harassment. Criminal courts should ensure that proceedings before it are not used for settling scores or to pressurise parties to settle civil disputes. ..."

It is also held at para No.15 as follows:

"15........ If a person sells a property knowing that it does not belong to him, and thereby defrauds the person who purchased the property, the person defrauded, that is the purchaser, may complain that the vendor committed the fraudulent act of cheating. But a third party who is not the purchaser under the deed may not be able to make such complaint. ..........."

RECITALS OF THE SALE DEED BELIE THE VERSION OF THE SELLERS:

95) While the facts of the prosecution case as projected

and the submissions made on behalf of the prosecution as

discussed supra do not find favour to attract any offence under

Section 420 IPC, in the light of the above discussion, even the

factual aspects emanating from the record also do not support

the case of the prosecution. A meticulous perusal of the

recitals of the registered sale deeds executed by the sellers in

14 (2009) 8 SCC 751

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favour of the petitioners selling their lands to them clearly

proves that it is not the petitioners as buyers who have

approached the sellers to sell the property to them. The recitals

of the sale deed show that it is the sellers who offered to sell

their lands to the petitioners to meet their legal necessities.

96) The contents of the sale deeds show that as lands are

not found to be profitable to the vendors and as they are in dire

necessity of money either for the purpose of meeting their family

expenses or to discharge their debts that the owners have

decided to sell away their lands and thereby offered to sell the

lands to the petitioners and the petitioners have accepted their

offer and sale consideration to a tune of lakhs of rupees was

arrived at by consensus between both of them and on receipt of

the said sale consideration that the sale deeds have been

registered by the owners of the lands in favour of the

petitioners. Therefore, it is now evident that the petitioners did

not approach the owners of the land with a request to sell the

lands to them so as to believe or say that the petitioners have

induced them to sell the lands by suppressing the fact that the

capital is going to be located in the said area. Therefore, the

recitals in the sale deeds completely belies the version of the

prosecution that the petitioners induced the sellers to sell the

land by offering high value of sale price and by suppressing the

fact that the capital is going to be located in that area.

Recitals of the sale deeds clinchingly establishes that the offer

to sell the lands was made by the owners/sellers of the land

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and the petitioners accepted the said offer and purchased the

said lands. When that be the case, the question of informing

the owners of the lands by the petitioners that the capital is

going to be located in the said area completely loses its

significance and the same does not arise at all. So, the evidence

in the form of recitals of the sale deeds completely negate the

contention of the prosecution. There is absolutely no dispute

regarding the fact that the sale deeds contain the said recitals

that the owners have offered to sell the lands to the petitioners

to meet their legal necessities. In fact, in the last column of the

table appended to the written submissions made by the learned

Public Prosecutor, the prosecution itself elicited the said recitals

in the sale deeds showing that for the purpose of meeting the

family necessities of the owners of the said lands, they have sold

the same to the petitioners, both in Telugu and in the translated

version in English. So, these recitals absolutely clinch the

issue and prove that there is no truth in the version of the

prosecution that the petitioners approached the owners of the

lands with a request to sell the lands by suppressing the said

material fact.

97) The submission of the learned Advocate General that

recitals in all the sale deeds are stereo type recitals and they are

usual recitals which find mention in the sale deeds and as such

they cannot be considered to disbelieve the present version of

the sellers is devoid of any merit and the same cannot be

countenanced. Accepting the said contention amounts to

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distortion of true facts borne out by record and would also

result into travesty of truth. It would also be taking an

erroneous view contrary to express recitals of the sale deeds

which is not permissible under law.

98) No doubt, during the course of investigation it is

shown that some of the owners of the lands, who sold their

lands to the petitioners i.e. L.Ws.3 to 11 and 13 to 16 stated in

their statements before the police given under Section 161

Cr.P.C. that one Srinivas, who is the broker/mediator,

approached him on behalf of the petitioners to sell the lands

and when they initially rejected his request to sell the lands,

that subsequently, he convinced them by offering high sale

price and that the owners have sold their lands after accepting

the said sale price and that at that time the owners do not know

that the capital is going to be located in the said area and

subsequently they came to know that the Government notified

their area as the capital region and that the petitioners without

disclosing the said fact to them have purchased their lands and

on account of increase in the value of the lands, thereafter, that

they are put to loss and they are and they have been

accordingly cheated. The recitals of the sale deeds completely

belie the said version given by L.Ws.3 to 11 and 13 to 16 in

their 161 Cr.P.C. statements. As already discussed supra, their

own unequivocal declaration made in the sale deeds show that

they voluntarily offered to sell their lands to the petitioners to

meet their legal necessities and family necessities. Therefore,

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they are now estopped from contending contrary to their own

declaration made in the form of recitals in the registered sale

deeds which are admittedly signed by them before the

competent registering authority. So, there cannot be any truth

in the subsequent version given by them before the police that

some real estate broker approached them on behalf of the

petitioners and requested them to sell their lands and that there

is suppression of material fact in the said process.

INFORMATION RELATING TO LOCATION OF CAPITAL IS VERY MUCH IN PUBLIC DOMAIN:-

99) Be that as it may, even the version of the prosecution

that the proposal of the Government to locate capital city in the

area between the Krishna District and the Guntur District by

the side of the Krishna river and adjacent to the highway is not

known to the sellers of the land and the petitioners

clandestinely obtained the said information from the top

officials and the political leaders in the then government

unauthorisedly and thereby purchased the lands on the basis of

the said information without disclosing the said fact to the

owners of the land is far from truth. The material placed before

this Court by the petitioners in the form of paper publications

completely belies the said version. It is noticed supra that the

appointed day for formation of the residuary State of Andhra

Pradesh under the A.P. Reorganisation Act, 2014, is

02.06.2014. The new Government for the said State was

formed after General Assembly Elections on 09.06.2014. The

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Chief Minister sworn in on 09.06.2014. These facts are

incontrovertible facts. Immediately after the swearing-in-

ceremony, the then Chief Minister declared publicly that the

capital city is going to come within the Krishna District and the

Guntur District by the side of the Krishna river. This news has

been widely published in all the widely circulated Telugu and

English newspapers. On 10.06.2014 it was published in

English newspaper with the headlines "AP capital near Guntur,

Naidu says he wants capital between Guntur and Vijayawada".

The news reads as under:

"It is official. The new capital of Andhra Pradesh will come up between Vijayawada and Guntur. Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister N. Chandrababu Naidu announced this on Monday (i.e. on 09.06.2014).

Speaking to the media at his residence, Mr.Naidu said that if the capital comes up between Vijayawada and Guntur it will develop like Hyderabad city."

100) In Andhra Jyothi, Telugu daily newspaper, it was

published on 10.06.2014 that the new capital will be between

Vijayawada and Guntur as it is geographically in centre. It is

stated in the news that it was clarified by the Chief Minister of

newly formed Andhra Pradesh Nara Chandrababu Naidu that

the new capital will be between Vijayawada and Guntur as they

are geographically centrally located in Seemandhra. So,

inclined to form capital at that place.

101) In Eenadu, Telugu daily newspaper, which is another

widely circulated local news paper, it was published on

02.07.2014 that the Andhra Pradesh Government is

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contemplating to establish the new capital for the State would

be established by the side of Krishna river, making Amaravati

as main centre and that the Government is also contemplating

to construct big flyover bridges connecting all the areas in the

capital region. It has been stated in the said news that the

capital is to be developed on both sides of river Krishna to be

linked with heavy bridges and the State Government is working

out on the collection of details of Government lands in the said

area. In Times of India, English newspaper, also it was

published on 02.07.20214 with the headline "AP capital in

Amaravati? "Low land prices swing it in favour of ancient

Satavahana Town". The news published in the said newspaper

reads as follows:

"The new capital city of Andhra Pradesh will be built around the ancient town of Amaravti."

102) Again on 23.07.2014 a news was published in

Sakshi, Telugu daily newspaper, which is another widely

circulated newspaper in the State, with the caption "Capital will

be in between Krishna and Guntur and it is the suitable place

for building capital city said by Chairman of Advisory

Committee Narayana. It has been published in the said news

that the Advisory Committee Chairman and the Minister for

Municipal Administration Dr.P.Narayana, informed that they

met Sri Sivaramakrishnan in Delhi and apprised him that the

area between Krishna and Guntur Districts would be suitable

for building new capital city in the State as it would be in equal

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distance to North Coastal Districts and Rayalaseema Districts

apart from having water sources, airport, rail and road facilities

etc. The photograph showing the Advisory Committee

Chairman and Kambhampati Rammohan Rao talking to Sri

Sivaramakrishnan was also published.

103) Again in Eenadu, Telugu daily newspaper, a news

was published on 24.09.2014 stating that the capital city would

be on ring road and it may be anywhere throughout the length

of 184 K.Ms as the farmers are now coming forward and that

30,000 acres are necessary and the aerial photograph of

Putrajaya Nagara was also published in the newspaper. On

05.09.2014 it was published in Economic Times, which is a

English daily newspaper, with the caption "Andhra Pradesh's

new capital will be in Vijayawada region announces CM

N.Chandrababu Naidu". The news reads that putting an end to

months of speculation over the issue even as some ambiguity

remained on the exact location, Chief Minister N. Chandrababu

Naidu announced in the State Assembly on Thursday that the

new capital of Andhra Pradesh will be located in Vijaywada

region. On 26.10.2014 it was published in Andhra Jyothi,

Telugu daily newspaper, that the capital city will be located

within the purview of Tulluru Mandal and 14 villages in the said

Mandal are identified and in the first spell 30,000 acres of land

is going to be acquired from the farmers under Land Pooling

Scheme. On 30.10.2014 The Economic Times published the

news that the Andhra Pradesh will have a "riverfront" capital on

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the south side of river Krishna as the State Government ended

months of suspense and speculation today by announcing that

17 villages in the existing Guntur District would be developed

as new capital city. It is also stated that it is for the first time

that the Telugu Desam Party lead government had come out

with a clear location of the new capital as it had so far been

saying it would come within Vijayawada region. Most

importantly it is to be noted that the names of the proposed

villages that would form part of the new capital area are

published in the above news paper stating that Neerukonda,

Kurugallu and Nidamarru in Mangalagiri Mandal; Borupalem,

Tulluru, Nelapadu, Nekkallu, Sakhamuru, Mandadam,

Malkapuram, Velagapudi, Mudalingayapalem,

Uddandarayapalem, Lingayapalem, Rayapudi, Apparajupalem

and Dondapadu in Tulluru Mandal would form part of capital

area.

104) In Deccan Chronicle, English daily newspaper, it was

published on 31.10.2014, stating that in tune with the dream of

Chief Minister N. Chandrababu Naidu of building a "riverfront

capital", the Cabinet sub-committee, on land pooling, met here

on Thursday, identified 17 villages - 14 in Tulluru Mandal and

three in Mangalagiri of Guntur District and most of the villages

that will be formed part of the A.P. capital on the banks of the

river Krishna. Learned counsel for the petitioners submit that

same news has been widely announced in T.V. channels also.

But, they did not produce evidence to that effect.

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105) The prosecution did not deny publication of the

above news relating to the proposal of the Government to locate

the capital city by the side of Krishna river between the Krishna

District and the Guntur District in newspapers. So, publication

of the aforesaid news is again an incontrovertible fact.

Therefore, the above news which was widely published both in

Telugu and English widely circulated newspapers in the State of

Andhra Pradesh, clearly establishes that the information

relating to the proposal of the Government to locate the capital

in the said area is very much in the public domain right from

June, 2014 when the present State of Andhra Pradesh was

formed with effect from 02.06.2014. The above news also bears

ample testimony of the fact that there is wide spread

speculation and anticipation among the people in the public

circle that the capital city is going to be located between the

Krishna and Guntur Districts by the side of Krishna river and

by the side of the highway. When that be the fact, it cannot be

said that the said information is only within the exclusive

knowledge of the concerned top government officials and

political leaders and it is a non-public information as has been

contended by the learned Advocate General. In fact, the said

information relating to location of the capital area at a

particular region is very much in the public domain as it was

announced by no less than a responsible authority like the very

Chief Minister of the State immediately on the date of his

swearing-in-ceremony itself i.e. on 09.06.2014 which was

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published in the newspapers on 10.06.2014. Therefore, it

cannot be said that the petitioners have secured the information

unauthorisedly from the top government officials and political

leaders regarding the area where the capital would be located. It

cannot also be said that the sellers are not aware of the said

fact or information. In fact, it is an information known to the

whole world on account of wide publicity given to the said news

in the newspapers. So, not only the petitioners, even the

owners of the land are aware of the said information relating to

the proposal of the government to locate the capital city in the

said area. Therefore, the sellers of the land cannot now plead

ignorance of the said information that the capital is going to be

located in their area and contend that the said information was

suppressed and not disclosed to them at the time of selling the

lands and as such they sustained loss. At the cost of repetition

it is to be held that the said information is very much in the

public domain and the whole world knows about the same. The

evidence in the form of the aforesaid wide publication in the

newspapers bespeaks to that effect.

106) As per the submissions made by the learned

Advocate General, the Cabinet took decision regarding location

of capital on 01.09.2014 and it was announced in the

Legislative Assembly on 02.09.2014. Therefore, on account of

announcement of the said information relating to the area

where the capital would be located in the Legislative Assembly,

the said news is again in public domain.

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107) So, when the said information is very much in the

public domain and when even the sellers are aware of the same,

it cannot be legitimately contended that there has been

concealment of material fact dishonestly as required under

Explanation appended to Section 415 IPC to attribute any

criminal liability of deception to the petitioners. In fact the plan

submitted by the Investigating Officer along with the C.D. file

show that not only the petitioners, but there are several other

people who have purchased lands in and around the proposed

capital region. Probably on account of the information that is

available to them in the public domain, which is published in

newspapers, all of them have purchased lands in the said area.

As the right to acquire and own property is a constitutional

right, legal right and human right, none can find fault with the

said buyers in purchasing the lands as any citizen is entitled to

acquire lands in exercise of their constitutional and legal right.

So, no criminal liability can be fastened to the petitioners or any

persons who purchased lands in the proposed capital region to

prosecute them for any offence under criminal law. Therefore,

no offence under Section 420 IPC is made out or constituted

from the facts of the case.

APPLICABILITY OF SECTIONS 406 AND 409 OF IPC TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE:

108) Section 406 IPC deals with punishment for criminal

breach of trust. It says that whoever commits criminal breach

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of trust shall be punished with imprisonment of either

description for a term which may extend to three years, or with

fine, or with both. Criminal breach of trust is defined in

Section 405 IPC.

109) A reading of Section 405 IPC makes it manifest that

when a person is entrusted with the property, or with any

dominion over property, and if he dishonestly misappropriates

or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or

disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law

prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, is

said to have committed the offence of criminal breach of trust.

So, there must be an allegation of entrustment of property to

the petitioners and consequent breach of trust. There is

absolutely no allegation that any property was entrusted to the

petitioners by any one or the petitioners had any domain over

the property that was entrusted to them and that they have

dishonestly misappropriated or converted the same to their own

use or dishonestly disposed of the said property in violation of

any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is

to be discharged. Therefore, on the face of the allegations and

the contents of the F.I.R., absolutely no offence whatsoever is

made out or constituted against the petitioners for the said

offence punishable under Section 406 IPC relating to criminal

breach of trust. Explanations 1 and 2 appended to Section 405

IPC make the position very clear that only when there is an

entrustment of some property to the accused and when they

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dishonestly misappropriates the said property or converts to

their own use or disposes of any such property, then only the

said section attracts and not otherwise. The illustrations (a) to

(f) given under Section 405 IPC also make the said position very

clear. The word 'entrusted' used in the section is very

important to note and unless there is entrustment, there can be

no offence of criminal breach of trust under Section 406 IPC.

So, Section 406 IPC is wholly inapplicable to the facts of the

case.

110) As regards the offence under Section 409 IPC, it

relates to criminal breach of trust by public servant, banker,

merchant or agent. It reads thus:

"409. Criminal breach of trust by public servant, or by banker, merchant or agent.--Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property in his capacity of a public servant or in the way of his business as a banker, merchant, factor, broker, attorney or agent, commits criminal breach of trust in respect of that property, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."

111) So, the predominant requirement which is essential

to attract the offence under Section 409 IPC is that the accused

must be a public servant or a banker or a merchant or an agent

and the property is to be entrusted to him in any one of the

above capacities and while holding domain over the said

property in his capacity as a public servant, banker, merchant

or agent, broker or attorney, if he commits any criminal breach

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of trust in respect of the said property, it is said that an offence

under Section 409 IPC is committed. Therefore, the prosecution

has to necessarily establish that the accused is a public servant

or a banker or an agent and that the property was entrusted to

him in the said capacity and he has committed any criminal

breach of trust in respect of the said property. Admittedly, it is

not at all the case of the prosecution that the petitioners are

public servants or bankers or merchants or agents and that any

property was entrusted to them in any such capacity and that

they have committed any criminal breach of trust in respect of

the said property. Therefore, the necessary ingredients

contemplated under law which are required to establish the said

offence under Section 409 IPC are totally lacking in this case.

Therefore, no offence whatsoever is constituted against the

petitioners from the contents of the F.I.R. or from the material

collected during the course of investigation against the

petitioners under Section 409 IPC. Ergo, Section 409 of IPC is

also wholly inapplicable to the facts of the case.

OFFENCE UNDER SECTION 120-B OF IPC:

112) There remains Section 120-B of IPC to be dealt with.

While Section 120-B of IPC deals with punishment for criminal

conspiracy, Section 120-A of IPC defines what is criminal

conspiracy. It reads thus:

"120A. Definition of criminal conspiracy.--When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done,-- (1) an illegal act, or

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(2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy:

Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof.

Explanation.--It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreement, or is merely incidental to that object."

113) A plain reading of the aforesaid Section shows that

there must be an agreement between two or more persons to do

or cause to be done (1) an illegal act, or (2) an act which is not

illegal by illegal means. Therefore, an agreement between two

persons to do an illegal act or to do an act which is not illegal by

illegal means is designated as an offence of criminal conspiracy.

It is significant to note that the proviso to Section 120-A of IPC

makes it clear that no agreement except an agreement to

commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless

some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties

to such agreement in pursuance thereof. Therefore, the essence

of criminal conspiracy is an agreement to do an illegal act. So,

the emphasis is on the expression "illegal act" used in the

Section. Now, it is relevant to note that what is an illegal act is

defined under Section 43 of IPC. For better appreciation, it is

extracted hereunder and it reads thus:

"43. "Illegal", "Legally bound to do".--The word "illegal" is applicable to everything which is an offence or which is prohibited by law, or which furnishes ground for a civil action; and a person is said to be "legally bound to do" whatever it is illegal in him to omit."

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114) A reading of the aforesaid definition of illegal act

makes it manifest that it is applicable to a fact or situation

which is an offence or which is prohibited by law. As per the

findings recorded by this Court supra, after undertaking

elaborate discussion relating to the question of fact and

question of law based on the facts and circumstances of the

case, it is held in no uncertain terms that no offence whatsoever

was committed by the petitioners under Sections 420, 406, and

409 IPC and that the facts of the case do not constitute any

offences under Sections 420, 406 and 409 of IPC. Therefore, as

a corollary it is to be held that there was no attempt made by

the petitioners in agreement with any other person to do an

illegal act or an offence or even to do an act which is not illegal

by illegal means. Since, the petitioners have purchased the

lands in question which are willingly sold by the owners with

their own volition for a valid consideration under registered sale

deeds and lawfully became owners of the same, no act

whatsoever which is not illegal, but by illegal means was

committed. By adopting a legal process, the petitioners have

purchased the lands and legally became owners of the same.

115) The circumstances in a case, when taken together,

on their face value, should indicate meeting of minds between

the conspirators for the intended object of committing an illegal

act or committing an act which is not illegal, by illegal means.

A few bits here and a few bits there on which prosecution relies

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cannot be held to be adequate for connecting the accused with

the commission of the crime of criminal conspiracy. It has to be

shown that all means adopted and illegal acts done were in

furtherance of the object of conspiracy hatched. In Esher

Singh v. State of Andhra Pradesh15 at the end of para No.38

with reference to the earlier judgment in V.C.Shukla v. State

(Delhi Admn.)16 held as above. The same view was again

expressed following the judgment in Esher Singh's15 case,

stating that a few bits here and a few bits there on which the

prosecution relies cannot be held to be adequate for connecting

the accused with the commission of the crime of criminal

conspiracy, at the end of para.56 in John Pandian v. State17.

116) The above view taken by the Apex Court squarely

applies to the present facts of the case. In the present case, the

facts of the case show that the prosecution is making an

attempt to pick up sporadic instances here and there

hypothetically and knit the same to concoct a story of

conspiracy to somehow bring the same within the scope of

Section 120-B of IPC. Therefore, no offence under Section 120-

B of IPC is also made out and constituted from the facts of the

case.

117) The learned Advocate General would contend that

some of the employees working in the concerned Section in the

Secretariat, whose duty is to prepare draft G.Os. gave

15 (2004)11 SCC 585 16 (1980) 2 SCC 665 17 2010 (8) Supreme 389

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statements under Section 161 and Section 164 Cr.P.C. before

the investigating officer and the learned Magistrate stating that

at the time of drafting the G.O.Ms.No.252 and 254 dated

30.12.2014 notifying the capital region area, that the

established procedure is not followed and that there are

irregularities committed in drafting the said G.Os. as the names

of the villages falling in the capital region are not disclosed in

the draft G.O. and as such, it indicates that there has been a

conspiracy in bringing out the said G.O. relating to the location

of the capital area and the villages covered by the said capital

area. Therefore, he would contend that the matter requires

investigation to find out the conspiracy angle in this regard.

The said contention is also devoid of any merit. If at all any

business rules are contravened in drafting the said G.Os. or

preparing the draft G.Os. in this regard and even if there are

any illegalities and irregularities in drafting the said G.Os., the

petitioners, who are totally strangers to the said Government

Department have nothing to do with the said drafting of G.Os.

There is also nothing incriminating against these petitioners in

the said 164 Cr.P.C. statement and other statements under

Section 161 Cr.P.C. given by the employees of the Secretariat.

So, these statements, even if true, do not establish commission

of any offence punishable under Sections 420, 406, 409 and

120-B of IPC against the petitioners herein.

118) Thus, after considering entire gamut of the

prosecution case and all the allegations and factual aspects

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emanating from the record, as projected by the prosecution,

meticulously and minutely in legal parlance, even stretching the

reasoning to the extent of straining it, the facts of the case

absolutely do not admit commission of any offence whatsoever

much less the offence punishable under Sections 420, 406, 409

and 120-B of IPC, which are registered against the petitioners.

No criminal liability can be attributed to them on the simple

ground which is untenable that they did not inform the sellers

that the capital city is going to come in their area and as such,

the sellers have sustained monetary loss in view of subsequent

increase in the value of the lands. It is really beyond the

comprehension of this Court as to how the said private sale

transactions can be criminalised on the said flimsy grounds and

criminal liability can be attributed to the buyers of the lands to

prosecute them under criminal law. In fact it would be beyond

the comprehension of any reasonable and prudent man as to

how the buyers of the land can be prosecuted under criminal

law in the given facts and circumstances of the case.

119) In fact, criminalizing any such private sale

transactions and prosecuting the buyers of the land in the given

facts and circumstances of the case on the premise of

concealment of a fact even if true and on the ground that there

has been loss to the sellers of the land in view of the subsequent

increase in the value of the lands would create a very dangerous

trend in the field of criminal law and it would open the flood

gates of the criminal prosecution, as every vendor/seller of

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lands, who sold away their lands may subsequently make an

attempt to prosecute every buyer of the land whenever there is

phenomenal increase in the value of the lands subsequently.

Law does not permit such criminal prosecution of the buyer of

the land on the said ground. Undoubtedly, it is a sort of

speculative criminal prosecution that was launched by the State

against the petitioners in this case, which is not permissible

under law. Therefore, it is undoubtedly an attempt by the

prosecution to fire a blind shot in a dark room to prosecute

these petitioners in the above facts and circumstances of the

case.

120) In view of the above factual findings based on the

prevailing legal position recorded by this Court, the entire

prosecution case bristles with several fatal legal infirmities and

the same strikes at the very bottom of the substratum of the

prosecution case and it cuts the case of the prosecution at its

roots. Therefore, as the facts of the case do not constitute any

offences punishable under Sections 420, 406, 409 and 120-B of

IPC, the prosecution against the petitioners amounts to sheer

abuse of process of law. The contents of the F.I.R. also do not

disclose commission of any cognizable offences. So, the F.I.R.

registered against them is liable to be quashed.

121) The grounds on which the F.I.R. is liable to be

quashed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India are enumerated by the Supreme Court in

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the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal18. At para No.102 of

the judgment, the Apex Court held as follows:

"In the backdrop of the interpretation of various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

18 1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335 = 1992 CriLJ 527

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(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

122) Thus, as per the law enunciated by the Apex Court

above, grounds No.1 to 3 and 5 are clearly applicable to the

present facts of the case. As this Court found from the contents

of the F.I.R. and the material collected during the course of

investigation done so far that the allegations made in the F.I.R.

even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their

entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a

case against the accused for the offences punishable under

Sections 420, 406, 409 and 120-B of IPC and also found that

the allegations in the F.I.R. and materials collected during the

course of investigation done so far do not disclose commission

of a cognizable offence justifying investigation and also found

that the allegations made in the F.I.R. are so absurd and

inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person

can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground

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for proceeding against the accused, the F.I.R. registered against

the petitioners is liable to be quashed.

123) The Apex Court in the case of Vesa Holdings Private

Limited v. State of Kerala19 held that the complaint did not

disclose any criminal offence at all. Allowing the police

investigation to continue would amount to abuse of process of

Court and High Court committed error in refusing to exercise

power to quash proceedings. Impugned order is set aside.

124) In the case of State of Karnataka v. Arun Kumar

Agarwal20, the Apex Court held at para No.15 of the judgment

as follows:

"... The acts of persons will not be subject of criminal investigation unless a crime is reported to have been committed or reasonable suspicion thereto arises. On mere conjecture or surmise as a flight of fancy that some crime might have been committed, somewhere, by somebody but the crime is not known, the persons involved in it or the place of crime unknown, cannot be termed to be reasonable basis at all for starting a criminal investigation."

It is further held:

"....The attempt made by the High Court in this case appears to us to be in the nature of blind shot fired in the dark without even knowing whether there is a prey at all. That may create sound and fury but not result in hunting down the prey. ......."

125) Though learned Advocate-General submits that text

of WhatsApp messages of some of the petitioners secured during

19 (2015) 8 SCC 293 20 (2000) 1 SCC 210

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the course of investigation show that they had communication

with some N.R.Is. alleging that as the capital city is coming in

the said area that they have to hurry to purchase the lands in

that area, as can be seen from the C.D. file produced by the

prosecution, no such text of WhatsApp messages are available

in it. Even if it is true, it cannot be an incriminating material

against the petitioners in view of the above discussion and

findings.

126) Apropos the judgments relied on by the learned

Advocate General are concerned, he relied on the judgments in

the cases of Umesh Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh21;

Prakash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab22 on the proposition of

law that criminal prosecution cannot be vitiated merely on the

basis of allegation of political vendetta if there is substance in

the allegations. Irrespective of the motive attributed by the

petitioners to the State in launching the criminal prosecution,

this Court has decided the case on its merits based on law and

found that there is no substance in the report lodged against

the petitioners to prosecute them. Therefore, these cases are of

no avail to the prosecution. For the same reason, the judgment

in S.Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab23 is not of any relevance.

He relied on the cases decided in Imtiyaz Ahmad v. State of

U.P.24; Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana25 and

21 (2013) 10 SCC 591 22 (2007) 1 SCC 1 23 AIR 1964 SC 72 24 (2012) 2 SCC 688

CMR,J.

Crl.P.No.4819 of 2020 & batch

State of Rajasthan v. Ravi Shankar Srivastava26 on the

proposition that the investigation cannot be stayed as a matter

of routine specifically at the initial stage. These cases are

distinguishable on facts and as this Court found that the

allegations set out in the F.I.R. do not prima facie constitute any

offense against the petitioners, in view of the authoritative

pronouncements on the point in Bhajan Lal's18 case (cited

supra), this Court is inclined to quash the F.I.R.

127) The learned Advocate General also relied on the

judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Skoda Auto

Volkswagen India Pvt. Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh27.

The observation made by the Apex Court at para No.41 of the

said judgment is more in favour of the petitioners. It is held in

the said judgment that, "it is only in cases where no cognizable

offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first

information report that the Court will not permit an

investigation to go on." As this Court found that no cognizable

offence or offences of any kind is disclosed in the F.I.R., this

Court is inclined to quash the F.I.R.

128) He then relied on the judgment rendered in the case

of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Awadh Kishore Gupta28 on the

proposition that allegation of mala fides are no consequences

for quashing of F.I.R. Irrespective of the mala fides that are

25 (1977) 4 SCC 451 26 (2011) 10 SCC 632 27 Judgment dated 26.11.2020 in Spl.L.P.(Cri) No.4931 of 2020 28 (2004) 15 SCC 691

CMR,J.

Crl.P.No.4819 of 2020 & batch

attributed by the petitioners, based on factual aspects and legal

position applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case,

this Court has arrived at the above conclusion.

129) The unreported judgment of this Court rendered in

the case of Anne Sudhir Babu v. State of A.P.29, relied on by

the prosecution is distinguishable on facts. That was a case

where originally a report was lodged against certain accused

relating to commission of certain offences. Incidentally the role

played by the Tahsildar in committing certain irregularities in

respect of the lands in question was mentioned in F.I.R. Police

registered case against him also and shown him as accused

No.4. He questioned the F.I.R. registered against him on the

ground that no allegation was made against him regarding

commission of any offence and only incidentally his role was

referred in the F.I.R. and as such that the registration of the

said F.I.R. against him is not valid. So, in that context the

Court held that even though the role played by him was

incidentally mentioned in the F.I.R. that nothing prevents the

police from registering the case against him and investing the

same. So, this judgment does not support the case of the

prosecution in this case.

130) For the aforesaid reasons, all the judgments relied on

behalf of the State are distinguishable on facts and they are of

no avail to the prosecution case.

CMR,J.

Crl.P.No.4819 of 2020 & batch

DENOUEMENT:-

131) To sum up, the upshot of the above detailed

discussion is that right to acquire property is a constitutional

right and legal right of the petitioners as citizens of this country.

As they purchased the lands, in exercise of the said

constitutional and legal right and acquired property from the

sellers who willingly and voluntarily sold them to the petitioners

for a valid sale consideration under registered sale deeds, the

said private sale transactions cannot be criminalized and no

criminal liability can be attributed to the petitioners in the facts

and circumstances of the case to prosecute them for any

offences much less for the offences punishable under Sections

420, 406, 409 and 120-B of IPC. The concept of the offence of

insider trading which is essentially an offence in the field of

stock market relating to selling and buying the securities and

bonds cannot be applied to the offences under Indian Penal

Code and cannot be read into Section 420 IPC or into any

provisions in the scheme of Indian Penal Code. The said

concept of offence of insider trading is totally alien to IPC and it

is unknown to our criminal jurisprudence under the Indian

Penal Code. So, it cannot even contextually or relatively applied

to the facts of the case to prosecute the petitioners. Applying the

said concept of insider trading to the facts of the case to

prosecute the petitioners is totally misconceived and legally

unsustainable in the given facts and circumstances of the case.

CMR,J.

Crl.P.No.4819 of 2020 & batch

The petitioners have no legal obligation to disclose the

information relating to latent advantages in purchasing the land

to the sellers at the time of buying the said land. Therefore, it

does not amount to dishonest concealment of fact as

contemplated under the Explanation appended to Section 415

IPC. It does not amount to any deception under Section 420

IPC read with Section 415 IPC. The sellers did not sustain any

loss on account of the said sale transactions. No element of

criminality is involved in the sale transaction. So, the

petitioners cannot be even remotely connected with any

criminal acts or offence to attribute or fasten any criminal

liability to them in the facts and circumstances of the case.

Therefore, the allegations set out in the F.I.R. coupled with the

material collected during the course of investigation so far done,

do not make out any case or constitute any offences under

Sections 420, 406, 409 and 120-B of IPC. No offence of

conspiracy to do any illegal act or to commit an offence is made

out from the facts of the case. Therefore, in the said facts and

circumstances of the case, the prosecution of the petitioners for

the alleged offences for which the F.I.R. was registered is wholly

unjustifiable and clearly opposed to all cannons and basic

tenets of criminal law and it amounts to sheer abuse of process

of law warranting interference of this Court in exercise of its

inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the same

in view of the law enunciated and the grounds enumerated by

the Apex Court in Bhajan Lal's18 case (cited supra).

CMR,J.

Crl.P.No.4819 of 2020 & batch

132) In the light of the aforesaid findings, the only

irresistible conclusion that can be drawn in the facts and

circumstances of the case is that the prosecution against the

petitioners for the alleged offences is not at all maintainable and

the same is liable to be quashed.

133) In fine, the Criminal Petitions are allowed. The

common F.I.R. in Crime No.49 of 2020 of C.I.D.P.S., A.P.,

Amaravati of Mangalagiri, registered against the petitioners for

the offences punishable under Sections 420, 409, 406 and

120-B of I.P.C. and all the proceedings initiated pursuant to the

registration of the said F.I.R. are hereby quashed.

Consequently, miscellaneous applications, pending if any,

shall also stand closed.

________________________________________________ JUSTICE CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY Date:19-01-2021.

Note:

L.R. copy to be marked.

B/O cs

 
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