[Cites 7, Cited by 0]
Allahabad High Court
Municipal Commissioner Lko Nagar Nigam ... vs Smt. Manraji Devi (Deceased) Thru. Her ... on 12 May, 2026
Author: Alok Mathur
Bench: Alok Mathur
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
Judgment Reserved on 04.05.2026
Judgment Delivered on 12.05.2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
CIVIL MISC REVIEW APPLICATION DEFECTIVE No. - 212 of 2024
Municipal Commissioner Lko Nagar Nigam, Lalbgah
.Applicant(s)
Versus
Smt. Manraji Devi (Deceased) Thru. Her Legal
Heirs Sri Onkar Nath Shukla And 2 Others
..Opposite Party(s)
Counsel for Applicant(s) : Namit Sharma
Counsel for opposite Party(s) : Apoorva Tewari
Court No. - 5
HON'BLE ALOK MATHUR, J.
HON'BLE AMITABH KUMAR RAI, J.
1. Heard Sri Namit Shrama, learned counsel for petitioner as well as Sri Apoorv Tiwari, learned counsel for respondents.
2. The instant petition has been filed by the applicant seeking review of the judgment and order of this court dated 29-5-2017 passed in Civil Misc. Bench No. 4642 of 2014. It has been submitted on behalf of the applicant that the dispute raised in the writ petition pertained to the house constructed over Khasra plot number 232 ad measuring 684.29 square meter situated at village Khagapur, Faridnagar, Tahsil and District Lucknow. It has been submitted that according to the opposite party, construction was made on the said property 42 years ago and they are residing in the said premises and further had claimed regularisation of the possession on the said land.
3. It has further been stated that, by means of notification dated 03.02.1987, the state government utilizing its power under Section 3 of the Nagar Palika Adhiniyam Act 1953 included the village Khargapur, Farid Nagar, Tahsil and District Lucknow in municipal limits of Lucknow city and by virtue of the aforesaid notification all the lands belonging to the grams sabha stood vested in the Lucknow Nagar Nigam.
4. The house of the opposite party was assessed by the revenue officials of the Lucknow Nagar Nigam for the purposes of house tax in the year 1988 and since then he is paying the house tax.
5. The State Government issued a Government Order dated 26.02.2001 pertaining to the manner of maintenance, allotment and disposal of the Gram Sabha property which stood vested in Nagar Nigam. Clause 5 of the said Government order provided for the actions which are to be taken with regard to the unauthorized occupation, possession, and sub-clause 1 provided that such unauthorized possession in which constructions have been made would be regularized by granting lease, by charging an amount not less than the prevailing market rate.
6. It is in pursuance of aforesaid notification that the Executive Committee of the Nagar Nigam passed a resolution on 13-5-2002 for regularization / grant of lease of the property of Gram Samaj which stood vested in Nagar Nigam to the occupants who are in unauthorized possession and where construction have been made. A notice was issued to the opposite party on 12-9-2003 when the valuation of property of the assessed and the opposite party was required to deposit penalty at the rate of 10% of Rs. 1,05,381.20. The opposite party duly deposited the said fee on 18.09.2003 and was awaiting orders for his regularization, but no such orders were passed.
7. It has further been stated that the Municipal Corporation submitted report on 9-7-2004 for consideration before the Executive Committee of the Nagar Nigam for regularization / grant of lease where the name of the opposite party found mentioned at serial no. 1. It has further been submitted that the Executive Committee duly approved the report of the Municipal Corporation by means of Resolution No. 911, but no further orders were passed or communicated to the opposite parties in this regard.
8. It is in the aforesaid circumstances that the opposite parties had filed a writ petition before this court, being writ petition No. 8168 MB of 2007. (Smt. Manraji Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.) where this court by means of order dated 3-10-2007 directed the petitioner to consider and decide the representation of the petitioner. It was in the counter-affidavit filed in the said petition that this Court was informed that representation of the opposite party was disposed of by means of order dated 15-7-2009.
9. It was stated that the aspect of regularization can be done as per the Government Order dated 12-1-2000, only by a committee headed by the Divisional Commissioner, Lucknow and no approval or decision has been received by the Municipal Commissioner and consequently no orders could be passed by them in this regard. This Court, in the aforesaid circumstances, while disposing of the aforesaid writ petition, directed the authority concerned to take a decision for regularization / grant of lease in favour of the opposite party with expedition by means of order dated 3-5-2013.
10. The Municipal Commissioner in compliance of the directions of this Court, dated 3-5-2013, passed in Writ Petition No. 8168 (MB) of 2017, refused to regularize / grant release of the said property in favour of the opposite party, again, reiterating his stand that the approval in this regard can be done only by a committee headed by Divisional Commissioner Lucknow and Municipal Commissioner is not empowered to regularize the property.
11. The order dated 26-5-2014 was assailed by the opposite parties in Writ Petition No. 4642 (MB) of 2014. The aforesaid writ petition was allowed on 29-5-2017 and the order dated 26-5-2014 was quashed, and the Municipal Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation was directed to issue formal orders for opposite partys regularization over land, Khasra No. 232, within one month from the date of communication of the said order.
12. This court, while allowing the writ petition, had made the following relevant observations.
1. The Government Order dated 26-02-2001 was issued with regard to administration of the properties with the gaon sabha which stood vested in Nagar Nigam and provided that the land over which the pakka house or godown has been constructed shall be regularized by granting lease at the rate not less than the market rate.
2. It is in pursuance of the aforesaid government order that the Lucknow Nagar Nigam had issued notice dated 12.09.2003 to the opposite party to deposit an amount of Rs.105381.20 for the purpose of regularization within 15 days so that his case may be placed before the Executive Committee / Board for approval.
3. The opposite party had deposited the aforesaid amount on 18.9.2003 and the Executive Committee of the Nagar Nigam by means of Resolution No. 22 took up the matter and approved the same vide its Resolution No. 911.
4. This Court in writ petition No. 8168 MB of 2007 preferred by the opposite parties by order dated 31-10-2007 was pleased to direct the petitioner to decide the representation of the opposite party for regulation of the aforesaid land / house of opposite parties.
5. The Municipal Corporation thereafter had declined to regularize the petitioner's possession by means of order dated 26.05.2014.
13. This Court was of the considered view that once the Nagar Nigam has duly considered the case of the opposite party for regularization and asked him to deposit the said amount which was deposited by him, then the Nagar Nigam could not disapprove its proposal without assigning any reasons. It also considered the ground that the Committee constituted under the chairmanship of the Divisional Commissioner was the competent committee to take decision but held that since Government Order dated 26.02.2001 had permitted regularization of such possession on such conditions and the opposite parties has acted on the said recommendation, the court found that rights of the opposite parties had crystallized and there was no occasion for the Municipal commissioner to have rejected the claim of the opposite party and therefore allowed the writ petition by means of judgment dated 29.5.2017.
14. That against the judgment of this court dated 29.5.2017, a Special leave Petition was preferred by the petitioner before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, being Special leave petition No. 21628 of 2017, where notices were issued on 1-9-2017 and status quo was also directed to be maintained by the parties. But subsequently, by means of judgment and order dated 19-4-2018, the Special leave Petition was dismissed by the following orders:
"We have heard the counsel for the parties.
Having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, we do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned order.
The special leave petition is, accordingly, dismissed. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of."
15. The petitioners thereafter filed an application for review of the judgment and order of the Supreme Court dated 19-4-2018, which Review Petition No. 665 of 2019 was dismissed on 18-3-2019 with the following orders.
"Delay Condoned.
Having carefully gone through the review petition, but the order under challenge and the papers annexed therewith, we are satisfied that there was no error apparent on the face of the record, warranting reconsideration of the order impugned.
The review petition is accordingly dismissed."
16. The petitioners further persisted with the challenge to the judgement of this Court, and filed a curative petition being Curative Petition (C) 349/2019 which was dismissed by means of order dated 05/03/2020. The Honble Supreme Court while dismissing the curative petition passed the following order:-
We have gone through the curative petition and the relevant documents. In our opinion, no case is made out within the parameters indicated in the decision of this Court in Rupa Ashok Hurra vs Ashok Hurra and another reported in 2002 (4) SCC 388. Hence, the curative petition is dismissed.
17. The opposite party had in the meanwhile instituted contempt proceedings for non-compliance of the judgement and order of this Court dated 29/5/2017. The contempt petition was numbered as contempt No. 3026 of 2018. Notices were issued to the Municipal Commissioner against whom the contempt proceedings were initiated on 16/11/2018. After seeking number of adjournments, application for deferment of the contempt proceedings was also filed which application was rejected on 04/09/2024, and charges were framed on 01/10/2024.
18. It is at this stage that the present review petition was filed seeking recall/ review of the order dated 29/05/2017.
19. Against the order of the contempt Court framing charges on 01/10/2024 petitioners filed another special leave petition before the Honble Supreme Court being Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. - 28810 28811/2024 in which the following order was passed:-
1.Since no order prejudicial to the interest of the respondent is being passed, the requirement of issuance of notices waived.
2.Mr Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General appearing for the petitioner submits that the order of which contempt is alleged is under review. The grounds raised in the review petition is that since the land of which regularisation is directed is on a public road and, therefore, cannot be regularized.
3.That in view of the matter, we find that it will be appropriate that both review petition and the content petition are kept together and heard by the same bench.
4.We direct the registrar of the High Court to place the matter before Honble the Chief Justice of the High Court of judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow bench for clubbing and placing both the matters before the same bench.
5.We further direct that the review petition be taken up for hearing as expeditiously as possible and the same is disposed of in accordance with law.
6.Until then, no effective orders be passed in the contempt petition.
7.In view of the aforesaid order, the personal appearance of the petitioner shall stand dispensed with until further orders are passed by the division bench of the High Court.
8.The special leave petitions are, accordingly, disposed of.
9.Pending applications if any stands disposed of.
20. It is therefore in the aforesaid circumstances that the review and the contempt petitions has been placed before this bench.
21. According to the petitioner review petition has been filed on three grounds as narrated by them in paragraph 10 of the said application. The first ground is that the application for regularisation could not have been considered by the Municipal Commissioner as it does not have any power in this regard, and therefore lacked the jurisdiction, and the High Court by the impugned judgement having directed him to pass such an order for regularisation would be a nullity.
22. The second ground was that the classification of land was such that regularisation thereof was not permissible. It was submitted that the land situated at khasra plot No. 232 village Kharakpur, Faridinagar is shown as Rasta and the remaining portion of the said land is shown as charam shodhak sthan and accordingly the land is in the category of reserved land to be utilised only for public utility purposes and Bhumidhari right on such land cannot be created.
23. Lastly it was contended that the judgement of this Court was obtained by the opposite parties fraudulently by suppression of material facts especially with regard to the nature of land and in this regard it was contended that fraud vitiates all solemn acts and therefore in the present case doctrine of merger would not be applicable and the opposite party has abused the process of Court and gained undue advantage and therefore the present review would be maintainable.
24. The first ground raised on behalf of the applicant is regard to the competence of the Municipal Commissioner to consider and pass the order of regularization, and that they do not have subject matter competence, consequently the judgement of this Court is a nullity.
25. The perusal of the judgement dated 29/05/2017 would indicate that this aspect of the matter has been dealt with in great detail. The relevant portion of the judgement are quoted hereinbelow:-
Insofar as the matter of regularization of her possession is concerned since the State Government vide Government Order -5- dated 26.02.2001 itself took a decision to regularize such possession and after assessment of value of the house, the petitioner was issued a notice to deposit the amount mentioned in the notice itself along with ten percent penalty. The petitioner followed the said notice and deposited the said amount through cheque. Her proposal was approved by the Executive Committee of the Municipal Corporation, there was no occasion for the Executive Committee of the Corporation to disapprove its earlier proposal without assigning reason.
26. This Court had duly considered the grounds raised by the petitioner and rejected the same holding that the Government Order dated 26/02/2001 itself permitted the local authority/Municipal Corporation to pass appropriate order with regard to regularisation of the unauthorised occupation of lands which come the Municipal Corporation. It is in terms of the aforesaid Government Order that the executive committee of the Municipal Corporation had taken a decision to regularise the occupation of the opposite party, and he had acted upon the said decision and also deposited the amount are required.
27. Further we find that section 117 of the U.P Zamidari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 provides for vesting of certain lands, etc. in Gaon Sabha and other Local Authorities, and sub-clause 4 also clearly deals with this aspect of the matter which is as follows:-
117 (4)Where a declaration has been made under sub-section (1) or sub-section) vesting any of the things specified in Clauses (i) to (vi) of sub-section (1) in a local authority other than a Gaon Sabha and the village or the part of village in which the thing is situate is outside the limits of such local authority or where after any declaration is made under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the thing vests or as the case may be, had vested in a Nagar Mahapalika under Section 126 of the Uttar Pradesh Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959, such local authority shall in respect of that thing perform, discharge and exercise the functions, duties and powers assigned, imposed or conferred by or under this Act or the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, on a Gaon Sabha or Land Management Committee :Provided that the local authority shall in the performance, discharge and exercise of its functions, duties and powers under this sub-section follow such procedure as may be prescribed.
28. Accordingly, after the disputed area having come within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Corporation, it was the Municipal Corporation alone which has to perform discharge of function and duties conferred under the U.P.Z.A and L.R Act, and hence there was no dispute that the Municipal Corporation itself was a proper authority to have decided about the aspect of regularisation of the unauthorised occupation of the opposite party.
29. The Government Order dated 26/02/2001 only amplifies and clarifies the aforesaid statutory provision of section 117(4) of Act of 1950 and further states that the local authority would have same power and duty which were exercised by the Land Management Committee prior to the date of vesting. It specifically gives the power of regularisation of land to the Nagar Nigam. Accordingly, the Government Order dated 26.02.2001 sets aside all the previous Government Orders including the Government Order of 2000 and clearly states that the the orders with regard to regulisation unauthorized occupants can be passed by the local authorities itself i.e. the Municipal Corporation. Accordingly, we do not find that the impugned order dated 26.05.2014 could have been validly and legally passed by the Nagar Palika Parishad and the arguments in this regard on behalf of the petitioner are devoid of merits and accordingly rejected.
30. After due consideration of the grounds in this regard raised by the petitioner, we find that the same is misconceived and is accordingly rejected. We further find that the said ground was duly dealt by the High Court the judgement dated 29/05/2017, and this aspect having been raised before the Supreme Court in special leave petition, review petition and curative petition where no interference was made.
31. The second and third ground raised by the petitioner are closely intertwined and accordingly are being dealt simultaneously. It is the contention of the petitioner that the nature of land is such that it cannot be regularised and a clear statutory embargo exists this regard. It was submitted that the said land is described in the revenue records as Rasta and charam shodhak sthan, and such land cannot be subject matter of regularisation. It was further submitted that the status of the aforesaid land is recorded in the revenue records and the copy of the relevant revenue records was filed along with the review application as annexure No. A10.
32. It is in this regard, it was further submitted that the opposite party did not disclose the relevant documents i.e CH-41 and CH-45, pertaining to year 1964 i.e fasli , 1371 where the disputed land is described as pathway and place of Tannery. These lands according to the petitioner are public utility lands and cannot be settled in favour of an individual. It was stated that it was the duty of the opposite party to have disclose the said documents before this Court and not having done so, they have obtained the judgement by fraud and therefore the said issue can be duly corrected by means of review, and on this ground for allowing of the instant petition.
33. We have given a very patient and extensive opportunity of hearing to the petitioner in the present case. The writ petition No. 4642 of 2014 (MB) was preferred by the opposite party for quashing of the order dated 26/05/2014 and for a further direction in the nature of mandamus to regularise/grant lease of khasra plot No. 323, measuring 684.29 m situated at village Khargapur, Faridnagar, tehsil and District Lucknow in favour of the opposite party.
34. The order dated 26/05/2014 had rejected the representation of the opposite party relying upon the ground order dated 12/01/2000, according to which such regularisation could be done only by a committee headed by the Divisional Commissioner. It also took into account the government order dated 26/02/2001 where such illegal and unauthorised construction could be regularised but the case of the opposite party was not covered under the said government order as, there was only tinshed and a dairy was being run and as such the construction does not fall into the category of the construction describing the aforesaid government order.
35. The first and foremost aspect which is self-evident reasons given for rejection of the claim of the opposite parties for regularisation of his unauthorised occupation as given in the order dated 26/05/2014 is only to the extent that the decision has to be taken by the committee headed by the Divisional Commissioner and secondly that the construction of the opposite party in the disputed land is only a tinshed. It is clear that it was not the case of the petitioner as per the order impugned that the land on which regularisation of occupation was sought is a public utility land defined as Rasta and charam shodhak sthan. In assailing the impugned order before this Court in Writ Petition No. 4642 of 2014 the opposite party was tasked merely to assail the reasons and findings given in the impugned order and nothing beyond. The petitioners have relied upon the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case ofBabu Singh vs Consolidation officer and otherspassed in Civil Appeal No. 463 of 2026 to canvass the submission that public utility land cannot be allotted to any private individual.
36. We would like to hasten to add at this stage that the grounds taken by the petitioner were duly dealt with in the impugned order / judgment and especially with regard to the fact as to whether any house was existing on the disputed land or not. It was considered that the opposite partys house was surveyed by the Tax Superintendent on 30/12/1987 and after assessment the value of the house for the purpose of tax was assessed as ₹ 1200 and there was no report that there was dairy on the disputed land. In the present review petition, there is no material that the said finding are wrong. We find that the findings of this Court in the previous judgement were based on the report of the Tax Superintendent who is the officer of the petitioners themselves and no other material is available on record which may persuade us from taking a different view of the matter and therefore, no interference is required in such finding and the arguments to the petitioner to the contrary are rejected .
37. The said writ petition was duly contested by the petitioners where there was no defence taken by them or any assertion made by them that the disputed land is a public utility land. Even before the Supreme Court in the special leave petition, or the review petition and even the curative petition this ground was never taken by them. It is the first time, the said ground has been taken in the review petition.
38. From the aforesaid, we find that the opposite party had assailed the validity of the order dated 26.05.2014 and his case was never considered by the petitioner in light of the fact that the nature of the land was a public utility land, and therefore, the onus did not lay upon the opposite party to disclose the said fact in the writ petition. On the other hand, we find that the petitioners who were strongly contesting the case with such fervour and vehemence which is evident from the fact that they were not satisfied by mere dismissal of the special leave petition and further proceeded to exercise the discretion by filing a review petition and curative petition evidently they did not undertake the due diligence expected of them and place full and correct facts before either this Court or before the Supreme Court. It is the aforesaid circumstances, we find that the onus, if any, lay upon the petitioner to have taken the plea regarding the status of the land being a public utility land, which fact ought to have been considered by them while passing the impugned order dated 26.05.2014 and not while defending the said order in writ proceedings. No reason is forthcoming as to why these facts were deliberately concealed by the petitioner before this Court as well as the Supreme Court. Accordingly, we do not find any ground for entertaining the plea of the petitioner that opposite party had fraudulently concealed this fact at the time of filing of the writ petition.
29. We are further conscious of the directions the Honble Supreme Court in the case ofMohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr., (1978) 1 SCC 405where it has been heldthat the order has to be tested on the reasons stated in the said order itself and the reasons cannot be supplemented by filing an affidavit. In paragraph 8 of the said judgement it was held:-
Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr., (1978) 1 SCC 405 : 1977 SCC OnLine SC 323at page 417
8.The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose, J. inGordhandas Bhanji[Commr. of Police, Bombayv.Gordhandas Bhanji, 1951 SCC 1088 : AIR 1952 SC 16] :
Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself.
Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older.
40. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, we find that the genesis of the dispute in the present case is the rejection order dated 26/05/2014 passed by the Municipal Commissioner which had to be judged on the grounds and reasons stated therein, and admittedly the Municipal Commissioner, had not rejected the claim of the opposite party on the basis of the fact that the nature of the land was a public utility land. In the said circumstances the challenge made by the opposite parties was limited to assailing the grounds stated in the impugned order and were not duty-bound address other issues not mentioned in the impugned order. We further find that it was not a writ of mandamus where the opposite party was seeking a direction and asserting their claim before this Court for the first time, but were merely assailing the validity of the order passed by the petitioner.
41. It is the aforesaid circumstances, we find that the opposite parties by not enclosing any material regarding the nature of land being a public utility land in the writ petition filed before this Court had not committed any fraud, while the negligence of the petitioners is writ large by not considering this aspect this while passing the order dated 26/05/2014. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that there was no concealment by the opposite parties and further find that there is no question of fraud having been committed by them necessitating review of order dated 29.05.2017.
42 It is the aforesaid facts we find that the ratio of the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Babu Singh versus Consolidation Officer and others would be of no relevance and will not apply to the facts of the present case inasmuch as this aspect of the matter was not looked into by the petitioners themselves at the stage of passing of impugned order dated 26/05/2014, and the entire proceedings initiated at the behest of the opposite party are with regard to the validity of the order dated 26.05.2014. The grounds and reasons not taken by the petitioners at the stage of passing of the said order cannot be added or modified and subsequent stage, of which an vain attempt has been made by the petitioners by instituting the present review petition keeping in mind the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill.
43 We are not burdened with the judgement cited by the petitioner pertaining to the maintainability of the review petition inasmuch as we have considered the submissions on merits, considering the directions of the Supreme Court to decide the review along with the contempt petition.
44. We further cannot but observe that the Municipal Corporation is an local authority and therefore, an arm of the state and it has to function in a manner expected of a State. The lis having been decided by this High Court, by means of the judgement and order dated 29/05/2017 was challenged before the Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition which was dismissed on 19/04/2018, under further review petition was filed which was dismissed on 28/03/2019 and further the curative petition was also dismissed on 05/03/2020, and only thereafter the present review petition was filed on fresh grounds not raised by them earlier. The documents pertaining to the revenue records are public documents and could have been obtained by the petitioner in the previous round of litigation but they chose not to place them on record and accordingly, no cognizance of the same can be taken in the review petition. We may reiterate that the case of the opposite parties was never rejected by the petitioners on the ground that the disputed land is the public utility land and accordingly production of such documents in the review petition is of no consequence. We find that there is no serious question of law or fact to be determined and therefore find no justification for this prolonged litigation solely at the behest of the petitioners.
45. Accordingly, for the reasons above, we do not find any ground for review of the judgement and order of this Court dated 26/05/2014 and accordingly, the present review application is dismissed with cost of Rs. 25,000/- which is to be paid to the opposite party by the competent authority within next four weeks.
46. Before parting with the said judgment we would like to record our serious disapproval of the manner and conduct of the counsel for the petitioner Sri Namit Sharma in presenting his case before this Court. He from the very outset had shown disregard for the queries made by the Court and declined to answer any such queries.
47. Needless to say that any Advocate practicing before any court should maintain dignity and authority of the court and any attempt of on the part of any advocate to disrespect or to lower down the authority of the Court cannot be tolerated or be leniently viewed. His tone and manner of arguments expressed the intention which was clearly calculated to show disrespect to overbear and to overawe the court and from the very inception was defiant and belligerent. To resent the questions asked by a Judge, to be disrespectful to him and to loose temper are all acts calculated to interfere with an obstruct the course of justice. As such acts tend to overawe the court and to prevent it from performing its duties to administer justice. Accordingly, taking a lenient view of the aforesaid actions, we caution the learned counsel to behave and conduct himself properly and in a decent manner in future proceedings, failure of which will invite appropriate action in accordance with law.
(Amitabh Kumar Rai, J.) (Alok Mathur,J.)
May 12, 2026
Ravi/
