Smt. Mehtab Begum vs State Of U.P. And 5 Others
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Allahabad High Court

Smt. Mehtab Begum vs State Of U.P. And 5 Others on 28 October, 2025

Author: Arun Kumar

Bench: Arun Kumar

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 


Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:188908
 

 
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD 
 
WRIT - C No. - 27034 of 2025   
 
   Smt. Mehtab Begum    
 
  .....Petitioner(s)   
 
 Versus  
 
   State Of U.P. And 5 Others    
 
  .....Respondent(s)       
 
   
 
  
 
Counsel for Petitioner(s)   
 
:   
 
Nitesh Patel, Udit Chandra   
 
  
 
Counsel for Respondent(s)   
 
:   
 
C.S.C., Sunil Kumar Srivastava   
 
     
 
 Court No. - 9
 
   
 
 HON'BLE ARUN KUMAR, J.      

1. Heard Sri Udit Chandra, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents nos.1 to 4 and Sri Sunil Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondent no.5.

2. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the order of respondent no.2, District Magistrate, Saharanpur, dated 01.08.2025, passed in exercise of powers under Section 95(1)(g) of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, seizing financial and administrative powers of the petitioner as Gram Pradhan of village Firozabad, Block Sarsawa, District Saharanpur.

3. It is contended by the counsel for the petitioner that in pursuance of the complaint received from respondent no.5 a preliminary enquiry was directed to be conducted and the Project Director, District Village Development Authority was appointed as Enquiry Officer, who submitted his enquiry report on 12.12.2024. Thereafter, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 24.12.2024 by the respondent no.2. The petitioner submitted his explanation to the show cause notice on 27.01.2025. The explanation submitted by the petitioner was got examined by the members of the Enquiry Committee. Pursuant to the second report dated 17.05.2025, submitted by the Enquiry Committee, an order dated 10.06.2025 was passed by the respondent no.2, seizing financial and administrative power of the petitioner. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner filed a writ petition being Writ-C No.20241 of 2025 before this Court. This Court vide its judgment and order dated 02.07.2025 set aside the order of the respondent no.2, directing him to pass a fresh order in accordance with law. Thereafter, the respondent no.2 proceeded to pass order impugned, dated 01.08.2025.

4. It is further contended by the counsel for the petitioner that respondent no.2 while passing the fresh order has again proceeded to record the observations in the charge sheet, enquiry report, the explanation of petitioner and the relevant extract from the second examination report of the Enquiry Committee in respect of each charges and has finally adjudicated each charges by recording positive findings holding respective charges to be proved. Thus, by the impugned order the petitioner has been hold guilty on the basis of preliminary enquiry without conducting any formal enquiry as contemplated under rule 6 of the U.P. Panchayat Raj (Removal of Pradhan, Up-Pradhan and Members) Enquiry Rules, 1997.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has laid great stress on the fact that the impugned order of the respondent no.2, dated 01.08.2025, is vitiated because, despite the written request by the petitioner, he was not afforded opportunity of personal hearing and was not served with the preliminary enquiry report, despite being mentioned to be annexed with the show cause notice.

6. On the other hand, learned Standing Counsel has tried to defend the order of respondent no.2 stating that the findings recorded in respect of each charges levelled against the petitioner are subject to the final enquiry and they may be considered as prima facie satisfaction alone of the respondent no.2.

7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.

8. The respondent no.2, after remand of the matter pursuant to the judgment and order of this Court dated 02.07.2025, passed a fresh order dated 01.08.2025, which shows that after referring to the charges from the enquiry report and the findings recorded therein, he has verbatim copied the explanation of the petitioner and comments of the Enquiry Committee and proceeded to record his conclusions in respect of each charges. The conclusion in respect of each charge refers to the observations of the Enquiry Committee alone without any consideration of reply submitted by the petitioner against it. The conclusions by no stretch of imagination are prima facie satisfaction but the final adjudication in respect of all five charges, which have been found to be proved. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid findings, nothing remains for the final enquiry to be held. The aforesaid findings are contrary to rule 4 of the Enquiry Rules, 1997 as the respondent no.2 had only to record his satisfaction of a prima facie case for a formal enquiry pursuant to which he could seize the financial and administrative powers of Gram Pradhan.

9. The question as to what would be the manner of exercising powers by the State Government/District Magistrate for ceasing financial and administrative powers of the Pradhan fell for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court in Hafiz Ataullah Ansari Vs. State of U.P. and others, 2011 (2) UPLBEC 889. A subsequent Full Bench in the case of Shamim (supra) has examined all previous judgments and the powers of District Magistrate for the purposes of exercise of jurisdiction under Section 95(1)(g) of the Act of 1947. The 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments have been noticed by the Full Bench to observe that Panchayats and Municipalities have now been conferred constitutional status. The question for consideration before the Full Bench has been noticed in para 23 of the judgment, which is reproduced hereinafter:-

"23. In the backdrop of the legislative history and the status of an elected Pradhan, after the Constitutional Amendment, the primary issue is whether the power exercised by the State Government/District Magistrate under the proviso to Section 95(1)(g) of Panchayat Raj Act is a purely administrative or a quasi judicial. In other words whether State Government/District Magistrate while exercising power under the proviso to Section 95(1)(g) is a Tribunal."

While answering the reference, the Full Bench observed as under in para 37 of the judgment in Shamim (supra):-

"37. In Vivekanand, Hafiz Ataullah Ansari and thereafter reiterated in Paras Jain that the elected representative would have to be given an opportunity to raise objection to the findings returned in the preliminary enquiry and his/or her objections will have be considered, though prima facie, by the State Government/District Magistrate before an order ceasing the financial and administrative power and functions is passed. The consequence of the order passed in exercise of power under Section 95(1)(g) is serious consequence as it divests the elected representative from exercising power until exonerated in final enquiry and the decision of the State Government is final. The decision taken by the State Government is not based on any expediency or policy of the State, rather, it is a statutory power conferred upon the State Government exercising inherent judicial power after confronting the elected representative, with show cause notice based on the preliminary report, thereafter, taking a decision upon due application of mind on the objections of the elected Pradhan. Once such an order is passed, it is not open for the State Government to either review or modify the order during the course of final enquiry. The order, therefore, finally decides the issue between Pradhan and the Authority (State Government) in so far it relates to exercise of financial and administrative power. The office of the local body is an elected office of the constitutional democratic institution; the elected head is not a government servant and it would be improper to compare these proceeding with departmental proceeding in service jurisprudence. A head of a local body is elected for a limited term. If during the removal proceedings, he is denuded from exercising financial and administrative powers then even if he is exonerated in the enquiry the time spent during enquiry is lost, he does not get his period extended. The consideration about the presence of all or some of the trappings of a court is really not decisive. The main and basic test is whether the adjudicating power which a particular authority is empowered to exercise has been conferred on it by a statute and can be described as part of the State's inherent power exercised in discharging its judicial function. Applying this test there can be no doubt that the power which the State Government/District Magistrate exercises under proviso to Section 95(1)(g) is a quasi-judicial power exercised by a quasi-judicial authority."

10. Since the power to be exercised by the District Magistrate is quasi-judicial in nature and has serious consequences for elected representative, it is expected that the District Magistrate would apply his mind to the nature of charges levelled and would record a prima facie satisfaction with regard to existence of materials collected in the preliminary enquiry, which necessitates holding of regular enquiry and justify seizure of financial and administrative powers of Pradhan. The District Magistrate, therefore, is expected to look into the nature of charges as also the defence set up by the elected Pradhan or else the very object of issuing show cause notice would be frustrated. Law is otherwise settled that reason is the soul of an order and considerations which have prevailed in passing of the order must be reflected from the order itself. In such circumstances this Court finds that the order of District Magistrate is wanting on relevant parameters, noticed above, and therefore the order impugned cannot be sustained.

11. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the order of respondent no.2, District Magistrate, Saharanpur, dated 01.08.2025, finally adjudicating the charges levelled against the petitioner as Gram Pradhan, is in contravention to the Enquiry Rules, 1997, as such, is unsustainable and is liable to be set aside.

12. Writ petition is, accordingly, allowed. Order dated 01.08.2025, passed by the respondent no.2, is set aside. The respondent no.2 is directed to pass a fresh order after considering enquiry report and explanation of the petitioner recording his prima facie satisfaction for holding a formal enquiry, if required, against the petitioner, in accordance with law, within a period of one month from the date of presentation of a certified copy of this order.

(Arun Kumar,J.)

October 28, 2025

Ashok Kr.