Allahabad High Court
Jagdish Prasad vs Pandit Ram Shanker Mishra Trust on 15 October, 2025
Author: Neeraj Tiwari
Bench: Neeraj Tiwari
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:184271
Reserved On: 11.8.2025
Delivered On :15.10.2025
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 3791 of 2025
A.F.R.
Jagdish Prasad
.....Petitioner(s)
Versus
Pandit Ram Shanker Mishra Trust
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s)
:
Rishabh Agarwal
Counsel for Respondent(s)
:
Rahul Sahai
Court No. - 1
HON'BLE NEERAJ TIWARI, J.
1. Heard Sri Rishabh Agarwal, learned counsel for the applicant and Sri Rahul Sahai, learned counsel for the respondent.
2. Present petition has been filed for setting aside the order dated 1.3.2025 passed by the ADJ, Court No.26, Agra in SCCR No.47 of 2024.
3. Brief facts of the case are that earlier SCC Suit No. 61 of 2021 was instituted by the respondent/plaintiff seeking decree of eviction and recovery of arrears of rent. Thereafter, written Statement has also been filed by the petitioner-defendant with the specific plea about the execution of lease deed dated 23.2.2011 in favour of Shri S.K. Agarwal and two others. Petitioner-defendant has filed application under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC on 14.12.2021 to implead the lessee of the respondent-plaintiff, which was allowed vide order dated 6.4.2024. Against that, plaintiff-respondent has preferred SCC Revision No. 47 of 2024, which was allowed vide order dated 1.3.2025 and matter was remanded back to decide the matter afresh. Hence the present petition.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that between the petitioner-defendant and respondent-plaintiff, SCC Suit No. 61 of 2021 is pending. Petitioner-defendant is tenant and prior to institution of suit, lease deed dated 23.2.2011 was executed by the plaintiff-respondent in favour of the certain persons, having no right for cancellation of lease and further all powers are given to lessee, transferees with regard to construction, repairing etc. In paragraph 3 of the lease deed dated 23.2.2011, it is stated that the property in question is very old and dilapidated condition, therefore, repairing/reconstruction is necessary. Lessee-second party has right to reconstruct all the buildings on his own expenses and also obtain all necessary permission for sanction of map from concerned Departments. They have also given right to deposit and receive any amount on behalf of lessor-first party. In paragraph 4 of the lease deed, it is further stated that after reconstruction, rent will be payable at the rate of Rs.3 per square foot per month and further the first party will execute another long term lease (more than 90 years) in favour of second party or any other persons nominated by him. Right to take possession from all tenant have also given to lessee-second party. Lessee-second party will be liable to pay all Government, Semi Government taxes, Future Taxes and may also obtain electricity connection in their name. In fact, this lease deed is only for the sake of name, otherwise it is transfer of property by misusing the process of law and this lease deed may be termed as sale deed. Therefore, lessees are necessary party and must have been impleaded in original suit as defendant.
5. He next submitted that to implead them, petitioner defendant has moved an application under 1 Rule 10 of CPC dated 14.12.2021, which was allowed vide order dated 6.4.2024. Against that plaintiff-defendant respondent no.1 preferred SCC Revision No. 47 of 2024, which was allowed vide order dated 1.3.2025 and further matter was remanded back to Original Court to decide the matter afresh in light of observation made by the Revisional Court.
6. He further submitted that without appreciating the facts of the case, remand order has been passed, which is absolutely bad in law. In fact once the right has been transferred to lesse-second party, they became necessary party. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court as well as Apex Court in the cases State of U.P. vs. 14th Addl. District Judge, Agra and others reported in 2001 AIHC 3396 and Ambica Prasad vs. Mohd Alam and another reported in (2015) 13 SCC 13.
7. He next submitted that once the lessee became the actual title holder, they are necessary party to be heard while deciding the SCC Suit. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon judgment of this Court in the matter of of Prakash Chand vs. Arjun Das and another reported in 2011 AIR CC 561.
8. He further argued that law is settled that once the interest of a party is in question, he must have been made party and heard prior to passing of order. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Bhim Sen Wadhwa vs. Om Prakash Barra and others reported in 2010 SCC Online AII 980 and Dr. Shyam Chandra Srivastava vs. Estate of Padmasri Smt. Savitri Sahni reported in 2010 SCC Online AII 855.
9. Sri Rahul Sahai, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the crux of the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is totally based upon the judgment of State of U.P. vs. 14th Addl. District Judge, Agra and others (Supra) and in that case, lease was perpetual lease with transferees along with each and every right where in the present case lease deed is conditional. He further pointed that paragraph 1 of the lease deed clearly says that it is for 29 years & 11 months meaning thereby that it is time bound lease. In case, same is not extended, first party shall regain all the rights. Further, paragraph 7 of the lease deed says that for any legal action, responsibility lies upon the first party trust and only expenses is entrusted upon the second party. It clarifies that to sue right rest with the first party that confirms that ownership has not been transferred. Apart that in paragraph 8 of the lease deed, there is instruction for second party not to sell the property till the reconstruction and vice versa also. Here again absolute restriction has been imposed upon the second party. He firmly submitted that lease deed in question in the State of U.P., (Supra) is entirely different from present lease, therefore, it cannot said to be sale deed in light of so many conditions imposed therein and would only be a lease deed. Therefore, this judgment would not come in the rescue of the petitioner.
10. He next submitted that Court may not proceed to test the title of the parties in a dispute between the landlord and tenant in SCC Suit. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Shobhit Nigam Vs. Smt. Batulan reported in 2017 (1) AWC 1082.
11. He further submitted that in his written statement, petitioner-defendant has accepted that he is tenant, therefore, SCC Court may confine to tenancy dispute and petitioner is having no right to raise any title dispute and issue of impleadment of any person coupled with this fact that alleged aggrieved person have never came up before the Court for filing impleadment application under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC. He reiterated that in case any right of lessees is affected, they are at liberty to approach the Court at any time for that neither applicant is having right nor authorized to file the impleadment application. In support of this contention, he has placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Jeet Kaur and others vs. Balalji Builders and others reported in 2001(2) ARC 98 and followed in Kanak Lata Das and others vs. Naba Kumar Das and others reported in AIR 2018 SC 682.
12. He further submitted that judgment of this Court in the matter of Prakash Chandra (Supra) relied by the petitioner is based upon the peculiar facts and further Court has observed that tenant had colluded with the third party and not laid down any law, therefore, it is not applicable in the present case.
13. Further, he distinguished the judgment of Bhimsen Wadhwa (supra) and submitted that there in lease deed, right to prosecute the suit and right to recover the arrears of rent etc has been transferred and interest of second party was involved, which is missing in the present case as the first party is having full right for prosecution. Therefore, this judgment would also not come into the rescue of learned counsel for the petitioner.
14. He submitted that petitioner has relied the upon judgment of Apex Court in the case Dr. Shyam Chandra Srivastava (Supra), which is arisen out of a re gular suit with regard to dispute pertaining to will deed, therefore, this judgment is not applicable in the present case.
15. In the judgment of Ambica Prasad (Supra), he submitted that Section 109 of T.P. Act itself clear that this would be applicable in the absence of a contract to the contrary, shall possess all the rights, but so far as present lease is concerned, there is specific contract that all rights of prosecution lies with first party, therefore, this judgment would not be applicable in the present case.
16. In the rejoinder argument, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in paragraph 3 & 6 of the lease, it is apparently clear that sale deed is in the shape of lease deed for the reason that all construction right has been given to the second party. Except the part of office, possession is with the old tenants for which second party is given right to obtain physical possession from the legal heirs and tenants.
17. He also pointed out that judgment of Kanak Lata Das and Jeet Kaur (Supra) relied by learned counsel for the respondent is about the title dispute, therefore, this would not be applicable in the present matter.
18. I have considered the rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record as well as judgments relied upon.
19. The main crux of the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is based upon the judgment of Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. vs. 14th Additional District Judge (Supra), therefore, relevant paragraph of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow:-
?9. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that no doubt Bharatpur Royal Family Religious and Ceremonial Trust was the owner of the property. However, the trust has executed a lease deed of the property in favour of the respondent No. 3. which is a Sahkari Awas Samiti, the copy of the lease deed has been filed, which is Anncxure-8 to the petition. This is a permanent lease with all rights of enjoyment of the property which are available to any owner of property including the right to enjoy the same, transfer, lease and also right of demolition and reconstruction of property in dispute and to deal with the property as the lessee likes. A sum of Rs. ten lacs was obtained in advance and the nominal lessee rent has been fixed as Rs. 250 per year. It is contended that conditions of this lease show that for all practical purposes, it was an out and out sale. That the court below has erred in not accepting it as sale, in view of the definition of sale and lease, as given in the Transfer of Property Act. 10. It is no doubt aiso true that according to the definitions given in Transfer of Property Act, the lease and sale are totally two different kind oftransfers. The sale is exchange of ownership. The lease is only transfer of a right to enjoy the property. However, the material circumstances cannot be overlooked, which show that in fact it is a sale. This deed was executed with intention to defeat the provisions of law. The trust property cannot be sold by any person and, therefore, this deed was executed in the form of lease deed which as per terms of transfer is in fact out and out sale. No rights have been reserved by the lessor except that he will get a meagre sum of Rs. 250 per year and can never get the property. There was no right to terminate the lease. Even the lessee have been given the right to demolish and to reconstruct the building. Therefore, in fact, it is out and out sale deed. The lease deed has been executed to defeat the provisions of law as the property of trust cannot be sold."
20. I have perused the lease deed as well as judgement relied hereinabove. The contents of the lease deed is not supporting the case of petitioner in light of judgment. In fact, in that case, lease deed is perpetual lease deed having no right of repatriation whereas in the present case, there is no such unfettered right of transfer in the lease deed dated 23.2.2011 and only limited rights are contained in Clause 9 of lease deed with prior consent of landlord. Secondly, lease deed dated 23.2.2011 was time bound of 29 years & 11 months subject to further renewal and right to file/pursue suits for ejectment was also rest with the first party and no right of transfer was given to lessee-second party, therefore, contention so raised here cannot be accepted and judgment of State of U.P (Supra) will not come into the rescue of petitioner.
21. I have also perused the judgment relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the matter of Ambica Prasad (Supra). Relevant paragraph of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow:-
?17. On the question of tenancy, both the trial court and the High Court have not considered the provision of Section109 of the Transfer of Property Act.
"109. Rights of lessor's transferee.-If the lessor transfers the property leased, or any part thereof, or any part of his interest therein, the transferee, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, shall possess all the rights, and, if the lessee so elects, be subject to all the liabilities of the lessor as to the property or part transferred so long as he is the owner of it; but the lessor shall not, by reason only of such transfer cease to be subject to any of the liabilities imposed upon him by the lease, unless the lessee elects to treat the transferee as the person liable to him:
Provided that the transferee is not entitled to arrears of rent due before the transfer, and that, if the lessee, not having reason to believe that such transfer has been made, pays rent to the lessor, the lessee shall not be liable to pay such rent over again to the transferee.
The lessor, the transferee and the lessee may determine what proportion of the premium or rent reserved by the lease is payable in respect of the part so transferred, and, in case they disagree, such determination may be made by any Court having jurisdiction to entertain a suit for the possession of the property leased.
18. From perusal of the aforesaid Section, it is manifest that after the transfer of lessor's right in favour of the transferee, the latter gets all rights and liabilities of the lessor in respect of subsisting tenancy. The Section does not insist that transfer will take effect only when the tenant attorns. It is well settled that a transferee of the landlord's rights steps into the shoes of the landlord with all the rights and liabilities of the transferor landlord in respect of the subsisting tenancy. The section does not require that the transfer of the right of the landlord can take effect only if the tenant attorns to him. Attornment by the tenant is not necessary to confer validity of the transfer of the landlord's rights. Since attornment by the tenant is not required, a notice under Section 106 in terms of the old terms of lease by the transferor landlord would be proper and so also the suit for ejectment. 19. As noticed above, the respondent-tenant on many occasions approached the appellant, the transferee, owner and the landlord to receive the rent. Further, admittedly, the electricity charges of the tenanted premises were paid by the tenant to the present appellant. Non-consideration of subsequent tenancy agreement executed by the erstwhile owner namely the brother of the appellant will not come in the way of the present appellant to seek eviction of the tenant on the ground of personal necessity as also on the ground of non-payment of rent. The approach of the High Court reversing the appellate court's finding cannot be sustained in law."
22. From perusal of the aforesaid judgment, it is clear that after the transfer of lessor's right in favour of the transferee, the latter gets all rights and liabilities of the lessor in respect of subsisting tenancy. Section 109 of T.P. Act itself clear that this would be applicable in the absence of a contract to the contrary, shall possess all the rights, but so far as present lease is concerned, there is specific contract that all rights of prosecution lies with first party and limited rights have been given to the second party, therefore, this judgment would not be applicable in the present case.
23. Learned counsel for the applicant placed reliance upon judgment of this Court in the case of Prakash Chand (Supra) and submitted that lessee i.e. owner is the necessary party, therefore, relevant paragraph of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow:-
?1. By means of this writ petition, the petitioner challenges the validity and correctness of the order dated 5.6.2010 passed by the Prescribed Authority/Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Agra appended as Annexure-5 to the writ petition, by which the application for impleadment filed by respondent no.2 has been allowed.
7. It is urged that in absence of any finding with regard to impleadment of respondent no.2 by the Prescribed Authority, the controversy involved in P.A. Case No. 23 of 2006 cannot be properly and effectively decided, hence the Prescribed Authority has acted illegally while inferring presence of the applicant for impleadment as necessary party to the release application, as such the impugned order cannot be sustained as there has to be evidence much less prima facie evidence to establish the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant in between respondent nos. 1 and 2. 12. The court below after hearing objection on the impleadment application held that the trust/impleader third party is the necessary party to be impleaded in the case. Relying upon the decisions rendered in Narendra Nath Srivastava versus Prescribed Authority, Lucknow and others, ARC, 1992(2)-236 and Laxmi Narain versus District Judge, Fatehpur and others, ARC 1991(2)-538 and considering the provisions of Sections 21(1) (a) and 22 of the U.P. Rent Control Act, the court below held that it is necessary for disposal of impleadment application that as to who is the landlord and owner of the property in suit since the controversy is a matter of adjudication by the regular court. It may also be noted here that the impleader third party i.e. trust is not getting its right adjudicated in the release application filed by the petitioner as owner of the property in dispute rather, it has sought to be impleaded as a party as the trust is being illegally ousted by the tenant as alleged landlords who claim themselves to be the owners of the property in suit. When after the tenants do not pay the rent and recognize some other person as landlord for ousting the real landlords from the scene, the rights of the third party who claim to be real landlords and owners would be affected. Even though the rights of the impleader third party as owner may not be adjudicated in a suit for rent and eviction but it can not be said that its impleadment is unnecessary for just and equitable decision in the case particularly when it may appear that the tenant is colluding with other persons whose sale-deeds have been cancelled recognizing them as landlords to collusively oust the real landlord. This being the position the court below has rightly concluded that impleader third party is a necessary party.?
24. From perusal of the aforesaid judgment, it is apparently clear that tenant and landlord are colluded, therefore, to save the right of actual owner, direction was issued to implead the third party. In fact, Court itself has held that in SCC Suit, rights to implead the third party is not required to be adjudicated, but only considering the element of fraud and collusion, order was passed. In the present case, tenancy is admitted by the petitioner/defendant in written submission and there is no allegation upon the contesting parties. Therefore, this judgment would also not applicable in the present case.
25. Learned counsel for the applicant has also placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in the matter of Bhim Sen Wadhwa (Supra). Relevant paragraph of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow:- ?4. During its pendency, the respondent sold the disputed shop to Ankur Bharadwaj through registered sale deed dated 21.4.2008 together with the right to prosecute the suit and right to recover the arrears of rent etc. whereupon, Ankur Bhardwaj moved an application no. 42Ga for impleadment as plaintiff while the respondent moved application no. 45Ga for amending the array of parties on identical grounds. Both the applications have been allowed by the courts below giving an opportunity to the petitioner to file any additional written statement. 7 There is another aspect of the matter. Though both the impugned orders have been passed in favour of Ankur Bhardwaj, the subsequent purchaser, but curiously he has not been impleaded as a party. It is settled principle of law and requirement of fair play that where the interest of a party is in question, he has to be impleaded and heard and no orders against his interest can be passed without hearing him. Therefore, on this ground alone the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. The respondents have unnecessarily been dragged to this court even though the petitioner has no stateable right, therefore he is liable to pay cost.?
26. From perusal of the same, it is apparently clear that through registered sale deed dated 21.4.2008 together with the right to prosecute the suit and right to recover the arrears of rent etc has been transferred and interest of second party was involved, but in the present case, all elements are missing neither it is sale deed nor right to prosecution was transferred through lease deed. Therefore, this judgment is also of no use in present controversy.
27. He also placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Dr. Shyam Chandra Srivastava (Supra) with the argument that transferees is necessary party. Relevant paragraph of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow:-
?18. In the case report in Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal. Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and others, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively. A proper party is one in whose absence, an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding. It has been further held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that a person should be impleaded as party so far as he should be bound by the result of the suit and question to be settled. The relevant portion of the Judgment of the Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal's case (supra is reproduced as under:-
"6. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 gives a wide discretion to the Court to meet every case of defect of parties and is not affected by the inaction of the plaintiff to bring the necessary parties on record. The question of impleadment of a part has to be decided on the touchstone of Order 1 Rule 10 which provides that only a necessary or a proper party may be added. A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively. A proper party is one in whose absence on effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding. The addition of parties is generally not a question of initial jurisdiction of the Court but of a judicial discretion which has to be exercised in view of all the facts and circumstances of a particular case.
14. It can not be said that the main object of the rule is to prevent multiplicity of actions though it may incidentally have the effect. But that appears to be a desirable consequence of the rule rather than its main objective. The person to be joined must be one whose presence is necessary as a party. What makes a person a necessary party is not merely that he has relevant evidence to give on some of the questions involved; that would only make him a necessary witness. It is not merely that he has an interest in the correct solution of some question involved and has thought of relevant arguments to advance. The only reason which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is so that he should be bound by the result of the action and the question to be settled, therefore, must be a question in action which cannot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party. The line has been drawn on a wider construction of the rule between the direct interest or the legal interest and commercial interest. It is, therefore, necessary that the person must be directly or legally interested in the action in the answer, i.e., he can say that the litigation may lead to a result which will affect him legally that is by curtailing his legal rights. It is difficult to say that the rule contemplates joining as a defendant a person whose only object is to prosecute his own cause of action. Similar provision was considered in Amon V Ropael Tuck & Sons Ltd. 2, wherein after quoting the observations of Wynn-Party,J. in Dollfus Miweg et Compagnie S.A. V Bank of England. 3, that their true test lies not so much in an analysis of what are the constituenis of the applicants' rights, but rather in what would be the result on the subject matter of the action if those rights could be established, Devlin, J has stated. "The test is "May the order for which the plaintiff is asking directly affect the intervener in the enjoyment of his legal rights."
22 In the case reported Committee of Management, Ratan Muni Jain Inter College and another. Vs. III Additional Civil Judge, Agra and others) as well as in AIR 1995 298 (Hridaya NarainSingh. Vs. Lal and another), this Court while interpreting the Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, held that it is the discretion of the court to add certain persons as party keeping in view the facts and circumstances of a particular case. For convenience, relevant portion of the Committee of Management, Ratan Muni Jain Inter College and another's case is reproduced as under:-
"The theory of dominus litus should not be over-stretched because it is the duty of the court to ensure that if for deciding the real matter in dispute, a person is necessary party, the court can order such persons to be impleaded. Merely because the plaintiff does not choose to implead a person, is not sufficient for rejection of an application for being impleaded. The provisions of Order I Rule 10 (2) C.P.C. are very wide and the powers of the court are equally extensive. Even without an application to be impleaded as a party, the court may at any stage of the proceedings order that the name of any party, who ought to have been joined whether as plaintiff or defendant or whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added. So the learned Addl. Civil Judge was totally wrong in believing that Sri Moti Lal Jain's impleadment was not necessary for proper adjudication of the case. Although at page 4 of the judgment (page 153), while dealing with the point of dominus litus that the court may consider whether the joining of a person is essential or not but still he has proceeded to delude himself that even without the impleadment of Sri Moti Lal Jain, an effective decree could be passed. It amount to play Hamlet without the prince of Denmark." 24. Allahabad High Court in the case reported in AIR 1989 Allahabad 43 (Om Prakash Tewari Vs. State Bank of India and others) held that the persons who are in some way interested in a controversy under suit, whether the relief has been sought against others, may be impleaded as proper parties, at the discretion of the court. The relevant portion from Om Prakash Tewari's case (Supra) is reproduced as under:-
"Persons who are not essential to be impleaded as defendants to a suit again fall in two classes (1) of those who are ion some way interested in, or connected with, the relief sought against others and (2) of others, who are not at all interested in, or connected with it. Persons of latter class must not be impleaded as defendants at all, but persons of the former class may be impleaded as proper parties at the discretion of the plaintiff by way of abundant caution or to avoid future litigation and the relief will not be refused on the ground that they have not been impleaded. Second part of the decision is that even the persons of former class may be impleaded as proper parties at the discretion of the plaintiff by way of abundant caution. Here again the case as in the present one is distinguishable. In the present case the application has not been made by the plaintiff for impleadment of the National Insurance company rather the plaintiff has been opposing the said impleadment, therefore, the aforesaid decision of the Full Bench will not be of any help to the applicant. Apart from that the only provision which has been cited is O.I R.10 (2). Even there it has been provided that the court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party and on such terms as may appear to the court to be just order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settled all the questions involved in the suit be added. It is significant that one of the very necessary principle in all these cases for impleading a party is that only such parties should be impleaded whose presence are necessary to settle all the questions involved in the suit."
28. From perusal of the aforesaid paragraphs, it is apparently clear that present dispute was arisen out of a regular suit with regard to a dispute of will deed and taking into account relevant provisions of the Succession Act, judgment has been given. So far as present SCC Suit is concerned, it is summary in nature and only pertaining to a tenancy dispute between the landlord and tenant, therefore, this judgment would also not be applicable in the present case.
29. I have also perused the judgment of this Court in the case of Shobhit Nigam (Supra) relied by the learned counsel for the opposite party. Relevant paragraph of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow:- ?38. In view of the aforesaid discussion with efffect from 7th December 2015 the jurisdiction to try all suits between the lessor and lessee for rent & eviction under Section 15 of the Act as applicable to the State of U.P., upto the valuation of Rs. 1 Lakh irrespective of the date of their institution would lie before the Small Causes Court presided over by the Civil Judge (Senior Division) and the District Judge/Additional District Judge would not have jurisdiction to decide them except those having the valuation of over 1 lakh/"
30. From perusal of the same, it is apparently clear that filing of proceedings under the PSCC 1887 are contained under Section 15 of the PSCC Act read with the II Schedule and interpretation thereof would lead to a conclusion that it is primarily limited to disputes between lessor and lessee for rent and eviction beyound that nothing can be seen and same has also been concluded in paragraph 38 of the judgment, therefore, this Court is of the view that such impleadment application in light of facts hereinabove cannot be entertained in SCC Suit.
31. I have also perused the judgment of this Court in the case of Jeet Kaur and Ors. (Supra) relied by the learned counsel for the opposite party. Relevant paragraph of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow:-
"4. As regards the relevance of the issue of title of the landlord in an eviction suit under rent laws it is fairly well settled that the impleadment of co-owner/co-sharer to the proceedings is not essential as eviction proceedings can normally be decided on merits in absence of such co-owner/co-sharer. In an eviction suit filed by the landlord, only landlord and tenant are necessary parties and in view thereof title of landlord in an eviction suit is not relevant. If the landlord fails to prove his title but proves relationship of landlord and tenant, and proves existence of any ground pleaded for eviction then his suit would succeed. On the other hand, if the landlord proves his title but fails to prove relationship of landlord and tenant, then his suit would fail.
5. Moreover, the plaintiff in the proceedings, being dominus litis, cannot be compelled to implead any third party to proceedings unless that third party proves that he is necessary party and without his presence the suit cannot be proceeded with or can be decided effectively.
6. In this context an application for impleadment by a third party asserting right of owner-ship in the suit premises, is liable to be rejected for the reason that such person would neither be a necessary nor proper party to eviction proceedings, and in his absence the suit can be decreed or dismissed on merits. The questions of title or owner-ship can neither be decided nor can be made subject matter of determination in eviction proceedings. 9. In the facts of the present case the application seeking impleadment having been filed asserting rights of owner ship and title, the Court below has right rejected the same following the well-settled proposition of law that questions of title and owner-ship cannot be gone into while deciding an eviction suit."
32. The same ratio of law was also followed by the Apex Court in the matter of Kanak Lata Das (Supra). Relevant paragraph of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow:-
12. First, in an eviction suit filed by the plaintiff (Landlord) against the defendant(Tenant) under the State Rent Act, the landlord and tenant are the only necessary parties.
13. In other words, in a tenancy suit, only two persons are necessary parties for the decision of the suit, namely, the landlord and the tenant.
14. Second, the landlord (plaintiff) in such suit is required to plead and prove only two things to enable him to claim a decree for eviction against his tenant from the tenanted suit premises. First, there exists a relationship of the landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant and second, the ground(s) on which the plaintiff-landlord has sought defendant?s-tenant's eviction under the Rent Act exists. When these two things are proved, eviction suit succeeds.
15. Third, the question of title to the suit premises is not germane for the decision of the eviction suit. The reason being, if the landlord fails to prove his title to the suit premises but proves the existence of relationship of the landlord and tenant in relation to the suit premises and further proves existence of any ground on which the eviction is sought under the Tenancy Act, the eviction suit succeeds.
16. Conversely, if the landlord proves his title to the suit premises but fails to prove the existence of relationship of the landlord and tenant in relation to the suit premises, the eviction suit fails. (See- Dr. Ranbir Singh vs. Asharfi Lal, 1995(6) SCC 580).
17. Fourth, the plaintiff being a dominus litis cannot be compelled to make any third person a party to the suit, be that a plaintiff or the defendant, against his wish unless such person is able to prove that he is a necessary party to the suit and without his presence, the suit cannot proceed and nor can be decided effectively.
18. In other words, no person can compel the plaintiff to allow such person to become the co-plaintiff or defendant in the suit. It is more so when such person is unable to show as to how he is a necessary or proper party to the suit and how without his presence, the suit can neither proceed and nor it can be decided or how his presence is necessary for the effective decision of the suit. (See-Ruma Chakraborty vs. Sudha Rani Banerjee & Anr.), 2005(8) SCC 140)
19. Fifth, a necessary party is one without whom, no order can be made effectively, a proper party is one inf whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding. (See-Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia vs. Additional Member Board of Revenue, Bihar & Anr.), AIR 1963 786) 20. Sixth, if there are co-owners or co-landlords of the suit premises then any co-owner or co-landlord can file a suit for eviction against the tenant. In other words, it is not necessary that all the owners/landlords should join in filing the eviction suit against the tenant. (See-Kasthuri Radhakrishnan & Ors. Vs. M. Chinniyan & Anr., 2016(3) SCC 296).
33. In the present case, written statement was filed by the petitioner-defendant in which tenancy is admitted without any dispute, therefore, in light of such facts as well as law laid down by the Court, there is no scope to entertain the impleadment application to implead the subsequent lessees/transferees with limited rights under the lease. Therefore, this judgment would also not applicable in the present case.
34. It is undisputed that SCC suit has been filed by the landlord against the tenant in which tenancy is admitted in written submission without any dispute. Further lease deed dated 23.2.2011 is executed, which is time bound lease subject to further renewal and only limited rights have been given to lessee, therefore, in title dispute lessee would not be necessary party. In SCC Suit rights of third party is affected in tenancy dispute. Further in case right of any third party is affected, they are having full right to file any application under Order I Rule 10 CPC for which there is no legal obligation upon the petitioner-defendant to file such application on their behalf.
35. In light of facts as well as judgment referred hereinabove, application filed under Order 1 Rule 10 cannot be entertained, therefore, I found no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order. 36. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.
(Neeraj Tiwari,J.)
October 15, 2025
Junaid
