Allahabad High Court
Mohammad Zaki Siddiqui vs State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy., Lok ... on 10 October, 2025
Author: Manish Mathur
Bench: Manish Mathur
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC-LKO:62947
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
WRIT - A No. - 4387 of 2024
Mohammad Zaki Siddiqui
.....Petitioner(s)
Versus
State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy., Lok Nirman Vibhag, Lko.
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s)
:
Ninnie Shrivastava, Mukul Misra, Sushma Shukla
Counsel for Respondent(s)
:
C.S.C.
Court No. - 7
HON'BLE MANISH MATHUR, J.
1. Heard Ms. Ninnie Shrivastava, learned counsel for petitioner and learned State Counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite parties.
2. Present petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India has been filed challenging order dated 27.06.2023 whereby sanction has been granted under Article 351A of the Civil Service Regulations [hereinafter referred to as the Service Regulations] for continuance of enquiry proceedings against petitioner post-superannuation.
3. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that earlier petitioner while in service was subjected to enquiry proceedings with regard to allegations pertaining to year 2007 and subsequently was visited with the punishment order dated 30.06.2011 which was challenged in Claim Petition No.1358 of 2011 before the State Public Services Tribunal. The said petition was allowed by means of judgment and order dated 08.08.2018 primarily on ground that enquiry proceedings were not in conformity with the law since neither ample opportunity of hearing was provided to petitioner nor was any relevant document supplied to him.
4. The said judgment and order was thereafter challenged by the State in WRIT - A No. - 34917 of 2019 primarily on ground that the Tribunal had refused to grant liberty to the department to initiate fresh proceedings. The said writ petition was thereafter disposed of vide judgment and order dated 08.02.2023 setting aside the judgment and order dated 08.08.2018 passed by the Tribunal and modifying it by providing the authorities liberty to pass appropriate direction for continuance of the enquiry proceedings. It is submitted that a direction was issued that the said exercise was to be completed within a period of three months from the date of judgment but instead of complying with the time-frame so stipulated, the impugned order itself has been passed after about four months without seeking any extension of time from the court concerned.
5. Learned counsel has placed reliance on a Full Bench decision of this Court rendered in Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthi v. The New India Assurance Company Limited and others, reported in 2014(32) LCD 405, as also the decision of Supreme Court in State of U.P. through Principal Secretary, Department of Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 891.
6. It is also submitted that a specific averment has been made in paragraph 17 of the writ petition that despite time-frame stipulated by this Court having expired, no application for extension of time was ever preferred and the same has not been denied by opposite parties in paragraph-19 of counter affidavit.
7. Learned State Counsel on the basis of counter affidavit has refuted the submissions advanced by learned counsel for petitioner with the submission that a perusal of the judgment and order dated 08.02.2023 passed by the Division Bench of this Court will make it evident that the allegations levelled against petitioner are of serious nature involving allegations of financial irregularities and it is in this context that reliance placed by petitioner in Anant R. Kulkarni v. Y.P. Education Society and others reported in (2013) 6 SCC 515 was rejected and an opportunity was granted for holding enquiry afresh. It is submitted that it was in extra ordinary circumstances that fresh enquiry could not be initiated within the stipulated time period since petitioner had already superannuated from service in year 2008 but in view of seriousness of the charges levelled against petitioner, the impugned order has been passed whereby sanction has been accorded in terms of Article 351A of the Civil Service Regulations.
8. Upon consideration of submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and perusal of material on record, the facts as narrated herein above are undisputed.
9. It is evident from a perusal of judgment and order dated 08.08.2018 passed by the Tribunal that the earlier enquiry proceedings were found to be in violation of service regulations as well as principles of natural justice and therefore the order of punishment was set aside. The Tribunal also noticed the fact that the charges pertained to year 2007 whereas petitioner had superannuated in year 2008 and since he had attained the age of 70 years, the Tribunal did not find it appropriate to remit the matter for consideration afresh.
10. However, upon challenge being raised against judgment of the Tribunal, a Division Bench of this Court in its judgment and order dated 08.02.2023 did not approve the aforesaid aspect as indicated by the Tribunal and also held that the case in Anant R. Kulkarni(supra) would be inapplicable in view of serious nature of allegations levelled against petitioner. The judgment thereafter granted liberty to opposite parties to pass an order after providing copies of documents mentioned and demanded by petitioner through his letter dated 18.11.2008 and to pass fresh orders in accordance with law after providing opportunity of oral hearing, after fixing date, time and place for the said purpose.
11. Apparently, in view of fact that charges were quite old and also looking to the age of petitioner, a specific direction was issued that the exercise was to be completed within a period of three months from the date of passing of judgment. The State was also directed to make payment of retiral dues payable to petitioner after withholding the sum mentioned in punishment order dated 30.06.2011, which was to be governed by final outcome of enquiry proceedings.
12. It is evident that the impugned order has been passed beyond the period stipulated by the Division Bench of this Court granting sanction under Article 351A of the Civil Service Regulations. In paragraph-17 of the writ petition, it has been categorically averred that no application for extension of time was preferred by opposite parties in writ proceedings to conclude the enquiry proceedings beyond the time limit prescribed. The said assertion made in paragraph 17 of the writ petition has not been denied in paragraph 19 of the counter affidavit.
13. It is also pertinent to notice that there was no interim order passed in favour of petitioner during pendency of the present writ petition but despite passing of almost one year during pendency of this petition, the enquiry proceedings have not been concluded.
14. The aforesaid aspect has clearly been enunciated upon by a Full Bench of this Court in Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthi(supra) and has thereafter been considered by Hon?ble the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Ram Prakash Singh(supra) in the following manner:-
"61. The fourth issue requires us to consider Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthi (supra), a decision of the Full Bench of the High Court. Being a Full Bench decision, obviously the Tribunal as well as the Division Bench of the High Court was bound thereby. The Full Bench rendered such decision upon considering, inter alia, the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Satyendra Kumar Sahai44. We may only notice the answers to the questions referred to the Full Bench, reading as follows:
?(A) Question No. (a) : We hold that if an enquiry is not concluded within the time which has been fixed by the Court, it is open to the employer to seek an extension of time by making an appropriate application to the Court setting out the reasons for the delay in the conclusion of the enquiry. In such an event, it is for the Court to consider whether time should be extended, based on the facts and circumstances of the case. However, where there is a stipulation of time by the Court, it will not be open to the employer to disregard that stipulation and an extension of time must be sought;
(B) Question No. (b) : The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Chandra (supra) as well as the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Satyendra Kumar Sahai (supra) clearly indicate that a mere delay on the part of the employer in concluding a disciplinary enquiry will not ipso facto nullify the entire proceedings in every case. The Court which has fixed a stipulation of time has jurisdiction to extend the time and it is open to the Court, while exercising that jurisdiction, to consider whether the delay has been satisfactorily explained. The Court can suitably extend time for conclusion of the enquiry either in a proceeding instituted by the employee challenging the enquiry on the ground that it was not completed within the stipulated period or even upon an independent application moved by the employer. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to grant an extension of time, the original stipulation of time having been fixed by the Court itself. Such an extension of time has to be considered in the interests of justice balancing both the need for expeditious conclusion of the enquiry in the interests of fairness and an honest administration. In an appropriate case, it would be open to the Court to extend time suo motu in order to ensure that a serious charge of misconduct does not go unpunished leading to a serious detriment to the public interest. The Court has sufficient powers to grant an extension of time both before and after the period stipulated by the Court has come to an end?.
62. While affirming the aforesaid view of the Full Bench, we would like to provide clarification on certain points not touched by such bench. First, in view of unseen institutional hurdles that can slow down swift action, it may not always be possible for the disciplinary authority in each such case where a fixed time has been stipulated by a tribunal/court to conclude the proceedings to apply and seek extension of time before expiry of such time although there can be no gainsaying that applying and obtaining an extension before expiry is eminently desirable. In exceptional cases, even after expiry of the stipulated time, such an application can be moved; and, depending on the cause shown for inability or failure to conclude the proceedings within the time stipulated and also for not applying for extension before expiry, the tribunal/court may, in its discretion, allow or reject the prayer for extension. If the application is rejected, the proceedings cannot be carried forward unless a superior court, reversing the order of rejection, permits the disciplinary authority to so proceed. Secondly, if the delinquent employee objects to continuation of proceedings beyond the time stipulated, the disciplinary authority without proceeding further ought to apply for extension of time and may not go ahead till such time its prayer for extension is granted on such application. Proceeding despite objection and without there being an extension could give rise to apprehensions of bias. Therefore, applying for extension upon halting the proceedings awaiting order on the application would be an advisable course of action to balance the interests of both the employer and the employee. Thirdly, even if the delinquent employee has not objected to continuation of proceedings beyond the time stipulated by the tribunal/court but before the final order is passed in the proceedings, the disciplinary authority would be bound to seek and obtain extension of time. This is for the simple reason that the sanctity of the orders of tribunals/courts cannot be disrespected by errant parties. The dignity of the judicial process would be seriously eroded and there would be nothing left of the rule of law if orders of tribunals/courts, validly made, are disobeyed and the disobedience is encouraged by being indulgent. Finally, we hasten to add that if a tribunal/court stipulates a fixed time by which an enquiry or proceedings for disciplinary action ought to be concluded coupled with a rider that, in default, the enquiry/proceedings will stand lapsed, the disciplinary authority in such a case would cease to have the jurisdiction to proceed further unless, of course, citing genuine grounds, a recall of such default clause is sought and obtained to proceed further in accordance with law.
63. We also hold that continuation of disciplinary proceedings beyond the time stipulated by a tribunal/court could invite interdiction if no bona fide attempt is shown to have been made to seek an extension of time. However, much would depend on the facts of each case and it may not be possible to lay down a common formula applicable to each case. In an exceptional case, the tribunal/court would have the discretion to overlook the laxity and make such direction as it deems fit in the circumstances.
64. The answer to the fourth issue, in view of our discussion, has to be in favour of the respondent and against the appellant. Without an extension of time, no order of punishment could have been validly made and the grievance of the respondent in this behalf is absolutely legitimate."
15. Upon applicability of aforesaid judgments in the present facts and circumstance of the case, it is thus inevitable that the impugned order is vitiated on account of fact that it has been passed beyond the time period stipulated by this Court for conclusion of enquiry proceedings particularly when admittedly no application for extension of time has been filed by the opposite parties.
16. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Allahabad Bank and others v. Krishna Narayan Tewari reported in 2017 (2) SCC 308 has held that although there is no quarrel with the proposition that in case the inquiry is found to be deficient, procedurally or otherwise, the proper course is always to remand the matter but there may be situations where because of a long time lag or such other supervening circumstances where the court considers it unfair, harsh or unnecessary to direct a fresh inquiry. The relevant portion reads as follows:
"8. There is no quarrel with the proposition that in cases where the High Court finds the enquiry to be deficient, either procedurally or otherwise, the proper course always is to remand the matter back to the authority concerned to redo the same afresh. That course could have been followed even in the present case. The matter could be remanded back to the disciplinary authority or to the enquiry officer for a proper enquiry and a fresh report and order. But that course may not have been the only course open in a given situation. There may be situations where because of a long time-lag or such other supervening circumstances the writ court considers it unfair, harsh or otherwise unnecessary to direct a fresh enquiry or fresh order by the competent authority. That is precisely what the High Court has done in the case at hand."
17. Aforesaid judgment has thereafter been followed in State of U.P. v. Ram Prakash Singh(supra).
18. It is evident and admitted in the present case as also apparent from record that charges against delinquent employee pertained to year 2007 while he superannuated in the year 2008. Following the dictum of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Allahabad Bank and others v. Krishna Narayan Tewari(supra) and discussions made herein above, this Court does not find any good ground to accord any fresh extension of time to opposite parties to conclude the disciplinary proceedings.
19. In view of discussions made herein above, the impugned order dated 27.06.2023 is hereby quashed by issuance of a writ in the nature of Certiorari. A further writ in the nature of Mandamus is issued commanding the opposite parties to provide all post-retiral benefits including regular pension, gratuity etc. to petitioner within a period of six months from the date a certified copy of this order is served upon authority concerned. In the facts and circumstances of the case, petitioner shall also be entitled to interest at the rate of 6% per annum with effect from 09.06.2023 till the date of actual payment.
20. Resultantly, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The parties to bear their own costs.
(Manish Mathur,J.)
October 10, 2025
kvg/-
