Allahabad High Court
Sandeep Bhatnagar And Others vs State Of U.P. And Others on 13 May, 2025
Author: Vivek Kumar Birla
Bench: Vivek Kumar Birla
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Reserved on 18.04.2025
Delivered on 13.05.2025
Neutral Citation No.-2025:AHC:77431-DB
A.F.R.
Court No. - 43
Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 612 of 2003
Appellant :- Sandeep Bhatnagar And Others
Respondent :- State of U.P. and Others
Counsel for Appellant :- S.V. Goswami,Manish Kr.Nigam,Pradeep Kumar Rai,Shesh Kumar,V.P. Rai,Vishnu Swaroop Srivastava
Hon'ble Vivek Kumar Birla,J.
Hon'ble Jitendra Kumar Sinha,J.
(Per: Hon'ble Jitendra Kumar Sinha,J.)
Order on Civil Misc. Review Application No.135040 of 2017
1. Heard Shri Shesh Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant and Shri Dinesh Varun, learned Standing Counsel for all the respondents.
2. We have considered the submissions made by counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record. In the interest of justice, we have heard learned counsel for the appellants on the point of delay condonation application as well as merit of the review application.
3. This present Civil Misc. Delay Condonation application has been filed for condoning the delay in filing the review application to review / recall the judgment passed by this Court, dated 25.01.2016, passed in First Appeal No.612 of 2003, in which, one of us (Hon'ble Justice Vivek Kumar Birla, J) was a member of the Bench. The ground taken in this Civil Misc. Application, inter-alia is that prior to delivery of judgement of this Court in First Appeal No.612 of 2003, the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Judge was raised from Rs.5,00,000/- (Five Lakhs) to Rs.25,00,000/- (Twenty Five Lakhs) vide Gazette Notification No. 1599/79-V-1-15-1(ka)19/2015 dated 07.12.2015, Section 19 of The Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Court Act, 1987 was amended and the concerned District Judges were conferred jurisdiction to hear appeals of valuation up to Rupees Twenty Five Lakhs. Hence, the pecuniary jurisdiction of the first appeal was that of the learned District Judge and this Court ought not to have decided the first appeal, instead, the same ought to have been remanded/ transferred to the learned District Judge, Moradabad.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that since the pecuniary jurisdiction of learned District Judge to hear the first appeal stood raised from Rs.5,00,000/- to Rs.25,00,000/- during pendency of the appeal this Court had no jurisdiction to decide the instant first appeal No.612 of 2003. He further submits that lack of jurisdiction is error apparent on the face of record and the review application has got strong merit.
5. Confronted with the situation regarding filing of Special Leave Petition against the judgement of this Court before the Hon'ble Apex Court which was dismissed in limine and by non speaking order and how the review petition could be maintainable before this Court, the learned counsel submits that the doctrine of merger does not apply in this case as the lack of jurisdiction is involved.
6. In so far as condonation of delay is concerned, in support of his argument, learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon the judgements of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Delhi Development Authority Vs. Jagan Singh and others, passed in Civil Appeal No.4335 of 2023, paragraph nos.11,12, 13 & 14 whereof reads as under:-
11. There cannot be any dispute about the proposition of law canvassed by the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent. However, there cannot be any hard and fast rule to decide whether sufficient cause exists. It all depends on the facts and circumstances of each individual case.
12. Over the years, this Court has repeatedly held that a liberal and justice-oriented approach needs to be adopted in the matters of condonation of delay so that the substantive rights of the parties are not defeated only on the ground of delay. The power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 must be exercised in a very meaningful manner which will serve the ends of justice.
13. It is true that the fact that the decision on which the impugned judgement is based has been overruled is by itself no ground to condone a long delay. In the facts of this case, it is true that the Special Leave Petition has been filed two years and three days after the date of the decision of the Constitution Bench in the case of Indore Development Authority.
14. In this case, admittedly, the acquired land has been used by DMRC for the metro depot and the metro depot exists on the acquired land as noted in the impugned judgement. Thus, when the writ petition was filed invoking sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, the acquired land was already put to use for an important public purpose of the metro depot. The use of the land for public purposes for the last several years is certainly a relevant factor for adopting a liberal approach while considering the prayer for condoning the delay. We may also note here that the petition invoking sub-Section (2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act was filed by the appellant nearly seventeen months after the 2013 Act came into force. In a case where the land was not put to use for a public purpose, the approach of this Court while deciding the application for condonation of a long delay in such a case would have been different."
7. In so far as issue of lack of jurisdiction is concerned, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the judgement in the case of Zuari Cement Ltd. Vs. Regional Director E.S.I.C., Hyderabad & others, (2015) 7 SCC 690, paragraph nos.9,10 and 11 whereof reads as under:-
" 9. As per the scheme of the Act, the power to grant exemption is a plenary power given to an appropriate government. It follows that the ESI Court constituted under Section 74 of the Act has no jurisdiction to take up the question of grant of exemption. The Court constituted under Section 74 of the Act cannot decide such matters including the validity of an exemption notification. The order granting or denying exemption is certainly open to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But the question of exemption under Section 87 cannot be raised under Section 75 of the Act and the ESI Court constituted under Section 74 of the Act, cannot decide the legality or otherwise of an order relating to exemption passed by the appropriate government.
10. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that grant of exemption to a factory or establishment from the operation of the Act falls within the jurisdiction of ESI Court under Section 75(1)(g) of the Act which specifically empowers the ESI Court to decide any matter which is in dispute between a principal employer and the Corporation in respect of any contribution or benefit or other dues payable or recoverable under the Act. It was submitted that only pursuant to the orders of the High Court, the appellant approached the ESI Court and the ESI Court has exercised its power to grant exemption on the basis of the orders of the Division Bench of the High Court. It was submitted that ESI Corporation submitted itself to the jurisdiction of ESI Court and while so, it cannot turn round and raise objection as to its jurisdiction to consider the issue of exemption and in support of his contention, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in Sohan Singh & Ors. vs. G.M. Ordnance Factory & Ors., (1984) Supp. SCC 661.
11. While disposing the writ petitions, of course, the High Court directed the appellant to approach the ESI Court constituted under Section 74 of the Act for the relief which the appellant had claimed in the writ petitions. Notably, both the appellant as well as the ESI Corporation did not challenge the order of the High Court but subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of the ESI Court. In our view, neither the order of the High Court nor the act of Corporation subjecting itself to the jurisdiction of ESI Court would confer jurisdiction upon ESI Court to determine the question of exemption from the operation of the Act. By consent, parties cannot agree to vest jurisdiction in the Court to try the dispute when the Court does not have the jurisdiction.
8. Learned counsel has placed reliance upon the judgement in the case of A.R.Antulay Vs. R.S.Nayak and another, (1988) 2 SCC 602, paragraph no.87 whereof reads as under:-
" 87. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the appeal is allowed; all proceedings in this matter subsequent to the directions of this Court on 16th February, 1984 (reported in AIR 1984 Supreme Court 684) as indicated before are set aside and quashed. The trial shall proceed in accordance with law, that is to say under the Act of 1952 as mentioned hereinbefore."
9. In so far as doctrine of merger is concerned, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the judgement in the case of S.Narahari & others Vs. S.R.Kumar & others, (2023) 7 SCC 740, paragraph no.35, 36 & 37 whereof reads as under:-
"35.While the conclusion of the said judgment is not relevant to the present case at hand, however, the reasoning behind coming to the said conclusion, in our opinion, has bearing on the present case.This Court, in the abovementioned case, while holding that a review is maintainable even after the dismissal of Special Leave Petition, observed that the dismissal of Special Leave Petition by way of a non- speaking order does not attract the doctrine of merger.
36.In simpler terms, this would essentially mean that even in cases where the Special Leave Petition was dismissed as withdrawn, where no reason was assigned by the Court while dismissing the matter and where leave was not granted in the said Special Leave Petition, the said dismissal would not be considered as laying down law within the ambit of Article 141 of the Constitution of India.
37.If a dismissal of Special Leave Petition by way of a non- speaking order is not considered law under Article141 of the 4(2000) 6 SCC 359 14 Constitution of India, the same also cannot be considered as res judicata, and therefore, in every such dismissal, even in cases where the dismissal is by way of a withdrawal, the remedy of filing a freshSpecial Leave Petition would still persist. Further, if on the said reasoning, a remedy to file a review in the High Court is allowed, then the same reasoning cannot arbitrarily exclude the filing of a subsequent Special Leave Petition."
10. On lack of pecuniary jurisdiction, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the judgement in the case of Tejumal Vs. Mohd. Sarfraz reported in 2016(3) A.R.C. 570, paragraph nos.5, 6 & 7 whereof reads as under:-
"5. In SCC Revision No.278 of 2016, Shri Shobit Nigam Vs. Smt. Batulan and another decided by me, vide judgement and order dated 29.08.2016. I have held that with effect from 07.12.2015, in view of the U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 2015, the jurisdiction to try all suits between the lessor and lessee for rent and eviction under Section 15 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act as applicable to the State of U.P. up to the valuation of Rs.1 Lakh, irrespective of the date of institution of the suit vests in the small cause court presided over by the Civil Judge (Senior Division) and that the District Judge/ Additional District Judge would have jurisdiction to decide such cases of higher valuation, above Rs.1 Lakh only.
6. In view of the above decision, as the valuation of the present suit happen to be Rs.41,400/- it was cognizable and triable by the Small Cause Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) and not by the District Judge/ Additional District Judge. Accordingly, the impugned judgement and order passed by the Additional District Judge on the face of it appears to be without jurisdiction.
7. The Apex Court in case of R.S.D.V. Finance Company Private Ltd. Vs. Shree Vallabh Glass Works Ltd., AIR 1993 Supreme Court 2094, has held that in view of Section 21(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, object as to the place of suing should be taken by the party concerned in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and that objection to this effect shall not be allowed by the appellate or revisional Court. "
11. The question of defect of pecuniary jurisdiction and territorial jurisdiction on the decree has been considered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Subhash Mahadevasa Habib Vs. Nemasa Ambasa Dharmadas (D) By LRS and others, (2007) 13 SCC 650, in which the Apex Court has held that the Code of Civil Procedure has made a distinction between lack of inherent jurisdiction and objection to territorial jurisdiction and pecuniary jurisdiction. Whereas, an inherent lack of jurisdiction may make a decree passed by that Court one without jurisdiction or void in law, a decree passed by a Court lacking territorial jurisdiction or pecuniary jurisdiction does not automatically become void. At best it is voidable in the sense that it could be challenged in appeal therefrom provided the conditions of Section 21 of the of the Code of Civil Procedure are satisfied. It may be noted that Section 21 of C.P.C. provides that no objection as to place of suing can be allowed by even an appellate or revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and there has been a consequent failure of justice.
12. Similar view has been expressed in an earlier decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of R.S.D.V. Finance Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Vallabh Glass Works Ltd., 1993 AIR 2094, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that Section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that no objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any appellate or revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity.
13. In Sneh Lata Goel Vs. Pushplata and others, (2019) 3 SCC 594, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken the same view that an objection to territorial jurisdiction or pecuniary jurisdiction does not go to the root of the subject matter of the suit and would not render a final decree as void. Paragraph nos. 15 to 24 reads as under:-
"15. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent has placed a considerable degree of reliance on the judgment of four Judges of this Court in Kiran Singh (supra). In that case, there was a dispute in regard to the valuation of the suit. The issue would ultimately determine the forum to which the appeal from the judgment of the trial court would lie. If the valuation of the suit as set out in the plaint was to be accepted, the appeal would lie to the district court. On the other hand, if the valuation as determined by the High Court was to be accepted, the appeal would lie before the High Court and not the District Court. It was in this background that this Court held that as a fundamental principle, a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity and that its validity could be set up wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution in a collateral proceeding. Moreover, it was held that a defect of jurisdiction, whether pecuniary or territorial or whether it is in respect of the subject matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the court to pass the decree and cannot be cured even by the consent of the parties.
16. The Court then proceeded to examine the effect of Section 11 of the Suit Valuation Act 1887 on this fundamental principle. This Court held thus:
"7. Section 11 enacts that notwithstanding anything in Section 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an objection that a court which had no jurisdiction over a suit or appeal had exercised it by reason of overvaluation or undervaluation, should not be entertained by an appellate court, except as provided in the section...a decree passed by a court, which would have had no jurisdiction to hear a suit or appeal but for overvaluation or undervaluation, is not to be treated as, what it would be but for the section, null and void, and that an objection to jurisdiction based on overvaluation or undervaluation, should be dealt with under that section and not otherwise. The reference to Section 578, now Section 99 CPC, in the opening words of the section is significant. That section, while providing that no decree shall be reversed or varied in appeal on account of the defects mentioned therein when they do not affect the merits of the case, excepts from its operation defects of jurisdiction. Section 99 therefore gives no protection to decrees passed on merits, when the courts which passed them lacked jurisdiction as a result of overvaluation or undervaluation. It is with a view to avoid this result that Section 11 was enacted. It provides that objections to the jurisdiction of a court based on overvaluation or undervaluation shall not be entertained by an appellate court except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in the section. It is a self-contained provision complete in itself, and no objection to jurisdiction based on overvaluation or undervaluation can be raised otherwise than in accordance with it. With reference to objections relating to territorial jurisdiction, Section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code enacts that no objection to the place of suing should be allowed by an appellate or Revisional Court, unless there was a consequent failure of justice. It is the same principle that has been adopted in Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act with reference to pecuniary jurisdiction. The policy underlying Sections 21 and 99 of the Civil Procedure Code and Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits."
(Emphasis supplied)
17. Dealing with the question of whether a decree passed on appeal by a court which had jurisdiction to entertain it only by reason of undervaluation or overvaluation can be set aside on the ground that on a true valuation that court was not competent to entertain the appeal, the Court held that a mere change of forum is not 'prejudice' within Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act. This Court held thus:
"12. it is impossible on the language of the section to come to a different conclusion. If the fact of an appeal being heard by a Subordinate Court or District Court where the appeal would have lain to the High Court if the correct valuation had been given is itself a matter of prejudice, then the decree passed by the Subordinate Court or the District Court must, without more, be liable to be set aside, and the words "unless the overvaluation or undervaluation thereof has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit or appeal on its merits" would become wholly useless. These words clearly show that the decrees passed in such cases are liable to be interfered with in an appellate court, not in all cases and as a matter of course, but only if prejudice such as is mentioned in the section results. And the prejudice envisaged by that section therefore must be something other than the appeal being heard in a different forum. A contrary conclusion will lead to the surprising result that the section was enacted with the object of curing defects of jurisdiction arising by reason of overvaluation or undervaluation, but that, in fact, this object has not been achieved. We are therefore clearly of opinion that the prejudice contemplated by the section is something different from the fact of the appeal having been heard in a forum which would not have been competent to hear it on a correct valuation of the suit as ultimately determined."
(Emphasis supplied)
18. The Court disallowed the objection to jurisdiction on the ground that no objection was raised at the first instance and that the party filing the suit was precluded from raising an objection to jurisdiction of that court at the appellate stage. This Court concluded thus:
"16. If the law were that the decree of a court which would have had no jurisdiction over the suit or appeal but for the overvaluation or undervaluation should be treated as a nullity, then of course, they would not be stopped from setting up want of jurisdiction in the court by the fact of their having themselves invoked it. That, however, is not the position under Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act."
19. Thus, where the defect in jurisdiction is of kind which falls within Section 21 of the CPC or Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act 1887, an objection to jurisdiction cannot be raised except in the manner and subject to the conditions mentioned thereunder. Far from helping the case of the respondent, the judgment in Kiran Singh (supra) holds that an objection to territorial jurisdiction and pecuniary jurisdiction is different from an objection to jurisdiction over the subject matter. An objection to the want of territorial jurisdiction does not travel to the root of or to the inherent lack of jurisdiction of a civil court to entertain the suit.
20. In Hiralal v Kalinath, a person filed a suit on the original side of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay for recovering commission due to him. The matter was referred to arbitration and it resulted in an award in favour of the Plaintiff. A decree was passed in terms of the award and was eventually incorporated in a decree of the High Court. In execution proceedings, the judgment-debtor resisted it on the ground that no part of the cause of action had arisen in Bombay, and therefore, the High Court had no jurisdiction to try the cause and that all proceedings following thereon where wholly without jurisdiction and thus a nullity. Rejecting this contention, a four judge Bench of this Court held thus:
"The objection to its [Bombay High Court] territorial jurisdiction is one which does not go to the competence of the court and can, therefore, be waived. In the instant case, when the plaintiff obtained the leave of the Bombay High Court on the original side, under clause 12 of the Letters Patent, the correctness of the procedure or of the order granting the leave could be questioned by the defendant or the objection could be waived by him. When he agreed to refer the matter to arbitration through court, he would be deemed to have waived his objection to the territorial jurisdiction of the court, raised by him in his written statement. It is well settled that the objection as to local jurisdiction of a court does not stand on the same footing as an objection to the competence of a court to try a case. Competence of a court to try a case goes to the very root of the jurisdiction, and where it is lacking, it is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand, an objection as to the local jurisdiction of a court can be waived and this principle has been given a statutory recognition by enactments like Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure."
(Emphasis supplied)
21. In Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v DLF Universal Ltd.9, this Court held that an objection to territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity. If it is not raised at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be taken at a subsequent stage. This Court held thus:
"30. The jurisdiction of a court may be classified into several categories. The important categories are (i) territorial or local jurisdiction; (ii) pecuniary jurisdiction; and (iii) jurisdiction over the subject matter. So far as territorial and pecuniary jurisdictions are concerned, objection to such jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in any case at or before settlement of issues. The law is well settled on the point that if such objection is not taken at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be aken at a subsequent stage. Jurisdiction as to subject-matter, however, is totally distinct and stands on a different footing. Where a court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit by reason of any limitation imposed by statute, charter or commission, it cannot take up the cause or matter. An order passed by a court having no jurisdiction is a nullity."
22. In Hasham Abbas Sayyad v Usman Abbas Sayyad 10, a two judge Bench of this Court held thus:
"24. We may, however, hasten to add that a distinction must be made between a decree passed by a court which has no territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction in the light of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and a decree passed by a court having no jurisdiction in regard to the subject-matter of the suit. Whereas in the former case, the appellate court may not interfere with the decree unless prejudice is shown, ordinarily the second category of the cases would be interfered with."
23. Similarly, in Mantoo Sarkar v Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd, a two judge Bench of this Court held thus:
"20. A distinction, however, must be made between a jurisdiction with regard to the subject-matter of the suit and that of territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction. Whereas in the case falling within the former category the judgment would be a nullity, in the latter it would not be. It is not a case where the Tribunal had no jurisdiction in relation to the subject-matter of claim?in our opinion, the court should not have, in the absence of any finding of sufferance of any prejudice on the part of the first respondent, entertained the appeal.
24. The objection which was raised in execution in the present case did not relate to the subject matter of the suit. It was an objection to territorial jurisdiction which does not travel to the root of or to the inherent lack of jurisdiction of a civil court to entertain the suit. An executing court cannot go behind the decree and must execute the decree as it stands. In Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v Rajabhai Abdul Rehman12, the Petitioner filed a suit in the Court of Small Causes, Ahmedabad for ejecting the Defendant-tenant. The suit was eventually decreed in his favour by this Court. During execution proceedings, the defendant-tenant raised an objection that the Court of Small Causes had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and its decree was a nullity. The court executing the decree and the Court of Small Causes rejected the contention. The High Court reversed the order of the Court of Small Causes and dismissed the petition for execution. On appeal to this Court, a three judge Bench of this Court, reversed the judgment of the High Court and held thus:
"6. A court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree: between the parties or their representatives it must take the decree according to its tenor, and cannot entertain any objection that the decree was incorrect in law or on facts. Until it is set aside by an appropriate proceeding in appeal or revision, a decree even if it be erroneous is still binding between the parties. 8. If the decree is on the face of the record without jurisdiction and the question does not relate to the territorial jurisdiction or under Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, objection to the jurisdiction of the Court to make the decree may be raised; where it is necessary to investigate facts in order to determine whether the Court which had passed the decree had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit, the objection cannot be raised in the execution proceeding."
14. In assessing the merits of the rival submissions, it would, at the outset, be necessary to advert to the provisions of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
(1) Section 21(1) postulates that no objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any appellate or revisional court 6 AIR 1954 SC 340 7 (2005) 7 SCC 791 unless the objection was taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled on or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice.
(2) No objection as to the competence of a Court with reference to the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity, and in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice.
(3) No objection as to the competence of the executing Court with reference to the local limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the executing Court at the earliest possible opportunity, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice."
Sub-section (1) of Section 21 provides that before raising an objection to territorial jurisdiction before an appellate or revisional court, two conditions precedent must be fulfiled:
i) The objection must be taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity; and
ii) There has been a consequent failure of justice.
15. In Harshad Chiman Lal Modi Vs. DLF Universal Ltd. MANU/ SC/0710/2005 : (2005) 7 SCC 791, this Court held that an objection to territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity. If it is not raised at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be taken at a subsequent stage. This Court held as under:-
"3). The jurisdiction of a court may be classified into several categories. The important categories are (i) Territorial or local jurisdiction; (ii) Pecuniary jurisdiction; and (iii) Jurisdiction over the subject matter. So far as territorial and pecuniary jurisdictions are concerned, objection to such jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in any case at or before settlement of issues. The law is well settled on the point that if such objection is not taken at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be taken at a subsequent stage. Jurisdiction as to subject matter, however, is totally distinct and stands on a different footing. Where a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit by reason of any limitation imposed by statute, charter or commission, it cannot take up the cause or matter. An order passed by a court having no jurisdiction is nullity.
16. In Hasham Abbas Sayyad Vs. Usman Abbas Sayyad MANU/SC/5541/2006: (2007) 2 SCC 355, a two judge Bench of this Court has held as under:-
"24. We may, however, hasten to add that a distinction must be made between a decree passed by a court which has no territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction in the light of Section 21 of the Code of the Code of Civil Procedure Code, and a decre passed by a court having no jurisdiction in regard to the subject-matter of the suit. Whereas in the former case, the appellate court may not interfere with the decree unless prejudice is shown, ordinarily the second category of the cases would be interfered with."
17. Similarly, in Mantoo Sarkar Vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. MANU/SC/8464/2008: (2009) 2 SCC 244, a two judge Bench of this Court held as under :-
"20. A distinction, however, must be made between a jurisdiction with regard to the subject matter of the suit and that of territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction. Whereas in the case falling within the former category the judgtement would be a nullity, in the latter it would not be. It is not a case where the Tribunal had no jurisdiction in relation to the subject matter of claim... in our opinion, the Court should not have, in the absence of any finding of sufferance of any prejudice on the part of the first respondent, entertained the appeal."
18. In a recent judgement in Punjab National Bank Vs. Atin Arora & another, Supreme Court [2025 LiveLaw (SC) 27], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that while exercising its discretion, the Court overlooked the provisions of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, whose principles and rule, should be applied in the present case. The principle enjoins that objections regarding the place of suing shall not be allowed unless such objection is taken in the Court/ tribunal of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity.
19. In S.Nagraj and others Vs. State of Karnataka and another, 1993, Supp (4) SCC 595, the Court has held that the review literally and even judicially means re-examination or reconsideration. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. The purpose of review is rectification of an order which stems from the fundamental principle that the justice is above all and it is exercised only to correct the error which has occurred by some accident without any blame. The power of a Civil Court to review its judgement/ decision is traceable in Section 114 CPC and the grounds on which review can be sought are enumerated in order 47, Rule 1 CPC, which imposes definitive limits to the exercise of power of review.
20. In Shivdeo Singh Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909, the power of review is very much endowed upon High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, being a court of plenary jurisdiction, in order to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. Such power of review is to be exercised within the definitive limits, for which the grounds provided under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC provides sufficient guidance.
21. In Shri Ram Sahu (dead) through LRs and others Vs. Vinod Kumar Rawat and others 2020(12) Scale 415, in following terms:-
"...9. To appreciate the scope of review, it would be proper for this Court to discuss the object and ambit of Section 114 CPC as the same is a substantive provision for review when a person considering himself aggrieved either by a decree or by an order of Court from which appeal is allowed but no appeal is preferred or where there is no provision for appeal against an order and decree, may apply for review of the decree or order as the case may be in the Court, which may order or pass the decree. From the bare reading of Section 114 CPC, it appears that the said substantive power of review under Section 114 CPC has not laid down any condition as the condition precedent in exercise of power of review nor the said Section imposed any substantive power of review under Section 114 CPC has not laid down any condition as the condition precedent in exercise of power of review nor the said Section imposed any prohibition on the Court for exercise its power to review its decision. An application for review is more restricted than that of an appeal and the court of review has limited jurisdiction as to the definite limit mentioned in Order 47, Rule 1 CPC itself.
22. In the case of Parison Devi Vs. Sumitri Devi, (1997) 8 SCC 715 holding that an error which has to be detected by reasoning can hardly be called as an error apparent on the face of record. It was observed as under :-
"9. Under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC a judgement may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC it is njot permissible for an erroneous decision to be 'reheard and corrected'. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be 'an appeal in disguise'."
23. The observations of Apex Court in Delhi Administration Vs. Guldip Singh Uban and others AIR 2000 SC 3737 are worth noting here wherein an argument was raised before the Court that in every case where there is "injustice", the Court should not feel shackled by rules of procedure nor constrained by the limited scope of a review application. The argument was rejected by the Court after making reference to essay authored by Justice Cardozo, which in fact summarizes the boundaries within which a court has to act while balancing the rights of parties within the four corners of law and to not sway away under the influence of plea of "justice" and "injustice". The observations of the Court are as follows:-
" 23. The words "justice" and "injustice", in our view, are sometimes loosely used and have different meanings to different persons particularly to those arrayed an opposite sides. "One man's justice is another's injustice". Justice Cardozo said. "The web is tangled and obscure, shot through with a multitude of shades and colours, the skeins irregular and broken. Many hues that seem to be simple, are found, when analysed, to be a complex and uncertain blend. Justice itself, which we are want to appeal to as a test as well as an ideal, may mean different things to different minds and at different times. Attempts to objectify its standards or even to describe them, have never wholly succeeded."
24. Learned counsel has failed to point out that what failure of justice has occasioned by the judgement of this Court in view of Special Leave Petition above being dismissed by Hon'ble Apex Court against the instant judgement.
25. The question of pecuniary jurisdiction was not raised before this Court before passing of the judgement in First Appeal No.612 of 2003. The same was not even raised before Hon'ble Apex Court. The right of review does not stand on the same footing as right to appeal. The scope of review is very narrow and is limited on the ground mentioned under Order 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise".
26. It is true that in view of the judgement of Hon'ble Apex Court in S.Narahari (supra) in limine dismissal of first appeal does not operate as merger and review can be filed before the High Court even after dismissal of the Special Leave Petition but the facts of that case were different as in that case the review was not on the ground of alteration of pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. In S.Narahari (Supra) the Special Leave Petitions were filed before the Hon'ble Apex Court not against the final judgement but against some orders passed by the High Court. The first appeal was pending and the Hon'ble Apex Court passed the order for avoiding multiplicity of the proceedings.
27. In the case of Union of India Vs. B. Valluvan is (2006) 8 SCC 686, Hon'ble Apex Court has again considered the parameters of review jurisdiction of High Court and held that same shall be exercised within the limitations as provided under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule of C.P.C., and without recording finding as to there existed error apparent on the face of the record, merit cannot be gone into. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana and others Vs. M.P. Mohilal (2006 INSC 832), has taken the view that in the garb of clarification application, recourse to achieve the result of review application, cannot be permitted. Further, the review lies only on the grounds mentioned in Order 47, Rule 1 read with Section 141 CPC.
28. From the above proposition it is clear that lack of jurisdiction either the pecuniary or territorial, has to be taken at the earliest opportunity. But in this case, the same has not been raised before this Court before passing of the judgement and the same has not been raised before Hon'ble Apex Court.
29. It is pertinent to mention here that the First Appeal No.612 of 2003 was filed before this Court, the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Judge was Rs.5,00,000/- (Five Lakhs) and this Court had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Even when the arguments were heard, the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Judge stood unchanged. It was only on the date when the judgement was pronounced, the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Judge was enhanced from Rs.5,00,000/- (Five Lakhs) to Rs.25,00,000/- (Twenty Five Lakhs). Therefore, it is amply clear that at the time of filing of the first appeal, this Court had pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain and hear the appeal. In such view of the matter, on the date of filing of the first appeal, this Court had inherent jurisdiction as well as pecuniary jurisdiction.
30. In that view of the matter, the appellant cannot be allowed to raise the lack of pecuniary jurisdiction at such belated stage. We find that the ratio of judgements relied on by learned counsel for the applicants are of no help to the applicants.
31. So far as the ground for condonation of delay is concerned, only ground taken is that the appellants were suffering from diabetes and hyper tension which is not sufficient ground for condoning the delay in filing the review application.
32. In view of the above, the delay condonation application also lacks merit and deserves to be rejected.
33. Accordingly, the delay condonation application as well as review application both stand rejected.
Order Date :- 13.5.2025
RKM
